Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

353. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia¹

322446.

Washington, October 16, 1987, 0717Z

SUBJECT

• Ben Ali Nomination: Implications for the U.S.

Refs:

• A. Tunis 11489²
• B. Tunis 11526.³

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Department appreciated receiving thoughtful analysis (ref A) of implications of Zine Ben Ali’s appointment as Prime Minister of Tunisia. Over the coming months, we will want to monitor developments closely as Tunisia adjusts to Ben Ali’s stewardship. The following points come to mind as issues we both will need to address in our continuing analysis of the situation.

Tunisia’s Islamic challenge reflects not only discontent with the dominant but out-of-touch Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), but also dissatisfaction at the lack of credible alternative political institutions to the PSD. As non-PSD institutions like the trade union movement and the opposition lost ground over the past several years, Tunisia’s Islamic challenge has grown. How will Ben Ali address this basic problem?

— Ref A describes circumstances of PM Sfar’s abrupt dismissal; questions of competence appeared to have little to do with it. What assurance do we have that Ben Ali is not equally vulnerable to such treatment? Why should his hold on the Prime Ministry be any more secure than that of his predecessor or of his predecessor’s predecessor?

— Ben Ali now holds both the interior and Prime Ministry portfolios. His ability to keep order is likely to affect his success rate as Prime Minister significantly. Doesn’t this, in fact, impose a double burden on him? What are his prospects if the security situation should worsen rather than improve?

— Ben Ali was the man Tunisia looked to in 1978 and again in 1984 for order in times of violence and civil strife. During the intervening period of calm, he was removed from the political scene and dispatched as Tunisia’s Ambassador to Poland. Is there a possibility this pattern could repeat itself?

— Ben Ali has solid experience in the security field but little where such matters as economics, foreign policy, and socio-political reform are concerned. How effectively will he handle these aspects of his portfolio?

Ben Ali’s previous responsibilities afforded him little opportunity for building the political support critical to his success as Prime Minister. The position he took on the Islamic trials and his subsequent meetings with human rights activists offer a good beginning in the right direction. He must still, however, deal with the legacy left by his 1978 encounter with the trade union movement. How will he overcome this and other similar problems? To what extent can he count on support from within the PSD, especially with hardliner Mahjoub Ben Ali at the helm of the PSD? Will erstwhile competitors of broader political experience (e.g. Education Minister Sayah) rally around him or seek to sabotage his efforts?

— Ben Ali is the first military officer to be named PM and thus nominal successor to Bourguiba. Does this have fundamental implications for the nature of the Tunisian regime? Has a red line been crossed? Has Ben Ali’s appointment had an effect on possibilities for the rise of the military to power in Tunisia? If one military officer can be named Prime Minister, why not another, such as the ambitious Saida Sassi protege, Air Force Chief Naaman?

Finally, what impact will Ben Ali’s appointment have on Tunisian rapprochement with Libya, given his undoubted interest in the impact such a move would have on internal security, and in particular the prospects it offers for Libyan exploitation of Tunisia’s present difficulties with Islamic activists.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870850–0781. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Casey and Rosemary O’Neill (NEA/AFN); cleared by Eastham, Richard Whitaker (INR/NESA), Klosson (S/S), and Huggins (S/S–O); approved by Ussery. Sent for information to Algiers, Cairo, Madrid, Paris, Rabat, and Rome.
2. In telegram 11489 from Tunis, October 9, the Embassy reported that “Bourguiba’s abrupt dismissal of Sfar and elevation of Interior Minister Ben Ali again demonstrates President Bourguiba’s personal control of power in Tunisia. Ben Ali’s appointment puts a strong man in the Prime Ministry and a heartbeat away from the Presidency.” The Embassy also stated “U.S. interests are well served by Ben Ali’s appointment since it will enhance stability in the near and longer term. While he is not ‘America’s Man,’ he carries no ideological baggage which would impede close working relations. U.S. interests are also served by Ben Ali’s tentative opening to critics which should be encouraged.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870758–0659, D870833–0457)
3. In telegram 11526 from Tunis, October 9, Pelletreau reported that in his initial call on Ben Ali, Ali “sketched broad lines of Tunisian policy which parallel closely our thinking on the major Tunisian and regional issues treated.” After working to improve the economy, Ali said he wished to improve “public order,” which “will allow him to work for an internal political dialogue to which he claimed he and President Bourguiba are committed. On relations with Libya, he said GOT would go cautiously, stopping short of full normalization, while at same time strengthening security cooperation with U.S. Tunisia will also improve its relations with Egypt.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870834–0057)