149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Consulate in Jerusalem1
277205. For Ambassador Lewis. Subject: Message From President Carter to Prime Minister Begin.
1. You should deliver following letter from President Carter to Prime Minister Begin at earliest opportunity.
2. Begin text:
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I deeply appreciate your taking the trouble to call me yesterday regarding President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem.2 I share your hope that this bold act of statesmanship will bring the Middle East closer to peace.
As you will have noted, however, there is considerable and growing criticism of President Sadat in the Arab world over his decision to visit Israel. His adversaries will seize upon it in their efforts to block progress. This makes it all the more important that President Sadat be able to demonstrate that his action in going to Jerusalem was not a futile gesture. If he cannot show palpable proof that it has advanced the prospects of peace and served Arab interests he will be charged with the betrayal of Arab interests, and moderate leadership in the Arab world may be discredited.
I am sure that you and your colleagues share our concern in this regard. We fully recognize that the substantive issues of territory, the Palestinian problem and the nature of peace cannot be resolved in the short time allotted for President Sadat’s visit. A step of historic proportions could however be accomplished if the visit could close with the way cleared for Israel and all the Arab parties to reconvene at Geneva in December or shortly thereafter. Ambassador Lewis has already briefed you on our views as to how procedural details can be put behind us in order to move on promptly to Geneva. As he has told you, there remains the problem of Syrian attendance at the conference. If you could make clear in your talks with President Sadat and in your public statements that Israel is ready to deal seriously with the Palestinian problem and also to do its utmost to reach a settlement with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, Sadat’s position would be measurably [Page 760] strengthened and the outlook for Geneva much improved. It also occurs to us that a constructive step that would make Syria’s agreement to Geneva easier—and strengthen Sadat’s position—would be Israel’s agreement to Syria’s being included as a member of the working group that would deal with the West Bank and Gaza. I hope you can make such a proposal to President Sadat.
Another point that would be helpful concerns the matter of the plenary at Geneva. While as we have made clear we agree with Israel that the plenary should not be a forum for substantive negotiation, we do believe that the plenary should have a continuing existence, pursuant to the procedures adopted in 1973. President Sadat shares this view, and of course you well know the importance that President Asad attaches to this subject. Any accommodation that the Government of Israel might be able to make to President Sadat on this subject would help enormously in meeting the concerns that I have mentioned.
I make these suggestions in the spirit of friendship and candor which mark our close personal relationship and the enduring ties that bind our two countries. I am sure that you will agree with me that it is of the utmost importance to both our countries that this historic first visit by a President of Egypt to Jerusalem be a success and lay the groundwork for the peace that we all seek.
I would appreciate any thoughts that you may have on these or other steps which might be taken to secure that goal.
Please do not hesitate to call me on the telephone at any time it would be useful.
Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.
End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2601. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Korn; cleared by Atherton, Habib (draft), Quandt, and Tarnoff; and approved by Secretary Vance. Sent immediate for information to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, and Tel Aviv.↩
- See Document 147.↩