Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

165. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria¹

68909.

Washington, March 10, 1987, 0332Z

SUBJECT

• Meeting on Military Sales to Algeria.

1. Secret—Entire text

2. On 2/25/87, Interagency Group met to discuss general views and some specific pending and past cases of military sales to Algeria. Meeting co-chaired by NEA DAS E. Michael Ussery and PM DAS Vladimir Lehovich. Following is text of a memorandum containing a partial record of that meeting, summarizing open remarks, general themes raised by various participants, some indications of agreement on next steps, and a list of attendees.

3. Opening Remarks—Ussery:

— State NEA is concerned that, while USG agreed on a case-by-case approach to Algerian military purchases with good reasons to move cautiously, bureaucratic inertia has unnecessarily delayed decisions in this key bilateral area.

— A review of the bilateral relationship since 1979 accession of President Bendjedid shows slow but steady improvement; Algeria helped in freeing Tehran hostages and has continued assistance to U.S. in dealing with radical regimes (note recent help with Seib case in Iran).

— Vice President’s 1983 trip to Algiers² and Bendjedid’s 1985 visit to U.S.³ accelerated improvement in relations with latter’s visit leading to real efforts to help Algerian military diversification as well as agreements to conclude consular and cultural treaties and set up a Joint Economic Commission.

— Positive aspects are encouraging, but there are real problems and areas of disagreement: basic differences on Middle East policy, how to handle Libya, Algerian closeness to USSR, and Algerian voting record in UN.

— Moroccan/Algerian antipathy, evidenced by long conflict over Western Sahara, also a stumbling block for U.S. which has valuable, longstanding relationship with Morocco.

— U.S./Morocco and U.S./Algeria relations cannot be treated as zero sum game, however, and we must concentrate on building two bilateral relationships with reassurances of regard and respect for both parties—not an easy task.

— We also recognize Bendjedid’s problems with internal opposition to his efforts to move closer to the West; combined with severe economic problems limiting GOA budgetary ability to acquire new weapons systems, we must acknowledge that military relationship will move slowly, even without cautious U.S. approach.

4. Opening Remarks—Lehovich:

— Military relationship with Algeria has expanded gradually since 1979 to include an exchange of defense attaches, initiation of an IMET program, U.S. Navy ship visits, commercial C–130 sales, and a Presidential Determination making Algeria eligible for defense purchases under FMS procedures.

— Within the past year, we also have signed a GSOMIA and started the training of Algerian pilots.

— These actions represent measured response to improved bilateral relations and Algeria’s expressed interest in diversifying its heretofore predominant dependence on the Soviets and East Bloc for military equipment and training.

— We have reviewed Algerian arms requests on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the regional military balance and security interests with Morocco.

— Record to date has been one of denying requests for advanced weapons and approving sales only of non-sensitive items; denying weapons and/or deleting advanced and sensitive components from weapons systems predictably has lessened Algerian interest in purchasing equipment.

— An interagency exchange on this subject is overdue and today’s meeting gives us an opportunity to review the evolution of the military supply relationship, examine previous decisions on Algerian requests and licensing applications from U.S. commercial firms, and discuss possible progress in our military relationship with Algeria.

5. Key Points/Themes Raised by Participants:

• The “shopping list” of requested military items presented at the time of the 1985 Bendjedid visit consisted exclusively of air force items; the air force leadership change may have affected that service’s desires and willingness to shift toward the West. The army may not be as interested.

— In any case, the diversification desired by the Algerians is not, as some think, a replacement of Warsaw Pact sources by Western sources. The Algerians are not “chasing us”, they will go slow, and they are very picky shoppers.

• Algerians have been very specific, looking for items with special capabilities; regarding these sensitive items, we must address whether the presence of about 800 Soviet advisers in Algeria remains a major worry and whether Moroccan concerns will be aroused by such sales (Note: At this point, DAS Ussery reiterated point that “Moroccan paranoia, and for that matter, Algerian paranoia”, cannot be affected by the U.S.; we must determine sales questions in USG interest).

• Is anyone assuming that sales of sensitive technology to the Algerians would result in an “automatic pass” to the Soviets? (Note: No response offered by any participant). If not, we should assume that we have a valid GSOMIA.

• Does a GSOMIA imply “automatic access to a certain level of classification?” (Note: Answer from several respondents was “no”).

• DOD is concerned that we still do not have a good feel for Algerian “needs”. What uses do the Algerians see for equipment. Also, we need better guidance on how to proceed with sales issues.

• Getting each others’ feedback and improving communication on the sales questions is indeed a problem and is a major reason for this meeting. A regular meeting might be profitable (bimonthly, perhaps?) and consultation among other players outside of the meeting context would be desirable, particularly where a sales request appears to have opposition. Could there not be a quick consultation before action occurs?

• Licensing process does indeed break down in giving little feedback on the “why” and “who objected”. It is important to remember, however, that this is not a “veto” process; a case can be pursued further and pushed forward if arguments overriding a denial are sufficiently persuasive.

• PM has responsibility for managing the process, but this does not rule out active participation of the regional bureau and the desk.

6. Follow Up Actions Agreed To by Participants:

• Sale of C–130H with some type of EW and recon capability can be reconsidered. (Note: shortly before meeting date, Lockheed representatives told NEA/AFN and PM/SAS officers that they remain interested in submitting this request and consider Algeria their best potential customer in North Africa).

• Parachute and paradrop kits have been approved for sale, but present procurement timetable could mean 12–18 months for delivery, thus lessening Algerian interest. Examination will be made of possible expedited procurement from existing stocks.

• Sale of RPV (Northrop Chukar III), with photo recon capability can be reconsidered.

• No objection voiced to sale of armored cars (Cadillac Gage) and similar low-tech items; sale can be reconsidered.

• Objections to TOW remain strong.

• Upgrades of Soviet equipment (MIG 21 and T–55) are probably moot from Algerian perspective, but are being reviewed.

• Offices clearing munition list licenses were encouraged to notify PM/MC that a denial letter should not be sent until PM/MC recontacts offices which have granted approval.

• In general, climate now appears better for consideration of Algerian purchases requests given improved bilateral dialogue, signing of GSOMIA, and other factors.

7. List of Participants:

• NEA, E. Michael Ussery
• PM, Vlad Lehovich
• NEA/AFN, David E. Zweifel, Richard V. Fisher
• PM/SAS, James Pierce, Blair L. Murray
• PM/ISP, Col. Denis J. Kiely
• NEA/RA, Col. John Bircher
• T, Stan Sienkiewicz
• S/P, Ellen Laipson
• INR/NESA, Janean Mann
• ACDA/NWC, Joe Clare, Edmund S. Finegold
• OSD/ISA, CDR. Tim Hartung, John Norris
• OSD/DTSA/M, Len Altman, Wolfgang Maier, Robert Witter
• OSD/DTSA/MC, Howard Gardiner
• OSD/DSAA, LTCOL Mike Simpson, Dave Monahan
• OJCS/J5, MAJ Jerry Thompson

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870183–0436. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Richard Fisher (NEA/AFN); cleared by James Pierce (PM/SAS); approved by Zweifel. Sent for information Priority to Rabat and Moscow.
2. See Document 130.
3. See Documents 147 and 148.