Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 16, 1987, 3:45–5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Deputy Secretary Whitehead
  • Under Secretary Armacost
  • Assistant Secretary Ridgway
  • Mr. Ermarth, NSC Staff
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Dubinin
  • Minister Counselor Kutovoy
  • Mr. Mamedov (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Korchilov (Interpreter)

SUBJECT

• Regional Issues, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq

THE SECRETARY opened the session by noting that he had wanted to spend some time on regional issues. The Foreign Minister and he had set a rough agenda: Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Kampuchea, Central America, Southern Africa.

SHEVARDNADZE noted that both sides’ regional experts had recently reviewed most of the areas the Secretary had mentioned. Shevardnadze was not sure he would be able to say much new.

THE SECRETARY said he had the same fear. Moreover, if he said anything, he would have to check with Armacost to see if it was right. But an effort had to be made. Perhaps the Foreign Minister would like to lead off on Afghanistan.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would be happy to, adding that he would check with Bessmertnykh to be sure what he was saying was right from the standpoint of U.S. interests.

In a more serious vein, Shevardnadze said there was no need to say again that Afghanistan was a serious problem which troubled Moscow greatly. But before he described the Soviet view of the problem in detail, he wanted to talk a bit about the overall Soviet approach to regional questions, focusing on what he termed “fresh elements of that approach.”

In the past, each side had sought essentially to “expose” the other in their dialogue on regional issues. Perhaps this was all right; perhaps it would continue. But the effort tended to overshadow the main task of uniting to find a solution to regional problems. There had recently been some changes in this pattern: consultations had become more specific, with negotiations underway in some areas; certain positive trends were emerging; even in areas where past incompatibility of interests had frustrated progress, prospects seemed to be opening up. On the question of a Middle East peace conference, for example, the two sides had once had very different approaches. There were still major differences on specifics such as participants, goals, and such, but positions on the concept were much closer now than they had been. Given a constructive approach, similar possibilities existed in other areas. Common ground could be found. Shevardnadze did not rule out that something could be done together in Afghanistan.

With respect to Afghanistan per se, Shevardnadze pointed to some serious developments in the process of finding a settlement “within” Afghanistan. The Foreign Minister said he knew what the U.S. thought of the current Afghan regime, and admitted that he held no “brief” for the current Afghan leadership.

But the Soviets did see how the face of that regime was changing. These were not the same people who had come to power in 1978, although some of those people were still around. What had changed were the views, the concepts of the leadership. It was the reality of what was going on in Afghanistan that had made them change and seek to develop new policies. In seeking to face squarely the contradictions of their approach, they had developed the policy of national reconciliation. This was not a phenomenon unique to Afghanistan; it could be seen in many countries. It had to be reckoned with.

Shevardnadze invited the Secretary to look at what was underway with respect to Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had taken a clear political decision that its forces would be withdrawn. “This decision will be carried out.” The Afghan government had instituted a ceasefire, which had recently been extended. It had also announced that there would be a multiparty system in the country. All classes, sectors and ethnic groups would be able to participate, including members of the bourgeoisie and clergy. A decision had been made to share power with the opposition, and a list of positions amounting to half of the government’s portfolios, including that of prime minister, had been released as open to those currently opposed to the regime. The process of the return of refugees was also continuing, albeit slowly, and special committees had been set up to facilitate their reabsorption.

Shevardnadze said he did not mean to imply that the situation was ideal, or that conditions were perfect. But neither could one ignore what he had been talking about. Shevardnadze knew personally of people who had not understood the April revolution² and its slogans, but had returned after the new policy of national reconciliation had been announced.

What was needed now? First, Shevardnadze said, the withdrawal of Soviet forces. This would have great importance in terms of policy, political impact and many other aspects. The Secretary had said before, and Shevardnadze agreed, that it was up to the Afghans to build their own future. Afghanistan would become a neutral and nonaligned country; the Soviet Union also wanted to see this happen.

Second, Shevardnadze continued, there should be an end to interference. The Secretary was aware that such interference was taking place. This was a real issue. So on the one hand there was the withdrawal of Soviet forces; on the other there was an end to interference. This was an area in which the U.S. could make a real contribution.

A process which could lead to a political settlement, of course, was underway. Negotiations were being conducted. During the next round, agreement could be reached on a timetable. This was not just a remote possibility, it was realistically possible. The Soviet Union was for this.

But who would be responsible for an end to interference? Sometimes it was said that the PDPA should go and a coalition government be established. But who would ensure that this would work; who would say who would govern?

Shevardnadze said with emphasis that there is a government in Kabul. It was governing. The most realistic approach would be to recognize that fact. Whether one considered it a good or a bad government, it was a reality. It existed.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, he had tried to give the Secretary some sense of how the face of the PDPA regime was changing. Moscow felt that the process of national reconciliation held many interesting aspects which deserved attention.

THE SECRETARY asked to comment on what Shevardnadze had said. Perhaps the time had come for a genuinely serious dialogue on Afghanistan. We welcomed Shevardnadze’s unambiguous, emphatic statement that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw its forces. There were many details to be worked out on how that would happen, but the Secretary wanted to leave those aside for the moment.

What we should ask ourselves at this time is: what kind of Afghanistan could one see, was one ready to see, in a post-withdrawal situation? One could then ask: what does it take to move from the present situation to that one hoped to see after withdrawal? These were both hard questions, but well worth talking about.

Shevardnadze had said the Soviet Union wanted a nonaligned Afghanistan ruled in accordance with the wishes of the Afghan people. The U.S. accepted that. At times we also heard that the Soviet Union could envision a situation for Afghanistan analogous to that of Austria or Switzerland. We also could imagine such a regime described by guarantors in a Geneva meeting. We could see neutrality brought about by an understanding among those guarantors and by a parallel understanding with Afghanistan.

As to what the guarantors might undertake, we could envision the following:

—To respect and observe the sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence and permanent neutrality of Afghanistan.

—Not to bring Afghanistan into any military alliance or other security arrangement or invite or encourage Afghanistan to enter into such alliance or arrangement.

—Not to introduce foreign military personnel or establish foreign military facilities or bases.

For its part, THE SECRETARY continued, Afghanistan, however represented, would undertake:

—To be a permanently neutral state.

—Not to enter into military alliances or other security arrangements.

—To prohibit introduction of foreign military facilities or bases.

In short, these constraints would exist among the guarantors and on the part of Afghanistan, and within the context they provided, Afghanistan would be free to determine its political orientation and foreign and domestic policy, including its aid and trading partners and participation in regional or international organizations. As Shevardnadze would note, there was a parallel to the Austrian model. The question was how to get there.

As for Afghanistan itself, the Secretary said we would be the first to admit that it would be difficult to bring about reconciliation in a situation as strained and bloody as the present one. We thought that the process would have the best chance in the context of a situation in which there was an interim government. One could also envisage the presence in Afghanistan of international agencies that might have access to the developmental funds which would be necessary in a post-withdrawal situation. The presence of such agencies could have a calming effect.

The Secretary reiterated that in such a transition period, a government which was viewed as having a limited purpose and duration would have the best chance of success. Such a government would be neither organized nor constituted as a permanent government. Its tasks could include the following:

—To promote stability during Soviet withdrawal.

—To establish the ground rules for selecting its legitimate successor.

—To develop an amnesty for former regime officials, so that people with the necessary skills could begin to return.

How to constitute such a government would be difficult. But the U.S. felt that for it to succeed it would need sufficiently broad support to carry out these kinds of tasks. The present regime seemed to appreciate this, and for this reason to have offered posts to others. Our view remained, however, that the current government did not have the kind of base necessary to make the process work. As far as we could see, for example, the net flow of refugees continued to be out of the country.

The Secretary continued that, if a government of the sort he had been describing could get underway, sufficient momentum could develop for it to succeed. Because the country would need to take advantage of the technical and other skills held by many of those associated with the current regime, they should have little difficulty being accepted. This could help bring about the national reconciliation process Shevardnadze had called for.

This, then, represented current U.S. views on the subject. As potential guarantors, if this kind of an arrangement were in place, it would cause us to change our behavior, just as the Soviet Union would have changed its own. In the interest of giving Shevardnadze a fuller flavor of what we had in mind, and since everyone had been citing Armacost as such an authority on the subject, the Secretary would ask the Under Secretary to comment further.

UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST said he had little to add. He shared the Secretary’s view that this was a time for practical exchanges on the subject. The Secretary had put forward some ideas for achieving a solution.

We welcomed the sense of urgency which Shevardnadze had conveyed. But we were a bit perplexed on certain points. Shevardnadze had said the Soviet Union was prepared to withdraw its forces, but no withdrawals had occurred. Moscow had emphasized national reconciliation, but all the proposals which had been advanced had the same bottom line of dominance by the PDPA. This was no basis for national reconciliation. Similarly, when the Kabul government had first refused to talk to Cordovez, and then accepted a new round, we had expected to see new proposals. We were perplexed when this did not happen.

We had earlier sensed that the Soviets and Pakistanis were moving into a more serious discussion of Afghanistan; that process had ended this spring, while attempts to intimidate Pakistan had intensified. Perhaps Moscow was counting on a public rift between Islamabad and Washington over nuclear issues to make its task easier. If so, ARMACOST believed the Soviets were underestimating the resilience of Pakistan and overestimating the likelihood of a public row.

SHEVARDNADZE said sarcastically, “that’s right, all our policies are based on the hope of a split over nuclear issues.” ARMACOST said he only wanted to emphasize that there were practical ways of getting to the kinds of outcomes the Soviets said they wanted. The sooner we could get into that kind of a discussion, the better.

Shevardnadze said that Armacost’s remarks had contained “nothing reasonable” in terms of seeking solutions. They reflected “yesterday’s reality.” Shevardnadze could complain about what the U.S. was up to as well, but there was insufficient time.

The Soviet Union was prepared to find a practical way of resolving the Afghanistan problem. Armacost had confined himself to groundless accusations. Why did he say that the DRA had advanced no serious proposals in the last proximity round? Shevardnadze thought it had been a good round. There would be another. Shevardnadze hoped for progress.

Moreover, U.S. representatives should go to Kabul and talk to Najib themselves to persuade him to resign and invite in a new government. Moscow was not prepared to talk to him in this way. Shevardnadze agreed with the Secretary, there should be some serious discussions.

The Secretary had described principles for a neutral state in Afghanistan. There were no differences between the two sides positions on this point. The Soviet Union wanted the principles of nonalignment and neutrality to be the foundations of the government of Afghanistan. But the U.S. had not answered the basic question: what to do with the current regime. There was a government in power, it was functioning, it had all the attributes of governing and important sources of support and influence throughout the country. Afghanistan was not a chessboard on which the Soviet Union and Armacost could just move pieces. Who would ensure a situation in which the current government would go and another be put in power? If this question was not answered, the rest remained simply good wishes. Shevardnadze was, in short, talking about a real situation. As to Armacost’s statement that the Soviet Union sought to play on U.S.-Pakistani divisions, it was devoid of substance.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the focus of the discussion be narrowed. In a general way, he had outlined the conditions which guarantors might agree upon, and on which the Afghan government might agree upon. Shevardnadze appeared to have agreed to those conditions. So that might be identified as where both sides wanted to end up, and could be put aside for the moment.

Shevardnadze had said that the Soviet Union intended to withdraw from Afghanistan. We recognized that that would be a very difficult process: when would it start? How long would it continue? These issues were being negotiated in the proximity talks. There would be another round. So for the moment the Secretary would prefer to put these issues aside as well.

Instead, he suggested focusing on the nature of the governmental process which would be underway while withdrawal was taking place and prior to the establishment of a post-withdrawal, neutral nonaligned government. That was a hard question. We were suggesting certain ways to address it.

One consideration was that it had to be clear to the Afghan people where the guarantor powers stood on the question of a neutral and nonaligned Afghan regime further down the road. They needed to see a future compatible with underlying attitudes within the country.

Another was that it would be useful to introduce some neutral international agencies. They might be able to help with economic reconstruction, and might have a peacekeeping role or be able to provide political expertise. But, in general, an international presence of some sort could be useful.

A third point was the idea that the government during this period should have the limited purpose of managing the transition, with the expectation that it would go out of business once the task had been completed. So there was the problem of designing ground rules for selecting a legitimate successor regime. This was a complicated task, which must be undertaken by the Afghans themselves, since Afghanistan was not historically a country which had easily submitted to central rule. So a successor regime had to be designed which fit Afghanistan.

There would also be the task of promoting stability while the process of withdrawal was underway. This would be hard, because of the hatred which had been aroused and the scores there were to settle.

An amnesty would also have to be promoted so that those who left, whether current refugees or regime officials, would feel confident that they could return and take part in the life of the country.

Those, then, were the tasks, the Secretary said. They were difficult. For a government to accomplish them, it would require a broad base of public support. Again, it was hard to see how the current regime was up to the challenge. That was why some were interested in the former king,³ although one could not be sure that he was the right person. As for those in the current government, they, too would have to be included in some way. They should not just be thrown out.

The Secretary concluded by reiterating that we realized these were all real, hard problems. The solutions were not “in the can.” People had to struggle with them. In that spirit we were prepared to think constructively and, if the Soviet side was willing, to sit down quietly and discuss and work on the problems. The Secretary wasn’t saying he had all the answers. He had tried only to outline our ideas on a possible approach.

SHEVARDNADZE said he also had no pat answers. He had wanted frankly to describe how the Soviet side saw the situation and correlation of forces in Afghanistan. He had tried to outline the reasons why it was necessary to deal with the current regime in Kabul. That government might not be ideal, but it existed. The question was what to do about that.

On the question of guarantees, the Soviet side felt it important that it be established that, once Soviet forces had withdrawn, guarantors would pledge that there be no interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

As for the principle that Afghanistan’s government should be neutral and nonaligned, that was up to the Afghan people themselves. This was not a case of unconditional surrender, in which other powers could, as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had done with Nazi Germany, devise principles and impose them on another country. That could not be done in Afghanistan in such a way that Soviet forces would leave the country and the government would simply resign. That could not be.

So Shevardnadze felt the dialogue should continue. But it was important that it be based on realities. Otherwise, it could turn out to be a waste of time.

THE SECRETARY said he had described Afghanistan not as a country defeated, as Nazi Germany had been after World War II, but as a country in turmoil, and partly occupied by Soviet forces. Large parts of Afghanistan were controlled by forces opposed to the current government. The government was able to govern in some areas, but could not control the country; it was not able to provide the most fundamental requirement of a government—law and order. A large percentage of the country’s population was not even in Afghanistan, and many of those who were were actively fighting the government. So these were all hard questions, but they were certainly the reality.

The point the Secretary wanted to make, however, was that the U.S. was willing to work with the Soviet Union. It was Moscow’s option as to whether it wished to do so. We were open to the possibility.

SHEVARDNADZE said he could debate the Secretary on the situation in Afghanistan, but that was not his purpose. The situation was certainly complicated, but it was well known to the Soviets. No one felt the realities there more painfully than the Soviet Union.

The question remained, however, what to do with the current regime. No one could answer that question: not Armacost, not the Secretary. Saying that the current regime was bad and that a new one should just be created would not work. One had to assume that this was an independent country. The U.S. might ask how that could be the case with Soviet troops there. They would be withdrawn. So one should proceed from the assumption that it was up to the Afghans to form whatever regime suited them.

What should be the basis for such a regime? Zahir Shah, Shevardnadze believed, was acceptable to the U.S., as he was to the Soviet Union and, apparently, most others. Moscow had had good relations with the ex-king when he was in power. It could cooperate with him now. But who would presume to tell the current regime in Kabul that it should go and Zahir Shah should rule? That was something for the current leaders themselves to consider.

THE SECRETARY said that reminded him of a baseball story. When pitcher Warren Spahn, having reached the (still active) age of 40, was asked when he would retire, he replied, “the batters will let me know.” That’s how it was with the current regime. If Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan tomorrow, the current regime could not survive. So one had to look at alternatives. This did not mean that members of the current government did not have a role to play. Skills and expertise were scarce commodities in Afghanistan. Any successor regime would need all the country had to offer, regardless of politics. That was why the U.S. believed that if it were possible to pull together a government designed to be an interim regime, with clearly defined transitional tasks, it would be easier for people to give it their support, knowing that it would ultimately leave power. But these were decisions which the Soviet Union had to face more than the U.S. For our part, we were prepared to try in whatever way we could to be constructive in helping to create a situation in which Afghanistan could become a more stable, nonaligned country.

SHEVARDNADZE said that, at last, the Secretary was getting to the main thing. Shevardnadze said he was convinced that, once Soviet forces had withdrawn, the current regime would not collapse. The Secretary’s information was one-sided; but it should not be surprising that the Soviet information on such matters should be more reliable.

THE SECRETARY and ARMACOST said that in that case the Soviets should go ahead and withdraw. SHEVARDNADZE replied that they had decided to do just that. But there had to be guarantees that interference from Pakistan would stop. Once these two elements were in place, the Afghans would be able to build their own country. That was the logic of the Soviet position. The U.S. and Soviet Union could cooperate on this basis if Washington was willing. The Soviet Union would not be willing to agree to U.S. bases in Afghanistan, but neither did it want any for itself.

ARMACOST noted that everything that Shevardnadze had been talking about was already covered by the various instruments negotiated in the Geneva proximity talks. The only missing element was the instrument on withdrawal.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there would be a timetable. But the Soviets needed—and the Afghans needed—guarantees of the sort Shevardnadze had described. “At present,” the dialogue in Geneva was with the current regime in Kabul. It made no sense to suggest that that regime should conclude an agreement, and then disappear so that others could rule. And Shevardnadze had to say that these were not really bad people. He had even considered suggesting that he and the Secretary travel to Kabul to meet them.

THE SECRETARY said he had been to the Khyber Pass. SHEVARDNADZE said he should see it from the other side.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, in the interest of time, the Ministers move on to the Iran-Iraq war. He noted that earlier that year there had been a special moment when a strong resolution (598), worked out largely by the U.S. and Soviet Union, had been unanimously approved by the Security Council. It had been an historic moment; the Secretary had felt like clapping. It had been an expression of the world community’s sense that the war had gone on long enough, and that it was time to end it.

The UN Secretary General (SecGen) had now completed his mission to the region. The Secretary had not yet had a detailed report, but understood we had a preliminary read-out, and asked Armacost to summarize what we knew.

ARMACOST said that the reports thus far were conflicting, and said we would need to wait for a more definitive report from the SecGen.

THE SECRETARY felt, however, that the two sides should be prepared if the SecGen’s report was not satisfactory to move on to consideration of a second resolution. A second resolution might or might not be totally effective, but if all the Security Council members worked at it, the party most likely to reject it—Iran—would at least find it more difficult to obtain arms, and where it found them would have to pay more for them. That would represent some headway. But, THE SECRETARY noted, Shevardnadze had had greater opportunity to judge Iranian intentions than he. The Secretary would be interested in his views.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Iran-Iraq war was a terrible thing. He, too, however, was encouraged by the way the U.S. and Soviet Union had cooperated in seeking to end it. This was something very precious, and Shevardnadze looked forward to a more detailed discussion once the results of the SecGen’s mission were known.

Shevardnadze saw two basic questions at the center of the problem: first, the war itself and what was needed to end it; and, second, the situation in the Security Council in that context.

Shevardnadze felt that at this point every effort should be made to realize the potential inherent in Resolution 598. The Soviet Union was not against a second resolution. But it was essential to consider carefully what guarantees existed to ensure it was implemented. If not one, but two, resolutions remained only on paper, it would undermine the Council’s credibility. That was the main problem “we” faced. So bilateral and multilateral consultations on the issue should continue.

Were an embargo and sanctions to be imposed, it would be important that they be fully implemented. A resolution containing such elements would have to be effective.

There were also considerations relating to the situation in the Gulf itself. The area was close to Soviet borders. As a result, Moscow had made official statements to that effect, and Shevardnadze wanted to underscore what had been stated therein. The continued presence of massive military potential in the region was dangerous.

The Soviets were realistic, however. They recognized the need for minesweepers in the Gulf. They were ready to cooperate with the U.S. and others on such problems. But the concentration of dozens of warships, tens of thousands of personnel, and senior command structures was dangerous.

So, on the one hand, there had been good cooperation in the Security Council. The Soviets were prepared to continue to support what the U.S. was trying to do there. But the other side of the U.S. approach was something Moscow could not support.

As for the fact that the Soviets were in contact with both parties to the conflict, that was of course true. There had been some good contacts with both sides. Iran knew that Moscow was supplying arms to Iraq and would continue to do so. The Soviets had told Iran frankly that if the war did not end they would have to vote for a second resolution. So Moscow was using all means at its disposal to move things forward. So far, unfortunately, these contacts had produced no results. But neither had the U.S. military build-up in the Gulf.

THE SECRETARY countered that our presence in the Gulf had produced results. It had been the only way to deal with threats by Iran against the flow of oil out of the Gulf and against Gulf state governments. The size and presence of U.S. forces in the region was directly related to Iranian behaviour. We had laid no mines, nor taken any aggressive action. When the threat diminished, the size of our force would be diminished. But our interests in the region were historic due to the enormous flow of energy resources through the region, and their importance to us and our friends. So we would stick at it, as we had for generations. (SHEVARDNADZE said that was up to the U.S.).

On the Security Council, THE SECRETARY agreed that our cooperation to date had been precious. In the absence of the SecGen’s report, the Secretary suggested that the Ministers return to the subject the next day. The Secretary was also certain that the matter would be under review when the two Ministers were in New York the following week.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet Union also wanted to support the SecGen. So that was a point in common. THE SECRETARY expressed his hope that the SecGen’s trip had been successful. But, as Shevardnadze had suggested during the previous evening’s discussion on the CNO’s barge, that did not seem likely. SHEVARDNADZE said he had only expressed some doubts; they were not based on any hard information.

The meeting ended on a discussion of the quality of the luncheon offered earlier that afternoon by Ambassador Dubinin.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze—Wash—9/87. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State.
2. Reference is to the April 1978 Communist takeover in Afghanistan.
3. Reference is to Zahir Shah, the King of Afghanistan, who was ousted in 1973.