Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

279876.

Washington, September 20, 1984, 2253Z

SUBJECT

• Tunisian Ambassador’s Call September 19 on DAS Nassif.

1. C—Entire text.

2. Summary: Tunisian Ambassador Habib Ben Yahia called at his request September 19 on NEA DAS Thomas Nassif. Ben Yahia reviewed intra-Maghreb relations in light of the Moroccan-Libyan accord, counseling the U.S. not to react too harshly against Morocco. Ben Yahia’s major concern was that the U.S. do what it could to avoid further Maghrebi polarization, the main short-term result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia also observed that the announced Libyan-French troop withdrawal from Chad was welcome news but did nothing to settle internal strife in Chad. End summary.

3. Ben Yahia began the meeting by requesting the U.S. reaction to the recent Washington visit of Moroccan Royal Advisor Redi Guedira.² Nassif summarized the visit, stressing that Guedira had been told plainly of U.S. displeasure with the accord. Nassif noted some congressional dissatisfaction on both sides of the Hill and in both authorizing and appropriating committees. Nassif stressed that the Department would be watching developments closely but that we wanted the traditionally close relationship with Morocco to continue, if possible. We do not like the resulting polarization of the Maghreb and do not believe the accord bodes well for a resolution of the Western Sahara conflict. Morocco is using Libya to give political legitimacy to the strategic gains Morocco had achieved by constructing the berm. Nassif also said new questions are raised on whether the Western Saharan conflict would become more an Arab than an OAU problem. Nassif concluded by noting the new French-Libyan agreement on troop withdrawals from Chad and wondered what relationship, if any, that event had to the Moroccan-Libyan agreement.

4. Ben Yahia responded that while the troop withdrawal agreement was a positive development, it did not necessarily suggest that Qadhafi was being more moderate, as Hassan said might happen as a result of the Moroccan-Libyan accord. Ben Yahia cautioned that Qadhafi’s traditional pattern is to withdraw in one area and to be aggressive elsewhere. At any rate, noted Ben Yahia, the internal situation in Chad had not been resolved; Habre’s position was still weak and further civil conflict was inevitable. Nassif concurred that this would probably be the case.

5. Responding to Nassif’s question, Ben Yahia turned his attention to relations among the Maghreb states. He said that Tunisia does not want strained relations with Morocco and that the 1983 Tunisian-Algerian Treaty of Friendship, later joined by Mauritania, should not be seen as directed against any country. Ben Yahia thought Algerian President Bendjidid had been weakened vis-à-vis his hard line domestic critics by the accord.

6. The meeting was concluded by Ben Yahia’s advice that the U.S. avoid the instinct to punish Morocco for its accord. Instead, Ben Yahia suggested an extended period of observation to see whether in fact the accord would survive and whether Qadhafi would in fact moderate his views. Punitive U.S. action might only exacerbate Moroccan-Algerian relations and polarize further the Maghreb.³ He suggested that the French could perhaps play a role in improving Moroccan-Algerian relations.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840600–0276. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Eisenbraun; cleared by Zweifel; approved by Nassif. Sent for Information Priority to Algiers, Rabat, and Paris.
2. See footnote 6, Document 38.
3. In telegram 7361 from Tunis, September 21, Sebastian replied: “I see King Hassan’s union as primarily a tactical move. He has gambled on shuffling the deck in order to break the deadlock—in his favor, of course.” Sebastian continued: “Algeria and the Sahara remain his main focus, and he has taken his precautions with Chadli with whom he hopes to meet even now. He is not likely to hesitate in dropping the union when it has served his purposes. We should not allow our ties to Morocco to be unduly distended by Hassan’s misstep, for we are central to his calculation and strategic orientation. We must therefore try to preserve our balancing Maghrebi relationships—all of them.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011–0026.