Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

63. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

11620.

Tunis, December 18, 1985, 1622Z

SUBJECT

• FonMin on Libyan-Algerian Contacts, Tunisian-Libyan Relations.

Ref:

• A) Tunis 11215,²
• B) Tunis 11500,³
• C) Tunis 11578⁴ (all Notal).

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary. Ambassador took occasion of session with GOT FonMin Caid Essebsi December 18 to discuss state of Tunisian relations with Libya and Algeria, in light of FonMin’s one-day visit to Algiers December 17 where he met with Algerian President and FonMin. Discussions with Algerians focussed on Algerian-Libyan rapprochement and possible Qadhafi visit to Algeria. GOT raised standard concerns over Libyan intentions. While Caid Essebsi indicated understanding of “pressures” on Algeria to improve its relations with Libya (including possibly inviting Qadhafi to visit) he stressed Tunisia’s intent not to resume diplomatic relations with Tripoli, unless Libya proved willing to compensate Tunisia for losses caused by expulsions. Caid Essebsi thought Algeria’s new interest in Libyan relations stemmed primarily from “Moroccan decision to opt for a military solution in the Sahara.” All in all, GOT seems increasingly worried about pace and tenor of recent Libyan-Algerian contacts. One response to Qadhafi’s much publicized African tour has been to dispatch Deputy FonMin Mahmoud Mestiri to several African countries in effort to keep Tunisian-African relations on track. End summary.

3. FonMin Beji Caid Essebsi received Ambassador Dec 18, the morning after FonMin’s return from quick visit to Algiers. PolCouns accompanied Ambassador.

4. Ambassador said he would appreciate having the Minister’s impressions of his visit to Algiers of the previous day. He said we had also had some exchanges with the Algerians and were aware of Bendjedid’s decision to receive Qadhafi eventually. We had exchanged points of view on the region. The Algerians said they posed conditions for the meeting but had no confidence in Qadhafi’s assurances. We had stressed our concerns over Qadhafi’s intentions in the region, especially as concerned Tunisia and we had urged Algeria to continue its support. We had also voiced our concerns over possible Libyan mischief vis-a-vis Egypt, Sudan and Chad.

5. Caid Essebsi noted he had just spoken to Bendjedid the previous day. The Algerians were under a lot of pressure—from Qadhafi and “others”—to receive the Libyan leaders. It appeared the Soviets had talked to Qadhafi in Moscow about Tunisia and Algeria, reminding them of their concerns for stability (sic) and disapproving of Libyan pressure on Tunisia. One of the purposes of MFA SecState Mahmoud Mestiri’s current trip to Moscow (Tunis 11395),⁵ Caid Essebsi said, was to get readout on what Soviets had said to Qadhafi.

6. GOT understood, Caid Essebsi said, that Libyans had sent a high-level delegation to Bendjedid and had urged him to see Qadhafi. Bendjedid had at first refused. But when Algerian FonMin Ibrahimi came he said Algerians had reversed themselves. Caid Essebsi had told Bendjedid yesterday that Algeria is of course sovereign. He noted that Algiers, unlike Tunis, still had relations with Libya. But Tunisia wanted things to be clear. There was no hope of resumption of relations by Tunis with Tripoli. Tunisia would not exclude a possible eventual resumption of normal ties if there were compensation by Libya for costs Tunisia had to assume due to Libya’s expulsions of Tunisian workers. But in future Libya must stay out of Tunisia’s affairs and renounce such actions and allow Tunisia to live side-by-side (read: passively) with Libya.

7. Caid Essebsi said he told Bendjedid Algeria’s receiving Qadhafi would help get latter out of his isolation. Algeria, after all, was not Burkina Faso. Others would now see receiving him as less of a stigma. Who knows, he might even visit Egypt next since Mubarak had inexplicably offered to receive him. In any case, Tunisia was different and would not accommodate Qadhafi.

8. Bendjedid had told FonMin he had no confidence in Qadhafi either. He noted Qadhafi would not be received in Algiers but at an unspecified location elsewhere. But, Caid Essebsi sighed, Algeria was concerned about the Sahara war and worried that Morocco had opted for a military solution, so it had to try to manage Qadhafi a little.

9. Caid Essebsi mentioned that Mestiri would be making stops in Burkina Faso and Ghana on his way back from Moscow as a follow-up to the earlier mediation meeting those countries had undertaken to lessen tensions between Libya and Tunisia. The GOT does not seem to have taken these efforts very seriously, but based on Caid Essebsi’s comments and other impressions we have gotten from the MFA the GOT is anxious to maintain its own relations in Africa, especially after Qadhafi’s recent trip there.

10. Comment: The Tunisian concern reflected ofer Algerian-Libyan contacts has not been relieved since on Dec. 4 meeting with Caid Essebsi. If anything, it has been heightened.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850907–0347. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Accra, Algiers, Cairo, Moscow, Ouagadougou, Paris, Rabat, Warsaw, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 11215 from Tunis, December 6, the Embassy reported: “It is too early to be certain, but Tunisia’s friends—especially Algeria—may be nudging Tunisia towards a slightly less confrontational posture vis-à-vis Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850877–0368)
3. In telegram 11500 from Tunis, December 16, the Embassy reported that the Tunisia Press Agency had announced that “Essebsi was received by President Bourguiba on the morning of December 16” and that he “will travel to Algeria December 17 as Special Envoy of President Bourguiba to President Bendjedid.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850902–0269)
4. In telegram 11578 from Tunis, December 18, the Embassy reported that Mzali, whom the Department, before the Libyan crisis, had “seen as one of the more conciliatory elements in the GOT vis-à-vis Libya,” had “seized on the crisis” in September and “set the GOT tone of never letting relations ‘go back’ to where they were before.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850906–0712)
5. In telegram 11395 from Tunis, December 12, the Embassy reported that on December 11, the Tunisian Official News Agency (TAP), “carried an item citing ‘official source’ which announced that MFA SecState Mahmoud Mestiri would be ‘transmitting an oral message to Soviet leaders.’ The message, TAP continued, would express gratitude for Soviet assistance following the Israeli raid, as well as touch on other questions of mutual interest.” The Embassy commented: “The unusually suggestive GOT/TAP announcement of the Mestiri visit leads one to conclude that the Tunisians are doing a little siren act on the Soviets, at least in part for our benefit.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850893–0610) For more on the Israeli October 1 raid on the PLO’s headquarters in Tunis, see Documents 331–334.