Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume XI, START I

144. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, August 12, 1986, 10:15 a.m.–1:05 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of NST Experts

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Ambassador Mike Glitman
  • Ambassador Ronald Lehman
  • Assistant Secretary R. Perle
  • Colonel Robert Linhard
  • Mr. Norman Clyne
  • Mr. Bruce Burton
  • Ms. Priscilla Clapp
  • Mr. Steve Pifer
  • Ms. Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

• Soviet

  • Ambassador V. Karpov
  • Ambassador A. Obukhov
  • General A. Chervov
  • General N. Detinov
  • Mr. Tarasenko
  • Mr. Nagradov, Interpreter
  • Mr. Zolotov, Interpreter
  • Mr. Skulkov, Interpreter

After an exchange of pleasantries about the weather, Karpov proposed that the sides continue yesterday’s discussion. He said he would sum up where the sides had left off yesterday. The Soviet side had called attention to the need to prepare for the upcoming meeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz. It had also called attention to the possibility of moving the sides’ positions closer together with a view to finding mutually-acceptable solutions for the meeting of ministers. In this connection, the Soviet side had touched upon the issue of enhancing the ABM treaty regime, both by providing for an obligation not to use the right of withdrawal for a sufficiently long period, and by ensuring the confidence of the sides that all treaty provisions are understood and are being carried out in the same way. In this connection, the sides could explore the possibility of achieving a common understanding about the boundaries of those activities that would be permitted and those that would be prohibited under the treaty. They could choose as a guideline the boundary between work done in the laboratory and work done outside it. Regarding offensive arms, the Soviet side had stressed its desire to make the deepest possible cuts in strategic offensive arms—specifically, reductions of 50% with a ban on space-strike weapons. Taking into account the fact that the U.S. side is not prepared to make such deep reductions, the Soviet side is willing to examine the possibility of 30% reductions. It believes that the U.S. side is also prepared to explore ways of bringing the positions of the sides closer together. The Soviet side had proposed these specific questions for consideration at these discussions. Given the fact that there are certain difficulties involved in finding a cardinal solution to the issue of medium-range missiles in Europe, the Soviet side had stated that it was willing to consider the possibility of an interim solution which would provide for keeping some U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe for a certain time. In this connection, the Soviet side is willing to consider some elements of the U.S. proposal regarding an interim solution. The sides could hold an exchange of views on these issues in order to contribute to preparations for the September meeting of Foreign Ministers. Karpov said that unfortunately the U.S. side had not taken advantage yesterday of possibilities which the Soviet side proposed. The U.S. side preferred to focus the talks on questions of a conceptual nature related to the general inter-relationship between offensive and defensive arms and to a certain classification of arms which the U.S. side believes is related to working out an agreement on strategic offensive arms. While the Soviet side does not deny the importance of discussing concepts, it believes that in view of the objective of providing productive ideas for questions related to NST at the meeting of Ministers, it would be advisable in the time left today to focus on practical aspects of the questions under consideration. The Soviet side had offered specific new considerations on how to approach these issues, and it hoped the U.S. side would present new ideas aimed at finding mutually-acceptable solutions to them. Karpov had one procedural question to ask first. Since both delegations were invited to return to Moscow for lunch at the home of DCM Combs at 1:30, would they meet again after lunch or limit themselves to this meeting and discussions during lunch?

Ambassador Nitze replied that he thought the sides could finish their work this morning and then go to lunch. However, they could leave open the possibility of meeting again after lunch if this would be useful.

Karpov agreed.

Nitze said the sides should also discuss whether or not they wished to meet in Washington before the Ministers’ meeting in September. The U.S. side was prepared to invite the Soviet side to Washington on September 8–9 if this were convenient.

Karpov thanked Nitze for the invitation. Judging by yesterday’s meeting, the sides would hardly be able to make the necessary headway at today’s meeting and therefore would need to hold a second meeting in Washington. Karpov only wondered whether the dates suggested by Nitze were too late, considering that the Ministers’ meeting is slated for September 19–20, and that the next round of the NST negotiations opens on 18 September. Given that the meetings of this working group are aimed at making easier the talks between the Ministers as well as the work of the delegations at the negotiations, Karpov thought it would be advisable to meet earlier, say, in late August or early September, so as to leave enough time to examine all the issues.

Nitze took note of Karpov’s suggestion and said the U.S. side would be in touch about how to accommodate this suggestion. As a result of yesterday’s conversation, the U.S. side had worked out some questions it thought were appropriate for consideration by Foreign Ministers and certainly appropriate for consideration by this group when it meets in Washington in preparation for the Ministers’ meeting. These three questions concerned space and defense, START and INF. Nitze then read the following prepared text:

“1) Can we jointly envision an agreement now that places the eventual deployment of defenses, after an interval during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect, in the context of the elimination of both sides’ ballistic missiles and the sharing of the benefits of such defenses? If yes, how long should the interval be during which the ABM Treaty remains in effect without amendment?

“2) Can we recognize and deal with the differences in strategic systems in the context of an agreement which significantly reduces existing nuclear offensive arsenals in an equitable and verifiable manner while increasing stability?

“3) Can we promptly reach a separate, interim agreement on INF missiles which results in equal levels on LRINF missile systems in Europe at some level above zero, while also making proportional reductions elsewhere in the world, resulting in an equal worldwide ceiling on LRINF warheads worldwide.”

Chervov asked whether Nitze was talking about a zero level in Europe. Nitze replied that the first clause of the question regards levels on LRINF systems in Europe, the second clause speaks of also making reductions elsewhere in the world, and the last clause concerns the goal of equality in the level of warheads worldwide.

Karpov asked whether the U.S. side could lend this paper to the Soviet side for a minute so that it could be copied.

Nitze said he would send over a copy this afternoon. The questions raised by the Soviet side were somewhat different from these three questions, but Nitze thought these three questions were more pertinent to the issues at hand. He thought the Soviet side would wish to study them. He asked Karpov for suggestions on how to proceed further.

Karpov replied that the Soviet side would take these questions as homework and would compare them against the questions it had raised itself. He thought a discussion of these questions could continue in Washington at the next working meeting. As for the questions raised by both sides yesterday, and by Karpov today, they could continue discussing them in an attempt to find new possibilities for bringing the positions closer together. There was also the question of the regime of restraint which Karpov had mentioned yesterday. The Soviet side might have questions to ask that could clarify the three questions Nitze had just read. In addition, Chervov wished to comment on the statement made by Assistant Secretary Perle yesterday.

Nitze noted that the U.S. side owed Ambassador Obukhov a response to a question he had asked yesterday. Nitze suggested doing this first so as to clear the books of unanswered questions. He said Perle would answer Obukhov’s question.

Perle noted that this was a very pertinent and important question and he welcomed it because the sides need to discuss and understand the implications for both sides of the transformation not only of the security relationship between them, but of relationships with other countries of the world in the fortunate event that ballistic missiles could be eliminated. Firstly, in relation to the nuclear arms on both sides which would exist after the elimination of ballistic missiles, even the largest third-country arsenal would be modest by comparison. The U.S. cannot speak for third countries, but some countries who have nuclear weapons have already stated that within a context of radical reductions of the weapons the two sides are discussing here, they would reexamine their own requirements. It is clear that they are prepared to reduce their capabilities. Perhaps more important in the U.S. concept is the fact that the elimination of the nuclear missiles both sides have and the sharing of defense technology would lead to both sides having formidable capabilities by comparison with the small ballistic missile forces held by other countries. In other words, the U.S. and USSR would be well defended. Indeed, Perle continued, the presence of these defenses would be a powerful disincentive to third countries to build ballistic missile systems which would effectively be nullified by the defenses. For this reason, the sides could anticipate that other countries might decide that it was in their interest to eliminate their ballistic missiles. Perle thought the most important element here was the change for the positive of the security relationship between the U.S. and USSR. A world in which offensive systems exist in great numbers on both sides has important consequences for the reactions of the world as a whole. After eliminating these systems, the sides could anticipate deployment of defenses on a modest scale. The political changes would be of great benefit to both sides. Both sides recognize that it would be difficult to achieve this, but the benefits are important enough to try it. Perle had hoped yesterday that the sides could discuss this concept seriously today, but it is a new concept and needs to be considered. Since the two sides will meet again, he hoped it could be discussed at the next meeting and perhaps even today.

General Detinov described the model that he pictured as Perle outlined his thoughts. In this model, relatively minor defensive systems, i.e., ABM, would be deployed by both sides, subject to conditions under which both sides would give up their ballistic missiles. Third countries would probably also choose to give up their own ballistic missiles. Detinov wished to know how all the other nuclear weapons that the sides possessed would look, i.e., heavy bombers, cruise missiles of all basing modes, nuclear FBS and others? What would be their place and role in Perle’s model?

Perle replied that it was clear that the objective of the sides in all negotiations is to try to achieve a balance that leaves them secure, with the least burden of armaments. This principle applies in the situation envisaged here. Neither side would want more heavy bombers or cruise missiles than were necessary to ensure its security, and the balance would be maintained at lower levels. Perle thought both sides recognized that they were not now at a stage in their political relationship where they were ready to give up their arms. There are third countries which would make them pause before they could do this. However, they could make significant reductions in weapons of different types. This would still leave both sides in a strong position with regard to other countries and a stable position with regard to each other. Perle did not mean in this model that the entire burden of disarmament would be carried in the area of ballistic missiles. He expected considerable parallel reductions in other weapons in order to achieve a balance ensuring greater security. One characteristic of this balance was that systems which cannot be recalled and are therefore more subject to cause terrible accidents would be eliminated. Diminishing the level of anxiety resulting from the inability to recall them would contribute to the confidence of the sides in reducing arms in other areas. This would be the first time in recent history when the sides could relieve the severe psychological burden of a terrible accident leading to consequences that neither side wants. Perle added that this process would take place in a period sufficiently long so that both sides could plan effective defensive systems in agreed categories. Much of the discussion that had taken place over the years regarding the effectiveness of one type of weapon versus another would be much simplified if the sides were dealing with a category of weapon which continued to be permitted.

Obukhov thanked Perle for his clarification, but said he had an additional question. As far as he understood Perle’s comments, Perle meant that the process of destroying the ballistic missiles of both sides as envisaged by the U.S. proposal would not happen in isolation, but would be accompanied by limitations and reductions in other areas of nuclear weapons. As Perle had said, such reductions would have as their objective the establishment of a balance ensuring greater security for the sides. Was Obukhov correct in thinking that Perle is suggesting that in a process of limitation and reduction, a leveling out of the capabilities of the sides would take place regarding the nuclear FBS of the U.S.?

Perle replied that he must be frank and say that this is a broad concept which would lead to major changes in the strategic relationship as it has existed between the sides since they first deployed ballistic missiles. The U.S. side has not yet thought through all the implications. The sides had come here to exchange fresh ideas, and must examine broad concepts together. Perle said Obukhov’s question was a fair one, and the best general answer Perle could give now was to say that in trying to establish a balance, the U.S. is not seeking nuclear advantage. The Soviet side well knows the nature of U.S. FBS—they are essentially conventional weapons. It also knows the nature of U.S. commitments to its allies. It is clear that this question must be resolved and dealt with. It is a more tractable question in this context because what is meant is a fundamental change that would lead to fresh thinking. Agreements concluded in the past were based on different strategic concepts and growing numbers of effective weapons. Now there is a shift in direction that must have political and psychological consequences that are beneficial to both sides. Problems which the sides have been unable to resolve heretofore may now be resolvable in this new and unprecedented situation. Perle did not have a more specific answer and suggested that the sides discuss this together.

Detinov wished to ask a question to help him better understand. Returning to the model Perle had spoken of in which neither side would have ballistic missiles and a modest ABM system is deployed, what sequence of events would follow in this situation? Would deployment of the ABM system preceed elimination of ballistic missiles or would ballistic missiles be eliminated first and defensive systems then be deployed? Or would this process take place in parallel?

Perle replied that he had no fixed notion. This is an important and complex question. A process was envisaged where the sides would refrain from deploying defensive systems for a certain time. During this time they would try to negotiate a new situation, and at the end of the time they would hope to proceed on a cooperative basis to the deployment of agreed levels of defense. Because there is a clear understanding of the reduction of ballistic missiles, the threat seen by the Soviet side in deploying defensive systems would not arise in this situation. Both sides would want to be satisfied that the sequence of events was correct and did not prejudice their security. Perle thought the sides could ensure this. The schedule of work on defensive systems in conjunction with sharing the benefits of defense technology in the absence of ballistic missiles would become a common defense against other countries having ballistic missiles. Perle thought both sides needed to examine this question further. The U.S. side has no monopoly on wisdom here. The U.S. side’s intention is that both sides have greater security at all stages of the process than they did at the previous stage.

Chervov asked whether Nitze could clarify the questions he had raised at the beginning of today’s meeting. Regarding the first question, Nitze had spoken of maintaining the ABM Treaty for a certain interval. The Soviet side was proposing an interval of non-withdrawal from the treaty of 15–20 years. The U.S. side has taken note of this interval, yet in the U.S. press there are articles interpreting Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev² to mean an interval of 5–7 years. Could Nitze comment on the specific time interval envisaged by the U.S. side?

Nitze replied that the U.S. side’s question stated that during this time the ABM Treaty would remain in effect without amendment. The U.S. side had in mind Agreed Statement D which provides that if weapons are created based on different physical principles, the side that created them would hold consultations with the other side in accordance with Article XIII with a view to developing appropriate limitations on such systems which could be included in the agreement by amendment, as provided for in Article XIV. This is not stated in the formulation of the treaty, but it was in the minds of those who, like Nitze, had worked out Agreed Statement D. If the research of either side during the interval of five years or more persuaded it that defense would meet the necessary criterion of effectiveness and it wanted to deploy a defense, there would also be consultations under Article XIII as provided for in Agreed Statement D, with a view to developing appropriate provisions for transition to another regime. Perle had referred to this. The U.S. side had in mind that after 5 years it would not wish to use the right which exists in the ABM Treaty for either side to withdraw on six months’ notice if it feels its supreme national interests are prejudiced. If at some time 5 or more years after the agreement entered into force a side decided that its research was complete and it wanted both sides to have the benefits of advanced defenses, both sides would begin discussions to work out a new regime. These discussions might continue up to two years. Only after two years could the sides consider a return to the present situation, i.e. where either side has the right to withdraw upon six months’ notice for reasons of supreme national interest.

Chervov asked whether the 5–7 years cover only research or whether testing is also included.

To avoid misunderstanding, Nitze said he would read the relevant paragraphs of Reagan’s letter to Gorbachev. He quoted: “I have assured you that the United States has no interest in seeking unilateral advantage in this area. To ensure that neither of us is in a position to do so, we would be prepared immediately to conclude an agreement incorporating the following limits:

“(a) While it may take longer to complete such research, both sides would confine themselves for five years, through 1991, to a program of research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether, in principle, advanced reliable systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Such research and development could include testing necessary to establish feasibility. In the event either side wishes to conduct such testing, the other side shall have the right to observe the tests, in accord with mutually agreed procedures.”

Chervov interrupted to ask whether such testing is in accordance with the ABM Treaty. The letter claims that it is.

Nitze replied that certain testing is permitted. Testing on the basis of the technology as understood in 1972 is permitted at test ranges in accordance with the provisions of the treaty. It is also permitted to test non-components. There are a number of things on which testing is permitted. Agreed Statement D provides for the creation of systems, and this implies testing them. Nitze wished to continue quoting the President’s letter.

“(b) Following this five year period, or at some later future time, either the United States or the Soviet Union may determine that advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible. Either party may then desire to proceed beyond research, development, and testing to deployment of an advanced strategic defense system. In anticipation that this may occur, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy an advanced strategic defense system to share the benefits of such a system with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides. Once a plan is offered to this end, the details of the sharing arrangement and the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles would be the subject of negotiations for a period of no more than two years.

“(c) If, following the initial five–year period and subsequent to two years after either side has offered a plan for such sharing and the associated mutual elimination of ballistic missiles, the United States and Soviet Union have not agreed on such a plan, either side will be free to deploy unilaterally after six months notice of such intention is given to the other side.”

Chervov said that basically the Soviet side understands. It is clear that under the U.S. proposal the ABM Treaty has 5–7 years left to live. He wished to comment on the concept offered by Perle today. One of the many points Perle had made was to try to prove the legitimacy of defenses, suggesting that SDI is a new stage of defense for the sides. Perle even went back in history, saying that defense has always been a part of military science and is therefore justified now. In general, Chervov noted, Perle is correct because there is no offense without defense and no defense without offense. All of military history shows this. What can be concluded from it? Perle seems to conclude from this undisputed historical fact that SDI is legitimate and justified. Chervov himself, however, came to a different conclusion. In his view, all military history is the history of conflict between offense and defense. These two military phenomenon are inseparable. The history of war is the history of the shield against the sword, armor against weapon. This can be traced as far back as the Greek military leader Epaminondas. Now Perle is bringing this conflict into a qualitatively new area of confrontation, i.e., creation of a qualitatively new weapon. Perle is afraid to say so, but this is exactly what the U.S. side is trying to do in outer space. These are not harmless systems, but deadly weapons, weapons which the U.S. wants to put into space. A qualitatively new era of conflict is beginning. The U.S. side claims that SDI will help eliminate nuclear arms and this will bring benefits and peace to all. However, Perle found it difficult to answer the question of which comes first: is SDI deployed first or does the elimination of nuclear weapons come first? The U.S. side asserts that SDI is not an offensive system. However, the most important mission of SDI is to counter satellites of other countries, that is, these weapons are aimed at blinding the other side. Let us call things by their proper names, Chervov said. This is the first and most important mission of the systems. SDI creates systems with a range of 4,000 kilometers and more. What kind of defensive weapon has a 4,000 kilometer range, Chervov asked? This is a multi-purpose system that can carry out offensive and defensive missions, but is being played up by one side as defensive only. Along with SDI, the U.S. is now carrying out an accelerated buildup of its strategic nuclear potential, especially strategic offensive arms, giving them a first-strike capability. The U.S. is creating systems that overcome ABM defenses. Why is the U.S. creating these systems if it advocates elimination of nuclear weapons? This also applies, Chervov continued, to the accelerated work being carried out on Stealth technology. Is this really a defensive system? The U.S. side speaks of the concept of fast- and slow-flying strategic systems, but this concept cannot stand up to criticism. A first strike is not a single launch of a weapon, but a system of nuclear strikes. It begins with a launch of an ICBM, then an SLBM, then a long-range cruise missile from a heavy bomber. It is the sum of actions of the entire strategic triad and not simply a single fast- or slow-flying system. Having deployed Pershing II’s under the Soviet Union’s own nose, the U.S. does not talk of them as destabilizing systems, but tries to assert that they are stabilizing. The U.S. proposes first of all to eliminate ballistic missiles. The Soviet side understands this to mean that the entire threat to U.S. territory would be eliminated, but the threat to Soviet territory would remain. Is this really equal security, Chervov asked? If ballistic missiles are eliminated, the U.S. will have security, but there will be none for the USSR. This is the root of the issue. The U.S. side thinks the Soviet side will develop SDI and that third countries will destroy their missiles. The U.S. speaks of third-country missiles as negligible and insignificant, but this is not so. These are nuclear weapons and they cannot be compared to any other kind of weapons. Even the UK government understood this when it wrote in an official white paper that Britain has a nuclear capability which the Soviet Union takes account of in its planning. The U.S. side has lost sight of this official statement of the British government. Chervov said he could not help but ask himself where the U.S. side is trying to lead the Soviet side. It is forcing the Soviet side to create a space shield just as the U.S. does in its star wars. As a military man who has devoted his life to military science, Chervov could only say that if both sides create a space shield, this will lead not to peace, but to war. The U.S. concept elaborated in the past and at present of establishing a space shield is based on one thing—an unlimited arms race. The U.S. is attempting to pull the USSR into an arms race and to exhaust its economic resources. Then, by means of SDI, the U.S. intends to dictate its will to the Soviet side. But this is an illusion, Chervov said, and he would say, frankly, that this course is hopeless but extremely dangerous. The Soviet Union and the United States are two countries which cannot possibly dictate their will and policies to each other. They can reach agreement only as equals and not by unleashing an arms race, but by preventing one and by banning an arms race in space.

Chervov said that Nitze did not agree with the term “militarization of space.” Nitze has said that the use of this term is not the substance of the issue. The substance, Chervov stated, is that at present there are no weapons in space, nor should there be any. This is the fundamental issue. The U.S. side is pushing the Soviet side to create space systems, while at the same time protesting against the militarization of space. The U.S. is pulling the USSR directly into a space arms race. In conclusion, Chervov wished to repeat the Soviet concept of stability. The essence of this concept is the enhancing of treaties, agreements and the ABM Treaty regime. The ABM Treaty should not be made hostage for 5 years, after which time it could be scrapped. The period of non-withdrawal from this treaty should be 15–20 years or longer. This is a treaty of indefinite duration, and the longer it lasts, the better. The Soviet side is prepared to make radical reductions in arms, and what is more, is prepared to take into account all of the U.S. side’s concerns.

Karpov noted that there was not much time left and perhaps the sides should designate the questions they still wished to address today. Karpov had raised some questions this morning which had not yet received a reply from the U.S. side. He had also not received clarification on his question regarding the proposed regime of mutual restraint.

Nitze said that it was clear that he strongly disagreed with Chervov’s remarks, but to save time he would turn to the question of interim restraint. He asked Colonel Linhard to take the floor.

Linhard said that President Reagan has always maintained that the SALT II Treaty is unacceptable as a long-term U.S.-Soviet arms control arrangement. Both sides have gone beyond the treaty as real reductions have been made in their existing arsenals. For some time, the U.S. side had avoided undercutting the provisions of the treaty, hoping that we could use it as an interim framework for mutual restraint while negotiating a START treaty. Judging from Karpov’s question, Linhard did not need to repeat why the President had made his decision of 27 May.³ Linhard did not wish to describe what had happened in the past, but preferred to look to the future.

Karpov said that this is what he wanted, too—not a repetition of what has happened in the past, but what an interim regime of mutual restraint means.

Linhard continued that the President had clearly stated that the U.S. would continue to exercise considerable restraint. He had stated that as long as there is no change in the threat, the U.S. would deploy no more warheads on offensive ballistic missiles or more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than the USSR has.

Karpov noted that he had already read the President’s statement and did not need Linhard to repeat it. He was looking for a clarification of the substance of the U.S. proposal on restraint. He could also ask some specific questions. The U.S. President had spoken of a number of warheads and strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but not of long-range cruise missiles of all basing modes. Why this discrimination, Karpov asked? In the particular category of arms discussed here, it is clear that only the Soviet side is being asked to show restraint. Other categories are passed over in silence. The U.S. side leaves much room for a buildup and race in the systems that it favors. It can increase nuclear systems without limit. However, the Soviet side cannot increase its strategic weapons, but must exercise restraint.

Linhard replied that this is a valid question. He had tried to explain the measures proposed by the President indicating why the U.S. was exercising restraint and would continue to do so. The U.S. side calls attention to ballistic missile warheads because it sees them as an essential element of the equation. It also calls attention to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles because they are covered in the expired SALT Treaty. Perhaps there are other systems which could also be discussed, but the U.S. side believes it is proper to look at reductions of those weapons that it is considering. If in a regime of mutual restraint the sides move the negotiations away from reductions, this would be tragic.

Karpov asked how, in a regime of restraint where competition in the military area is an important element, a moratorium on nuclear testing fit in.

Linhard replied that if Karpov had any doubt why the U.S. has serious reservations about a moratorium, he would be happy to clarify this, but he did not think the U.S. position needed to be explained. Briefly, as long as the U.S. requires nuclear weapons for defense and security (and the Soviet side also has such weapons), it would not understand how the Soviet side could forego testing as a requirement to ensure the security, effectiveness, survivability and reliability of its weapons.

Karpov noted that, unlike the U.S., the USSR has not tested any nuclear weapons for one year, and the Soviets are still alive. As he understood it, the U.S. proposal on mutual restraint does not provide for a moratorium or end to nuclear testing during the period of restraint.

Linhard agreed that the U.S. position on a moratorium is firm. It was, of course, clear that the measures proposed by the President for the U.S. to exercise restraint are not necessarily what we would propose for both sides together. The U.S. side had hoped to maintain the SALT II framework, as the President had stated in June, 1985, but this was not possible. Linhard said that the two elements he had mentioned were examples of the restraint the U.S. side would continue to exercise.

Karpov said he concluded that the U.S. regime of restraint does not provide for restraint from perfecting new types of nuclear weapons. How does the U.S. side envisage the regime of restraint—is it a one-sided statement by the U.S. calling for the Soviet Union to act with restraint, that is, not to increase its numbers of warheads and delivery vehicles, while at the same time leaving the U.S. free to increase and develop new nuclear systems? Or should there be mutual agreement on parameters of this restraint?

Linhard remarked that we are here ad referendum to discuss new concepts. The U.S. side had explained at the special session of the SCC and elsewhere what it was prepared to continue to do in the absence of mutual agreement. The main focus was the negotiations regarding the reductions being discussed here. However, if it would be useful to discuss other areas, the U.S. side is prepared. Linhard thought he had answered Karpov’s question about a moratorium.

Karpov said that the reason he asked his question was because the Soviet side had not received a reply to this question in the SCC. Was he correct in concluding from Linhard’s remarks that the U.S. does not want to agree on a regime of mutual restraint?

Linhard replied that the U.S. side had explained what it would do, taking into consideration actual conditions. Now it is ready to hear the ideas of the Soviet side regarding such a regime. He wished to repeat that during such discussions as these we should not divert from the primary task of discussing reductions.

Chervov said he had one more question regarding the regime of restraint. Does the U.S. side envisage recording this regime as a formal document or as a verbal political commitment?

Perle said he wished to comment. Chervov is well aware of U.S. military programs and plans, as is Karpov. These plans had been developed throughout the current Administration in accordance with a treaty which it did not like. Despite criticism of the treaty, the President had instructed the Department of Defense to proceed with these plans in accordance with the treaty. This decision which was prompted by our sense of what the Soviet side was doing with respect to the SALT Treaty, has changed but we have not begun any new weapons systems. As the Soviet side knows, a change in plans leading to new systems and creating conditions for an unlimited arms race is neither feasible nor desirable. If the sides are creative and expeditious in their work today, the direction of a new regime can be determined before the question of practical U.S. action not in accord with the SALT II Treaty arises. The U.S. side has not yet taken any such action. While it might be useful to discuss the question of uncontrolled competition, Perle feared to do so. We are ready, as Linhard had said, to explore ways to record and express this regime by any means the Soviet side suggests, although the shortest distance between the two points is the rapid completion of an agreement to replace SALT II. We have taken this view from the very beginning of this process. Some agreements last long after they are meant to, including SALT II, which was meant to expire last year. Perle thought that both sides knew that the only thing at issue here in the future was the introduction of weapons systems one side did not anticipate or a change in the schedule of dismantling. Perle did not think the Soviet side would find that a change in the destruction schedule has a major impact on the strategic relationship between us.

Nitze recalled that there was one outstanding question left regarding INF that Obukhov had asked. He would ask Glitman to answer it.

Karpov noted that it was time to leave for lunch at the DCM’s Residence.

Ambassador Glitman repeated Obukhov’s question regarding whether the U.S. is seeking a free hand in Asia while attempting to limit Soviet missiles. He said Obukhov’s question is related to the concept of a freeze on the Soviet part because the statement made in Vladivostok by the General Secretary concerning the Soviet position on the increase or non-increase of SS–20s in Asia said that this is not conditional on anything. Therefore, the question of a free hand relates to the context of reductions on the part of the USSR in the non-European part of the Soviet Union.

Obukhov said he had asked a question about the U.S. position and was still awaiting an answer.

Glitman agreed. He said that in a situation where the Soviet side reduces its systems worldwide, the U.S. is prepared to limit its LRINF missiles globally. This would lead to limits on the capability to deploy systems elsewhere than in Europe. On the other hand, lower numbers on the Soviet side for systems outside of Europe would lead to lower numbers for the U.S. systems which could remain. Now Glitman would turn to the specific question of the so-called free hand for the U.S. In the context of an agreement assuring equality for both sides with respect to LRINF missiles in Europe, the sides should work together to allay each other’s concerns regarding LRINF missiles in Asia. Glitman said he was speaking of missiles, not of other nuclear delivery vehicles. He thought he should go no further than this in today’s discussion, but the sides could return to this at their meeting in Washington.

Karpov said that as he understood Glitman, Glitman meant that if the Soviet Union reduces its missiles in Europe and Asia, the U.S. will reduce its deployments, including those in Asia. Does Glitman mean U.S. missiles in Asia? If so, does the U.S. take into account only its strategic relationship with the Soviet Union or also its strategic relationship with the Chinese People’s Republic?

Glitman replied that the U.S. would be ready in the context of the agreement being discussed here to limit total numbers of U.S. LRINF missiles regardless of their location. This number would depend on adding the number of systems the sides agree upon for Europe to the reductions taken by the Soviet side outside of Europe. The sum of these two would comprise the global ceiling. The lower the number on the Soviet side, the lower the number for the U.S. side. Glitman thought this also provided an answer to Karpov’s second question.

Karpov replied that it did not do so completely, but he thought now was a good time to stop. He asked how Nitze thought they should proceed—should they continue the discussion after lunch or end it now and go to lunch?

Nitze suggested continuing the discussion during lunch⁴ and then concluding the two days of talks. The U.S. would be in touch through diplomatic channels about the date for resuming these discussions in Washington. It would be important to work hard in the time left between now and then.

Karpov asked Nitze to keep in mind the time frame he had proposed for the Washington meetings.

Nitze said he would do so.

Karpov thanked him and adjourned the meeting.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, 7 DWARVES MEETING, MOSCOW, 11–12 AUG 1986. Secret. The meeting took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guest House, Meshcherino. Drafted by Smith; approved by Nitze.
2. See Document 138.
3. Reference is to Reagan’s statement of May 27, in which he announced that “in the future the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance, and especially in a flawed SALT II treaty, which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.” (“Statement on Soviet and United States Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,” May 27; Public Papers: Reagan, 1986, vol. 1, pp. 678–681)
4. No memorandum of conversation was found.