166. Information Memorandum From the Director of Policy Planning (Solomon) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Improving Relations with Algeria
SUMMARY: Our long-term interests in North Africa are served by a non-radical, increasingly moderate Algeria, and our influence might help reinforce favorable trends in this direction. That process will be long and slow, but we should move to advance the effort begun when President Benjedid visited Washington in 1985. In particular, we should look for ways to expand our bilateral contacts and programs in trade and security areas. END SUMMARY.
Algeria: An Alternative We Should Consider2
There are two reasons why we should focus on Algeria. First, the prospects for instability in and among the countries of North Africa suggests that we should develop as many options as possible in our relations with the region. Experience has shown the need for alternatives when a key country we have long relied on in a region (in this case, either Morocco or Tunisia) becomes unexpectedly unstable. Algeria now presents us with certain opportunities to broaden our ties with an important North African state.
The second reason relates to changes in Algeria’s domestic and foreign policies. The current leadership’s pragmatism has led to two major policy changes since 1979: a diversification of its military supplies and training away from excessive reliance on the Soviets; and an expansion of economic ties with the West. The latter development reflects a change in basic attitudes about the state’s role in economic activities, clearly an area in which we can have influence.
In its foreign policy, Algeria selectively seeks to play a pragmatic role in regional and international politics and conflicts; on other issues (e.g. South Africa) its positions remain unshakably ideological. Algeria’s essential middleman role in securing the release of our hostages in Iran, its early efforts to mediate the Iran-Iraq war, and [Page 370] its current activities to help Chad and end Libyan domination there demonstrate its concern about regional stability, and suggest there may be additional opportunities for us to cooperate.
Potential Pitfalls: There are two important policy concerns that must be addressed in order to proceed with improvements in our relations with Algeria. One is managing our sharp ideological differences over certain issues, including Algeria’s willingness to allow convicted terrorist Abu Abbas to come to Algiers from time to time to participate in events aimed at uniting Palestinian leadership. The Algerians must understand that major improvements in our relationship will be affected by their actions and policies toward Arab radical causes and the terrorism factor.
The second concern is maintaining the relationship we want with Morocco. We see no reason why an improved relationship with Algeria should affect our ties with Morocco, and we should avoid letting our policy toward one become linked to policy toward the other. The excellent relationship we enjoy with King Hassan is based on Morocco’s desire to be firmly in the pro-western camp, not on support for Morocco against Algeria. We must avoid being drawn into the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, especially when the protracted war in the western Sahara heats up and we are pressured to abandon our policy of neutrality toward the war.
Where Can We Work Together?
In 1985, we agreed with President Benjedid to expand our bilateral relations.3 The momentum in that initiative has waned. We should reinvigorate that process, identifying ways to increase cooperation with Algeria gradually and in non-controversial areas. Movement may be possible on economic and trade issues, already of great interest to the Algerians, and we should be ready to move up the ladder on military cooperation.
Trade and Economic Issues: The Algerians are rightly eager to diversify their exports away from hydrocarbons. We can help the Algerians identify promising areas for export promotion, as we have done with the Turks. It is important to steer them away from areas where protectionist sentiment is high, such as steel, and try to identify unexploited markets for their products in the U.S. Algeria is already an important and expanding market for American agricultural commodities.
We can also work together to enhance their agricultural productivity through improved technology. We have shown our willingness to finance pilot farm projects. This is a promising area and provides us a chance to contribute to one of their most acute needs—greater food self-reliance. [Page 371] Strengthening relationships in the economic area also serves to reinforce privatization trends currently favored among Algeria’s leaders.
Regional Cooperation: We should continue to work together on the Chad problem. Algeria permitted overflights to resupply Habre, and we should demonstrate support for their efforts to promote reconciliation among Chadian factions as part of an OAU peace plan. While we are skeptical about prospects for real Chadian unity, it is important to complement the French-U.S. military support for Habre with a political process. Our support for their approach on Chad now may have dividends for us later, in Algeria and with Africa generally, if Algeria succeeds in its bid for the OAU presidency next year.
Security and Arms: We, in effect, agreed to help Algeria diversify its arms supply away from the Soviets when we made them FMS-eligible in 1985. Since then, we have repeatedly rejected their arms requests; and we had to deflect a premature discussion of F–16s last year. We need to get both sides focused on more achievable goals, such as increased training programs, aerial surveillance equipment and low-tech ground forces equipment. Appropriate agencies and bureaus are reexamining the list of Algerian requests with an eye to approving some non-controversial items. We support this, with the understanding that the long-term future of this supply relationship hinges on our increased confidence about Algerian policy attitudes in the Middle East and Africa.
- Source: Department of State, S/P Records, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Correspondence Files: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons: March 1987. Confidential. Drafted on March 5 by Ellen Laipson (S/P). Solomon wrote: “Dick” next to his name on the “From” line. A stamped notation at the top of the memorandum reads: “GPS.” Pascoe also initialed the memorandum and wrote: “3/10.”↩
- Shultz wrote: “I agree GPS” in the right-hand margin. A typed notation below this reads: “I agree. GPS 3/12/87.”↩
- See Document 147.↩