56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union1
200231. Subject: Presidential Message on Iran-Iraq.
1. Secret—Entire text.
2. Please deliver the following letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev. There will be no signed original. Since the President will announce several of these points Tuesday morning,2 delivery of this letter should take place ASAP.
3. Dear. Mr. General Secretary:
Over the past several months the permanent members of the Security Council have made extraordinary progress in the effort to advance the goal of bringing to an end the tragic and dangerous conflict between Iraq and Iran. We have now reached a major milestone in this effort, with agreement in principle on a Security Council resolution mandating an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal to international borders. I much appreciate the cooperative attitude of the Soviet Union, which has contributed substantially to this important achievement.
I believe you share our judgment that for the resolution to have an impact on the combatants they must realize that the Security Council is prepared to take measures to enforce its order. Thus, I would urge we reach agreement now, at least among the permanent members, on specific implementation measures. These would include mechanisms for verifying a ceasefire/withdrawal in the event of compliance, and enforcement measures, preferably an arms embargo, in the event of refusal of one or both parties to comply.
I am convinced that we must now focus intensively on reaching this agreement. Therefore, I have asked Secretary Shultz personally to lead our delegation in New York when this issue is brought before the [Page 264] Council. We believe this should be no later than mid-July, given the dangers of serious deterioration in the Gulf. I have instructed Ambassador Walters to explore these issues carefully with your officials in Moscow. Finally, I also urge that our deliberations in New York be intensified, and have directed that, beginning the week of July 6, our UN Delegation be augmented by experts to assist in bringing this matter to a speedy conclusion.
Success in this vital endeavor depends upon our common commitment to press ahead resolutely and swiftly to resolve the remaining issues, while we continue to support strongly the complementary mediation efforts of the Secretary General. As Under Secretary Armacost noted to Ambassador Dubinin,3 the U.S. and the USSR can play a special role in this process. When our countries decide to work together at the UN, we can achieve results.
Sincerely, Ronald Reagan
- Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870687–0263. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis; Immediate. Drafted by H. Lampert (IO); cleared by W. Courtney (NSC), G. Kulick (IO/UNP), Simons, R. Mueller (S/S), M. Creekmore (NEA), and in substance by N. Smith (IO) and D. Goodman (IO); approved by Armacost. Sent Immediate for information to Paris, London, Beijing, Baghdad, and USUN. For Gorbachev’s response, see Document 59.↩
- On June 30, Fitzwater issued a statement, on behalf of the President, concerning U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf. For the text, see Public Papers: Reagan, 1987, Book I, pp. 729–730.↩
- Transmitted in telegram 175523 to Moscow, USUN, and Secretary of State Shultz’s delegation to the ASEAN post-ministerial meeting in Singapore, June 19. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D870676–0149)↩