Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

352. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

276215.

Washington, September 3, 1987, 2113Z

For Pelletreau. Subject: U.S. Posture re Fundamentalist Trials. Ref: A. Tunis 9726 (Notal);² B. Tunis 9605 (Notal).³

1. S—Entire text.

2. Following are our reactions to issues raised reftels concerning trial and possible execution of Tunisian Islamist Rachid Ghannouchi. They are provided as possible background for your anticipated meetings with former PM Bahi Ladgham and others. We welcome your comments.

3. Re appeal to you by opposition leader Ahmed Mestiri for U.S. intervention to save Ghannouchi from execution, we are concerned that U.S. intervention could be construed by the GOT as explicit U.S. support of or sympathy for the Tunisian fundamentalist movement. We anticipate GOT would be particularly sensitive on this question since the U.S. (to our knowledge) has not so intervened in the past. Moreover, GOT’s decision to bring Ghannouchi to trial along with those accused of involvement in the August 2 hotel bombings complicates efforts to maintain distinction U.S. has scrupulously drawn between lawbreakers and peaceful oppositionists. Additionally, as you have rightly pointed out, it is important to avoid appearances of having arrived prematurely at conclusions about Ghannouchi’s culpability or about the validity of the Tunisian judicial process.

4. Rather than focusing U.S. concerns on the outcome of the trials (which may be problematic) or on the fate of a particular individual, we believe it would be more productive to emphasize our often-expressed interest in a stable future for Tunisia, focusing on what we perceive as the need for mechanisms of political participation and expression as an integral part of maintaining stability. We believe it might be time to encourage GOT in a quiet and low-key fashion to start thinking in terms of a more active political program to parallel its no-nonsense approach to violence and to lawbreakers. For example, it appears to us that the GOT, in making a determined effort to control Islamic activism and to stamp out associated violence, is overlooking the question of whether fundamentalism may not reflect a broader political malaise that stems from a lack of safety net features, such as opposition press, independent trade unions, etc. To our thinking, a pure law and order approach is unlikely to make Tunisia’s Islamic problem disappear, and may well exacerbate GOT’s woes, especially if the fundamentalists decide to up the ante (ref B). A dual-track strategy might help alleviate mounting political pressures.

5. UK Embassy here raised Mestiri approach to British Ambassador in Tunis regarding Ghannouchi’s fate. We told UK Embassy U.S. was currently in a wait and see posture pending outcome of the trial, and that any action we might rpt might undertake would likely focus on broader concerns such as U.S. support for human rights, political tolerance, and U.S. concern for Tunisia’s political future. UK Embassy indicated that UK was disinclined at this point to take up Ghannouchi’s case on its own, but could envision joining an EC démarche based for example on concern for human rights and on the need for political good sense.

6. We would be interested in learning whether or not Saudi Arabia might be contemplating action regarding Ghannouchi, given past Saudi discussions with GOT on Tunisian Islamism and given presence of exiled Tunisian Islamist Abd al-Fatah Mourou in Saudi Arabia. As a possible alternative to a U.S. démarche on Ghannouchi’s behalf, we might wish to consider the utility of approaching interested Arab countries such as Morocco and Algeria to inquire of their intentions. We also wonder whether President Bourguiba, who we believe values his country’s reputation in the Socialist International, might be open to thoughts from that quarter.⁴

7. Reftels repeated to info address.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870767–0634, D870726–0519. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Casey; cleared by Ussery, Eastham (P), Joyce Barr (HA/HR) and Mueller, and in substance by John Craig (NEA/ARP); approved by Djerejian. Sent for information Priority to London, Paris, and Riyadh.
2. In telegram 9726 from Tunis, September 1, the Embassy reported that Pelletreau had met with Mestiri, the Secretary General of the opposition Social Democratic Movement (MDS), on August 31. Mestiri wished “to solicit US intervention to help save MTI leader Rachid Ghannouchi from execution. Mestiri’s presentation was based on his certainty that Ghannouchi will be found guilty of a capital offense even though the government’s case against him rests on the shakiest of evidence—i.e. general statements of support for the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and political activities since his release from prison in 1984.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870763–0078, D870716–0557)
3. In telegram 9605 from Tunis, August 28, the Embassy reported that an MTI representative, “making what he called an official statement, told PolOff August 27 ‘the MTI is not like Hizbollah in Lebanon, not like Iran . . .all of our actions up to this point have been non-violent, but a (State Security Court) death sentence against (MTI President Rachid) Ghannouchi would be the point of no return.” The representative also said “the MTI was engaged in a re-evaluation of its goals and tactics, and that a death sentence would convince MTI moderates that violence was the only way to express their views.” He also denied involvement in the August 2 hotel bombings. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870758–0659, D870706–0050)
4. In telegram 10821 from Tunis, September 28, the Embassy reported: “The State Security Court sentenced 7 Islamic fundamentalist defendants to death, two in custody who had admitted to committing violent acts, and 5 in absentia. MTI leader Ghannouchi received a life sentence, and others received from 2 to 20 years in prison. There were 14 acquittals.” The Embassy also reported: “Most observers expected much harsher sentences for Ghannouchi and other MTI leaders, and initial reaction in Tunis seems to be general relief. The sentences, unlike the charges, differentiated between individual responsibility for violent acts and political opposition are likely to be seen by most Tunisians as just.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870798–0027)