Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

142. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 11, 1986, 10:15 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Paul H. Nitze
  • Ambassador Max M. Kampelman
  • Ambassador Edward L. Rowny
  • Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman
  • Asst. Secretary Richard Perle
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Mr. Norman G. Clyne
  • Mr. Bruce Burton
  • Ms. Priscilla Clapp
  • Mr. Steven K. Pifer
  • Ms. Carolyn R. Smith (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • General N. Chervov
  • General N. Detinov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Nagradov (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Zolotov (Interpreter)
  • Mr. Skulkov (Interpreter)

Ambassador Karpov welcomed the U.S. Delegation, saying he hoped the weather at this meeting would be sunnier than the weather outside. The Soviet side chose this quiet place in the Moscow countryside so that the discussions could take place in a location away from the noise and distractions of the city. He said that Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and Secretary of State Shultz had agreed that this working meeting should be a confidential one, not for propaganda purposes but to facilitate substantive solutions to lay the groundwork for a productive meeting between them in September. The Soviet side wished to hold these meetings in such a spirit. It saw these working meetings not as a continuation of the NST negotiations, but as a free exchange of opinions conducive to finding solutions that could make possible agreement on various specific issues within the context of nuclear and space arms. Karpov proposed that these discussions be ad referendum, and that results be reported to the authorities who would make the final decisions. Karpov said that the Soviet side was disappointed in the first working meetings, including those on nuclear weapons in Geneva, conventional weapons and issues related to the Vienna negotiations.² Frankly speaking, the Soviet side was disappointed. Karpov noted that the U.S. representative to the Vienna talks, Blackwill, had come to Moscow last week empty-handed. Blackwill brought only arguments supporting the U.S. proposal of last December 5 and nothing else. Karpov hoped that today’s discussion would not be in support of U.S. proposals already submitted, but that it would look to the future and find solutions which could be passed on to the Foreign Ministers. He said the Soviet side was convinced that the meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze³ would largely determine the decision of when and if there would be a meeting between the U.S. President and the Soviet General Secretary. For this reason, he continued, the sides should approach the meetings today and tomorrow with a view to the summit. He then gave the floor to Ambassador Nitze.

Nitze said he was very glad to be in Moscow again and to meet with such old friends as Karpov, Obukhov, Chervov and, in particular, Detinov. The entire U.S. Delegation was happy at this opportunity to meet. It also saw this meeting as a way of contributing to the success of the projected meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze. As Bessmertnykh had said during his recent Washington visit, he did not see this meeting as a continuation of the Geneva talks, but as a freer exchange of opinions, ad referendum, which could contribute to the Foreign Ministers’ meeting. The U.S. side agreed with this general objective of the meetings. Nitze continued that Bessmertnykh had also said he did not see this meeting as an opportunity to renew recriminations about the past, but to look to the future. For this reason, Nitze was surprised by Karpov’s mention of Blackwill’s meeting on MBFR. From the report Nitze had read on this meeting, he thought it was the U.S. side that should be disappointed, not the Soviet side. The U.S. side had made significant movement forward with respect to the Vienna talks, had given up its previous position on data exchange and accepted the Soviet position to agree to reductions before verifying the resulting numbers. There had been no progress on verification from the Soviet side. Of course, Nitze noted, verification was not everything, but it would be an important part of the agreement. He thought this was a very poor example of movement forward. But he did not wish to get into recriminations; he wished only to say this was not an appropriate way to begin today’s meeting.

Karpov said that Nitze had incorrectly interpreted his remark about Blackwill’s visit. He had referred to Blackwill’s meeting with Mikhailov, not to the negotiations in Vienna. Blackwill had indeed come to Moscow empty-handed and had talked only of the past, not wanting to look to the future for sulutions. Karpov did not want today’s meeting to go like Blackwill’s meeting had gone.

Nitze replied that he had also been referring to the meeting between Blackwill and Mikhailov. He understood that Mikhailov had been empty-handed, although he, Nitze, had not been there. Had Karpov?

Karpov answered that Mikhailov had not come empty-handed but had proposed a possible solution for the talks. Blackwell had reacted strangely, although later he had corrected himself and said he would report the Soviet proposals. The Soviet side was now awaiting a response. Karpov said the sides here should not be distracted by the Vienna talks, but should focus on NST issues.

Nitze replied that, according to Karpov, Nitze’s impression about Blackwill’s visit was not correct; but, Nitze said, there was no progress in the Soviet position on verification in MBFR, but since he was not at the meeting he did not have first-hand knowledge and would not persist.

Nitze continued by saying that it was appropriate to begin this discussion with a few words about how to proceed today and tomorrow. He would suggest exploring general ideas first and then proceed from there. They could also discuss details. The Soviet side had, of course, given this some thought since it was the one to propose this meeting. Nitze suggested that Karpov begin this discussion.

Karpov agreed that the Soviet side had indeed given thought to the subject matter of this meeting, and hoped the U.S. side had, too. Since Nitze preferred that he go first, he would. He suggested beginning with space weapons. He would not repeat proposals made by the Soviet side or analyze the U.S. position as elaborated at the talks. He wanted the sides to try together to come up with a realistic picture of how things stood in this area today, and then on the basis of this joint analysis to choose the most promising directions for discussion. He noted that new elements in the sides’ positions had recently appeared which could serve as points of departure in seeking solutions that would be in the interest of both sides. The Soviet side, of course, still preferred a most radical solution preventing the militarization of space and an arms race in space—in other words—a ban on space-strike weapons. The Soviet side could also consider partial solutions which could lead to preventing an arms race in space. In this connection, there was some common ground in the U.S. and Soviet views that one of the most important elements in preventing a space arms race was to preserve and strengthen the ABM Treaty regime. The Soviet side had proposed that both sides agree not to use their right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for a period of 15–20 years. As Karpov understood the U.S. position, it also provided for a certain period, but a shorter one. He suggested discussing this issue today. Observing the ABM Treaty was a question of the boundaries permitted and prohibited in working under the Treaty. This problem could also be discussed today. He thought they also could discuss the issues on which the sides’ positions are close and where they are different, with a view to eliminating the differences or at least bringing the positions closer together. There were also other issues related to preventing an arms race in space, such as the issue of ASAT weapons. The Soviet side was in favor of a complete ban on all ASAT weapons, including the destruction of existing systems. If there was any development in the U.S. position on this question, it, too, could be discussed. If the U.S. side was still not prepared to discuss this, they would put this off for the time being, as it meant this issue was not yet ripe for reporting to Ministers.

Another problem, Karpov continued, was that of banning the class of space-to-earth weapons. This question has been with us in various combinations in the past, including issues of offensive arms in space, and specifically offensive arms which could strike the earth or the earth’s atmosphere from space. Karpov said there are certain points in the U.S. position that are somewhat unclear, particularly in what the U.S. side now means when talking about additional guarantees of not stationing new types of weapons of mass destruction in space. The Soviet side would appreciate clarification of this. On the basis of this clarification the sides could perhaps find common ground to report to Ministers. Such were the issues the Soviet side was ready to discuss at the meetings today and tomorrow.

Nitze said he wished to make some preliminary comments on Karpov’s remarks and would ask his colleagues to address some aspects in detail. He said the U.S. side was interested in and willing to discuss questions of space defense because this is an important part of these talks. However, he thought the most important and basic issue preceded that of space defense, i.e., effective and stabilizing reductions in offensive arms, particularly intercontinental systems. It was obvious that the U.S. position on space was contingent on making real progress in this area. The U.S. side was not, however, insisting on discussion of one question before the other. Nitze merely thought it was important to say this at the beginning.

Nitze also wished to mention Karpov’s phrase, “prevention of the militarization of space,” as he thought such wording was misleading. This seemed to imply that there are no military objects in space now, and this is contrary to fact. Outer space is full of military objects; most of them are Soviet, but the U.S. also has many. Since outer space is already in part militarized, the idea of preventing the militarization of space is a tendentious formulation. In particular, Nitze continued, almost all ballistic missiles traverse space and therefore use it, and this is part of the militarization of space which causes such concern. If no ballistic missiles traversed space, there would be a different situation.

Nitze stated that the U.S. side believes very strongly that the ABM Treaty should be maintained and carried out. The U.S. position is consistent with the ABM Treaty and its strict implementation. Karpov had raised a number of problems to discuss and Nitze agreed that the sides could and should discuss them all. He now wished to ask Assistant Secretary Perle to offer some general conceptual ideas about the relationship between defensive space weapons and offensive weapons.

Perle began by saying that the U.S. side welcomed and took seriously Bessmertnykh’s invitation to come to Moscow and engage in fresh thinking rather than to rehearse positions already well known. It seems appropriate to think in broad terms in order to see if there are Soviet concerns the U.S. side could allay by clarifying the concepts behind its thinking. On the issue of defensive weapons, the notion that it is completely appropriate to develop and deploy defensive arms has long been accepted by both sides. This is clearly seen in the area of air defense, in which the Soviet Union, more than the United States, has developed, deployed, and continued to modernize its air defenses to protect Soviet territory from aircraft. As for the strategic offensive weapons both sides have, both sides go to considerable effort and spend considerable sums to protect these systems. The United States puts missiles on submarines and hides them in the ocean to protect them from attack, the Soviet Union builds mobile missiles to make them safe from attack. The Soviet side has systems to defend against ballistic missiles. So, Perle noted, the legitimate concept of defense is understood and agreed in all areas except the area of advanced defense against ballistic missiles. All these efforts in the area of defense over the years have been accompanied by the development of offensive weapons, now numbering tens of thousands on both sides. These offensive weapons are a burden to both sides. They are costly and need continuous modernization to counter the possibility of becoming vulnerable to the other side. There are two categories in offensive weapons. First is the one the United States sees as presenting the greatest threat to peace and stability, ICBMs—fast, accurate systems that cannot be recalled. The second category also presents a threat, but is air-breathing, slower and can be recalled. Such weapons cannot be used for a disarming first-strike. Both sides increase their arsenals to protect against the vulnerability of their forces.

Perle noted that President Reagan was describing this situation when in 1983 he first initiated work on advanced strategic systems. They were not intended to threaten the Soviet Union or to gain advantage, and still less to achieve superiority over it, but to introduce into the balance between the two sides another element of defense in addition to what already existed. The President believes that this could be an important source of stability and could pave the way to diminishing the burden on both sides in connection with the constant evolution of offensive weapons.

Perle said that the U.S. side had carefully listened to the Soviet side’s concerns regarding strategic defense. These concerns fall into two categories: first, that strategic defense systems might be used offensively. Perle said he would not say much about this. Nitze (and Karpov, too) had said the sides should seek ways to remove this concern. It was not the U.S. intention to use these systems in this way. Perle would try to respond to the second category of concern. As he understood the Soviet side, the combination of many offensive systems on both sides plus defensive systems could create a situation in which stability is diminished because the possibility exists of an offensive strike followed by the interception of the retaliatory strike. Both sides’ leaders speak of eliminating nuclear weapons. Perhaps there is a way to build on this area of agreement in relationship to questions and concerns raised regarding defensive systems. In broad conceptual terms this is very simple. If we look at defense in the context of eliminating the ballistic missiles the defense is intended to intercept, the implications for stability and the balance are very different from the implications of how we usually think of defense when combined with large ballistic missile forces. The concern expressed by the Soviet side would look different if we assumed that the elimination of ballistic missiles is the goal of defense. Then the role of deployed defenses is to protect against violations, against third countries that have or might acquire ballistic missiles, and against accidents. The U.S. side feels it is necessary to recognize that there will be concerns even if nuclear ballistic missiles are eliminated. In short, Perle continued, defenses would have no targets and therefore would not represent a threat to either side. In this conceptual framework the United States is ready to set aside some rights, such as the right it now has under the ABM Treaty to withdraw from the Treaty upon six months’ notice. It would do so for a specific period during which it would move to eliminate the offensive arms which concern it and which led to the desire to deploy defenses, and would work in such a manner as to give stability to the elimination of nuclear ballistic missiles. This puts a context to the President’s idea of sharing. If there are no ballistic missiles, there is less risk in sharing advanced technology. Both sides would be better off in relation to the third countries, and there would be more confidence in the relationship between the two. Of course, this is a radical solution, but, in Perle’s view, it was fresh thinking and he hoped the Soviet side would give it very serious consideration. In summary, he said that this represented a concept for achieving stability which takes into account the underlying logic of the Soviet concerns as the U.S. side understands them.

Karpov replied that this was an interesting subject with many aspects that could be discussed both in detail and generally, but it was better to discuss things in more practical terms. Based on what the U.S. side said, he wished to ask the following question: Is it possible in practical terms to consider the question of the sides’ obligation not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for an agreed period of time which would be sufficiently long? If so, what was the U.S. view on what this agreed period could be? Karpov’s second question was how both sides could ensure confidence that the ABM Treaty was being fully observed, and whether both sides had the same view of limits placed on their ABM activities under the Treaty.

Ambassador Kampelman said that he had found the discussion so far constructive and interesting. Karpov had suggested an agenda of questions to discuss in the area of outer space. Perle had tried, and Kampelman thought successfully, to place this question within the context of reducing offensive nuclear ballistic missiles. He thought it would be useful during this first meeting to hear more from Karpov about his suggested agenda on START so that the U.S. side could get an idea of the issues in their totality and then address specific points. He thought this was the best approach, given that there was an interrelationship between the issues.

Karpov agreed that there was an interrelationship. The sides had discussed this many times at the negotiations. At the beginning of today’s meeting he had raised a theoretical discussion of the relationship, but he wished to explore the practical side of the issues. He wished to look at a range of questions and how to deal with them. He thought it best to go through all these issues, beginning with space, strategic offensive arms and medium-range arms, so as to see what the sides would be able to do. If the U.S. side wished to hear the Soviet view on other questions, he could discuss this briefly now. The Soviet side had in mind examining strategic offensive arms strategic offensive arms along with the issue of outer space and, above all, the issue of ABM. The sides could explore the possibility of reducing strategic offensive arms. The Soviet side was in favor of more radical reductions; the United States was familiar with the Soviet proposal to reduce strategic offensive arms by 50 percent. The Soviet side believed that such reductions must necessarily cover medium-range weapons capable of reaching the territory of the other country. Based on all he had heard from various channels, Karpov had the impression that the United States was not prepared to agree to this kind of solution now. The Soviet side was prepared to take into account U.S. objections to including reductions in this context, as well as its objections to banning long-range cruise missiles completely. In this case the Soviets had a more modest but still significant proposal to reduce strategic offensive arms by 30 percent. It was Karpov’s understanding that the U.S. side is prepared to work in this direction. He said there are some unclear points in the U.S. position regarding the composition of arms to be limited and reduced within the framework of the 30 percent option. The Soviet side would be interested in discussing this today after lunch or tomorrow. As for medium-range systems, the Soviet side is still interested in the most radical solution which provides for the complete prohibition of medium-range missiles and other medium-range systems within the context of the disarmament program. The Soviet side is also willing to explore different solutions, i.e., U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe. In the course of various negotiations, Karpov continued, remarks have been made concerning the possibility of looking for a still narrower interim solution to the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss in practical terms the question of what interim or temporary solution the U.S. side has in mind. What specific parameters could be discussed for reporting to Ministers?

Kampelman said he wished to ask a question. The Soviet side in START had proposed reductions of 30 percent. Karpov had said he had questions about some unclear points in the U.S. points. What specifically were these questions?

In response Karpov asked what the U.S. side would do with sea-launched cruise missiles. So far in the negotiations the U.S. side has been silent on this. The Soviet side has raised the question of how the U.S. intends to incorporate heavy bombers in the 30 percent reduction option—would there be an overall ceiling or a separate one? What about the weapons carried on these bombers? Karpov said he also had other minor questions.

Nitze said he wished to make a general remark. He had been led to believe that this meeting was intended first of all to explore new ground and general ideas. Perle had begun by doing just that, but the Soviet side evidently did not wish to continue this discussion. This, Nitze said, raises a serious question: is this meeting to be a continuation of the Geneva talks or something new and different? The location was new and would indicate that things are different, but Nitze was not sure.

Karpov replied that was why he urged the U.S. side to speak in practical terms of new solutions which could be offered to the Foreign Ministers. What Perle had stated today contained no new ideas. Karpov had discussed these ideas many times at the negotiations with Kampelman. If the sides get distracted by theoretical questions, they would spend all the allotted time on this, and then what could they offer the Ministers who were to consider their ideas and then, in turn, provide suggestions for the summit meeting. If the discussions here are theoretical, they will not lead to specific results or proposals for a summit meeting and, therefore, Karpov urged that the sides focus on new ideas in practical terms. Otherwise, no one would understand what they had been doing. Of course, if they wanted they could form a theoretical club; this would be most interesting.

General Chervov added that a theoretical viewpoint was completely contrary to everything Perle had said. What was important now was to deal with practical issues.

Nitze said he wished to call on Perle to speak on the relationship between a conceptual approach and practical details.

Perle said that the point was not to discuss abstract theory. The positions of both sides, as well as the systems they have or want to deploy would follow from their concept of security. It is necessary to have a context in order to examine specific proposals. The distinction between the practical and the theoretical is close. For example, the United States is prepared to waive its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty on six months’ notice for a period of years. This idea is given in the context of a concept that the main source of the problem, i.e., ballistic missiles, would be eliminated. The sides could discuss the period of non-withdrawal, and have already begun to do so. The Soviet side must understand that context gives coherence to each side’s views. Perhaps the difference in context would make it impossible to resolve the differences, although Perle hoped not. The period of non-withdrawal is based on the concept of which direction it is in the interest of both sides to take the evolution of strategic forces. Perle said he should add that there is a difference between Karpov’s new ideas and new numbers. Karpov spoke of new numbers, while the U.S. side speaks of new ideas.

Karpov rejoined that he also spoke of new ideas, but in practical terms, because of the need to report possible solutions to the Ministers. What Perle had said about concepts was important and interesting, but one month from now in mid-September Shervardnadze and Shultz would meet and would ask what the sides produced at this meeting. Are we to say, Karpov asked, that we discussed theoretical concepts and due to differences between us put off dealing with concrete issues until we had resolved the theoretical differences?

Ambassador Obukhov said he had two brief questions, but first he wished to say to his U.S. colleagues that the sides would not agree on specific conceptual issues and should therefore turn the discussion toward practical solutions. In this connection, how did the U.S. side envisage a ceiling on the number of nuclear weapons on strategic offensive arms under the possible interim option which it has been agreed to call the 30% solution? Obukhov’s second question was addressed to Perle. In its concept of non-withdrawal from the Treaty, how does the U.S. side take into account the relationship between eliminating strategic missiles and the fact that third nuclear countries possess nuclear arms, including ballistic missiles?

Nitze wished to remark on the relationship between what Karpov was calling theoretical and practical. Frankly, he did not understand the word theoretical. The idea of the total elimination of nuclear arms is part of the Soviet program—not a theoretical part, but a real one. The concept of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is not a theoretical proposal but a real one. The U.S. side sees it as a specific limitation on a right which was worked out under the Treaty, and the Soviet side proposes to limit it. Therefore, this is a change from the ABM Treaty, a practical change. Nitze said he thought it was appropriate to make this remark. When the U.S. side speaks of an interim agreement, it means interim in the context of long-term objectives. Nitze did not think it possible to work out agreements short of the full schedule of events which would lead to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This is a practical issue because it would be part of any agreement. This has no impact on the issue, but it is practical and must be discussed and agreed between the sides. It is connected to immediate steps by both sides toward long-term objectives. Nitze thought the sides were caught in a seamless web of ideas and it was appropriate to discuss them now in this forum. He did not see how they could get away from it. They must discuss both long-term and interim possibilities and practical measures.

At the beginning of the meeting Nitze had said that the U.S. side is prepared to discuss the specific questions raised by Karpov and Obukhov. He wished to make clear that he was not closing off the possibility for the Soviet side to discuss any general ideas it might have. The U.S. side tried to begin with general ideas but the Soviet side apparently does not wish it to continue. If the Soviet side wishes to turn to specific questions, this could be done, but the sides would return to the relationship between short-term and long-term questions and the foundation beneath them, for without understanding the foundation it would be hard to work out a long-term solution with any possibility of success.⁴

Ambassador Rowny said that it was important to set forth the U.S. side’s concept and hear the new Soviet concept. Other problems which are very specific and complex, for example, verification of SLCMs, could perhaps be discussed during a coffee break or at lunch by Generals Chervov and Detinov or anyone else. If the sides took up these issues now, discussion of details could take up a great deal of time and drag out this meeting.

Karpov said he wished to share a secret with the U.S. side. Last Saturday⁵ he had a lengthy talk with Shevardnadze at the MFA. The Foreign Minister’s main question was: as a result of these working meetings what specific and practical solutions could emerge that could be discussed at the September meeting with Shultz? Karpov said that this evening Shevardnadze would ask him what specifically Karpov could propose, after a full day of talks, for discussion at the upcoming meeting with Shultz. If he couldn’t answer, Karpov continued, the Foreign Minister would be most displeased with the way in which the meeting had been conducted. Karpov said he did not know what instructions Nitze had received from Shultz or the President, but these were his own instructions on this matter. He said he was not opposed to combining, when appropriate, the search for practical solutions with more long-terms objectives of the sides in the context of exploring these practical solutions. If necessary to find practical solutions, this is all right, but if the sides make a discussion of broad concepts their main goal at this meeting and put a discussion of practical solutions in last place on the agenda, they would not accomplish the task agreed upon by Shultz and Bessertnykh.

Nitze said he had two remarks to make. The first concerned the initial discussion held between Shultz and Shevardnadze in Helsinki.⁶ As he recalled, they discussed the possibility of reaching a “class A” solution in which substantive progress led to important results at the arms talks, and “class B” solutions, or minor issues which moved ahead only a little way and for a short period. Both Shultz and Shevardnadze were in favor of achieving a “class A” solution.

Secondly, Nitze continued, he was present for much of the discussion during Bessmertnykh’s recent visit to Washington and so had a clear impression of what took place there. It had been agreed at that meeting that the present discussions would not duplicate what has been done before at the Geneva negotiations on the three aspects of NST which are of concern. It was agreed that these discussions should be free-ranging and informal. Nitze thought that his impression of what Shultz and Bessmertnykh had agreed to was different than Karpov’s.

Nitze stated that he was not insisting on how to move these discussions forward, but he wanted them to be as fruitful as possible. He wanted to be sure not to deny the Soviet side the possibility of expressing any general considerations. He wanted to be sure that when the sides go into more practical and narrow issues, the U.S. side would hear the practical and new ideas of the Soviet side. So far the Soviet side had only asked the U.S. side for new ideas, but Nitze thought that when more immediate questions were discussed, the Soviet side would also present new ideas.

Karpov replied that the sides were speaking of the same thing but perhaps using different words. At the beginning of the meeting, Karpov had said that this discussion should not be a repetition of what has been discussed in Geneva. Since Nitze was present at the Washington meeting, he was aware of the context in which today’s meeting was proposed, i.e., to prepare for the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. Therefore, Karpov suggested that this discussion be more focused in order to lay the groundwork for the Ministers’ meeting. Today’s discussion should be creative but practical. As Rowny likes to say, it takes two to tango. It also takes two to have ideas, Karpov said, and only then can there be a thorough discussion of ways to bring the positions of the sides closer together and arrive at practical solutions. He said the Soviet side is prepared for the discussion to move in this direction. He had begun the meeting in this way, identified areas for discussion, and it would be good to continue in this way in order to discuss each question and any other questions the U.S. side might wish to raise.

Nitze repeated his earlier comment that the U.S. side sees this meeting as directed toward assisting the work of the Ministers in September. There is no difference between the sides on this question. The question of where there are differences became clear during today’s discussion. It was one of the first practical issues raised by Karpov regarding whether the U.S. was willing to forego its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Perle had set forth the fundamental considerations on which the answer to this question is based, and so it was pertinent to the practical discussion. Karpov had elected not to comment on Perle’s remarks, and Nitze could not fail to draw a lesson from this. He had a degree of doubt as to how seriously the Soviet side considered the U.S. side’s remarks.

Karpov said the issue is not whether the Soviet side considers Perle’s remarks seriously or not seriously. The issue is in which context, terms, or plane the sides should examine questions in order that they be useful at the upcoming Ministers meeting. Karpov stated that Perle had raised a number of questions which had already been discussed. For example, Karpov and Rowny had spent a year-and-a-half discussing the issue of more or less destabilizing systems. Neither of them had convinced the other. Should we now spend another year-and-a-half discussing this, Karpov asked? We could do so, he said, but the real issue is what practical measures we can take in the area of limiting and reducing nuclear arms. He did not want the U.S. side to interpret this remark as a desire to brush aside fundamental issues. He only wanted the discussions at this working meeting to be directed toward a specific objective so that they would not lose sight of the concrete and practical questions to be worked out and proposed to the Ministers. This was his only concern and this was why he had proposed to explore ways of bringing the sides’ positions closer together and to look for solutions based on what they already knew of each other’s positions. Karpov said he could have started the meeting by setting forth the Soviet concept of banning space strike weapons. The sides could have discussed this all morning but this was not necessary because they were instructed to direct their efforts toward the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting. The Foreign Ministers were awaiting practical solutions, and the sides should propose some.

Nitze reminded Karpov that Obukhov had raised two questions for the U.S. side to answer. He wished to call on Ambassador Lehman to provide a response.

Lehman stated that the questions were not addressed to the U.S. side but were specific and deserved a reply. Obukhov’s question concerned the U.S. view on a ceiling on nuclear weapons under the interim 30% reduction. Lehman said that in a sense the U.S. reaction was one of disappointment. Our two leaders had already agreed on far-reaching objectives, including the total elimination of nuclear weapons. A first step in this direction was a 50% reduction with appropriate application. However, conditions for the total elimination of nuclear weapons are not near, so it is necessary to do two things: consider the necessary conditions and take possible measures to bring them nearer. How far the sides can go if they can reach agreement at all depends on whether they can deal with the question of stability to the satisfaction of both sides. In the U.S. view the conditions must permit a reduction to 50%. Obviously, different conditions are required to go further, and it is clear that one important condition is the elimination of the threat of ballistic missiles. However, if the Soviet side feels we cannot reach agreement on a 50% reduction, the U.S. side is prepared to seek a mutually acceptable framework for a less than 50% reduction. The U.S. side wants to make the deepest possible reductions, but this would require taking into account our concerns about stability. Lehman said that when he last met with Chervov, he told Chervov that it is clear each side has a different force structure. The U.S. side believes that achieving and enhancing stability in an arms control agreement requires differentiation between systems so as to eliminate the threat of a disarming first strike. Lehman had also told Chervov that the U.S. side feels that it is necessary to go beyond past agreements in order to enhance stability. The U.S. side’s analysis shows that it is possible to accommodate both U.S. and Soviet concerns and force structures. The U.S. side is flexible in how it sees various elements of the force structure, but the results must provide stability. Lehman said he had requested Chervov to raise this question again on the Soviet side, and Chervov had promised to do so. It is clear that the most important question being discussed at this meeting is the question of how to enhance stability. Concrete discussions are required on the distinctions between fast-flying and slow-flying systems, heavy missiles and mobile missiles, and the structure of the ICBM force. But the real question, Lehman stated, is whether both sides can, on a mutually acceptable basis, take into consideration each other’s concerns about stability. In short, the U.S. side prefers 50% reductions, but if the Soviet side believes that only reductions less than 50% can be achieved, the U.S. side is ready to explore this. It prefers the deepest possible reductions which maintain stability.

Chervov wondered how it was possible that withdrawal from the SALT II treaty could enhance stability. He said he was hearing this argument for the first time. Perhaps there was something behind it he did not understand.

Lehman responded that Chervov should have no doubt that the U.S. side is prepared to maintain the balance on a one-sided basis if necessary, but it prefers to do this in the context of an equitable agreement. If the agreement is not equitable, it will not enhance stability.

Nitze wished to add that of course the U.S. side strongly prefers to maintain the ABM Treaty in full. The ABM Treaty includes provisions for withdrawal upon six months’ notice in the event that either side feels its supreme interests are prejudiced. In May 1972 the U.S. side stated that the absence of a treaty parallel to the ABM Treaty, a treaty comprehensive and indefinitely limiting offensive arms, could be grounds for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. has not withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, but it still believes that appropriate limitations of indefinite duration are necessary for both offensive and defensive weapons. The U.S. side wants to have limitations on offensive weapons, and this is one of the main objectives at the negotiations.

Karpov reminded the group that Bessmertnykh was expecting them for lunch at one o’clock. He proposed that the discussion be continued after lunch and adjourned the meeting until then.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.
2. In telegram 13605 from Moscow, August 8, Blackwill reported on the U.S.-Soviet experts’ meeting on MBFR in Moscow, August, 6–8, to Shultz: “Despite my strong request that they reevaluate at a senior political level here NATO’s December 5 proposal before your September meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, my Soviet interlocutors said bluntly again and again that the current stalemate in MBFR could not be broken unless NATO abandoned its ‘dubious and inflated’ verification regime. They repeatedly stressed that Moscow certainly had no intention of changing its present position. So if the West also held to its current view, ‘it was not possible to reach an agreement in Vienna, ever.’” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, No Film Number)
3. Shultz and Shevardnadze met on September 19, 20, and 23. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 283–290.
4. See Documents 139, and 140.
5. August 9.
6. Reference is to Shultz and Shevardnadze’s meeting in Helsinki, July 31, 1985, from 2–5 p.m. The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 71.