I am sending you personally this copy of “Prospects for Morocco,” an
Intelligence Community production which focuses on King Hassan and his
regime. Although published the morning of Monday, 17 May, I wish to
ensure it reaches you prior to the King’s upcoming visit. I believe the
study projects a particularly balanced view of internal and regional
issues at stake for us in Morocco.
Enclosure
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum3
NI IIM
82–10004
Washington, May 1982
PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO
[Omitted here are a Scope Note and the Table of Contents.]
KEY JUDGMENTS
In the coming year, King Hassan
II is likely to maintain firm control of Morocco’s
political system. Hassan probably will continue to use his proven
techniques of divide-and-rule, manipulation, and co-option of
political parties to regulate the activities of the opposition. His
domestic security apparatus will keep a close eye on dissident
activity and we expect the armed forces will remain loyal. The
military and security service will obey orders to suppress sporadic
civil disturbances. Neither Morocco’s established political parties
and labor unions, which prefer to operate within the system, nor
fringe opposition groups pose a serious threat to the monarchy in
the short run.4
Over the next several years, however, Morocco will face a number of
extremely difficult socioeconomic and political problems as well as
the seemingly interminable conflict in Western Sahara that
cumulatively could pose a serious threat to domestic stability and
King Hassan’s survival. Many of these problems—rapidly growing
population, rising expectations, inflation, and international
debt—are common to most developing states. Although Morocco’s
economy has considerable potential for growth, for the next several
years it faces the prospect of—at best—slow growth, austerity, and a
declining standard of living.
Over the long term, the strains and pressures in Moroccan society
portend serious difficulty for the King, the monarchy as an
institution, and Morocco’s political system, which is heavily based
on patronage.5 We question whether
this system and Morocco’s limited resources will enable Rabat to
cope with its serious problems. If, as seems probable, the present
system fails to satisfy rising popular aspirations, societal
pressures probably will generate demands for major political
change.
[Page 447]
It is impossible to predict how severe the pressures must be before
serious instability develops. The situation is not irretrievable,
but Hassan will have to demonstrate astute managerial skills to deal
with existing economic and social problems.
In international affairs, Western Sahara will remain the primary
focus of Moroccan attention. The threats Morocco perceives from
Algeria, Libya, and the Soviet Union also will absorb Moroccan
attention. In pursuit of Moroccan interests, King Hassan will
continue to adopt foreign policies that often parallel or coincide
with US interests.
Neither a military nor a political solution to the Western Sahara
quagmire is in the offing.6 The economic burden of the war will remain
bearable for Morocco so long as Saudi Arabia continues to provide
financial assistance to cover the bulk of the war’s costs. The
Moroccan armed forces should be able to resist Polisario attacks but
will not be able to defeat the guerrilla forces so long as they have
sanctuary in Algeria and external sources of military assistance.
For their part, the Polisario will not be able to take control of
the Sahara by military means. Barring greater flexibility by all
parties and in the absence of minimal mutual confidence, the wide
divergence of views leaves little hope for a negotiated settlement.
None of the parties would support a referendum that did not appear
to ensure an outcome favorable to its interests.
Parallel interests have contributed to a recent effort by both the
United States and Morocco to intensify their close relations. The
accelerated pace of cooperation, however, risks serious regional and
bilateral misunderstandings. In the short run, and especially among
elements of the Moroccan military, the prospect of augmented US help could lead to unrealistic
expectations regarding the extent of US support and strengthen the conviction that military
victory in the Sahara is attainable. Interest in a negotiated,
settlement consequently could be set back.7 Regionally,
Portugal and Spain might misperceive US intentions and assume lessened US interest in established bases in
Iberia.
In the longer run, unmet expectations could produce a reaction in
Morocco dangerous both to US
interests and to those of the King. An impression that the United
States had made promises to Morocco it could not keep, or that the
King had proved inept in his dealings with the United States, might
harm close US-Moroccan relations and undermine military and popular
confidence in Hassan.
A close US-Moroccan relationship—especially one involving increased
military aid and the granting of air transit facilities—will
complicate efforts to improve US-Algerian relations. Algerian
leaders consider US military aid to
Morocco evidence that the United States supports a Moroccan military
solution to the Western Sahara dispute.
[Page 448]
They also are concerned that US-provided
equipment may ultimately be used against Algeria. Although Algeria’s
leaders are more interested than in the past in reaching an
accommodation with Morocco, they will not abandon the Polisario and
will continue to view the developing US-Moroccan relationship with
suspicion.
[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]