Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

60. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

8285.

Tunis, September 12, 1985, 1515Z

Military addresses handle as Specat Exclusive. Department please pass to HQ EUCOM Vaihingen GE for Polad. USCINCEUR for Polad. DIA for the Director. Subject: Tunisia’s Confrontation With Libya After Oujda. Ref: Algiers 4737.²

1. S/Exdis—Entire text.

2. Summary. In light of comments of Tunisian Ambassador in Algiers on Tunisian-Algerian planning vis-a-vis Qadhafi (reftel), Embassy will be alert to and report on any indications here. Tunisia finds itself increasingly isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb, while remaining weak militarily and vulnerable to Libyan actions. At the same time, many Tunisians remain suspicious of Algerian motives, while recognizing need for Algerian support and goodwill. GOA/GOT coordination has seen an upsurge, and we do not exclude planning for clandestine options against Qadhafi, should this ever be deemed opportune in light of Libya’s own capabilities against Tunisia. Introduction of Egypt into the equation, an eventuality unclear at this writing, could change the situation significantly. End summary.

3. Reftel reports conversation in Algiers between USA/DCM and well plugged-in but clearly uninstructed Tunisian Ambassador Hached. Latter left inference of active Algero-Tunisian planning for conflict with Libya and removal of Qadhafi. We will, of course, be alert for indications here that bear on this inference and will report our findings.

4. Meanwhile, it will not have escaped Department’s notice that the Tuniso-Libyan rupture, following the Oujda Accord and the apparent failure of Moroccan mediation (the Guedira/Filali mission) has left Tunisia more than ever isolated with Algeria in the Maghreb—a marriage of unequals. However that may work itself out,³ Tunisia’s traditional political recourse in an “open” Maghreb, viz., the uses of the Moroccan and Libyan relationships to counterpoise Algeria, is badly constrained for now—and the ramifications of this bear watching. Seen from here, the situation thus created could open the GOT to a reexamination of its distant relationship with Cairo as well as further efforts in the direction of Rabat.

5. Within this framework lie realities which must in any case be taken into account in evaluating Hached’s assertions. First, on the military side, Tunisia remains immensely vulnerable and quite incapable of major offensive military operations (as opposed to raids or clandestine paramilitary actions). Second, politically, suspicion of Algeria’s ultimate motives remains widespread here, cohabiting uneasily with the recognition—equally pervasive—that Algerian support and goodwill are more than ever important to Tunisia’s ability to resist Libyan threats. Finally, and we, of course, defer to Algiers on substance at this point, we assume Tunisians calculate that bulk of Algiers military capabilities likely to remain deployed against Morocco, whatever happens here.

6. This said, there has been an upsurge in GOA/GOT coordination: political, military and economic and we can safely assume that contingency plans for meeting various forms of possible aggression are being discussed. We would speculate, moreover, that thought is also being given to clandestine options against Qadhafi. While there are many, here, who would welcome a successful American preemptive initiative, vis-a-vis Qadhafi, it seems reasonable to assume, in the light of our often expressed posture of restraint, that the governments in Tunis and Algiers do not really expect us to take such an initiative, although they might well hope for some form of U.S. support should they choose to do so.

7. In summary, then, Tunisia is more exposed to Algerian pressure than heretofore and is trying to adapt while harboring traditional concerns lest the relationship become too burdensome. Notwithstanding greater coordination between Tunis and Algiers, we do not see Tunisia prepared for offensive military action of scope. This said, we think Tunis would seek to respond to localized Libyan military initiatives, should they materialize—preferably in some form of coordination with its friends, Algeria prominently included. Finally, we do not exclude planning here for clandestine action against Qadhafi should this ever be deemed opportune in the light of Libya’s own capabilities against Tunisia. It has come to our attention that Tunisian military planning includes retaliation for commando-type operation. Algerian support would be essential in case of escalation. These thoughts have focussed mainly on Tunisian-Algerian cooperation. If, as some indications suggest, an Egyptian role is to be considered, the equation could change significantly.⁴ This factor remains unclear at this writing.

Sebastian

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850648–0637. Secret; Immediate; Exdis; Specat Exclusive. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Nouakchott, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 4737 from Algiers, September 11, the Embassy reported that Hached said Tunisia and Algeria “were now coordinating their military strategy toward Libya, that they would like to ‘make an end of the Qadhafi problem now’ and urged the U.S. to support this effort. Hached characterized Algerian assurances of military support as a blank check of which the Tunisian Government feels fully confident.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850644–0872)
3. In telegram 8006 from Rabat, August 27, the Embassy reported: “King Hassan has offered his good offices in a bid to relax current tensions between Tunisia and Libya” which included visits by Filali and Guedira to Tunis and Tripoli. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850608–0255)
4. In telegram 287750 to Tunis, September 19, the Department noted that on September 13, Ben Yahia had told Whitehead “this crisis has brought about a fundamental change in Tunis’ policy towards Libya—from ‘crisis management to crisis prevention.’ GOT’s former ‘open door’ policies have given way to a much firmer position. The GOT has concluded that even the economic benefits from Tunisians working in Libya are more than offset by the long term risks from ‘brainwashing’ to which they are subjected in Libya. Accordingly, the GOT has decided to call on Tunisians to depart Libya.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850664–0919)