Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XXIV, North Africa

164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations¹

60064.

Washington, March 3, 1987, 2045Z

Following State 60064 rpted for your info sent action

Algiers info Rabat Tunis dtd Mar 2: QTE: SECRET State 60064.

SUBJECT

• Ambassador Walters Visit to Algiers.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Summary: Ambassador Walters was given red carpet treatment in Algiers, affording him excellent opportunity to convey US position on UN and regional issues to highest levels of GOA. In meetings with Foreign Minister Ibrahimi and President Bendjedid, Walters underlined US concerns over Algeria’s voting record in the UN and made clear the strength of US views on the Cuba resolution in the UNHRC.² On Iran-Iraq war, Walters confronted Algerian misimpression that US policy has a pro-Iranian tilt stressing US support for quote a solution in which there is no winner or loser unquote. On Western Sahara issue Walters was supportive of UNSYG de Cuellar’s efforts. Algerians also expressed support for UN Sahara effort. On UN voting issues they agreed to closer consultation and, somewhat surprisingly, to review voting record and try to be more helpful. Ambassador Walters found President Bendjedid far more secure and confident in his position than in any previous encounter, and the Algerians themselves more open and less “gray” than previously. End summary.

3. Issues covered during visit:

A. Irangate—Walters took on Irangate issue head on,³ explaining to Algerians in each meeting that a U.S. Government could be overturned by a domestic affair such as Watergate but that foreign policy issue such as Iran affair could pose no threat to government. He thought the issue would continue to draw press attention for another three months before blowing over. Algerians took comments on board without comment.

B. Iran-Iraq War: Issue was a preoccupation to all interlocutors. Ibrahimi, playing something of a devil’s advocate, said that Algeria was convinced that the U.S. was playing the Israeli game of promoting an Iranian victory to destabilize the Arab countries. Walters rejected the notion, pointing out that Israel would face grave risks if Iran emerged triumphant from the war. Walters stressed U.S. policy of seeking a political solution which had neither victorious nor defeated parties. President Bendjedid used same formula in describing GOA policy.

C. Chad and Libya: Issue was touched on in all meetings. Ibrahimi said GOA was trying to foster reconciliation between Habre and Goukouni as a step that would facilitate withdrawal of foreign forces. He said Goukouni was quite flexible, acknowledging Habre’s leadership and expressing willingness to accept need for French pressure in Chad as long as Libyan forces remained. At previous evening dinner in Walter’s honor (attended by high level representatives of MOD and MFA), MFA SecGen Hamdani was less upbeat on Habre’s willingness to reconcile with Goukouni. Hamdani thought Habre reluctant to take steps necessary for reconciliation. Algerians all agreed that the Aouzou strip problem should be put on ice for a while, possibly by referring it to international arbitration.

D. Middle East Peace: Bendjedid issued plea for U.S. to allow holding of international conference as a means of stimulating peace process. Walters reviewed U.S. policy.

E. Tunisia: The Algerians engaged in much handwringing over the succession issue, expressing hope that the Tunisians would sort out their affairs in keeping with constitutional norms.

F. Western Sahara: Walters put the emphasis on the UN SecGen efforts, noting that the latter had been pleased by his recent visit to Algeria. Walters thought the problems would boil down to who voted in the U.N.-controlled referendum and what would happen to Moroccan forces. He noted that a formula had been found for Namibia which involved withdrawal of some forces, and cantonment of others. General Belkheir (at dinner) offered no comment to this, whereas Ibrahimi appeared to be pressing for the withdrawal of all Moroccan forces before a referendum could be held. Walters opined that the King could not accept such an action. Ibrahimi threw cold water on the possibility of a Hassan-Bendjedid meeting, noting that it was too soon after Ifrane. He left the door open to a meeting between himself and Hassan, although complained that the Moroccans were telling others that Algeria had rejected this Moroccan offer. Despite the apparent roadblocks, all Algerian interlocutors expressed hope that de Cuellar’s mission could proceed and succeed.

G. UN voting: There were lively exchanges throughout visit on Algeria’s voting record. Walters pressed the point tactfully, citing statistics. Ibrahimi, after considerable barter, said that Algeria would look to see how the record might be improved. On South Africa, Walters defended the U.S. voting record in the face of Algerian complaints. He pointed out the practical irreversibility of a mandatory sanctions vote and the fact that the U.S. was the first country to impose sanctions.

4. Ambassador Walters cleared the summary only of this cable. Whitehead Unqte.

Whitehead

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D870162–0414. Secret. Repeated from telegram 60064 to Algiers, March 2. The March 3 version was sent for information to USUN. Drafted by Ellen Ivie (IO/UNA); cleared by Zweifel; approved by Hugh Montgomery (IO/UNA). Sent for information to Rabat and Tunis.
2. Reference is to UN Human Rights Council Draft Resolution E/CN.4/1987/L.29 submitted by the United States on February 24, which called for the Government of Cuba “to ensure that all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction are guaranteed effective enjoyment of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms” and “to allow any Cuban who might wish to leave or return to Cuba without hindrance, especially in those cases involving the reunification of families.”
3. See footnote 2, Document 163.