Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 11, 1988, 2:55–5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s First Meeting with Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, President’s National Security Advisor
  • Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)
  • Peter Afanasenko (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Sergei Tarasenko, Chief of Shevardnadze’s Secretariat
  • Georgiy Mamedov, USA and Canada Department (notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko, (interpreter)

During the photo opportunity, Shevardnadze said he had been asked why he arrived in Geneva so early; the last time he had been here he had been asked why he arrived so late. The Secretary gave him a picture of him showing the President a photo of the U.S. flag flower display in Tbilisi. In response to press questions, both said they were there to work; Shevardnadze told a Soviet questioner the atmosphere in the delegation was workmanlike and positive.

The Secretary began by saying he had told the President of the very warm reception he had received in Tbilisi, and of the good time he had had there. It had been a pleasure to see Shevardnadze’s children and grandchildren, although he had had a hard time making friends with the youngest. He then suggested they get to work.

Shevardnadze said we had to move forward. But he wished to say first he had had calls from Tbilisi and Kiev, all wishing the Secretary the best. The Secretary said he had had good visits to both places. It was educational and worthwhile to travel to different parts of Shevardnadze’s country. We all knew intellectually that big countries are diverse, but it did not register until you saw them. Shevardnadze said there was no substitute for personal experience.

The Secretary said they were working to make the summit a success. They needed to get hold of the issues, to get them in good order. Shevardnadze said he saw no reason to be pessimistic. It was in the nature of man to want the maximum possible. Maybe they would not obtain that in this case. But the leaders should review what had been done in the last years. There would be a lot to report on in Moscow. There had been a lot of results. The meeting could be a truly impressive occasion to take stock and determine the prospects for the future. The Secretary said he agreed totally.

Shevardnadze said it was becoming a tradition for them to finish up summit preparations in Geneva. The Secretary recalled that the first summit itself had taken place there.

Shevardnadze said the principal questions concerned disarmament, specifically strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. Perhaps they could return to these questions later. First he wanted to discuss the very basic questions of what could be completed by the time of the Moscow visit. They would be meeting in a small group to discuss strategic offensive arms, but the ministers should probably discuss INF matters first.

On INF there were problems that needed discussion, Shevardnadze continued. He failed to understand what had happened. The U.S. side had asked some questions which the Soviet side had answered. Then there was a new set of questions. The Soviets had sent answers. It was not clear what the problem was. They needed to discuss it. He had met with his experts through part of the night, digesting the material. The issues were mostly technical. Their experts could meet, and they could listen to them the next day. They could have a general discussion, and then take stock. It would be very desirable to complete this work while they were in Geneva.

The Secretary said it was essential to complete it while they were there, perhaps even that very day. There were two types of issues.

First, the Secretary said, they had to nail down what they had previously discussed on the so-called futuristic-type weapons on range at treaty-prohibited areas. He thought there was no disagreement there. We had brought with us a paper to clarify it. Ambassador Kampelman had it with him, and could meet with whomever Shevardnadze would designate to finish it off. Shevardnadze said he thought they had basically finished that issue. If the U.S. needed clarification, that would be fine. The Secretary replied that that was exactly the case; it could even be a problem of translation from the Russian. People in the Senate had asked that it be further clarified, and we had brought along some language that had been worked with the Senate.

The other set of issues, the Secretary continued, were those that had arisen between the two teams responsible for on-site inspection. It was not surprising that problems arose when two technical teams met. He thought these ought to be fairly resolvable. The guide should be the text of the treaty. The U.S. had a strong technical team in Geneva. He had brought Ambassador Glitman, who had negotiated the treaty and was coordinating the information flows with the Senate. The sooner the ministers gave instructions for the work to be done the better off they would be. He proposed that Glitman and a team meet with a Soviet team on the second set of issues, and that Kampelman and Shevardnadze’s designate meet on futuristics. He hoped they could finish that afternoon and evening. He was prepared to try.

Shevardnadze said with Glitman the Soviet delegation would be General Chervov and many specialists, including many participants in the talks. With Kampelman, he asked Bessmertnykh, he supposed it should be Karpov; Bessmertnykh confirmed that it should.

On START and DST, the Secretary suggested that they convene a working group, which could then report to them.

Shevardnadze asked if this meant there would be no plenary. Would they simply instruct the working group to begin? The Secretary said he did not feel they needed a human rights working group; perhaps the two of them could discuss that. The same, he felt, held for regional issues; they should discuss this area themselves. On bilateral issues, Simons was there for discussions, to the extent they were needed, with Bessmertnykh. That left arms control: INF, START and Defense and Space, chemical weapons, conventional arms.

On conventional arms, the Secretary continued, the ministers should seek to break things open in Vienna. We had not seen particular motion there, and that was where the key was. We thought very positive results in Vienna could be reflected at the summit. Shevardnadze had made many interesting statements on conventional arms, also from the standpoint of the expense of their respective defense efforts, where conventional arms played a major role, even though strategic arms took a tremendous burden when it came to deterrence. Both sides, he thought, would like to take note of movement; the key was Vienna.

Shevardnadze replied that the negotiations were in Vienna, but much depended on the two ministers. If they could not decide on the mandate and actual negotiations did not begin, there would be no movement to report. He was ready for more detailed discussion.

(At this point Ambassador Maynard Glitman, General Nikolai Chervov of the Soviet General Staff, and Ambassador Viktor Karpov, Soviet MFA Disarmament Department head arrived.)

Shevardnadze greeted Glitman, joking he was responsible for the whole INF mess. The Secretary informed the newcomers that he and Shevardnadze had decided they should meet briefly with the ministers and then with each other and their people, and should work in a positive frame of mind to resolve the remaining issues, largely related to on-site inspection. He hoped the work could be completed that day, though that would of course depend on how much could be achieved. Kampelman and Karpov would meet on futuristics. The U.S. side thought it quite possible the problem there was one of translation; it had brought some language which key members of the Senate found satisfactory.

Shevardnadze asked if Kampelman were in Geneva. The Secretary replied that he had come with the U.S. team, but had stopped by his apartment to change. Shevardnadze said he had reviewed all the questions relating to INF missiles, and did not see any that could not be resolved at this meeting. It was important for the experts to sit down and get to work. The Secretary said that was also our view; he suggested the ministers kick them out. Shevardnadze said he thought Karpov and Kampelman might finish first; all should get to work. The Secretary bid farewell to Ambassador Glitman. (Glitman and Chervov left at 3:20.)

Shevardnadze said he thought there should be some discussion of nuclear testing and chemical weapons, even if there were no formal working group. The Secretary said he had his full panoply of people with him. He suggested they organize; on the U.S. side this would be under Paul Nitze’s chairmanship. We were prepared to work in all areas. Shevardnadze said Nitze’s partner would be (Ambassador Alexei) Obukhov. (Simons left to call them in.)

The Secretary said he understood they would be meeting until 5:30 p.m., and would reconvene after a break at 8:00 p.m. The U.S. side was thinking in terms of finishing by 9:30 p.m., and meeting again at 9:00 a.m. the next day, and again in the afternoon, when they could work until they finished.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets had the same schedule in mind; the only difference was they had envisaged working till 6:00 p.m. the first day, but 5:30 was alright. The Secretary explained that he had just arrived and needed time to consult with his Geneva delegation. He was sorry he could not come earlier, but he had had to host a dinner the night before and wait till all the guests cleared out. Shevardnadze said he had met with his people. He thought they were not optimistic about strategic offensive weapons and the ABM Treaty. They had done some good work in Geneva, but without a push from the ministers there would not be agreement.

The Secretary said he saw two other items for discussion. First, they should reflect on how to document the summit and the work done since the Washington summit; it would also be desirable to reflect on the progress made since the Geneva summit.

(At 3:30 p.m. Kampelman, Obukhov and Ambassador Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President on Arms Control, arrived.)

Shevardnadze said jokingly he had told Obukhov he had been too quiet recently, listening to U.S. proposals.

The Secretary told the newcomers he had explained to Shevardnadze that Kampelman would be in a position to discuss language on futuristics, consistent with what had been agreed, that was satisfactory to the Senate, with a view to finishing off the issue. The ministers were asking Nitze and Obukhov to organize the arms control working group, for discussion of chemical weapons, conventional arms, nuclear testing, strategic arms, and defense and space issues.

Nitze asked if they should report at 9:00 a.m. the next day, or take more time. He did not think his people would welcome working all night, as had happened once before. The Secretary replied that this was not formalized: he and Shevardnadze would be discussing some issues, and the others could think of making reports the next afternoon. Shevardnadze said he agreed. The INF people should work through the rest of the day and then report; the others should work and then report the next afternoon. The Secretary added, however, that if they had something urgent to report they should come and tell the ministers. Shevardnadze said that in principle, therefore, everything was clear.

(Nitze, Kampelman and Karpov left at 3:35 p.m.)

Shevardnadze suggested the ministers discuss what the summit meeting should be like, what results it should have.

Realistically, Shevardnadze continued, it would not be possible to reach a START agreement by the summit. Even if the ministers agreed on all the basic issues that day, it would be physically impossible to put them all on paper in time. But he would welcome, as the crown of the summit, an impressive document that summarized the results of Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington and the work prior to Moscow. What the document was called was not important. What was important was to record the results achieved.

A conceptual approach was also needed here, Shevardnadze went on, and a review of specific issues: where we stood on START, what had been achieved, what ground had been prepared for the future. The ministers needed to decide whether it should be one big document or two documents. His view was that it should be one big impressive document, and that it should be signed by their two leaders. It could also be without their signatures, but that would be different. A document signed by the two would evoke more response in the world, would be more impressive. He thought their negotiators should work on such a document.

The Secretary said he agreed that they could find something suitable, and if both leaders signed it, that would be a good concept. We had suggested two documents. We had no hangup on whether there should be one or two. There were advantages and disadvantages each way. If there were two, that would single out some issues, and the disadvantage was that other issues would look as if they were of lesser importance. But we had gotten going because there had been a tremendous amount of forward movement toward 50% cuts in strategic arms since Geneva, and it would provide continuity with the INF Treaty to register that in some way. If there were one document, there would have to be a section with that in. Perhaps Shevardnadze’s suggestion was a good one.

General Powell said they should consider both possibilities.

Shevardnadze said the Soviet side had two drafts. He had looked them over the previous evening. The sides should consider the question of how to unite them. They should record everything that had been achieved between them. It would be a rather big document, and that was a little worrisome to him. But, he suggested, let the experts start on it. He asked Bessmertnykh to hand over the Soviet draft. The Secretary asked Bessmertnykh if the thick paper he had was the draft; Bessmertnykh laughingly said it was only a part, and pointed to his briefcase.

Shevardnadze said the document would have great significance. The people had wanted a START agreement. It was important to have a substantial appeal or address to the people on what had been achieved, to make up for the fact that there would be no START agreement.

The Secretary recalled that when he had met with the General Secretary in Moscow they had reflected on how progress on the broad range of issues was important; nuclear arms was part of it, but not everything.² There was a certain desirability to having that perspective. Perhaps the second document could be made part of the first.

Ambassador Ridgway noted that this would require a conceptual change in the nature of the joint statement. The Secretary said the two ministers had a trustworthy working group in these two individuals (Ridgway and Bessmertnykh). They should struggle to come up with a good document. Ridgway said it would help to have a piece of paper from the Soviet side. Shevardnadze said they had one, even translated into English, for the U.S. to consider. It could not be finished in Geneva, so the U.S. could send someone to Moscow, or the Soviets could send someone to Washington, to continue and complete it. He would like Bessmertnykh and Ridgway to complete it. They were people who did not argue much, but just did their work.

The Secretary said the sides should aspire to settle on the structure of the document while they were in Geneva. They should make up their minds, and agree to as much language as possible. Some things, for instance the historical recitation, could be pretty well settled. Others they would work on up to and even during the summit. But they should try to have most of it worked out.

The Secretary continued that he thought they should have a process underway working the document or documents that week and in the few days before the summit. He would be arriving in Helsinki the early morning of May 26, and would be there three days. They could work there if Shevardnadze wanted to send someone, or we could send people to Moscow. They should agree on the process by the next day.

The Secretary said he had the idea that Shevardnadze and he should meet as needed during the summit. This would keep the process going and understood. For instance, on the first day there would be an arrival ceremony and then a ceremony and private meeting of the two leaders at the Kremlin. Perhaps the ministers and their associates could meet during that time to see what the problems were. If there were a place always available for that, in or outside the Kremlin, that would facilitate things if there were problems to be solved.

Shevardnadze said he agreed they should discuss whether there should be one document or two documents. Looking at the matter the day before, he had thought it would be a good thing if there could be one document, with a general assessment and various sections, for instance political-military, including strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. In it they could record things that had been done by the time of the summit. In Moscow they had discussed whether chemical weapons should be treated in a separate document or as part of a joint document. There should be a section on conventional arms. There should be a big section on humanitarian issues. There should be a big section on regional matters, where there were also steps, progress to report. In the bilateral area they would be signing a very substantial number of agreements, and could mention those signed over the previous two years. If all these things were put together it would be very impressive. But there could also be two documents. They could discuss this matter. The day before he had been inclined toward one document. But those were just thoughts.

But, Shevardnadze went on, he thought the main work should be done before the summit. The sides knew the assets, the capital that had been accumulated. They could add to it during the meetings of their leaders. Or the leaders could decide there should be no document. But it would be useful to be prepared. He thought their people should get together to put the documentation in as final a form as possible. He would be giving the Secretary the Soviet suggestions on how they should work.

The Secretary said they would want to record what they had done in the past, but in a way that looked to the future. They should say what they had done since 1985, but they should also say this was an ongoing process. They should say that they had the people in place to do it, that they had not achieved everything, but that it was a good process. On strategic offensive weapons and defense and space, they should record results, but also give a sense of forward motion, so that people would have confidence that no matter how difficult the remaining issues the process would come to a conclusion.

A small question had arisen among the delegations, the Secretary continued, concerning the recess. He gathered they had agreed to break on May 24 so that our delegation could join the President in Helsinki. We had thought it would be a good idea to reconvene in mid- or early July. We could understand it would be desirable to reconvene at the end of June, since it was closer than July. The ministers could perhaps privately pick a date to announce at the summit, that would carry with it the notion of continuity.

The Secretary asked if General Powell or Ambassador Ridgway had anything to add. They did not.

Shevardnadze suggested they return to these issues after the U.S. side had looked at the Soviet ideas. The Secretary said that would be fine.

Shevardnadze said that, concerning matters related to the President’s visit, if the Secretary agreed, it would be a good idea to provide for parallel meetings of leaders and ministers and other members of the delegations. This had happened at Geneva, at Reykjavik and at Washington. The Soviet side would supply working areas. How many would be needed would depend on the situation.

The U.S. side had suggested simultaneous interpretation, Shevardnadze went on. The Soviet side agreed that interpretation should be simultaneous throughout the duration of the summit. The Secretary said that would be good, subject of course to the proviso that either side could ask interpreters to slow down and repeat, or switch back to consecutive interpretation. That was a convention they had followed. Shevardnadze agreed.

Shevardnadze said they should also think of some breakdown of questions to be discussed in each session. The Secretary said he agreed. Shevardnadze said they could prepare a preliminary agenda.

—On May 29 there would be a private meeting of the General Secretary and the President at 3:30 p.m.

—On May 30 he thought it would be useful to have a plenary session in the same room where the Secretary met with the General Secretary, the Catherine Hall. The Secretary asked how big it would be. Shevardnadze said they were thinking of eight or nine on a side. For instance, on the U.S. side, in addition to the President, there could be the Secretary, Carlucci, Powell, Baker, Ridgway and Matlock, and the Soviet side would have a similar group. This would be about the same as in Washington. On the Soviet side there would be Defense Minister Yazov rather than Akhromeyev, since Carlucci would be there, but it would be basically the same group. The Secretary said he liked Shevardnadze’s idea. He observed that as soon as the group got larger, it was hard to cut it below a roomful, and the quality of the meeting declined. He did not know why, but that was what happened. So he thought Shevardnadze’s idea was about right, with an interpreter and a notetaker. Shevardnadze said there should be two notetakers on each side.

Shevardnadze said that as to the meetings of the leaders, they would decide whom they wanted with them. The Secretary said his sense was that this would depend somewhat on the questions under discussion, but to the extent possible Bessmertnykh and Ridgway should be there. They would have to knead the material together, and should be present to hear what was said.

Shevardnadze said he saw the May 30 session as a general assessment of the status and prospects of the Soviet-American relationship, and perhaps some discussion of human rights. The Secretary said he thought that at the initial one-on-one session the President would want to give an assessment of the outlook in a broad way. He commented that the President also liked to say what he had to say on human rights to the General Secretary, and not to the whole world. So he expected the President would talk about human rights in the one-on-one session. That did not mean other issues could not also be discussed, or that the sides did not have a way of talking about human rights in a systematic and orderly way. But he expected the topic would be discussed there.

Shevardnadze reaffirmed that he expected the first meeting would touch on general Soviet-American relations, and probably the second afternoon meeting on May 30 would deal with strategic offensive arms and the ABM Treaty. Of course they could structure it otherwise. The Secretary said that sounded sensible to him.

Shevardnadze continued that on May 31 at 10:00 a.m. there would be a one-on-one in the General Secretary’s office. He thought that should be a conceptual meeting, on the future of Soviet-American relations, on continuity of policies. The General Secretary would want to touch on perestroika, as well as the future of our relations. But it would be a rather short meeting. The Secretary joked that he had thought from the subject matter that it would last a couple of days. Shevardnadze joked back that it could last a month. The Secretary said he thought it would be useful to have some continuity with the first day’s meeting. But he also understood it would be a relatively short meeting, and then the two leaders would walk to the general meeting. This would allow the President to see the inside of the Kremlin building.

Shevardnadze said that although they had been suggesting a broad approach, the General Secretary might wish to pick up some specific topics. The Secretary said that with regard to new thinking, the President had noticed the General Secretary’s comments on religion. He had given this a lot of attention; it fascinated him. He would be interested to hear on an expanded basis what the General Secretary had in mind. Shevardnadze said the two leaders could pick and discuss what they wanted. They could put religion on the list. The Secretary said that would not be necessary; he had merely wanted to note that the President would be interested. Shevardnadze said the General Secretary would be ready. Then at the conclusion of their private talk they would walk across the Kremlin.

Shevardnadze continued that at the session to which they would walk they could concentrate on regional and bilateral issues.

Then at the concluding session in Catherine Hall on May 31, Shevardnadze continued, with the full official delegations present, they could consider the concluding documentation and consider the results of the summit.

The Secretary said that in considering the question of signing bilateral documents, or the PNET document—that level of material—we had been asking whether this should be done as a prelude to the leaders’ signature of the main documentation, or in some other setting not involving the two leaders. Shevardnadze said the Soviets had been envisaging signing of all the documents in the presence of the two leaders. The Secretary asked if that meant the subsidiary and the principal documents. Shevardnadze said they saw signing of four or six documents by ministers or even other officials, and then signing of the substantial document by the two leaders.

The Secretary said that would be a perfectly good way to do it. We had no special objection to it. But perhaps the sides should look at another option. There would be a huge press corps in Moscow. They would be looking for something to report. One possible variant would be that at the conclusion of the plenary session on regional and bilateral issues, those agreements could be signed. That would be something to report, which would be an advantage. Then the final major signing would not be diluted by separate little ceremonies. He asked Ambassador Ridgway to comment.

Ridgway said we had given some thought to the image and perception of a new kind of dialogue. It was a fair evaluation to say that it was not the dialogue typical of previous leaders. The previous dialogue had been associated with a grand final day, with many ministers and officials present and signing. This suggested that agreements had been reached only because of the summit, in haste, and had no value of their own. We had been careful over the past two years not to let ceremony govern the preparation of our summits. If we were successful in negotiating one, this format would also take something away from the single document to be signed by the leaders. If it were not possible to get a major document, there would be advantage to gathering the various bilateral documents together for signature, but assuming we would be successful we had been thinking it could be signed with ministers present, and the others could be signed at other points during the visit. The Secretary interjected again the possibility of doing this after the session on bilateral matters. Ridgway said that was included in the idea of doing it earlier in the visit. The Secretary said that of course that was not the only option.

Shevardnadze said they should think about these issues. The Soviet practice was to have one signing ceremony. He did not think it would take too much time. It usually took place in the Vladimir Hall, with 150–200 persons present, drawn on the Soviet side from the leadership, from among intellectuals, from Supreme Soviet deputies.

The Secretary said he assumed each leader would make a statement, as had happened in the past. Shevardnadze agreed; they would be short statements, of three to five minutes each. The Secretary recalled the successful experience of Geneva in 1985, after they had persuaded the leaders to make them; short, pithy statements were good.

Returning to the question of separating ceremonies, Shevardnadze said it would have to be carefully weighed. It was one thing to sign in the presence of the leaders; that was impressive. If they did not participate, signing would be harder to understand. The Secretary said he wished merely to think aloud. At the conclusion of the session on bilateral issues, the parties could go to another room, and the appropriate people could sign documents in the presence of the leaders, and each leader could make a brief statement. The statements could register that our relationship is a broad one, and say they wished to call attention that day to the bilateral elements, and the next day to the relationship across the board. He was just trying out ideas, to see if it would be desirable to break up the signing into something readily reportable, after the arrival statements and before the end.

Powell noted this would also be close to the model used in Washington.

The Secretary recalled that in Washington there had been the arrival, which was an event; then the INF signature and the statements; then the toasts, which there would also be in Moscow; and then the finale. We were looking for a counterpart to the INF signing. He urged Shevardnadze to think about it. Shevardnadze said the Soviet side would. He had no objection in principle to the separation. But he had doubts about the two leaders’ attendance at a first signing. The Secretary said he saw some advantages to their spending three minutes there. As Shevardnadze had said, it would lend greater weight to the event, and they could say things on the meeting and the relationship that the press could report. It was something to think over. It was not something the President was pushing for, but he had thought about it.

Shevardnadze said they would think about it. The important thing was to have something to sign. The Secretary said there would be things to sign.

Shevardnadze said the Soviets would officially announce the visit May 22. They would provide the U.S. side with the text of the official announcement. The Secretary asked if this were routinely done. Shevardnadze said it was Soviet practice to announce visits in a formal way. The Secretary asked if this were to inform the people. Shevardnadze said they all knew, but since some visits were not announced officially, this one had to be too; otherwise people would not understand. There would be an official photo published in the press on the day of arrival, with a biographic note on the President. The Secretary said it was courteous of Shevardnadze to tell us about it. We did not have an official press; only an inundation of press interest. Shevardnadze noted that 5000 foreign journalists had already registered in Moscow.

The Secretary said he had mentioned Shevardnadze to his friend Katharine Graham,³ who wished to interview the General Secretary and would also like to interview Shevardnadze. She had told him she would be spending some time in Leningrad; he had told her she should go to Tbilisi. She and her friend Meg Greenfield, editorial page editor of the Post, would be going. Shevardnadze said it was on the program.

The Secretary suggested a break (at 4:30 p.m.).

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on May 12. The meeting took place in the Ambassador’s Office at the U.S. Mission.
2. See Document 147.
3. Reference is to Katharine Graham, editor of the Washington Post.