Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

61. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting¹

Washington, July 28, 1987, 2:06–3:12 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Embassy Security Issues

PARTICIPANTS

• The President

• The Vice President’s Office

  • Craig Fuller
  • Donald Gregg

• State

  • Secretary George Shultz
  • Deputy Secretary John Whitehead
  • Ronald Spiers

• Treasury

  • Secretary James Baker

• Defense

  • Secretary Caspar Weinberger
  • GEN William Odom

• Justice

  • Brad Reynolds

• OMB

  • James Miller

• CIA

  • Judge William Webster
  • [name not declassified]

• JCS

  • GEN Robert Herres
  • ADM Jonathan Howe

• FBI

  • John Otto

• White House

  • Howard Baker
  • Kenneth Duberstein
  • Frank Carlucci
  • Colin Powell
  • Barry Kelly
  • Fritz Ermarth
  • John Lewis

The President opened the meeting and made the following points: The reports from Jim Schlesinger, Mel Laird and Anne Armstrong all underscore one fact: our past practices have not been up to the security and counterintelligence job we face today overseas. The President said he is determined this situation will be corrected. We face a sophisticated, well funded, well organized assault, but he is convinced American management and technology can match any challenge our adversaries mount. To do so, we must organize ourselves better, marshal the best minds and management talent we have, and think creatively. We must build and maintain secure, efficient facilities overseas. Our personnel program must recognize the threats our people face and prepare them to meet those effectively. Overseas and in Washington our managers must have authority to provide security and be accountable for doing so. And we must do what is necessary to prevent adversaries from taking advantage of our open society by holding them to acceptable behavior in this country. The President added that he was interested in hearing assessments of these three reports and recommendations of where we go from here. (S)

Mr. Carlucci then turned the floor over to Secretary Shultz. (U)

Secretary Shultz noted that his 20 minutes of allotted time was reasonable since we have a major problem and must do something about it. He pointed out that although the State Department has been working on embassy security issues, State has not been moving fast enough. He indicated he had read the major reports and would make comments on the following topics focusing mostly on Moscow but applicable to the other bloc countries: (S)

The NOB: (U)

Secretary Shultz noted we have a reasonable degree of unanimity and that we should work to be as sure as possible about security of the NOB. Clearly we should tear down most of the building. Schlesinger recommends that we tear down the top three floors and that we build an annex. In discussing this issue with Schlesinger, Shultz believes we should knock down the top five floors of the NOB. (S)

The President asked how many floors are there? (U)

Secretary Shultz replied that there were nine floors with a pool in the basement. Shultz went on to say that the problem is not with the ground floor: it is what’s above and below. It’s for this reason that Shultz supports the Johnny Foster concept of “slicing” maybe as low as the first floor. Although we can’t count on it to do a full job, we can do certain things to insure our security. My specific recommendation on the NOB, however, is to incorporate the “slicing” concept at the lowest floor possible, together with deconstruction and rebuilding of the top five floors. Concerning the twin towers, the question must be asked, do we need the space? Size is a factor. We do not need additional space. Additionally, if we increase our size, the Soviets may want to increase theirs. The annex thus raises the reciprocity problem; they may want to build something here. An annex cannot be built until later, so we do not need to make the decision now. The annex has potential for the future. (S)

Secretary Shultz continued that to rebuild the NOB is a big job. We should bring everything in to rebuild the NOB. This is very expensive and we can’t get the funding from Congress to do it properly. Because this has a great deal to do with security, we should work with the intelligence committees to obtain appropriate funding. Secretary Shultz indicated that he had worked with some members of these committees, and that they were receptive. (S)

Secretary Shultz continued that there is no way the NOB could be ready for occupancy for at least five years, adding that the concept, money, Soviet agreement, and the unusualness of the construction job would require that amount of time. This will obviously be performed by a private contractor and the employees who perform this work must all be American and heavily screened. (S)

The Old Embassy Building: (U)

Secretary Shultz noted that there is unanimity that the old embassy is inadequate, particularly since we will have to utilize it for at least the next five years. The old embassy is in need of major renovation to fix the security. The renovation cannot be a band-aid approach. Secretary Shultz indicated that State is in the process of working with an architect, and efforts are under way to secure the facility and space, communications in particular. Secretary Shultz noted that he has been advised that the cost to renovate and rehabilitate the old embassy would be somewhere between $16–20 million. Based upon his experience, he would put it closer to $30–35 million. That is a lot of money for a building we do not think will be permanent. But again, the budget is a problem. We need the money to do the job. This is of such importance, however, that maybe we just ought to do what needs to be done and someone will pay for it. (S)

The President asked that once we had fixed up the old embassy building and moved in to the new building, who gets the old building? (U)

Secretary Shultz responded that under the current agreements the old building will go back to the Soviets. However, we are negotiating to keep the old building [1 line not declassified]. Additionally, we could perform certain activities in the old building which would be to our advantage, e.g., consular business. This would allow us to keep the Soviets out of the new building, insuring that the new building is all American and very secure. We might also utilize the old building for living quarters. (S)

The President asked that in cleaning up the old building and making it presentable, can we make sure that we also make it reasonably secure? (U)

Secretary Shultz responded that he was not an expert, but that if we go about it right we can provide good secure space and facilities. General Odom agreed with the Secretary totally, indicating that activities could be conducted to insure a high level of confidence about certain aspects, even though security for all spaces would be doubtful. The President noted that he was thinking about the residence, where people go home and can’t talk about work. Secretary Shultz noted that all our people in Moscow know that they should not talk about their work in their residence, or any place outside the embassy. Furthermore, our people must remember never to take things home from work. Our people must lead double lives in Moscow and seem to accommodate themselves to that. But on the plus side, professionals want to go there because it is an interesting and challenging assignment; so it is not all bad. The President noted that it was not as good as America, that a little 12 year old girl from Wisconsin told him that. Secretary Shultz agreed with the President and noted that when one leaves the airport in Moscow one sighs with relief that it is over. (S)

Organization: (U)

Secretary Shultz indicated that he would like to go on to another topic which was somewhat more controversial. Secretary Shultz recalled for the President the PFIAB Report, where Professor James Q. Wilson, a knowledgeable and brilliant man, set forth the concept from which his PFIAB recommendations stemmed, which are as follows: State Department has a role: its role is to engage in diplomatic and representational activities abroad. One acts as an American, mingles in the society, goes to bars, meets people and hopes that they might ask you to dinner and to reciprocate. One interacts with the people. One tries, in an overt way, to learn as much about that society as possible. That is the culture of the State Department. We want our people to get around and to learn about the culture and the people. Reporting by State officers constitutes important knowledge about the country. [1 line not declassified] Wilson concludes, however, that if that is the culture, one cannot bring oneself to worry about security and counterintelligence. Therefore, it is not possible in the State Department to administer a good counterintelligence program. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that in not speaking as the Secretary of State but speaking as a manager, he does not think Wilson’s concept will work. If counterintelligence and security is part of our mission we must work them. Counterintelligence and security are part of the problem and we have to live with them. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that when Mr. Carlucci was in Portugal he recognized that there were Communists there. We must, therefore, be ready to change the culture and management consciousness in State. Secretary Shultz noted that he has been working on this since becoming Secretary of State. He further noted that private business handles security a great deal better than the Government. Secretary Shultz then indicated that he wanted to talk about some of the reorganization recommendations. He indicated that he did not think that the DSA concept was a good idea, although recognizing that we need a strong security bureau. He has increased his security bureau by five times since becoming the Secretary, however, State counterintelligence is doing a crummy job, even though it is improving. He reiterated that he agreed that we need a separate bureau, but that it must be from within State rather than separate. He would, therefore, resist a spin-off or separate agency. Secretary Shultz also raised the issue of the audit function being conducted and certified by the CIA. He agreed that an independent audit function is a good idea and that standards must be set up as to what we are aiming at. Regardless of what we decide, however, we can never say something is 100 percent secure. Just as the Secret Service cannot provide 100 percent security for the President. The President requested Secretary Shultz to use another example. Secretary Shultz noted that there are certain people who will say that they can never secure anything 100 percent. He further believes that the CIA should not be the one to conduct the audit. Perhaps we could struggle with creating some kind of interagency, independent audit, with some kind of an outside aspect to it that would guarantee its independence, rather than hand it over to the CIA. (S)

Personnel: (U)

Secretary Shultz indicated that the selection of personnel should begin with the manager at post. There is no doubt that people should be screened and selected carefully. If we were to look at some of the resumes like that of Sergeant Stufflebeam, we would have realized early on that he had been in all kinds of trouble in previous posts. Perhaps there was a thought that someone was going to punish this guy and send him to Moscow. We should, therefore, start with the simplest things and this would eliminate many of the problems. Having worked industrial personnel, psychology tests are all right, but common sense management, security and counterintelligence, must be up front in the manager’s mind. Secretary Shultz noted that he has an ID badge. When he started wearing it every day, everyone else began wearing one. He observed time and again that when it comes to safety, and all other things are the same, better management consciousness and treating people right makes the difference. Therefore, accountability must be the Ambassador’s; and he must know it. Every agency also must know that it cannot thumb its nose at the Ambassador. The Ambassador must approve assignments. (S)

Polygraph: (U)

Secretary Shultz then moved on to the topic of polygraph, noting that he cannot see applying lie detector tests to a class of people as in the State Department. Secretary Shultz noted that he has been persuaded by Judge Webster, Helms and Casey that lie detector tests are good for investigative and interrogation techniques. But again, he has great apprehension in applying them to classes of people. Secretary Shultz noted that one can kid oneself that just because people pass the lie detector they are bona fide, noting the recent CIA Cuban double agents as an example. He added that someone who is nervous also might fail the test. Secretary Shultz again questioned the application of the polygraph in an embassy setting noting, however, that he is not addressing DOD or the Agency. He simply cannot see it. (S)

Secretary Shultz concluded by noting that the previously mentioned topics were searching and depressing problems but that we are looking into it and that we care a lot. (U)

Mr. Carlucci then turned the floor over to Judge Webster, asking if he could abbreviate because of time. Judge Webster opened his remarks by noting that we are in agreement on most of the issues. He noted that he agrees with Schlesinger that none of this will work unless we integrate the physical, technical and personnel security. He would also underscore putting the rehab of the old embassy building first, noting it is the most important. We should spend money and move immediately. Noting that in consultation with CIA, NSA, FBI and with more unanimity than on any other study, the highest priority was placed on the refurbishment, security and habitability of the old embassy building. Next, the review of personnel nominations for assignment to Moscow must be more comprehensive. Regarding the polygraph examination, Judge Webster noted that he took a polygraph examination the previous day to reinforce his support for the program. He conceded that the polygraph is a tool that can fail to detect deception, but further noted that it is important to keep people focused on accountability for looseness of talk. He could not think of a better setting where this applies than a diplomatic situation. (S)

Regarding the NOB, Judge Webster continued, we should take it down as far as we could go. If Secretary Shultz says five floors, we support that decision but that we should bring home the parts taken down for technical examination. (S)

Judge Webster noted that he further supports the concept of the DSA set out in PFIAB, recognizing that there is some apparent disagreement on how it’s to be constituted. Responding to Secretary Shultz’ concern on CIA certification, he noted that the DCI certifies the facility as the head of the Intelligence Community. He noted that Congress would probably support this more than an audit function inside the State Department. Secretary Shultz noted that he did not mean inside the State Department but independent. (S)

Judge Webster continued that the new building is going to require lots of cooperation from the Soviets and that the Soviets are not going into Mt. Alto until we are in good shape in the NOB. (S)

Judge Webster concluded by noting that Congress is looking for solutions. If we make Congress a part of it, we could move much more quickly. Secretary Shultz agreed totally. (S)

Mr. Carlucci then called upon Secretary Weinberger for discussion. Secretary Weinberger agreed to “slicing” the new building. He further agreed that we should refurbish, rehab and make secure the old embassy building noting that we could be there a long time. He suggested, however, that the Soviets should be asked to help pay for the new building since it’s their fault we have the added expenses. We should make this a part of our demand. He further agreed with the earlier comments about not being able to combine the State Department culture with the counterintelligence and security culture. The counterintelligence and security culture is a basically suspicious, negative approach to insure our security. It, therefore, takes a different mind set and a different group of people. All of this cannot be put into the State Department. One cannot audit one’s own activities. He further agreed that the DCI was in the best position to insure competency to store classified information. Secretary Weinberger went on to describe the Soviet Union as the only country in the world seeking world dominance. That doesn’t mean we can’t visit and work with them, but they cannot be in charge of our security. He went on to confirm his belief that the Ambassador must look at the people assigned to him, but then asked what do we do with a bad Ambassador? Secretary Weinberger indicated that Ambassador Hartman was a big problem. We must, therefore, have an outside agency that knows the game and looks at security. State, therefore, can look at the culture. We further must apply these rules to all countries. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that he would like to say a word about Ambassador Hartman. The Secretary described Hartman as doing more about security than his predecessors, although he left a lot to do. Secretary Weinberger indicated that he would like to say a word about Sergeant Stufflebeam. Secretary Shultz noted that Stufflebeam’s problem with bad checks was in the file. (S)

Mr. Carlucci summarized the results of the meeting noting that we have identified three problem areas: (1) the NOB, noting that the sentiment on the Hill is to tear it down; (2) management, with the degree and separation between the bureau of security and the State Department in question, and (3) the standards set for personnel. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked as to how we could bring all three together so the President can make a decision, noting that there is a lot we agree upon already. He reiterated that he wanted a bureau of security, but inside because he wants the culture at State to change a little. Mr. Carlucci noted that there is heavy pressure from the Hill on this issue and that if the President doesn’t make a decision, Congress will make one for us. He asked if Secretary Shultz would send in a report setting forth his position on the issues. Secretary Shultz indicated that he would be delighted and would send in a report noting the disagreements and he would do this before Congress goes home. We should be able to say to Congress that the President has done such and such. Mr. Carlucci reiterated that we must do something before Congress recesses. (S)

The President asked who will do the work if we start to work on the building? Secretary Shultz noted that only American workers would be employed. Judge Webster noted that we must be assured that what has happened will not happen again. (S)

Jim Baker asked what is the nature of the polygraph system. Judge Webster responded that [1 line not declassified]. (S)

Howard Baker noted that it was important that we stake out a position on this issue. He suggested that the President’s radio address this Saturday would be a good time for the President to make a remark about this issue. If we do not move quickly, this will become a Congressional issue rather than the President’s. He then asked Secretary Shultz how long until we can move on this matter? Secretary Shultz responded “pretty fast.” (S)

Howard Baker identified the key issue as the NOB, i.e., are we going to tear it down or not? Secretary Shultz noted that he and Judge Webster were practically in agreement. Judge Webster noted that to tear down the NOB is an emotional thing. But if we allow the Soviets to set the standards with whatever we do, it will be difficult. Howard Baker noted that it was important to have this fundamental question answered in time. (S)

The President stated that he could accept what he has heard at the meeting. If there is a need to rebuild, he agreed to go with the five floors and not the three, and to “slice.” (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that the building need not be the only issue for the President’s radio program, but personnel issues also could be addressed. Secretary Shultz agreed. (S)

General Odom noted that the skills to do competent audits requires representatives of other agencies and not just the CIA. (U)

Secretary Shultz noted that as he sees it right now when it comes to assuring communications one looks to CIA. General Odom indicated that if we find a technical penetration, often it is because of custodial problems involving personnel, locks, etc. All too often penetrations are premised on custodial problems. (S)

Howard Baker noted as one final item: let’s insure that we leave this to be the President’s decision. Mr. Carlucci stated that he would like to see the option of what we would sacrifice if we take the NOB all the way to the ground. The President noted that with what we have in the basement, we have no need to do that. Judge Webster noted that standards can be upgraded. (S)

The meeting concluded at 3:12 p.m.

1. Source: Reagan Library, 1987 SYS 4 RWR INT 40526–40549. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.