60. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Carlucci) to President Reagan1
SUBJECT
- Gorbachev’s Reply to Your Letter on the Iran-Iraq War
Last Saturday, July 18, Soviet Ambassador Dubinin came in to State on an urgent basis to deliver Gorbachev’s reply (Tab A)2 to your letter of June 29 (Tab B)3 inviting Soviet cooperation with us in the UN Security Council on political steps to end the Iran-Iraq war.
Gorbachev’s letter is positive in tone and mentions US-Soviet cooperation on a resolution calling for a cease fire and withdrawals. But he goes downhill fast from there. He is not forthcoming on subsequent [Page 271] steps, such as sanctions, other than admonishing us to join them in supporting the Secretary General’s efforts. In fact, the Soviets have been less active and exposed than we, as symbolized by Shevardnadze’s absence from the UNSC session.
Gorbachev strikes a few additional notes with negative edges.
—He calls attention to Soviet bilateral diplomacy with both Iraq and Iran, which we cannot replicate, claiming that it is not directed at selfish ends or harming the interests of others.
—He complains that US naval presence is a significant source of regional tension, while claiming that the Soviet naval counterpart is in no way comparable and that it operates at the request of littoral states (implying that ours does not). He also implies that there should be an Iran-Iraq agreement to end attacks on shipping, independent of the overall war.
—He reaffirms the Soviet proposal to remove the naval presence of all “non-regional” states, and claims to hear support from Iran and Iraq, many other states, and even some voices in your Administration. Although he does not do so explicitly in his letter, Gorbachev is asserting elsewhere that the USSR is a regional state while the US is not.
There is nothing surprising in Gorbachev’s letter; it tracks fully with Soviet actions we are seeing. Moscow is clearly trying to play all sides against the middle at low risk: Seeking to establish a reputation for statesmanlike cooperation; to appear moderate but fully engaged to the Gulf states; to keep political lines open to both Iran and Iraq; and to paint us as partisan and bellicose. For the moment, we have little choice but to let Moscow play this game. If we get into a more confrontational situation with Iran, we can expect the Soviets to step up their efforts to play the peacemaker, seeking broader regional influence at our expense.
- Source: Reagan Library, Ermarth Files, Chron Files, July-August 1987 (2). Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Bush and Baker. Reagan initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Reagan saw it on July 21.↩
- Attached but not printed. See Document 59.↩
- Attached but not printed. See Document 56.↩