Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

417. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco¹

53901.

Washington, February 23, 1984, 2224Z

SUBJECT

• Moroccan Request for U.S. Support for GOM Position on Western Sahara Dispute.

Ref:

• A) Rabat 1648²
• B) State 8877³
• C) State 32456.⁴

1. Secret—Entire text.

2. Department believes that sharing information with Foreign Minister Belkeziz on the Western Sahara issue is most appropriate. This message provides an interim response to FonMin’s request. We expect to follow up with more extensive discussion of Western Sahara at Belkeziz-Eagleburger meeting in Washington next week.

3. Reftel A suggests that Belkeziz is already aware of the latest developments regarding the Conakry summit, particularly its possible postponement until fall 1984, and of the general expectation that the SDAR will not press its case at the ministerial but will go all out at the summit to be seated. Specific talking points conveying information gained from discussions with selected African officials follow later in this cable.

4. We are concerned, however, by Belkeziz’s request that the U.S. “undertake diplomatic soundings” prior to the ministerial and “encourage” various African countries to “refrain from supporting a Polisario move to be seated at the OAU ministerial”.⁵ We believe that his specific request that the U.S. approach countries such as Algeria, Ghana, and Mauritania is impractical since the U.S. has little or no leverage on this issue with such countries. In addition there is the danger that these states might use charges that the U.S. is “pressuring” OAU members on Morocco’s behalf and interfering in the internal affairs of the OAU to undermine Morocco’s own efforts to carry out its strategy. Such démarches would also risk eliciting further requests for the U.S. to weigh in with King Hassan and use what African countries consider to be our considerable influence with the GOM to make the GOM “more reasonable” on the issue of negotiating directly and publicly with the Polisario. As Embassy is aware, we have already been asked to intercede with Morocco several times and have demurred. We recall also Senegalese FonMin Niasse’s admonition to the U.S. (repeated ref C to Rabat and others): “be discreet, even invisible” on the Western Sahara issue during the months preceding the next summit. In sum, we believe that our interests and Morocco’s are best served by continuing our discreet low-key discussions with friendly and knowledgeable key players on the Western Sahara and keeping the GOM informed of the results. The following talking points reflect the useful discussions we have had in Conakry and Dakar and in Addis with members of the OAU Secretariat since the Secretary’s conversation with King Hassan.

5. Talking points:

— We find our continuing dialogue on the Western Sahara dispute very useful in keeping abreast of an issue of great importance to Morocco and the U.S.

— Following the Secretary’s discussion with King Hassan on January 12,⁶ we asked our Ambassadors in selected key African countries to discuss the Western Sahara issue at the highest levels. In response to your specific request of February 20, I would like to share with you now what we have ascertained from these discussions about the February Foreign Ministers’ meeting.

— The general expectation is that the SDAR will not seek admission to an OAU meeting before the 20th summit. Presumably this would apply to the February 27 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, which is expected to focus primarily on OAU budgetary matters.

— Having said that, however, some radical African states may seek to have the SDAR seated at the ministerial. We understand that the OAU Secretariat wants to avoid controversy at the ministerial and hopes that the SDAR will stay away. It is always possible, however, that an SDAR delegation may show up in Addis Ababa and claim a seat, even if the SDAR has not been extended an invitation.

— We understand that the Polisario intends to pursue its claim to a seat at the 20th summit, particularly if it voluntarily absents itself from the Addis ministerial. As you remarked during our last meeting, there is a possibility that the summit may be postponed until November; this would give Morocco more time to deal with the situation within the OAU. We fear that unless there is some progress in resolving the Western Sahara dispute there may be erosion in the diplomatic support which Morocco has enjoyed from key members of the OAU, who, as a result, may acquiesce in the seating of the SDAR at the Conakry Summit.

— We will, of course, continue our discussion with key interlocutors. But we have little influence in this area with three of the countries you mentioned in our February 20 discussion (and Ivory Coast is Morocco’s friend), and believe an initiative on our part on this issue with them could be counterproductive to the interests of our two countries.

— We look forward to hearing the results of Morocco’s continued efforts with its friends in the OAU to deal with this question, in particular its strategy for handling the Polisario’s likely move to claim a seat at the summit. We look forward to discussing this and other aspects of the Western Sahara issue with you in Washington during the Prime Minister’s visit. Under Secretary Eagleburger will be hosting a breakfast for you on March 1⁷ and hopes to have a thorough discussion of the Saharan issue at that time.⁸

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840120–0441. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Kenneth Scott (AF/W); cleared by Sebastian, Edward Perkins (ADF/W), James Vincent (AF/I), Edmund van Gilder (AF/W), Schermerhorn, Raphel, and Schneider; approved by Bishop. Sent for information to Addis Ababa, Abidjan, Accra, Algiers, Conakry, Dakar, and Nouakchott.
2. In telegram 1648 from Rabat, February 21, the Embassy reported: “Foreign Minister Belkeziz reiterated Morocco’s request for more active U.S. support on the Western Sahara dispute during a February 20 meeting with Ambassador Reed.”(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840113–0132)
3. Telegram 8877 to Rabat, January 12, 1984. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840021-0534)
4. In telegram 32456 to Algiers, February 2, the Department repeated telegram 1116 from Dakar, February 2, which reported that Senegalese Foreign Minister Moustapha Niasse had warned that at the next OAU Summit, scheduled for later in the year in Conakry, “it would not be surprising if the radicals—led by Madagascar—turned the tables on the moderates at Conakry” on the issue of seating the SDAR. The Embassy continued: “By that he means that the radicals have more than a ‘blocking third’ and there is therefore a real risk that the summit may not take place unless some of the radicals can be wooed away.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840072–0331)
5. In telegram 877 from Nouakchott, February 25, the Embassy reported: “Chief of State Haidallah called in the Ambassador Feb 25 to advise that the GIRM will extend diplomatic recognition to the SDAR on the 27th. He wanted the USG to know that in taking this step, after long and careful study, Mauritania hoped to advance the cause of peace and reduce tensions; it does not wish to see an intensification or prolongation of the fighting.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840124–0538)
6. The date is in error. Shultz and Hassan met in Rabat on December 11, 1983. See Document 221.
7. No record of the Eagleburger-Reed breakfast meeting has been found.
8. In telegram 1930 from Rabat, February 29, the Embassy reported that in Belkeziz’s absence “Tazi expressed appreciation for the message” expressed in telegram 53901, “and made no further request for U.S. political support.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840133–0382)