Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

354. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan¹

Washington, November 9, 1987

SUBJECT

• Takeover of Power in Tunisia

What Happened

Zine Ben Ali, who was named Prime Minister only last month,² relieved President Bourguiba from power at dawn November 7 by having him declared medically incapacitated.³ The immediate catalyst for the bloodless action was apparently President Bourguiba’s insistence on retrying Islamic leader Ghannouchi in order to have him sentenced to death—a development likely to have precipitated severe civil unrest.⁴ Ben Ali immediately named leading PSD moderate Hedi Baccouche to succeed him as Prime Minister, and replaced his opponents in government with people he can trust. A military officer and former director for national security, Ben Ali presently appears to have the full backing of the Tunisian armed forces. Many elements across Tunisia’s political spectrum have welcomed the move.

What It Means

Ben Ali is well thought of, but lacks experience in critical areas. He will need to rely heavily on his advisors, and has already moved to install or retain competent professionals such as the new Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri. Ben Ali’s key problem is that he has no political base of his own. For the moment this is not critical, as the country, anxious about its future, closes ranks behind him. Because of his military background, Ben Ali can probably count on the continued support of the Tunisian military, but he may have to fight rearguard action by PSD hardliners like Mohamed Sayah (now under house arrest), who can be expected to attack the constitutionality of his action, to exploit Bourguiba’s continued in-country presence, and to utilize key parts of the party apparatus they still control. Over the long term, Ben Ali will have to establish his own political legitimacy, presumably by calling for new elections.

Implications for the US

Ben Ali is pro-U.S., and can be expected to seek our assistance as he confronts the challenges that will face him in the days to come. We will want to continue our traditional close support for Tunisia, without appearing to intervene in what is going on or to lend our support to the individual personalities involved. We will want to be alert to possible Libyan efforts to exploit the situation, although Ben Ali’s tough anti-Libyan views should help put Qadhafi on notice. Ambassador Pelletreau in Tunis has met with new Foreign Minister Mestiri,⁵ a long time friend of the United States, who conveyed Tunisia’s desire to maintain its close cooperation with us, and said Tunisia would seek U.S. help if Libya became a problem. We will also want to stay in close touch with the French government as developments unfold. We have issued a statement reaffirming US friendship for Tunisia, our support for its territorial integrity and security, and urging continued calm and moderation. The Embassy convened its emergency action committee to keep the public security situation under close review. We are also sending the customary messages from you and others.

Internal Implications

The loss of Bourguiba will be a shock to the Tunisian political system, but we can expect a period of consolidation as the country pulls together to manage its affairs without his leadership for the first time since 1956. Anxious to preserve its reputation as a moderate and reliable country, Tunisia is striving to create the appearance of business as usual. The composition of the new cabinet is designed to foster confidence at home and abroad. While the presidential palace and the homes of Ben Ali opponents are surrounded, the GOT has refrained from putting the army onto the streets. Any uncertainty among the Tunisian public appears to be outweighed by relief that a prolonged period of political sclerosis is finally over. Ben Ali publicly promised new legislation on political parties and the press, as well as increased citizen participation in government. This, along with the November 7 meeting GOT held with key members of the opposition, should help alleviate the immediate concerns of Tunisians about the political future of their country.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (10/30/1987)–11/29/1987). Secret. Drafted on November 7 by Casey; cleared by Ussery, Eastham, and Murphy. A stamped notations reads: “87 NOV 9P 3:05.”
2. See footnote 2, Document 353.
3. In telegram 12553 from Tunis, November 7, the Embassy transmitted an informal translation of Ben Ali’s communiqué “announcing the removal of President Habib Bourguiba and the formation of a new government.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0219)
4. See Document 352.
5. A record of Pelletreau’s November 7 conversation with Mestiri is in telegram 12554 from Tunis, November 7. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870920–0223)