Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 5, 1986, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NST Experts Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador P. Nitze
  • Ambassador M. Kampelman
  • Ambassador E. Rowny
  • Ambassador M. Glitman
  • Ambassador R. Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel R. Linhard
  • Mr. N. Clyne
  • Mr. M. Mobbs
  • Mr. B. Burton
  • Mr. P. Afanasenko, Interpreter

• Soviet

  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador Y. Dubinin
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • Colonel General N. Chervov
  • Lieutenant General N. Detinov
  • Mr. S. Chuvakhin
  • Mr. Y. Zolotov, Interpreter
  • Mr. A. Voytenkov, Interpreter

Ambassador Nitze opened the Friday, September 5 discussions by welcoming the Soviet delegation and its head, Ambassador Karpov. Before proceeding with the discussions Nitze allowed a group of press people to come in for a few minutes for a photo session.

Once the press had departed, Nitze welcomed the Soviet side to Washington, expressed his hope that the Soviet delegation had had a good trip from Moscow and thanked the Soviet side for the hospitality it had accorded the U.S. delegation on its last trip to Moscow.² Nitze said he looked to productive discussions in the next two days and hoped that it would allow for possibilities for progress at the next NST session in Geneva. Nitze said that as had been the case at the Moscow meeting, the U.S. side saw this meeting as an opportunity to assist the two Foreign Ministers when they met for the next time in September in Washington. Nitze said he did not see any need for going over old ground and explaining old positions. He said that at this session the sides were exploring the opportunity to achieve progress. Nitze said the U.S. side had carefully reviewed the record of the Moscow discussions and it believed that it had answered questions posed to it by the Soviet side. However, some of the questions that the U.S. side had asked of the Soviets, he believed, still remained to be answered. Nitze said he proposed the sides proceed with the program of today. Nitze said he wanted to stress the importance of these two days of discussions and of the next round which was to begin in Geneva on September 18. At this point, he turned the floor over to Ambassador Karpov.

Karpov thanked Nitze and said that the Soviet side was counting on U.S. hospitality to help in the Washington talks so that results could be achieved in this round of consultations, unlike the Moscow round where the Soviet side had offered practical solutions but which had not resulted in any agreement. Karpov said that, from the beginning, he would not set a tone but merely wanted to say that he could not agree to Nitze’s assessment that results had been achieved at the previous meeting. He said that if the U.S. side’s silence was meant to assure the Soviet side that progress had been made, this would not be sufficient. He said that the questions that the Soviets had posed in Moscow were still unanswered. Karpov said that the Soviet side had made very truly concrete suggestions as to ways of looking at the possibilities of preparing practical solutions for the upcoming September 19 meeting of the Foreign Ministers. He said that the Soviets had suggested ways of looking at comprehensive solutions in the following way: First, for the sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years while reducing by approximately 30% strategic offensive arms. Karpov said that this Soviet proposal had not met with any positive reaction from the U.S. side and it left the question of how the U.S. side was going to view in a practical way this Soviet proposal in preparation for the next meeting of Foreign Ministers. The Soviet side had expressed its willingness to look at all of the details involved in the non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years, as well as looking at the details of strategic offensive reductions. The Soviet side was prepared to discuss possible compromises and it had told this to the U.S. side. Practically speaking, the three questions asked by the U.S. side at the last session were not truly questions in their essence. In fact, said Karpov, this was merely a way of setting forth U.S. positions in the form of questions on issues of interest to the U.S. side. Karpov proceeded to formulate the premises for the U.S. approach to various issues as the Soviet side perceived them. Karpov said that essentially the U.S. side presented the relevant concepts in the same way as they were approached by the U.S. side in the NST. Karpov said that the sides could continue speaking about each of these concepts; that the sides could discuss large concepts at length; that the sides could discuss each in detail; however, he said that we would like to discuss in general terms these large issues and how they appear today.

Regarding the ABM Treaty, Karpov said he would like to think that the sides were rather close in their attitudes on treaty compliance. In this regard, he said the Soviets’ suggestions were set forth when it proposed non-withdrawal for a period of 15–20 years from the ABM Treaty, meaning that the sides would assume an obligation for such a non-withdrawal. Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to view such an obligation in the context of all of its details and from the perspective of limits on allowed and disallowed activities in the ABM Treaty area if such a detailed review were called for. He said the Soviet side believed very strict compliance with the ABM Treaty included avoiding those prohibited actions such as work on systems such as space-based systems and implementing the reductions of offensive weapons which had been a prerequisite of the ABM Treaty. Therefore, the Soviet side was ready to discuss with the U.S. side a solution that would detail such an obligation on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. Karpov said that he meant that the sides would not carry out activities outside of laboratories—activities not allowed by the ABM Treaty with respect to prohibited systems. Karpov said that it was the Soviet side’s desire that the sides take upon themselves the obligation not to exercise the right to withdraw from the Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. Karpov said that in this context the sides could discuss reductions in strategic offensive arms and agree to reduced levels in a way that the security interests of both sides would be assured. Karpov said that on June 11,³ the Soviet side had made appropriate proposals in the NST and that these proposals were still in force and he would not repeat them. He said that the U.S. side was aware of these Soviet proposals. Karpov wanted to add that the Soviet side was ready to explore possibilities within the framework of those proposals in order to take into account the views of the U.S. side if the U.S. side wishes to have its views taken into account. He said that he wanted to note that the June 11 proposals took into account two U.S. objections to early versions of Soviet proposals: first was the Soviet side’s acceptance of the idea that medium-range missiles capable of reaching the territory of the other side be discussed separately; second, the Soviet side willingness to take into account the U.S. objection to a full ban on all types of cruise missiles of any basing mode. Karpov said that the Soviet side had agreed to allow for a limited deployment of long-range ALCMs and SLCMs. Long-range ground-based cruise missiles could be discussed along with other issues in INF. Karpov said that in this manner the Soviet plan could be discussed in order to move the sides closer together on specific elements. Karpov said that, for example, the Soviet side was ready to review the possibility of limiting ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers to 1600 units. It was ready to limit the weapons on ICBMs, SLBM, and heavy bombers to a total of 8000 units. Karpov said that in such a case the question of concern to the Soviet side of long-range SLCMs could be discussed separately. However, the limit on these types of systems is needed in order to provide for stability in the strategic relationship and in order that agreements not be circumvented. He said that this was necessary in order that limits of future agreements not be exceeded. Karpov said that there was a need to provide strict verification to assure that provisions of future agreements would be met and that the sides would be confident that agreements are complied with.

With respect to medium-range missiles, Karpov said that the Soviet side was ready to discuss a separate solution for U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe—a solution not tied to ABM Treaty compliance or agreements on strategic offensive arms reductions. He said that here, the Soviet side was ready to consider a temporary interim solution which could set up an agreement for a limited period of time with equal limits on the medium-range missiles in Europe of both sides. Karpov said that such a version of an interim solution could be discussed where the U.S. and Soviet sides, for a limited period of time, could have 100 nuclear weapons on their medium-range missiles in Europe. In this manner, the U.S. side could have 25 weapons on their cruise-missile launchers and the Soviet side could have 33 weapons on their SS–20 launchers. The Soviet missiles in the Asian portion of Soviet territory would be frozen at the current level. The question of significantly reducing shorter-range missiles could be dealt with later. Karpov said that such a practical agreement could be achieved in the soonest possible time and the Soviet side would be prepared to discuss this with the U.S. side. Karpov said that the Soviet believed such an agreement could be arrived at now, in time for the September 19 Ministerial meeting. Karpov said that these were the practical answers to the U.S. sides questions posed at the last session.

Karpov added that one other issue of the greatest importance should be discussed in order that the Foreign Ministers meeting could be a success. He said that the cessation of nuclear testing was what he wanted to raise. He said that the U.S. side knows full well that the Soviet Union once again announced an extension of its moratorium on nuclear testing to January 1, 1987 and that it had asked the U.S. to join it and follow its example in stopping testing. Karpov said that he had a direct instruction from Foreign Minister Shevardnadze that he, Karpov, raise this issue at today’s meeting. Karpov said that Shevardnadze attaches the greatest importance to the discussion of this issue and intends to discuss it also in his meeting with the Secretary of State. Karpov said that the Soviet side is prepared to come to an agreement with the U.S. regarding a joint agreement on a bilateral basis which would provide that the sides take upon themselves the obligation not to test nuclear weapons. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss all verification measures to assure that all of the provisions of such an agreement are being carried out. Karpov said that at the start of the first round of consultations, the U.S. had spoken of new approaches, new solutions, and that the test ban could be such a solution. Karpov said that verification systems could include things like: national technical means, seismic means, and international measures of checking on compliance. He said that the Soviet side had even agreed to a proposal by the Delhi Six countries to help verify a nuclear test ban. Karpov said that they were prepared to establish an experts group which would include the U.S., the Soviet Union and the Delhi Six countries to consider verification measures in detail. He noted that such a test ban had been a subject of discussion in bilateral talks as well as in the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet side, for example, believes that it is important that progress be achieved in the exchange of seismic data to assist in the verification of a test ban. The Soviet side is also ready to proceed in the direction of setting up a dependent verification system. The Soviet side proposes to agree even now in order to come up with an agreement in principle assuming that the U.S. and USSR are both prepared to find a solution in which the test ban would be carried out under the strictest international verification measures.

Karpov said that the U.S. side knows very well that General Secretary Gorbachev, in his discussions with President Reagan, had expressed his willingness to sign a relevant agreement on this issue. Therefore, said Karpov, the Soviet side is proposing to discuss this issue in order to recommend it to the Foreign Ministers for discussion. This was the whole range of issues that the Soviet side wanted to discuss in Washington for these two days in order to work out practical recommendations for the Foreign Ministers. Karpov said that in the Soviet view the meeting of Foreign Ministers was a key element of the discussion of questions that would come up at the summit. Karpov said that today’s meeting was key in the preparation of subjects for the summit between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan. The Soviet side attaches great meaning to success at the summit and wishes to reach an accord on this important question. Karpov said that the Soviet side is prepared to work, and told Nitze that this was what he wanted to say in his opening remarks.

Nitze responded by stating that he was not surprised but disappointed by what he heard from Karpov. He said that the Moscow meeting foreshadowed this Soviet approach in the sense that the Soviet side says it wants to take practical steps in these negotiations by starting with Soviet proposals and not U.S. proposals. He said he had heard nothing about U.S. proposals; that there was no reference to the President’s letter. Incidentally, were there going to be answers from General Secretary Gorbachev to the President’s letter?

Karpov said that indeed there would be an answer to the President’s letter and, to a significant degree, the nature of the answer would depend on how the present consultations ended up.

Returning to the substance of the talks, Nitze wanted to comment on Karpov’s statements. He said that Karpov’s words contained very little in addition to what had been contained in previous presentations and the discussions that had been held previously in Geneva. There was nothing new with respect to a nuclear test moratorium and he suggested that the sides could return to this question later. Nitze said that on the issue of START, there was nothing new; on Defense and Space there was nothing new; whereas, on INF, there was something new mainly the number of 100 weapons not mentioned previously. Nitze said that at first glance what the Soviets were proposing was 100 RVs on cruise missiles for the U.S. and 100 RVs on SS–20 missiles for the Soviet Union. He said he heard nothing at all concerning missiles in Asia. Regarding the ABM Treaty he understood the Soviets to be proposing maintaining the ABM Treaty and not making any changes in the Treaty, but there would be an agreement not to withdraw from the Treaty for 15 years, an issue which Article XV of the Treaty is aimed at addressing. This, said Nitze, would be a change in the Treaty. Nitze proposed that the way to proceed would be to break the discussion into parts, starting with INF, an area of great interest and an area where he said he detected something new.

Karpov said that apparently Nitze had not listened carefully to what he said either on the ABM Treaty or on START. Karpov said that he had spoken about reaching an agreement on full compliance with the Treaty for a period of 15 years by the sides’ assuming an additional obligation of non-withdrawal—not changing anything in the Treaty the way it is now. Regarding strategic offensive arms, Karpov wanted to point out that the Soviet side was offering 1600 units of delivery vehicles to include ICBMs, SLBM, and heavy bombers where the number of weapons on these would be limited to 8000 units. This would include RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as weapons on heavy bombers, including long-range cruise missiles. Karpov said that a separate agreement to limit sea-based long-range cruise missiles could be arrived at. Such an offer took into account the U.S. position where it objected to the idea that the total number of weapons also include sea-based cruise missiles. Karpov said that the Soviet side had made a large concession to the U.S. side. He said that it was not clear to him why his presentation contained nothing new.

Ambassador Glitman said that in posing its question on INF in Moscow, the U.S. side was not attempting to repeat our position, but to determine from the Soviet answer whether the sides were in the same ball park on this question. He wanted to answer Karpov’s comments in that light. He said that since the question was short he would repeat it. At this point Glitman read the INF question as stated at the Moscow meeting:

Can we promptly reach a separate, interim agreement on INF missiles which results in equal levels on LRINF missile systems in Europe at some level above zero, while also making proportional reductions elsewhere in the world, resulting in an equal worldwide ceiling on LRINF warheads worldwide?

Glitman said on the plus side both sides were now speaking of a separate and interim agreement on LRINF and with an equal level of warheads on the number of their LRINF systems in Europe. The Soviet proposals on limiting or freezing Soviet LRINF in Asia at current levels follows a ½ plus, ½ minus category. There is a ½ plus because there is a recognition that Soviet missiles in Asia do have an impact on a possible INF agreement and there is a ½ minus because there still appears no readiness to reduce these missiles. Glitman said that the Soviet suggested interim solution would be for a limited time and as he wanted to better understand the suggestion he would like to know at what level the Soviet side would freeze its missiles in Asia. In addition, he wanted to better understand what period of time the Soviet side has in mind when it talks about “limited time.” Glitman also asked what Karpov had in mind when he said short-range INF missiles were to be dealt with later. Here Glitman said he had no more questions, simply other points to make. The first, noting that Karpov had mentioned verification in regard to START but not in regard to INF, was to confirm that the Soviet side would treat verification in the area of INF with the same importance as START. He said he hoped it would, as verification is an important issue for the U.S. Secondly, for now he wished to put aside the question of the mix of systems that Nitze had referred to.

On the question of overall limits or a freeze on missiles in Asia, Karpov said that now the Soviet missiles in Asia have been frozen for some time and will not be raised in number above today’s level. He asked what sense it made to discuss SRINF missiles now if the sides were ready to discuss SRINF systems with a range of less than 1000 kilometers after a decision on an interim agreement had been reached. He asked whether Glitman could clarify this for him. On the issue of verification, Karpov said that the Soviet side proposed verification in the interim agreement and would be prepared to review in detail and with great care verification in other areas in the same way as it deals with verification in START.

Karpov continued by saying that he would also like to address the interim agreement on INF since the U.S. has expressed its desire to discuss the question of INF limitations in Europe as well as equalizing the number of RVs on medium-range missiles. Karpov said that if the U.S. is ready to reach an agreement on INF in Europe, he would be ready to discuss the idea of not going above the number of missiles capable of reaching the territory of the other side and that the U.S. would have the right, in terms of the numbers of RVs, to have medium-range missiles not greater than the number of Soviet missiles in Asia. However, these U.S. missiles would have to be located on the territory of the continental U.S. but not in Alaska.

Glitman went back to the first issue that Karpov had raised, the question Karpov had not answered. He told Karpov that the question he had not answered was at what levels the Soviet side would be willing to freeze its Asian missiles. He said it would be useful to know this Soviet level to evaluate the Soviet proposal.

Karpov interjected by saying that the Soviet freeze would be at today’s level and if necessary he would provide the specific number at a later time. He said it was really more important now to say that the Soviet side was prepared not to increase the number of SS–20s in the Asian portion of the Soviet Union. Glitman retorted that, of course, this could be discussed when appropriate, however he wanted to ask the same question one more time because this was an appropriate moment. He said that Karpov had the specific number and that if the U.S. side is to have a better understanding of global limits, it would be very useful to have this number. He said that if Karpov could not provide the specific number now, he should say so, and we could go on with the discussions.

Karpov said that he simply did not bring this number with him from Moscow and wondered if it was really that important. He said that in principle the sides could get along without this number at this stage of the game. Glitman said he understood and went on to say that the U.S. proposal was based upon proportional reductions. Moving to the shorter-range INF issue, Glitman said he wanted to know what Karpov meant by his phrase “after an interim agreement.” He said that this caused a serious problem because, although the U.S. side believed in constraints on shorter-range INF missiles, it wanted to impose such restraints concurrently with those on longer-range INF missiles. He added that the Soviet side knew the reasons for this very well. Basically, Glitman said, this was aimed at not undercutting the effectiveness of a future agreement. Speaking personally, Glitman said that if the sides are able to arrive at such an agreement, there could be follow-on negotiations that included these systems and he added that without additional agreements on SRINF constraints the effectiveness of the interim INF agreement would be undermined. Glitman said the U.S. side had offered two ways of reaching a solution. If the Soviet Union was ready to discuss reductions at a later date it should also be ready to agree to constraints on them now. Glitman said that for the U.S. side this was a fundamental point.

Karpov said that he thought the Soviet solution for an interim agreement was a sufficiently weighty contribution without also bringing in other things such as shorter-range issues. Glitman said we were not seeking to complicate the issue, but SRINF missiles were part of the INF problem and could not be dealt with “later.”

At this point Nitze announced a 5–10 minute coffee break, during which time various groups of participants spoke in an informal fashion.

Nitze returned to the discussions by saying that he felt that some progress had been made in clarifying INF issues. He then invited Ambassador Lehman to talk on the subject of START. Lehman said that our two countries had discussed many issues for many years and the U.S. side understands that discussions can be held in a long or short form while presenting each side’s points of view. He said he would like to continue the business-like tone in which the discussions were proceeding and would like to get to specific questions. He said that there are big questions and specific questions. At the last meeting in Moscow, the sides had asked big questions. He said that it was possible to reach agreements on arms reductions that recognize and take into account differences in weapons systems and that such recognition can enhance stability. He said that he wished to go from this way of speaking to more specific questions before the sides today. Lehman said that when the sides talk to each other they often talk in shorthand or in other code in order to be efficient in their discussions. For example, he said that in the June 11 proposal, the Soviet proposal on SLCMs was expressed in a short, brief fashion. He wanted to apologize for the way in which he asked his question in a shorthand manner but said that he would return to it later.

Lehman said that the Soviet side knew the U.S. position on SLCMs, that they were not central to our dealings at the negotiations. The question of verification, however, is serious. Lehman said that he did not want SLCMs to become an obstacle to reaching an agreement on offensive forces. He said it was not necessary that the sides talk about SLCMs at this time. Of all nuclear systems mentioned above, said Lehman, the SLCM issue could be eliminated. Lehman recalled that the Soviets separately said that now certain systems should be put off until later but must be included ultimately to avoid circumvention of a possible agreement. He asked for a clarification of this.

Karpov said that if one were not to limit long-range cruise missiles then there was a chance that they would grow and be deployed in an unrestrained manner. This would include the unrestrained growth and deployment of weapons on nuclear delivery vehicles. Therefore, it was the belief of the Soviet side that limits on long-range SLCMs are a substantial element in any START agreement. That is why the Soviet side had early on offered to include these types of SLCMs in the numbers allowed for each side. Karpov said that since the U.S. saw difficulties with this situation, the Soviet side agreed to discuss and reach agreement on long-range SLCMs separately, on the premise that each side have levels numerically equal and that both sides agree to discuss them.

Lehman asked whether it was correct that the number of 8000 in the June 11 proposal was still in force. Karpov responded in the affirmative. Lehman then asked whether or not a separate SLCM agreement would be on numbers outside of the 8000 units. Again Karpov said that that was correct. In regard to intermediate-range systems in the June 11 proposal, Lehman said that INF talks had been carried out; however, there were no specifics in the June 11 proposal that our side would freeze these missiles unilaterally based on the levels in effect on September 1, 1985. Here Lehman asked for a clarification from the Soviet side. Karpov queried as to what Lehman specifically meant when he talked about the U.S. freezing LRINF missiles at the level of September 1, 1985, to which Lehman said that this was a date suggested by the Soviet side. Karpov explained that the Soviet side used the date of September 1, 1985 as a date from which to count the numbers of units capable of reaching the territory of the other side. He said that when the Soviet side talks of 50% reductions it takes an arbitrary figure of 3300 units which include the intermediate-range nuclear systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side and from that ends up with a number of U.S. units equivalent to 1650. He said the Soviet side spoke of the number of units based on the September 1, 1985 date and separately spoke of those U.S. systems deployed after 1985. These post-1985 units would also be reduced but would be reduced, so to speak, even beyond the first series of reductions, namely, the pre-September 1, 1985 units. Overall, the reduced level would give the U.S. 1650 units.

Further, regarding the non-increase in INF systems capable of reaching the territory of the other side, Karpov said the June 11, 1986 proposal did not choose a date, but called only for not increasing the numbers that actually existed at that time. Lehman asked whether or not those elements of the Soviet proposal remained unchanged and asked for a comment. Karpov said that, in fact, this is what the Soviet side maintains and it continues to speak on behalf of the following two proposals. First, that the 50% reductions would proceed from the counts of September 1, 1985 and second, that the June 11, 1986 proposal on an interim START agreement and an agreement on INF would presuppose, say, approximately 30% reductions. In discussing both of these propositions, Karpov said that, yes, the Soviet side is talking about the same thing.

Lehman said that the Soviet side understands the U.S. position and there is no need to repeat it at the present time; the U.S. side believes our systems are in Europe to defend NATO and not to act as offensive systems. He added that it is our hope that the Soviet Union would show the same kind of constraint in regard to its own systems aimed at NATO. Lehman said that U.S. efforts in the START negotiations are not encumbered by these systems and that there is no productive way of dealing with this question within START. For this, we have the INF talks which are ongoing. Lehman quoted the Soviet side as having said that limits on heavy bombers would include limits on the cruise missiles on such heavy bombers. He asked whether or not this was a specific limit on ALCMs.

Karpov said that the role of U.S. medium-range missiles needs no comment. He said that the U.S. side knows the Soviet position on this role and that he would not spend time discussing it. However, Karpov said that the Soviet side cannot close its eyes to the fact that they are in Europe and cannot accept the claim that such missiles are needed in carrying out U.S. obligations to NATO. Karpov said that NATO obligations and other claims have no bearing on the Soviet side. Facts remain facts and the fact is that these missiles are still there. He suggested that the sides go on to discuss how these missiles would affect the solution to strategic weapons.

Moving on, Karpov said that Lehman had asked a specific question on the number of cruise missiles. In response to the question Karpov said the Soviet side did not want a separate sublimit on ALCMs. There should be no more than 60% of the total of nuclear weapons on any category of strategic offensive arms. Karpov said that this was also true of ALCMs. But, bearing in mind the U.S. side’s request to set strict limits on ballistic missiles and on their warheads, the Soviet side is prepared to say that regarding ICBMs and SLBMs no more than 80–85% of the total number of warheads would be on them.

Lehman continued by asking whether he understood Karpov correctly when the latter spoke of SLCMs and nuclear delivery vehicles. He reiterated Karpov’s contention that 1600 would be the limit on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, and he asked whether this applied to SLCM carriers or other systems. Karpov agreed that the 1600 number referred to ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers and that the overall number of 8000 units was the ceiling on the weapons on such delivery vehicles. Lehman continued by saying that was it not true that the 60% sublimit would stay on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers but that an added limit of 80–85% of warheads would apply only to the sum of RVs on ICBMs and SLBMs. Karpov said that this was correct. Lehman asked whether or not the 60% figure applied to ALCMs, to which Karpov replied that the ALCMs would be included in the overall number of warheads that were carried on heavy bombers.

Lehman said that, as Karpov knew, the U.S. position on gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles was that they should not be included. He said that the differences in military capabilities of these as opposed to ballistic missile warheads would in fact have some implication. He said that the U.S. side was ready to discuss the issue of ALCMs but that the U.S. side felt that differentiation of weapons systems in past arms control agreements was based upon real military considerations. In SALT I there was no inclusion of heavy bombers and the weapons on such heavy bombers were not dealt with at all. In SALT II there was an agreement on specific limits on heavy bombers but no limits on bomber loading. He said this was true also with regard to strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limits. Lehman said that where we get into trouble is when we begin to compare short-range attack missiles with the capabilities of defensive systems designed to defend against them. He said that the short range missiles were slow just like bombers but that their yield was much different than the yield of warheads on ballistic missiles. He said that he could go on at length discussing this, but military people know the differences between these systems.

Karpov said that he did not want to get into a theoretical discussion at the present time and would not argue with Lehman. He simply wanted to correct Lehman. Karpov said that SALT I had not discussed heavy bomber limits. SALT II had discussed heavy bomber limits, but the overall number of nuclear weapons on such bombers was not the goal of the SALT II agreement. Now, however, the sides must discuss all strategic systems and strategic systems must include ballistic missile weapons as well as heavy bomber weapons. Lehman said that he did not disagree on what the previous treaties included. Each side understood the position of the other side. However, as an example, he wanted to look at short-range attack missiles and gravity bombs versus the capabilities of slow bombers. Lehman said that there were elements such as alert rates, dual missions, defenses and different payload ranges. He said that in this regard the question of verification becomes complicated. Lehman said that, in the past, ways had been found to deal with these questions and these ways are still appropriate. Lehman said that Karpov had gotten to the big questions which lie ahead and which were raised at the last meeting. However, he did not want to stop Karpov from continuing his analysis, namely, how to find practical ways to consider differences in systems in our agreements.

At this point, General Chervov entered the discussion by saying that it was not possible to use arguments such as “slow-flying” or “slow-falling,” or by using short-range missiles, which are super-fast, as examples. He said that we cannot allow the huge number of warheads that exists today not to be counted. Chervov said that military men know about nuclear attacks and how these can be used as a first strike; they know each type of strategic weapon and the capabilities of each, including short-range missiles, nuclear bombs, and other weapons currently used to equip heavy bombers. He said that it would not be correct to use the differences in planning a strategic situation. He said that one could not but take into account such things as heavy bomber loading. Chervov said that there are also military actions that do not use nuclear weapons. In such a case, heavy bombers with all of their payloads would now become very crucial. Chervov said that one cannot avoid taking such things into account. He added that for military people it is inconceivable how such weapons could be excluded from an arms control agreement. He said that if Lehman had some weighty arguments, the Soviet side could listen. However, for instance, short-range missiles are intended to overcome air defenses in a first strike. It is simply not an argument to say that short-range missiles have no meaning. He said that to deal with these carelessly would be out of the question. Lehman concluded by saying that he had many such questions that he would like to discuss but due to the press of time he would give the floor back to the chairman.

Nitze said that it was his recollection that in discussing the questions and answers earlier, Karpov had said that one cannot ignore the long-range INF missiles in Europe within the START negotiations and that since the missiles were there they must be accounted for. Nitze said it seemed to him that Karpov was making the argument that, within the START context, these missiles must be included. However, said Nitze, Karpov was excluding the Soviet weapons that Amb. Lehman had referred to. Nitze said that this was a one-sided approach. Nitze continued that if Karpov said that LRINF missiles were there then let’s admit it but so are the Soviet missiles. That cannot be denied. Nitze said that such argumentation was not pertinent in these consultations. He said that the real issue was that both U.S. and Soviet weapons should be dealt with and they should be reduced radically, maybe even to zero. Both sides had expressed such an intention. But to say that the weapons of only one side should be counted seemed typical of Karpov’s line of argumentation. Nitze referred then to another point of logic in General Chervov’s presentation when Chervov had commented on the fact that one cannot ignore short-range missiles and gravity bombs on whatever number of bombers there were. Nitze said that no one denies the fact they do exist. However, neither can one deny the reason for them. The reason, said Nitze, was to penetrate air defenses. He said that it was true that air defenses had not been limited. In SALT I, the U.S. said that air-defenses must be limited, in addition to bombers and weapons. Nitze said Chervov had a legitimate concern when he said that bombers could be used in strictly conventional situations. Circumstances might arise where the U.S. and USSR were not in conflict; we then agreed that there might be other needs for air defenses than protecting against strategic attack. Nitze said that the Soviet Union would not agree during SALT I that air defenses should be limited. They said that strategic attacks are not necessarily the same as tactical attacks. Nitze said the fact remains that the sides never had an agreement to limit air defense. The U.S. continues to maintain that in the absence of limitations on air defenses, weapons that are necessary to penetrate air defenses should not be limited. Nitze said that in order to bring his second point to a conclusion he was not proposing to ignore bombers and bomber weapons. The sides do need to discuss numbers of bombers. More importantly, other armaments on bombers are more affected by air defenses than are ALCMs. Nitze said that we need to establish strict limits on ALCMs. The U.S. side proposes a limit 50% below its planned ALCMs.

Nitze said that going back to Lehman’s points, the differences between weapons is important. He said he strongly believed in that argument. He said that it was not a good argument to point to the increasing importance of short-range missiles and gravity bombs. Nitze said that the U.S. side does not equate the capabilities of a Titan missile with the capabilities of warheads on Poseidon submarines or on bombers. They have capabilities that are quite different. The difference between Poseidons on submarines and missiles on our newer submarines is significant. Nitze said that the U.S. side does take into account differences. In an agreement the sides will have to grapple with this. Nitze asked Karpov if the Soviet side would be willing to let the U.S. select the types of Soviet weapons that would come under discussion for reduction. He said he would be amazed if the Soviet side would agree to this. The U.S. side would certainly never agree to something like this. Differences in capabilities must be taken into consideration. Nitze told Karpov that he thought the Soviet side would believe the same thing.

At this point, Amb. Nitze closed the morning discussions and turned the floor over to Mr. Clyne who outlined the plans for lunch and the logistics for the afternoon session.

1. Source: Department of State, Lot 90D397, Ambassador Nitze’s Personal Files 1953, 1972–1989, Box 4, September 1986. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place at the Department of State.
2. See Documents 142, 143, and 144.
3. See Document 134.