Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

202. Memorandum for the Record¹

DDI–3517/82

Washington, April 27, 1982

SUBJECT

• Bing West Trip to Morocco [portion marking not declassified]

1. C/NE [name not declassified] and I represented CIA at a meeting convened on 23 April by Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs West, in connection with his trip on 26 April to Rabat.² West will lead a delegation to the first session of the US-Moroccan Joint Military Commission. The meeting was intended to inform West on the current arrangement for [less than 1 line not declassified] the GOM and to coordinate a cable to Ambassador Reed on a related issue. Reed had recommended that the JMC framework be elaborated to include an intelligence panel. [portion marking not declassified]

2. ISA/Africa Chief Jim Woods opened by referring to Reed’s cable received only a few days before,³ noting that in effect it responded to a DoD recommendation some months ago, which the ambassador had not commented on. DoD’s reply, drafted for West’s signature, urges that the questions of an intelligence panel be deferred until West could discuss it with COM, [less than 1 line not declassified] and DATT. Other subjects on DoD’s mind, Wilson continued, were the NDPC security survey of Morocco beginning 10 May and the king’s visit to this country at mid month. [portion marking not declassified]

3. Wilson then reviewed DoD perceptions of current objectives: to establish a military-to-military intelligence relationship, successfully to complete the security survey and to provide tactical military intelligence training; and problems: the small number of Moroccans approved for receiving US intelligence and the GOM’s slow dissemination of the data. He said the upgrading of Moroccan military capabilities requires an infusion of promptly and properly processed intelligence data. He concluded that on the Moroccan side a way had to be found to overcome bureaucratic obstacles, while on the US side it was necessary to sort out the responsibilities for providing strategic and tactical intelligence. [portion marking not declassified]

4. [1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]

a) [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

b) [1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

c) [1 paragraph (2 lines) not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

d) Order of battle data [less than 1 line not declassified] may be passed by [less than 1 line not declassified] to the Defense Attache for Moroccan military [2 lines not declassified]. The USDAO is the pegpoint for Moroccan military request for military training. [portion marking not declassified]

e) Country team members will keep each other informed on their intelligence disclosure activity. [portion marking not declassified]

5. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

6. West [less than 1 line not declassified] left the room briefly and during this time Wilson said that DoD intends to raise with King Hassan, during his visit to Washington, the question of access and dissemination within the GOM. [less than 1 line not declassified] who will accompany West on the trip to Rabat said that one thought that had occurred to him is that the king might not want the tactical intelligence communicated rapidly to line units, because the Polisario threat serves his domestic political purposes. Wilson reiterated that this would have to be discussed with the king. He added that DoD staffers want to obtain SecDef’s account of the breakfast meeting discussion of subject. [portion marking not declassified]

7. When West returned to the room, [name not declassified] having departed for another meeting, the cable to Reed was discussed. It told the ambassador that West would discuss the intelligence panel concept with US officials on arrival and provided a status report on the security survey. West asked me if the contents raised any questions [less than 1 line not declassified]. I noted a reference to the survey facilitating the establishment of a military intelligence exchange arrangement and asked for confirmation that any such program would be the subject of separate review and determination. The DoD officers assured me that any such arrangement would be the subject of separate policy coordination. With that understanding, I said, the cable did not appear to contain any contentious issues. [portion marking not declassified]

8. Finally, Wilson told West that while the [less than 1 line not declassified] analyst accompanying him was prepared to brief intelligence substance, he was not equipped to discuss intelligence relations. If the latter subject was to be raised with mission officers, [less than 1 line not declassified] or another officer from [less than 1 line not declassified] also should go. West said he would give it further thought. [1 line not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

9. [name not declassified] attended this meeting as did: Lt. Col Mark Powe, USA, who recently represented DA/ACSI in talks with the Moroccans on army training; Dernell Whit of West’s office; and [name not declassified] Chairman of the National Disclosure Policy Committee, which sponsors the security surveys. [2 lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

[name not declassified]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 83M00914R: Box 17, C–379, Morocco. Secret. [less than one line not declassified]
2. See Document 203.
3. In telegram 3129 from Rabat, April 22, Reed transmitted his desire for West’s “thoughts on discussing intelligence matters” during the upcoming JMC. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820212–0876)