Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

32. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

93445.

Washington, March 30, 1984, 1425Z

For the Charge. Subject: Libya and our Bilateral Relations With Morocco. Refs: A) State 77312² B) State 78924³ C) State 91389⁴ D) State 76067.⁵

1. (S) Entire text.

2. Refs A–C have provided you with the tenor of our recent exchanges with Algerian emissary Khellef. Ref D instructs you to brief Moroccans thereon and invite their thoughts on how to inflect current drift towards more confrontation and dangerous situation in North Africa as a result of current Libyan activities.

3. You will note that Libyan aggressiveness is once again rising abruptly. London and Omdurman bombings are illustrative.⁶ Several of these Libyan machinations now in course could lead to actions targeting Americans (e.g. AWACS in Sudan) or NATO installations,⁷ as at COMISO, others could lead to sharp or sharper confrontations with allies such as Britain, France or Italy.

4. Since we value our relationship with Morocco, we have been at pains to follow Morocco’s rapprochement with Libya with understanding for Morocco’s needs. We remain convinced that it is tactical. But we are also becoming aware of rising costs which Morocco is incurring as a consequence of its new ties with Qadhafi (e.g. Rabat 2401⁸ and Niamey 1723⁹).

5. Given the disruptive potential of Libya’s overt and covert offensive which may well touch major U.S. interests still more directly and painfully, we think it is timely to draw palace attention to our rising sensitivity with respect thereto. (FYI. The Vice President’s comments in reftel are indicative. End FYI). You should therefore see Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor drawing on following talking points:

6. Begin talking points for use with Foreign Minister or Royal Counselor:

— Although we consider that Morocco’s attitude toward Libya and Rabat’s interest in improved relations with Tripoli are entirely matters for the GOM to decide, we are for our part increasingly disturbed by continuing Libyan subversion and aggression in and beyond Africa.

— Libyan efforts to absorb northern Chad, Libyan attacks on Sudan and Jordan, threats towards Egypt, Libyan attempts upon opponents of the Qadhafi regime residing in third countries—as in the London bombings—adversely affect American interests.

— We have long worked to help Morocco create and preserve a situation in North Africa conducive to a negotiated solution to the Saharan question, along the lines proposed by His Majesty King Hassan II and accepted by the OAU in Nairobi, which we support.

— Accordingly, we welcomed the diplomatic initiatives which led to the border meeting between King Hassan and President Bendjedid in February 1983. We subsequently urged Algiers to seize the opportunities offered by the rapprochement and to avoid rigid positions likely to impede the achievement of acceptable outcomes.

— We judge by what we are now hearing in African capitals, including Algiers, of concerns about the Moroccan-Libyan relationship, that Morocco is paying a rising price in terms of the support that it enjoys on the Saharan issue and the potential for a negotiated solution to the conflict.

— In light of these concerns, we would appreciate Morocco’s views on how a negotiated solution can be achieved under current circumstances.

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840005–0248. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sebastian; cleared by Pearson, Schneider, and Hill; approved by Murphy. Sent for information to Algiers and Tunis.
2. In telegram 77312 to Algiers, March 16, the Department transmitted a record of Khellef’s March 12 conversation with Shultz during which Khellef “outlined current GOA views on U.S.-Algerian bilateral relations and a range of foreign policy issues. The Western Sahara and Algerian relations with Morocco were the key topics, with Khellef stressing Algiers’ conviction that Morocco’s hardening position on the Sahara, in particular its apparent choice of military rather than political means to achieve a solution, risked further deterioration in Morocco’s already difficult domestic situation.” Khellef speculated that Hassan’s “reconciliation with Qadhafi and continuing assistance from Morocco’s ‘friends’ had led to a stiffening of his position.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840173–0806)
3. Telegram 78924 to Algiers, March 17, transmitted a record of Reagan’s and Bush’s conversation with Khellef. See Document 135.
4. In telegram 91389 to Rabat, March 29, the Department instructed the Embassy to “brief GOM at high (political) level on Khellef’s Washington visit” and included talking points for such a meeting. The Department continued: “When Moroccans digest line we have taken supporting them they will, of course, be pleased” and instructed the Embassy to ask Moroccans “given formal position Morocco and Algerians have taken on dispute, we are perplexed how Rabat expects to reach objective of negotiated political solution of Saharan conflict as mandated by OAU Reso based on King’s Nairobi offer which we both support and Algerians purport to accept. We would welcome GOM’s further thoughts.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840206–0898)
5. In telegram 76067 to Algiers, March 15, the Department informed the Embassy about Schneider’s March 13 discussion with Khellef, during which Schneider “repeated expressions by both the Secretary and the Vice President that in U.S. view the Moroccans wished a negotiated as opposed to a military solution to the problem. We did not believe, however, that King Hassan had the political latitude to engage in direct negotiations with the Polisario.” The Department continued: “given the formal and fixed positions Algeria has taken on the dispute, we are perplexed about just how Algeria might play this role. Consequently, we wondered what strategy Algeria intended to pursue in the quest of an objective which it appeared Algeria, Morocco and the U.S. share.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840170–0644)
6. In telegram 5809 from London, March 12, the Embassy reported that “seven bombing incidents occurred in London and Manchester over the weekend which authorities believe were sponsored by the Libyan Government.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840162–0631)
7. An unidentified plane dropped five bombs on the Sudanese city of Omdurman on March 16, killing five people and wounding two. Sudanese President Gaafar al-Nimeiri accused Libya of ordering the attack. Documentation on this incident is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXVII, Sub-Saharan Africa.
8. In telegram 2401 from Rabat, March 14, the Embassy reported that regarding Morocco’s attempts to prevent the admission of the SDAR to the OAU, “privately, the GOM is working to retain support of moderate black African states which have traditionally favored Morocco on this issue, but whose backing appears to be eroding from frustration over inflexibility of Morocco’s position and suspicion of the 8-month détente between Qadhafi and King Hassan.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840168–0789)
9. In telegram 1723 from Niamey, March 20, the Embassy reported that MFA Political Director Hama had told the DCM “the GON is increasingly disenchanted with Morocco and has so informed the Moroccan Ambassador personally. Hama says the King is speaking out too much, and that there is a duplicity in the King’s acquiescence to Libyan aggression in Chad vs. Libyan aggression elsewhere. According to Hama, there are many black African states which consider the Moroccan stance racist, and this undermines their support for Morocco on the Western Sahara.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840183–0177)