Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, May 11, 1988, 8:20–9:50 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Summit Documents; Missile Tech Proliferation; Nuclear Testing; CW; Conventional Arms; INF; START data; Southern Africa

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Matlock
  • Mr. Parris (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

• U.S.S.R.

  • SHEVARDNADZE
  • Dep. FM Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Mr. Stepanov
  • Mr. Tarasenko (Notetaker)
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

NST Recess

SHEVARDNADZE welcomed the Secretary and wished him success in their meeting. Returning to an issue that had been touched on that morning, he questioned whether it would be wise to adjourn the NST talks on a specific date before the summit, as the U.S. had proposed. This could create misunderstandings. It would be better to recess after the summit.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze was proposing that the delegations simply stop meeting as a matter of course about May 24, the date the U.S. had proposed, so that delegation leaders could return to capitals for pre-summit consultations. It later be announced that the talks would resume as of a specified date. SHEVARDNADZE noted that July 12 had been suggested. THE SECRETARY said that this was acceptable.

Summit Documents

SHEVARDNADZE asked what the ministers should address first.

THE SECRETARY said he had some follow-up comments to their morning discussion of possible summit documents.

We had had a chance to read and reflect on the Soviet draft report and draft summit joint statement which had been handed over that morning. It seemed to us that both sides were comfortable with a joint statement that talked about progress in all areas. So that seemed to be agreeable as a base line. Perhaps there should just be a single document. But the Secretary thought it worthwhile to review our rationale in suggesting a second document in the first place.

The U.S. concern was that the two leaders would meet without an agreement to reduce strategic arms by 50%. So the purpose of the special report would be to focus on subject. It would, for example, explain why there was no agreement—i.e., that both sides insisted on a good treaty. A second purpose would be to identify areas where progress had been made and to bring out the fact that the two sides intended to continue their efforts when negotiations reconvened after the summit. Thus, the concept was to focus on strategic arms reductions.

The Soviet draft, on the other hand, included all arms control subjects. This had the effect of separating arms control from the rest of the broad agenda the two sides had developed. It ran counter to the successful framework we had built. So the Secretary had wanted to highlight the U.S. desire to focus on START in any special report. If the Soviet side did not think this a good approach, we were prepared to drop the idea and include strategic arms in a single document, along with the rest of the agenda.

If the Soviet side preferred that approach, the Secretary felt that the two sides should proceed along lines which had proved successful in Geneva and Washington. The key was to recognize what progress had been made, but to distinguish between different areas. For example, there would be a relatively full treatment of START, including in areas where much had been accomplished. In contrast, there would be less on regional issues. We might, however, supplement this by developing common briefing points which enable people to see where that dialogue was going. It was of course important to use the summit to get things decided, but we needed also to focus on what was doable. For instance, the idea of a joint mission to Mars was interesting. The Secretary, for his part, would prefer that the Soviets went first. (SHEVARDNADZE quipped he would volunteer.) But we were not quite ready for such a commitment at this point.

The Secretary proposed that he and Shevardnadze try to decide in Geneva what was the best concept—one document or two. We were prepared to go either way. But if there were a second document, it should focus specifically on strategic arms. It was, of course, important to do as much as possible during the present visit. To this end, the Secretary proposed that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh have their working level people get together first thing the next morning to work on a joint statement and see how far they could get.

There would nonetheless be a need for further consideration of such matters. The U.S. would thus be prepared to receive a Soviet team in Washington the following week. If necessary, we would also be prepared to work in Helsinki or Washington as the summit neared.

SHEVARDNADZE said there was another possibility. If the substance justified it, there could be a separate START report.

THE SECRETARY said that that was the U.S. idea as well. But we were also open to merging the two documents. The two sides would have to be guided to some degree by the results of discussions between their arms control experts. There had been some progress since the Washington summit; but it was of the pick and shovel rather than the dramatic sort.

SHEVARDNADZE speculated that a separate START document could on the one hand record what had been achieved, and on the other contain instructions to delegations. This would underscore the continuation of the process.

THE SECRETARY noted that it would also be important to put in perspective why a Treaty had not been completed. One possibility would be to work an omnibus joint statement and a separate report, leaving open the question of whether or not the two would ultimately be merged.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that, given the centrality of strategic arms reductions and the fact that people expected a Treaty which would not be available, the two sides try to prepare a separate document on that subject. It should both reflect how much had been achieved by the time of the summit and give guidance to delegations. The document need not be lengthy.

THE SECRETARY observed that its length would depend on the degree of detail in describing what had been achieved and where things stood. The document should reassure publics that, when a Treaty was completed, it would be the result of a carefully thought-through process. It should be clear that decisions on issues of such importance were not being taken lightly.

POWELL suggested it might be useful to hear from working groups before proceeding too far.

THE SECRETARY suggested that working level people on both sides get together to draft an omnibus joint statement in which strategic arms would be only briefly mentioned. They could also work on a report dealing with strategic arms. The ministers could review their work Thursday, and agree on a work program for next steps.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the two sides should work on a separate statement on strategic arms. He thought it would be possible to formulate an acceptable statement. There could be a second overall document on other issues.

THE SECRETARY noted that, in that case, the two leaders might best sign only the document on strategic arms, and simply issue the joint statement in their name. If the two documents were merged, the leaders would sign the combined document.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that any decision on signing arrangements await agreement on the documents themselves. For the moment, however, the two sides should assume that there would be separate documents.

Missile Tech

THE SECRETARY said he had a new subject to introduce. The issue was one which increasingly worried the U.S.—the problem of the proliferation of ballistic missiles. China had sold to Saudi Arabia missiles with ranges covered by the INF Treaty. Various countries were developing the capability to produce ballistic missiles. This was a destabilizing development, especially when combined with volatility in many of the regions involved. The Secretary mentioned the Middle East and Pakistani-Indian rivalries in this context. Noting that the two sides had briefly discussed the issue a year before, he proposed a new bilateral meeting at the experts level to explore the problem in more detail. One way to lend prominence to the discussion, he added, would be to refer to it in any summit statement. This would tell the world that the two sides had identified this as a problem and were talking about how to deal with it. The Secretary had in mind no more than a sentence.

The Secretary noted that the NPT regime, while increasingly frayed at the edges, had worked well in dealing with the problem of nuclear non-proliferation. The U.S. and Soviet Union were also engaged in a discussion of chemical weapons proliferation and how to eliminate such weapons entirely. Now a third leg had arisen—ballistic missiles. The two sides ought to engage on this as well. The U.S. was already working with the “Summit Seven” nations² on the problem, but had come to the conclusion that the discussion had to be more comprehensive to be effective.

Asked to comment by the Secretary, POWELL concurred that the matter was one of great concern to the U.S.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the problem was acute. He thought expert-level contacts might well be the best way to start a discussion. Whether to include a reference to such contacts in a summit document was another question. But it should be possible to examine the problem before or after the summit.

THE SECRETARY said that he would be prepared to make Assistant Secretary Holmes available to discuss the matter further with whomever Shevardnadze might appoint. SHEVARDNADZE repeated that experts discussions seemed a good idea.

BESSMERTNYKH asked the Secretary for the U.S. assessment of the threat posed by the proliferation not only of ballistic, but cruise missile, technology, in the short and mid-term.

THE SECRETARY observed that people all over the world were smart. They saw that weapons existed. Once it was established that weapons could be given certain characteristics, it was natural that people should seek to copy them. Indeed, in the absence of other constraints, countries might feel obliged to do so. But if a regime were in place which discouraged proliferation, such a process became less likely.

Ballistic missile technology was currently proliferating in a number of parts of the world. The PRC clearly had no inhibitions against selling their missiles. Our approaches had been met with indignation that we would seek to interfere with their trade. Our current focus was on ballistic missiles, because that was where the problems had arisen; there was no reason that similar problems might not also arise with respect to cruise missiles. So the answer to Bessmertnykh’s question was that cruise missile proliferation was a potentially big problem which we ought to be able to address before it got out of control.

SHEVARDNADZE said that consultations should take place. THE SECRETARY said we would expect whomever Shevardnadze designated to contact Holmes. KARPOV said he had already discussed the issue with seven other countries and would be ready to meet with Holmes.

Nuclear Testing

SHEVARDNADZE asked whether the ministers should turn to other arms control issues or leave it to their experts.

THE SECRETARY said he had had a report from Amb. Nitze and his colleagues already. In the nuclear testing field, there seemed to be a good working spirit and the people involved felt 90% confident that by the time of the summit the Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty (PNET) documents would be completed. The question had arisen as to whether we would be able to present the PNET for ratification. The answer was “yes,” although it could not enter into force until verication provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty had been renegotiated. So it appeared that there would be something on hand for the summit in this area. The Secretary asked Shevardnadze if he had a different report.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did not. He felt that this was the area where the most tangible progress had been achieved. It appeared that both of the documents to which the Secretary had referred could be signed in Moscow.

Chemical Weapons

Turning to chemical weapons, THE SECRETARY noted that there had been a discussion in working groups of language for inclusion in a Moscow summit statement. The Soviet side had put forward various proposals for additional work. Some of them were interesting. Our sense was that they would be best discussed at the next session of the Conference on Disarmament, but this would not preclude bilateral discussions on the margins of the Conference. In any cases, experts should continue working on statements for the summit. That approach had worked well in the past.

SHEVARDNADZE opined that it would be possible to produce a solid statement, either for separate release or inclusion in a joint document. There were good prospects for real progress in the CW area. Perhaps it would be possible to say that both countries intended to become parties to a CW convention; this would set a good example. Working groups might prepare such a statement for the ministers’ review the next day. Another idea which had come up was the possibility of parallel statements on CW for use at the UN Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD).³

THE SECRETARY said we could consider these ideas. Ministers could revisit them the next day.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that it was up to the U.S. and Soviet Union to set an example on CW. He noted that Moscow had in the past tried to work with the UK only to find that British interest waned when U.S.-Soviet differences arose. Other U.S. allies were also interested in moving ahead on CW—the FRG and Italy among them. France was more “fluid.”

THE SECRETARY asked Shevardnadze if he would attend the SSOD. If he were, there was a possibility that the ministers could do some additional work. In the run-up to the OECD summit, however, this would be a busy time for us.

SHEVARDNADZE said he did, in fact, intend to go to New York. He would arrive June 5 or 6 and speak on the eighth.

THE SECRETARY said that the NAC Foreign Ministers meeting would run from June 9–10, and that he would depart for the Middle East immediately thereafter. Thus, it appeared he would not be in the U.S. during Shevardnadze’s visit.

Conventional Arms

Turning to conventional armaments, the Secretary said that he had been encouraged by what Shevardnadze had had to say that morning on possible new Soviet moves at the Vienna Follow-up Meeting. If there were a breakthrough in Vienna on human rights, the two sides would have to move quickly to put the finishing touches on a conventional arms negotiations mandate. We were of the view that it was useful to continue to talk about the mandate, but felt it was essential that the primary forum remain in Vienna. So we were interested in Soviet views, but considered it important to keep the discussion going in Vienna through Amb. Ledogar. Both sides should tell their negotiators to get on the front burners because human rights issues might be breaking. We were willing to work hard in Vienna to get to the point where something could be reflected at the summit.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had a similar view. If the two ministers could develop suitable language for a mandate in Geneva, afterwards the Secretary would see his allies⁴ and Shevardnadze would be going to Berlin to inform Warsaw Pact countries. They could have a good discussion with their respective allies, and the issue could be recorded in the Moscow joint statement with the support of those allies.

THE SECRETARY said we were prepared to talk. If we could find things which were good, OK. But we had to maintain the structure of allied consultations. The more that could be done in Vienna, the better off both sides would be in the long run.

SHEVARDNADZE asserted that agreement had previously been reached that dual-capable systems would not be excluded from the mandate. This was a basic question. This now needed to be reflected in appropriate language for the mandate. The Soviet Union had now decided on new instructions for its negotiators. It was ready to adopt language to cover conventional arms, armed forces and equipment, with no conventional arms or equipment to be excluded based on its ability to use not only conventional but other weapons. This approach, Shevardnadze said, should be acceptable to NATO. If it were possible to reach agreement on a mandate before the summit, it would be a major achievement for the leaders to cite.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Shevardnadze transmit the language he had used to the Soviet negotiator in Vienna that evening. Without making any commitments, the Secretary felt that the two sides were getting very close. We would advise our negotiator to expect an approach. The two ministers could see where things stood the next day. The important thing was to keep the play in Vienna to the extent possible. We could call Ledogar tonight and instruct him to call in a report by noon the next day. It seemed from what Shevardnadze had said that we were getting somewhere.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the working group in Geneva also be charged to continue its work.

THE SECRETARY said they were already engaged. The procedural point, he emphasized, was critical if we were to achieve anything. Shevardnadze had earlier mentioned the French. They were our allies. They were always very demanding with respect to procedure. To do the job right, we had to be sensitive to procedures in Vienna. The Secretary was not resisting the discussion Shevardnadze proposed, but he would rather that the issue were discussed first in Vienna and then in Brussels, rather than going through Brussels to Vienna. The Secretary added that Ridgway had reminded him that this approach was similar to that the two ministers had used in facilitating the Stockholm CDE end-game. That had worked well.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would not further debate the issue with the Secretary. Negotiators could work in Vienna. But the discussion had reminded him of the outstanding Soviet proposal for an exchange of data in advance of the conventional arms negotiations. Shevardnadze had thought a lot about the idea. If the U.S., the Soviet Union and their allies adopted such an approach it would be a major step toward encouraging some of the positive trends emerging in Europe in this area. He was not convinced that the Soviet proposal was unnecessary. There had been so much talk about an imbalance on one side or the other. It would be good to get figures on the table. Shevardnadze did not understand why the U.S. feared the concept.

THE SECRETARY said we had no fear. We simply believed that the first question was to settle on a mandate so talks could begin. Maybe negotiators could take up a data exchange thereafter. But fourteen years of MBFR talks did not inspire confidence that concentrating on data right off the bat was a promising approach. Perhaps a discussion could be structured to avoid becoming bogged down. At some point, of course, we would have to deal with data, as we had in INF. So we were not resisting the idea. We had views on timing and a certain apprehension based on the MBFR experience. We were not resisting the principle.

“So be it,” said SHEVARDNADZE. He was not persuaded, but he would not push the issue. He had expected the West to applaud the Soviet proposal.

THE SECRETARY said we would be glad to receive any data the Soviet side wanted to pass on.

The most difficult area, he continued, was START and Defense and Space. Working groups were already at work and had dealt with three items already, according to the reports the Secretary had heard. The Secretary would be glad to hear any comments Shevardnadze might have, but he was inclined to await a full report from the experts when they had concluded their discussions rather than work in parallel.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed the ministers should hear from experts the next day.

INF

THE SECRETARY said that the most important thing to accomplish in Geneva was to deal with on site inspection issues which had arisen in the Senate’s debate of the INF Treaty. It seemed, he lamented, that the two ministers could never get away from talking about INF. But the issues which had arisen needed to be resolved. There had been a good discussion that morning, althought closure seemed to be elusive. But if the Secretary went home without a solution, he could tell Shevardnadze that there was no chance that INF would be ratified in time for the summit. (At this point, there was a clap of thunder from outside.) On the other hand, if the ministers could reach agreement, there would be a good chance that the treaty could be ratified by then. It would be a huge set-back to get stalled after all that had been achieved. The things which were being discussed, while important, were basically the details. The Secretary asked Powell to comment.

POWELL underscored the importance of resolving in Geneva the issues which had arisen. The Senate was waiting for an answer on futuristic weapons and the nine inspection questions. We hoped they could be resolved the next day, so that Powell could take them right back and present them to the Senate. The Treaty could then go to the floor as early as Monday.⁵ That would create a high probability that instruments of ratification could be exchanged in Moscow. Powell assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. approach to these questions was not to seek advantages in resolving questions on which the Treaty was not clear. He could not overemphasize the importance of reaching conclusions the next day.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Soviet side had not expected the latest questions which had arisen. When the Secretary had raised the futuristics issue here in Geneva, Shevardnadze had responded and thought that was the end of it.

THE SECRETARY said that futuristics had never been a real issue. But it had to be dealt with. POWELL said it had been now. THE SECRETARY said what we were dealing with on the nine questions was a self-inflicted wound arising from a desire to put implementations groups to work early. It was in the nature of that work that problems had been found. Now we had to deal with them. Maybe it was good practice.

SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow had taken the nine questions seriously. The appropriate experts had looked into the matter carefully. The Soviets thought their initial answers had been adequate. Now it turned out they were not. And when the Soviets looked at the U.S. questions, they realized they had questions of their own. So, Shevardnadze suggested, the two sides should try to resolve these on a mutual basis, should try to find optimal solutions. But Soviet as well as U.S. interests had to be taken into account. Americans, including the President, often stressed how advantageous the Treaty was to the U.S. side. But it seemed there was no end to arguments about ratification. Soviet interests also needed to be taken into account.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the principle in seeking solutions should be what was in the Treaty. What it said, that was what should be done. Sometimes one side would not like the result, sometimes another. But it was too late to begin undercutting the Treaty.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that no one wanted to change the Treaty. It was a good Treaty. The Soviet side was answering the questions which had arisen. But it needed answers from the U.S. as well—e.g., on the question of P–1a missiles on U.S. territory, on the question of stages for Pershing missiles.

THE SECRETARY asked if POWELL would like to comment. POWELL said he could not comment on P–1a’s. As for stages, they were not in the Treaty, so we were surprised when the Soviet side had raised them. They had not been previously discussed. But it had been hard to explain this to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

KARPOV replied that the issue had in fact been discussed at length, briefly reviewing the negotiating history.

POWELL noted that this pointed up the need for a thorough discussion in working groups.

THE SECRETARY said he hoped Amb. Glitman and his colleagues could resolve the issues without the ministers’ having to become involved. The Secretary had been asked before he came to Geneva, he mused, if he thought the Soviets were reneging on their commitments. He had said, “no.” These were the kinds of problems which arose when one got down to the specifics of implementation. We were doing things which had never been done before.

SHEVARDNADZE said the Soviet side understood the situation. It had looked for and would look for the right solutions. But the U.S. should look at Soviet concerns as well. They were serious concerns which, if handled correctly, would help deal with the whole situation. Shevardnadze said he did not understand why P–1a’s had reemerged as an issue. He had thought them dealt with. Experts should be told to clarify the issues and report to ministers the next day.

START Data

Shevardnadze said that, before moving on, he wanted to raise data exchange on strategic arms. Handing over a list, Shevardnadze noted that this should remove any reason for U.S. criticism that the Soviet side was witholding such data.

THE SECRETARY said he was glad to have the data. It was something which could be pointed to as evidence of continued progress.

Southern Africa

THE SECRETARY said he wanted [to] raise southern Africa before breaking off the meeting. Recent U.S.-Soviet exchanges on the region, we thought, had been particularly useful. Both sides had made visits to the region, and Assistant Secretary Crocker had met with Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin. There had been an unprecedented exchange in London involving Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Preparations were being made for another meeting. We would see what South Africa came back with, but were encouraged by their indication that they would honor their commitments with respect to UNSC Res. 435.

So, the Secretary continued, perhaps something was working in the region. In the end, it would be important for national reconciliation to fall into place for the situation to come to completion. We were aware of discussions among African countries to this end, and considered them an appropriate means of pursuing it. So developments were potentially promising. We were prepared to push.

Crocker was working hard, and was ready to meet again with Adamishin before the summit. Perhaps a signal that the leaders of the U.S. and Soviet Union considered the issue important could be constructive. Crocker had expressed willingness, the Secretary noted, to come to Geneva to meet Adamishin on the margins of the ministers meetings, but this had proved impossible. Crocker was nonetheless ready to meet.

The Secretary observed that Shevardnadze had said in the past that the conclusion of the Afghanistan accords had put our regional discussion on a more substantive plane than previously. Something new was now happening in southern Africa. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union had had a role. If an agreement could be reached on national reconciliation, Cuban withdrawal and implementation of UNSC 435, it would have significance beyond the immediate problems involved. It might, for example, make possible the reopening of the Benguela railroad, loosening South Africa’s economic stranglehold on the region.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the process underway in southern Africa was encouraging. It was good that experts had been meeting. The atmosphere for their discussions had been good. It was good that South Africa was getting involved. It was also important that the Soviet Union was being consulted. It was hard to say, Shevardnadze continued, how the situation would evolve. The idea of national reconciliation was taking root in many parts of the world. So contacts should be continued, and the two sides should look for more effective ways to become involved.

Shevardnadze could say on the basis of direct contacts with the Angolans and Cubans that they wanted a solution as soon as possible. The Angolans could not afford the burden of the war; the Cubans had made a decision to withdraw their forces within the timeframe being discussed in the negotiations. South Africa was less predictable. The most important thing was for all concerned to endorse the relevant UNSC resolutions. They provided a good basis for further discussions.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the ministers should consider three things: (a) whether another Crocker-Adamishin meeting before the summit was desirable; (b) whether there should be a reference in the summit joint statement as a signal; and (c) should the summit reference emphasize the importance of national reconciliation, thereby encouraging the Angolan government not to avoid talks with UNITA. The Secretary said he understood Shevardnadze might want to think about these points.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was prepared to respond on the spot. There should be a meeting before the summit. The date could be set. Previous meetings had been useful. As for a joint statement reference, the Soviet side had some language to propose. It might be strengthened, perhaps, by references to UN resolutions and national reconciliation. As for Angola’s attitude toward UNITA, that was a different question, one which had no place in a summit statement.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that a reference to national reconciliation would itself be a signal.

The meeting concluded without further discussion.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Untitled Folder. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission.
2. Reference is to the Group of Seven, or “G7”: United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, and Italy.
3. Reference is to the United Nations Third Special Session on Disarmament, held in New York from May 31 to June 26.
4. Shultz briefed NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on May 13.
5. May 16.