Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

33. Telegram From the Embassy in Mauritania to the Department of State¹

2085.

Nouakchott, May 9, 1984, 1049Z

SUBJECT

• The Situation in the Maghreb: Mauritania’s Views.

1. (S—Entire text).

2. Summary: In an open and wide-ranging discussion, Chief of State Haidalla told Ambassadors Peck and Reed that his principal external concern is a peaceful resolution of the Sahara conflict. He fears that Morocco is determined to seek an unattainable military solution, which places the entire region at risk, and is particularly concerned about the burgeoning relationship between King Hassan and Qadhafi. End summary.

3. At their initiative, Chief of State Haidalla and FonMin Ould Minnih met with Ambassadors Peck and Reed on May 7, immediately prior to the latter’s departure. The meeting was friendly and relaxed, marked by a very evident Mauritanian interest in ensuring that Ambassador Reed was fully informed on Mauritania’s view of the regional situation.

4. Ambassador Reed opened the discussion with a description of the effect of his drive up from Rosso and flight to Tidjikja. He said that reading reports on the drought was totally insufficient in terms of understanding its dreadful impact. He was now able to comprehend the magnitude of the catastrophe, and in his forthcoming session with President Reagan he would strongly support continued American assistance.² Ambassador Reed added that President Reagan is interested in Mauritania and admires President Haidalla, which made this meeting particularly propitious. Haidalla replied with a request that Mauritania’s profound gratitude be conveyed to President Reagan along with the hope for success in the forthcoming elections.

5. Ambassador Reed then brought up the subject of the congressional proposal to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He said that King Hassan had told him he believed that the letter from President Reagan on this subject had been instrumental in securing the moderate position reached at Fez.³ He said that the U.S. was grateful for Mauritania’s position and volunteered to answer any questions that might remain on the subject. FonMin Ould Minnih replied that the GIRM had been kept well informed, and was gratified that so many other Muslim nations evidently shared a complete understanding of the administration’s firm stand.

6. Ambassador Reed raised the subject of the OAU and asked how Mauritania viewed the prospects for the next summit. Haidalla said that like many other countries, Mauritania was unsure of where or when the meeting might take place. He believed that the principal obstacle to a decision was the unresolved question of the SDAR and how the issue of seating would be handled. He felt that some form of consensus would be reached with the passage of time, but the whole matter was obscured by the dangerous developments in the Sahara itself.

7. Ambassador Reed replied that the King had reacted to Mauritanian recognition of the SDAR,⁴ as a personal setback and affront. He added he is positive that the King wants only the best possible relations with Mauritania and had therefore been distressed by the move, which he saw as strongly anti-Moroccan. Haidalla replied that one of Mauritania’s key difficulties was a continuing inability to have its neutrality properly perceived in Rabat. When the CMSN took the country out of the Saharan war to save it from total economic and political ruin, it was seen as an anti-Moroccan move. When, in subsequent years, Mauritania staunchly, and at some cost, maintained its neutrality in the conflict, Rabat insisted that this too was anti-Moroccan. Haidalla ruefully pointed out that Morocco apparently sees all those who are not strongly aligned with it as strongly opposed to it, an attitude which is neither reasonable nor productive.

8. For five long years, he went on, Mauritania had done whatever it could in facilitating a peaceful solution. It had steadfastly refrained from extending recognition to the SDAR because it wished to ensure that King Hassan knew he had an opening to the South and was therefore not isolated. Even though Moroccan actions before and after the signing of the Taif Accords⁵ clearly indicated a continued interest in destabilization, the GIRM had refrained from taking any steps which would limit the opportunities for an eventual peaceful solution. However, Mauritania and many other countries had finally become convinced that Rabat was only interested in military means. This fear was confirmed by the extensions of the berm, with the greatly increased risk of an expanded conflict, and the sudden reestablishment of good relations with Libya, a nation which poses serious threats to every country in the region, including Morocco. Ambassador Reed interjected that King Hassan has no illusions whatsoever about the dangers of dealing with Qadhafi, and is well aware of them. He wanted to secure the cessation of arms deliveries to the Polisario, a goal worth the price of improved but cautious relations.

9. Recognition of the SDAR was intended to accomplish a number of steps, Haidalla went on, none of which were inimical to Morocco’s interests. He said Mauritania wished to add momentum to the efforts of those seeking implementation of the OAU consensus decision and, at the same time, act to reduce the greatly increased isolation of Algeria which resulted from the Morocco-Libyan rapprochement. It was also intended to reduce the likelihood of a conflict with Morocco by forcing the Polisario into a reciprocal recognition of and respect for Mauritania’s borders. Haidalla said that this action, taken to protect Mauritania’s neutrality, is of short term benefit rather than harm to Morocco. In making the announcement of the recognition, he went on, he had heavily stressed that there was absolutely no change in Mauritania’s stance of total neutrality.

10. Haidalla said that no military solution is possible, however, particularly in the long run. He feels that Morocco is making a serious mistake and placing the entire Maghreb in danger by increasing the risks of an expanded war. Ambassador Reed interjected that King Hassan had personally assured him that under no circumstances would there be a war with Algeria. Haidalla said that Mauritania has no self-interests at stake and seeks nothing for itself, insisting only that the people of the region be allowed to determine their own future. He said his government still hopes for some form of political solution in which all of the Maghreb peoples, specifically including the Polisario and Morocco, could together find some way to solve the problem. (Comment: He clearly sees this as a means of avoiding the direct negotiations impasse, which was not specifically mentioned. End comment). Ambassador Reed stated his belief that the King would be satisfied with the flag and stamp solution proposed to Bendjedid in February, 1983. He added that the U.S., for one, would not wish to see a weak, independent and unstable state established in the area which could provide a base for hostile interests. Ould Minnih replied that while independence is not required, it must remain one of the options in a referendum.

11. Ambassador Reed said that he would like to be able to take to King Hassan some idea of the steps that would need to be taken for the reestablishment of relations between the two countries, something that he knows the King is very desirous of having. Haidalla did not answer directly, but replied with a low-key discussion of Mauritania’s constant, deep-seated fears of Moroccan intentions. He said that there has always been a strong desire to include Mauritania in the greater kingdom. A major effort was made in this direction both before and after independence, and the Moroccans have never tried to conceal their objective. The Istiqlal, in particular, has never ceased urging Morocco’s claims. Haidalla also quoted a remark attributed to the Crown Prince who has allegedly said “my grandfather liberated Morocco, my father liberated the Sahara, and I will liberate Mauritania.” Haidalla said that this basic attitude, and active destabilization efforts directed from Rabat, leaves his government to operate under constant threat from a large and powerful neighbor. Mauritania has therefore always tried to ensure that it did nothing to provoke the monarchy, with which it seeks the best possible relationship. (Comment: At dinner the preceding day with three senior MFA officials, Ambassador Reed asked the same question. The reply in this case was the full implementation of the Taif Accords, specifically an end to involvement in the internal affairs of the other party. Morocco has never stopped harboring and supporting Mauritanian dissidents, according to the Mauritanians, which violates that agreement. They added that Morocco’s aggressive intentions toward Mauritania are well known. End comment).

12. Ould Minnih drew attention to the fact that Mauritania cannot and will not be ignored as the Sahara conflict moves into a very critical phase. Underlining his belief that no military solution will be possible, a belief that he stressed was supported by a vast amount of modern history, Ould Minnih said that Mauritania is prepared to defend its sovereignty and dignity against all comers. While the resources for this purpose are limited, the intent should not be underestimated. The nation’s future is at stake and would be defended at all costs.

13. The session ended with a brief discussion of regional tribalism. Ambassador Reed said he had heard that one of Haidalla’s close relatives held a high position in the Polisario; Haidalla replied that as far as he was aware there were none.

14. Comment: The GIRM was clearly interested in explaining its views to Ambassador Reed, given his position in the USG and well-known access to the King. Ambassador Reed’s obvious, active and attentive interest in the issues discussed was very effective in securing from Haidalla a frank expression of his views. This message was drafted subsequent to Ambassador Reed’s departure.

Peck

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840303–0284. Secret. Sent for information to Algiers, Bamako, Banjul, Dakar, Paris, Rabat, and Tunis.
2. Reference is to the persistent drought that affected much of the African continent. In telegram 150550 to Addis Ababa, May 22, the Department reported: “We have followed the course of the serious and prolonged drought in Africa and have provided a rapid and generous response. To meet the short term needs of the affected populations, the administration has approved more than dols. 135 million in emergency food assistance under PL–480 Title II to Sub-Saharan African countries this fiscal year (more than in all of fiscal year 1983) and plans to provide yet more as additional needs are identified.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840333–0694) Documentation on the U.S. response to the drought and famine in Africa is published in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II.
3. On April 28, Reagan wrote Hassan: “As I have earlier assured you, I am strongly opposed to moving our Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. We are continuing discussions with the Congress regarding this issue.” (Telegram 125030 to Rabat, April 28; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840277–0703)
4. The GIRM recognized the SDAR on February 27. See footnote 5, Document 417.
5. Reference is to the resumption of relations between Mauritania and Morocco in the aftermath of the attempted coup in Mauritania in March 1981, which was brokered in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia. See Document 7.