Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

34. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

3712.

Tunis, May 14, 1984, 1512Z

SUBJECT

• Libyan-Tunisian Tensions—Qadhafi Signals That There is Still Room for Negotiations but His Threats Escalate.

Refs:

• Tunis 3665² Tunis 3685.³

1. (Confidential—Entire text.)

2. As of the morning of May 14, Tunisian officials seemed to be hoping that the crisis with Libya would evaporate. Chargé spoke briefly at an airport reception for President Abdou Diouf of Senegal with MFA Secretary General Fezzani, a former Tunisian Ambassador to Libya. Fezzani said that he felt it was a positive element that the Libyans had admitted holding three Tunisian personnel in their statement of May 10 (Tunis 3665). He indicated that negotiations for the return of the three had reached an impasse, however.

3. Fezzani did not seem to be aware of two Libyan statements released late May 13 and just received here which are the clearest Libyan public threat of retaliation against Tunisia to date. The first is a JANA statement which is moderately worded (LD 132209, notal).⁴ It expresses Libya’s continued desire for good relations, and says Libya does not doubt that Tunisia shares this desire. However, “as their passports have shown”, a handful of terrorists infiltrated Tunisia, and there can be no doubt that “a Tunisian side or sides” facilitated their entry into Libya. It is our joint task, the statement concludes, to “discover those sides which aim to harm relations between the two sister countries”. The second Libyan statement purports to represent the views of Libyan “masses” who demonstrated in Tripoli on May 13 (LD132037 notal).⁵ This violently worded statement accuses “the traitors from Egypt and Sudan’s rulers and the bad symbols conspiring within the Tunisian regime”, and calls for battle with the “agent reactionary regime” in Sudan as well as with “all other Arab regimes which helped in any form cooperate with the stray dogs”. Libya is, of course, a state of the masses. Taken together, these statements indicate the line Qadhafi is taking towards Tunisia: unless the Tunisians admit that infiltration took place from Tunisia, he may be unable to prevent the angry Libyan masses from retaliating. The implication in both statements is that while the Tunisian Government itself may not have facilitated the infiltration, elements within the Tunisian Government knew what was going on.

4. We continue to believe that a negotiated solution of the crisis is possible, but that the Tunisians will have to give Qadhafi some satisfaction in the form of an official expression of regret and private assurances that they will not allow infiltration from Tunisia. Statements like the Foreign Ministry’s flat denial of May 9 reiterated by the Tunisian News Agency May 11 are unlikely to have the desired effect. As time passes, the two sides are hardening their positions, but Qadhafi is signalling that there is still time to talk, provided the Tunisians are prepared to talk seriously.⁶

5. Finally, we hear from the Foreign Ministry that Algerian Foreign Minister Ibrahimi is expected here tomorrow. His presence will give the Tunisians moral support in the face of escalating Libyan threats.

Anderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840313–0208. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to Algiers, Cairo, Khartoum, London, Paris, Rabat, Rome, and USCINCEUR.
2. In telegram 3665 from Tunis, May 11, the Embassy reported that the Libyan Foreign Ministry had released a statement repeating the Libyan charge “that a group of three terrorists was arrested coming from the direction of the Tunisian border on May 6.” The statement, according to the Embassy, indicated that “members of another group, presumably those involved in the attack on May 8 in Tripoli, have admitted under interrogation that they infiltrated from Tunisia on March 1.” The Embassy continued: “On an equally menacing note, we understand that Libyan radio has broadcast interviews with Tunisians in Libya in which they call for the overthrow of the Tunisian Government and the ruling party.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840307–0899) In telegram 966 from Valletta, May 9, Price reported that the Egyptian Chargé said a “coup attempt” had occurred in Tripoli on May 8. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840301–0124)
3. In telegram 3685 from Tunis, May 12, the Embassy reported that in an official statement issued by the Tunisian Press Agency that day, the GOT responded to the Libyan Foreign Ministry statement, “reiterated previous GOT denial of involvement” in the incident involving the Libyan exiles, and “stressed GOT desire for good relations with Libya.”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840310–0940)
4. Not further identified.
5. Not further identified.
6. In telegram 3779 from Tunis, May 16, the Embassy reported: “Senior Tunisian security officials have told us that there was a clash between Libyan troops and the Tunisian National Guard May 15 at the border post of Dehibat in the far south.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840318–0504) Later that day, the Embassy reported that according a Tunisian Foreign Ministry statement, “Bourguiba has decided to recall the Tunisian High Commissioner (Ambassador) from Libya.” The statement suggested that the Libyan official media “have persisted in trying to implicate Tunisia in the events which took place in Tripoli.” (Telegram 3791 from Tunis, May 16; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840318–1034)