Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

143. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 11, 1986, 2:15–6:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Mike Glitman
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Mr. Norman Clyne
  • Mr. Bruce Burton
  • Ms. Priscilla Clapp
  • Mr. Steve Pifer
  • Ms. Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

• Soviet

  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • General N. Chervov
  • General N. Detinov
  • Mr. Tavasenko
  • Mr. Zolotov, Interpreter
  • Mr. Skulkov, Interpreter

Ambassador Nitze began the second half of the day’s meeting by noting that there were a number of questions outstanding from the morning meeting. He said Ambassador Obukhov had raised two questions of which the U.S. side had responded to only one. Ambassador Lehman had asked two questions of the Soviet side which were not yet answered. Nitze thought this would be a good place to start, if Karpov agreed.

Ambassador Karpov said this was fine. Since Obukhov had been the first to ask his question, it should be responded to first.

Nitze asked Obukhov to repeat his question. Obukhov said he would repeat both of them. Nitze said the U.S. side had already addressed one of them. Karpov interjected that Obukhov did not agree.

Obukhov said he wished to repeat both questions because Lehman’s response had gone astray from the substance of his question. Obukhov said this not in order to criticize but to remind Lehman of his questions. His first question was: what specific number of nuclear warheads on strategic offensive arms does the U.S. intend to establish after reductions under the interim 30% solution? Obukhov’s second question was addressed to Assistant Secretary Perle: in considering the possibility of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. links it to the elimination of U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles. In the U.S. concept, what is the place of the nuclear systems of third nuclear powers? Does the U.S. consider this problem in its approach at all?

Lehman responded that he thought he had stated clearly that the U.S. prefers reductions to approximately 50% but is willing to consider lesser reductions. The key issue is how the specific elements of an agreement enhance stability. The issue is not one of numbers, but of how to deal with the most destabilizing systems. The sum is less important than knowing the interrelationship of the parts. This, Lehman said, is part of his question to the Soviet side. The U.S. side is willing to explore a range of approaches, but it does not see how an undifferentiated aggregate could contribute to stability. The sides must take into account differences in systems.

Obukhov replied that he could understand that the U.S. intends to establish a ceiling on nuclear warheads on systems after reductions of strategic offensive arms. Establishing this ceiling is important in itself to prevent a continuation of the arms race in this area.

Lehman responded that he understood this Soviet position that had been stated so many times and in the same way in Geneva. The U.S. position is clear: the U.S. is flexible on the form of an agreement and on the interrelationship of the parts, but in the end it must differentiate between the systems which enhance stability. Lehman hoped this answered Obukhov’s question.

Lehman continued, saying that he had two questions himself. He was prepared to listen to and discuss the Soviet side’s responses. His first question was whether the Soviet side had any new thoughts on how mutually to take into account each side’s concerns regarding stability. He had not asked this question of Chervov at the last meeting. Lehman’s second question was actually several specific questions. Did the Soviet side have ideas on how to take into account U.S. concerns over fast and slow flying systems? Was the Soviet side prepared to limit warheads on ballistic missiles, heavy missiles or their warheads? Lehman said these were questions of a specific nature and he wished to hear the Soviet side’s specific ideas on them.

Chervov replied that the basis for stability at present is and should be the existence of agreements and treaties. The U.S. side now says that the SALT I and SALT II treaties are unfair and do not maintain stability. But it is most strange that although negotiations have been going on for 15 years, the U.S. side has only now understood this. This means that three U.S. administrations and the Soviet government have not understood for 15 years what stability is. But now, Chervov said, the U.S. has “discovered America”—it has discovered a new concept of stability, namely, Soviet heavy missiles. In the ’70s when the U.S. had numerical superiority in nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles, the Soviet side also had heavy missiles, but this issue was not raised then. Now that there is parity in missiles, Chervov continued, the issue is raised. He said that Soviet heavy missiles are like U.S. Trident I and II missiles and like the MX, so the sides should look at all of them. From a military standpoint there is no difference between Soviet heavy missiles and the Trident I, Trident II and MX. The U.S. has already put the MX on alert status. The U.S. side knows the Soviet 30% position—a total number of 1600 delivery vehicles, including heavy missiles. Objectively speaking, they are also subject to reduction. Chervov said the Soviet side would agree to reduce by 30% or 50%, providing there is a ban on space weapons and that the ABM Treaty is strengthened. If missiles exist, the sides should decide the question: would the U.S. agree to preserve the ABM Treaty for a period of 15 years, or does the U.S. side have in mind another time period? Obukhov’s second question concerned the SALT I and SALT II treaties which the U.S. now rejects. Only the ABM Treaty is left. Keeping in mind that treaties and agreements are an important measure of stability, what treaties and agreements does the U.S. side want to see in place of SALT I and SALT II?

Karpov said that the issue of enhancing or not enhancing stability as a result of agreements between the sides is a question of fundamental importance. Of course, the sides must look at what kind of agreements are to be worked out. By itself, the subject of enhancing stability cannot exist in isolation from specific agreements limiting and reducing arms. The Soviet side proposes exploring a specific system of limitations and reductions that meets the objective of enhancing strategic stability. The Soviet 50% reductions proposal, together with a ban on space strike weapons, is the best way to accomplish this.

Chervov stated that this is a fundamental point. The U.S. side always neglects to address the relationship between these two aspects, as if no relationship existed. Without it, he said, no reductions are possible. He warned the U.S. side not to pretend that it is in favor of 50% reductions while the Soviet side is against them. On the contrary, the Soviet 50% proposal (with clarifications to be made later) shows that the Soviet side favors reducing by 50% the number of delivery vehicles, including medium-range systems capable of reaching the territory of other countries, and categorically limiting to 6000 the number of warheads on the delivery vehicles that would be left. The Soviet side sees no possibility for either side to have more than 6000 warheads, but this cannot be said of the U.S. position. The U.S. proposal allows each side to have 15,000 or even more warheads, while at the same time the U.S. speaks of a 50% reduction. This, said Chervov, is strange but true. The sides should not speak of a 50% reduction but of what is realistically possible, including the prospects for enhancing stability. He suggested looking at the Soviet 30% reduction proposal from the viewpoint of whether or not it enhances stability. This new Soviet proposal was submitted on January 11, 1986, and provides for measures which in their totality would lead not only to lowering the level of nuclear confrontation between the sides, but would also enhance stability. One of the ways to substantively ensure strategic stability is to ensure compliance with the ABM treaty for a period of 15 to 20 years. Another element of the Soviet proposal is to reduce nuclear delivery vehicles by 30%, that is, to 1600, while reducing nuclear warheads on them to 8000.

The Soviet side is exploring ways of effectively limiting cruise missiles, Chervov continued, so that there would be no channel for an unchecked buildup of these weapons in the future. This would ensure equal limitations on the arms of both sides and foreclose a channel for building them up, thus enhancing strategic stability in the relationship between our two sides. When we speak of stability, Chervov said, we should speak of it in practical terms. He noted further that the Soviet side does not agree to differentiate systems as more or less destabilizing. This is an artificial and unjustified distinction. The Soviet position is that all strategic weapons pose a threat and therefore limitation must mean reducing them to the lowest level possible. It would be best to reduce them to 50%, but the U.S. position makes this impossible. For this reason the Soviet side is willing to agree to reductions of 30%. Chervov suggested that the sides discuss specific measures for implementing such reductions. The Soviet side proposes establishing clear-cut limits on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, while permitting a certain number of submarines with long-range cruise missiles. This proposal is made with a view to providing for the most effective kind of verification that the Soviet side can imagine. Chervov repeated his assertion that the Soviet side did not agree to break down arms into more or less destabilizing systems. However, in order to consider U.S. concerns, it is prepared to establish limits on individual types of weapons so that no more than 60% of warheads be permitted on a specific type of weapon, for example, ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers or submarines with cruise missiles.

Karpov stated that the U.S. side tends to pick on Soviet heavy missiles as a bete noir. Chervov added that these missiles are in no way different from Trident I, II and MX, and the Soviet side is prepared to agree not to exclude heavy missiles from the reductions. If the U.S. claims there are 308 heavy missiles on the Soviet side, they would be permitted to carry no more than 3000 nuclear warheads out of a total permitted number of 8000 warheads. Chervov said the sides cannot leave only heavy missiles and not other types of arms.

Karpov noted that the limit for delivery vehicles is 1600, not 300. Therefore the question of stability involves a specific agreement providing for a precise combination of enhancing the stability of the ABM treaty over a sufficiently long time period and limiting strategic offensive arms. This would ensure true stability and establish real limitations, ones which were firm and could not be exceeded or gotten around. This would be a practical and reliable way to ensure stability.

Chervov added that this would be included in a specific agreement, not in a general conversation about stability. Nitze said he wished to give Ambassador Lehman an opportunity to speak.

Lehman remarked that Karpov had eloquently repeated the details of the subject matter they have discussed in Geneva. Was Lehman therefore to conclude that Karpov had no new practical thoughts on how to resolve the differences between the sides, and should he report this?

Karpov replied that he did not know what Lehman should report to his government. He suggested reporting that today he, Karpov, had discussed a new approach to which the U.S. had given no response, either in Geneva or elsewhere. He wanted the U.S. side to report this approach to Washington once again, in case Washington had not studied it seriously enough.

Chervov said he had a question to ask Nitze.

Nitze replied that first he wished to speak. He said he was very troubled by Karpov’s and Chervov’s remarks. First of all, Nitze was confused by the references to the MX, Trident I and Trident II as heavy missiles. He had lived through the problem of defining heavy missiles from 1971 down to the present. The U.S. side thought agreement had been reached on a definition at SALT I, but this had been upset by the Soviet side. Then it thought agreement had finally been reached at SALT II. According to this definition, it is clear the MX, Trident I and Trident II are not heavy but light missiles. Karpov claimed that these U.S. missiles perform the same functions as Soviet heavy missiles, but, stated Nitze, this is also incorrect. They are not heavy missiles according to the most recent definition that is in effect. Is there now a change in this definition, Nitze asked? The Soviet side seems to assert that there is no definition of a heavy missile other than a subjective one. Karpov said he would respond by asking a question in return. Now that the U.S. has abandoned the SALT II treaty and the Interim Agreement, is it selectively preserving this one aspect of the treaty?

Nitze said he would respond to this later and continue with what he had been saying. As he understood it, Karpov’s remarks were intended as a response to Lehman’s question. If this was so, Nitze could find no substance in the remarks that resembled a response. They were merely a restatement of positions elaborated in Geneva that had already been discussed and understood in the past. There was nothing new and no change from statements about the Soviet position made in the past.

Nitze recalled Karpov’s question regarding how the U.S. side envisages treaties in the future, apart from the ABM treaty. Nitze said this would depend on what the sides work out. President Reagan has proposed space defense and has proposed developing a treaty now. It is clear that this depends on what the sides are able to work out at the negotiations. Nitze could envisage developing an agreement on space defense, INF and START. He saw no problem in the sides negotiating to find ways to maintain continuing valid agreements between them.

Referring to Perle’s remarks at the morning meeting, Nitze said that Karpov had violently attacked the concept of stability, including tendentious remarks about the year-and-a-half he had spent discussing the concept of stability with Rowny.

Karpov interrupted to say that this was not a concept, but aspects the U.S. side was trying to impose. Nitze rejoined that the Soviet side was trying to impose certain aspects of its own on the issue of stability, and this was one-sided. Over the years a clear understanding has emerged regarding stability. At SALT I there was a clear understanding between the sides on the concept of stability. Nitze agreed that the word “stability” can be used in many senses, but it still has a meaning on the basis of which it can be understood. He thought it was not correct to contend that it is a plaything that can be interpreted in any way. Nitze said he was disappointed at the lack of a response to Lehman’s question.

Karpov replied that he had responded exhaustively to Lehman’s question, contrast to Lehman, who had not answered the Soviet side’s question about the number of nuclear warheads that would be left after 50% reductions. Nor had the U.S. side answered the question of how it would take into account the nuclear weapons of third countries if U.S. and Soviet ballistic missiles were eliminated completely in accordance with U.S. plans for strategic defense.

Nitze replied that he had not yet gotten to this point, but that Perle would answer it. He wished to ask Karpov whether he had initiated the discussion of heavy missiles in order to indicate that a possible agreement would involve a new definition including Trident I on the U.S. side and Soviet missiles of comparable throw weight.

Karpov objected that he had not been the one to bring up the question of heavy missiles.

Nitze said he understood this, but nonetheless wanted an answer from Karpov.

Karpov replied that he had spoken of heavy missiles in connection with Lehman’s questions. Heavy missiles would be affected by reductions to either of the proposed levels, i.e., 50% or 30%. Chervov had pointed out that there was no need to single out this one category of terrible Soviet missiles. The USSR has heavy missiles which in their combat effectiveness are no different from the MX and Trident II, and Karpov agreed with him. Karpov had not spoken of a definition of heavy missiles.

Chervov added that the sides were speaking of two different things.

Karpov continued, saying that he had mentioned the definition of heavy missiles because the U.S. had abandoned the SALT II treaty. He did not know what the definition might be in the future or whether there will be one in future agreements. But since the U.S. has left the SALT II treaty, it must be aware that the definition of heavy missiles will no longer exist as a treaty formulation that took so long to work out. Karpov said he thought the sides were not doing what they should be doing here; they kept getting away from their main task. For four hours this morning and for an hour now they had been talking, but could they say that they had even a handful of material to present to Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze? Had the sides really scraped together any material or not?

Chervov offered the opinion that they had not.

Karpov said the sides would not accomplish their objective if they forgot why they were here. He proposed focusing on specific aspects of the subject matter so as not to digress and not to get into discussions which are not practical. Frankly, what could he report to Shevardnadze about today’s meeting without getting scolded?

Chervov remarked that Karpov would surely be scolded.

After agreeing to Karpov’s suggestion that the discussion continue until six pm, Nitze asked Lehman to take the floor.

Lehman said that he had answered Obukhov’s question when he said that the U.S. preferred reductions to 50%. The Soviet side also has proposed 50% reductions, as well as lesser ones. As Lehman had stated, the U.S. is willing to examine lesser reductions, but what is important is not the total number of nuclear warheads, but the parts and relationships of differentiated systems. For this reason Lehman had asked the Soviet side to share new thoughts on how to resolve the differences on this issue. He hoped the Soviet side was ready to address this issue.

Karpov replied that Lehman’s answer was addressed to a different question than the one he had asked. The Soviet side’s question concerns the so-called 50% reduction, but actually what is involved is a build-up of nuclear warheads on strategic delivery vehicles. It is clear, Karpov said, that this proposal provides for an arms race and cannot be the basis for an agreement. It is not possible to enhance strategic stability by whipping up an arms race, and Karpov thought the U.S. side would agree with him. When the Soviet side asks what specific level of nuclear warheads would be left after a 30% reduction, it means the following: If the U.S. 50% option permits deployment of 15,000 nuclear warheads after reductions, what number is envisaged after 30% reductions? Perhaps the U.S. side is considering 20,000 nuclear warheads or perhaps 8,000. Karpov was asking how the U.S. side would increase or decrease weapons under its reductions option.

Nitze asked whether there wasn’t a misunderstanding here. As he understood what Karpov had said, Karpov had stated that Lehman was speaking of 50% reductions. In fact, he was speaking of 30% reductions.

Karpov rejoined that Lehman had been speaking of both. He had mentioned 50% when he stated that the U.S. side prefers a 50% reduction. However, a 50% reduction in the U.S. interpretation means not a reduction but an increase in the number of nuclear warheads on the delivery vehicles that would be left after reductions. This was in the U.S. proposal of November 1, 1985. Karpov continued that the U.S. side had proposed that each side have 350 heavy bombers. The U.S. side, he said, needs 75 heavy bombers in order to have 1500 cruise missiles deployed on them. This means that the U.S. has 275 heavy bombers left without anything counted against them.

Nitze interjected that this was because the USSR has air defense systems that are not covered at all.

Karpov noted that the U.S. has 5,500 nuclear warheads that are not counted toward the ceiling. The U.S. is not inclined to put any limitations on SLCMs. Karpov had heard that the U.S. has plans to deploy 3,000–4,000 SLCMs. By adding up the various systems, i.e., 6,000 plus 5,000 plus 3,000 or 4,000, the total number would come to 15,000 or more. The arithmetic is quite simple.

Nitze replied that this related to Lehman’s question.

Karpov asked whether the U.S. proposal provided for a definite ceiling that neither side would surpass. He had asked Lehman whether the U.S. envisages a definite number that neither side would exceed.

Nitze responded that this was very clear from the U.S. proposal—there would be limits on warheads and ALCMs.

Karpov asked where the SLCMs were.

Lehman said that each side was familiar with the other side’s position as discussed at past meetings. The purpose of this meeting was to make progress. He had stated how to resolve the problem raised by the Soviet side. A solution could be found if the Soviet side was prepared to differentiate nuclear systems. But the Soviet side had said no to this, had it not?

Karpov replied that if Lehman reduces all problems to this aspect, his willingness to discriminate between systems means that he is putting the wrong emphasis on the wrong problem.

Lehman replied that this is the U.S. side’s emphasis. Karpov had said that he had no flexibility on this question.

Karpov said that he did. The Soviet side is ready to be flexible, although it cannot accept discrimination between systems. The Soviet side proposes to reduce some of the same systems the U.S. side wants to reduce.

Lehman rejoined that this was not flexibility, but merely the current position of the Soviet side.

Karpov responded that it was indeed flexibility because the Soviet side was willing to accept a reduction of these systems together with other systems. It had even proposed a 60% level.

Lehman asked whether the Soviet side had something beyond this?

Karpov said that it had the 30% option, i.e., 8,000 warheads and 16,000 delivery vehicles. Specific systems should be included within this. In such a context, what is wrong, where is the fault?

Lehman asked whether there were no limits on the number of ballistic missile warheads. This number could be 8,000.

Karpov replied, “60%.”

Lehman said that this was a major setback from SALT II.

Nitze asked whether it would be possible to have 4,800 ICBM RVs and 4,800 SLBM RVs.

Lehman said, “Or 32 additional systems, all RVs.”

Nitze said there could be 8,000 ballistic missile RVs.

Lehman said that the Soviet side seemed ready to change its position on this.

Ambassador Rowny had a suggestion to make ad referendum to Nitze. He suggested setting a limit in the new agreement at 60% of the original ICBM warheads, i.e., 3,600. Was the Soviet side willing to reduce to 3,600?

Karpov said it was willing to reduce within the context of its 50% reduction proposal.

Nitze said that Rowny’s question was specific within the context of 30% reductions. Under the Soviet definition, forward-based systems, which the U.S. has but the USSR does not, would be included. The U.S. has FBS because the Soviet Union has comparable systems that threaten the territory of U.S. allies. If the Soviet side is interested in reducing by 50%, it must be prepared to reduce by not more than 60%, i.e. to 3,600 systems. Karpov has said no to 3,600 in the context of 30% reductions, using a definition that does not involve either U.S. or Soviet FBS.

Rowny wondered whether the sides should speak of U.S. so-called FBS that are matched by Soviet FBS. He suggested discussing 3,600 ICBM warheads and taking away the restriction.

Karpov asked what Soviet FBS were.

Nitze said that Rowny had explained that certain Soviet systems are comparable to U.S. FBS, for example, medium-range systems. Rowny added that they could strike U.S. troops in Europe.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XII, INF, 1984–1987.]

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.