Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

130. Telegram From the Embassy in Algeria to the White House and the Department of State¹

3937.

Algiers, September 15, 1983, 1145Z

Tunis for Vice President’s Party. Subject: Vice President’s visit to Algeria: Meeting With Prime Minister Abdelghani.

1. S/Exdis—Entire text.

2. Vice President, accompanied by his working party, met September 14 with Prime Minister Abdelghani at the Palais du Gouvernement. Algerian participation included Minister of Planning Brahimi, Ambassador Yaker, and MFA Director for Europe and North America Chitour.

3. Abdelghani warmly welcomed the Vice President, calling his visit a major event in the history of our bilateral relations, one which would contribute substantially to the beginning of a new era. The GOA is ready to actively examine all possibilities for enlarging bilateral cooperation and giving it new elan and new dimensions. The Prime Minister recalled Algeria’s non-aligned position, a cardinal principal enshrined in the national charter. In that context, Algeria is working to consolidate its independence as well as for peace, progress and the liberty of peoples still under domination. The GOA is ready for fruitful, balanced, mutually beneficial relations with all those who accept cooperation on a reasonable and equitable basis. Abdelghani underlined the importance which Algeria attached to the diversification of its contacts as well as to efforts to better our bilateral exchanges and reinforce our mutual cooperation.

4. The Vice President emphasized our total respect for the principles of non-alignment and national independence, stressing that the U.S. seeks the best possible relations with all the nations of the Maghreb. Finally, the Vice President thanked Abdelghani for the very warm welcome extended by the GOA.

5. Turning to the Middle East, the Vice President said the U.S. understands Algeria’s position that there can never be true peace until a solution is found to the Palestinian problem. In our view, the President’s Sept 1 initiative is not dead—many countries agree with its general thesis and with a number of its specific points. The situation in Lebanon in particular has prevented progress toward a general Middle East settlement. The U.S. seeks a Lebanon free of all foreign forces. Syria, however, is now obstructing progress in refusing to honor the Lebanese request for the withdrawal of Syrian forces. Israel certainly poses some difficult problems, but at this moment it is Syria that needs to cooperate. The U.S. does not want to see its marines in combat, but its forces are there in the MNF context and will defend themselves as necessary, protected by U.S. forces in the region.

6. Abdelghani replied that until the Palestinian problem is resolved, peace in the Middle East will not be possible. This problem has been at the root of Middle East upheavel since 1948.

7. The Vice President agreed, saying the President’s initiative was unique for the U.S. in recognizing the need to get to the heart of the Palestinian question through negotiations. Speaking frankly, he said that it is impossible for the U.S. to deal with an organization—the PLO—whose very charter still calls for the destruction of the Zionist entity. The U.S. cannot in good conscience negotiate with an organization that would destroy a good friend.

8. The Prime Minister said that intermediaries can never be as effective as the principal parties themselves. In any case, Israel’s existence cannot be realistically threatened militarily. He concluded with the thought that the U.S. could greatly influence Israel.

9. The Vice President replied that Israel’s existence is a fact. It cannot be destroyed militarily and therefore the PLO loses nothing by abandoning its call for Israel’s destruction—only then would negotiations with the U.S. be possible. The Vice President concluded that we very much need this dialogue which could come from a changed PLO position.

10. Abdelghani thanked the Vice President again for his visit and expressed the hope for continued progress in the bilateral relationship. He mentioned the proposed joint economic commission as a useful tool for expanding the U.S.-Algerian dialogue.

11. Murphy and Gregg have seen this msg.

Newlin

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830573–0711. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.