Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

132. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 21, 1988, 4:55–6:30 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Organizational Questions, ABM Treaty, Nuclear Testing, Afghanistan, Central America

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • THE SECRETARY
  • Gen. Powell
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE
  • (Soviet Notetaker)
  • Pavel Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze, noting that the two were meeting frequently. But the more they met, the more they seemed to have to do. The present meeting was no exception.

The President was looking forward to seeing Shevardnadze on Wednesday,² the Secretary indicated. It was well that the two ministers could have this Monday afternoon meeting. It would enable them to go over the agenda and begin discussion of certain issues. The Secretary thought that it might be particularly useful to talk about Afghanistan in a preliminary way. That was a current issue, and one important to both sides.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed his own warm greetings and those of the Soviet leadership, including General Secretary Gorbachev. He agreed with the Secretary that the more often the two ministers met, the more problems seemed to pile up. As he had driven to the Department in his motorcade, he was interested that people in the street seemed to take no notice. They seemed to think that this was natural, as it should be, especially as the President would soon be in Moscow. Shevardnadze emphasized that the Soviet leadership believed that the summit would be an important event, even if, for the moment, it could not be said that all was in readiness. And, the Foreign Minister noted, there was little time remaining.

Much, therefore, depended on the ministers discussions this week. Decisions on the President’s visit would have to be taken, both with respect to dates and the substance of the visit. Substance, of course, was the important thing.

Shevardnadze said he was glad that the two ministers could have this initial meeting one-on-one. It would be well to get the agenda squared away. The Minister was also prepared to discuss other questions, including the situation around Afghanistan. This was indeed a subject of interest, particularly in the wake of the discussions which had taken place during the Secretary’s last visit to Moscow. Shevardnadze said he would also be interested in having the Secretary’s views on Central America.

THE SECRETARY suggested that they turn first to the agenda. He expressed his regret that Mrs. Shevardnadze had not been able to accompany the Minister, and that it had proved impossible to schedule a side trip to Boston during the visit. SHEVARDNADZE noted that it was the first time he had visited the U.S. without Mrs. Shevardnadze. Normally, she always accompanied him on his trips abroad. This time she was not feeling well, and the doctors had recommended against the trip. Shevardnadze was also disappointed to have missed Boston, but he had to be back in Moscow on March 24. Maybe next time, he suggested.

The SECRETARY and SHEVARDNADZE spent about fifteen minutes discussing organizational matters. They agreed to retain what had become the traditional pattern of small group meetings at the ministers’ level, supplemented by working groups. They agreed that there should be a single arms control group which could break off sub-groups as necessary. They agreed to establish working groups on regional and human rights questions, and that Ambassadors should oversee a discussion of bilateral issues, including those relating to the functioning of embassies in Moscow and Washington. THE SECRETARY noted that he would prefer to postpone discussion of the Middle East and other regional issues until the return Wednesday morning of Asst. Sec. Murphy.

THE MINISTERS agreed that there would be an initial plenary meeting to provide a photo op and to commission working groups. THE SECRETARY indicated that, on the U.S. side, Gen. Powell and Amb. Ridgway would participate in the restricted ministerial sessions. Outside experts could be brought in as needed.

THE SECRETARY suggested that their initial small group meeting open with a discussion of human rights, followed by initial presentations on arms control. The ministers would then break to open the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, and proceed to lunch. After lunch, they could deal with other arms control questions. The Secretary explained his suggestion for an informal buffet dinner that evening, possibly coupled with a showing of the movie, “That’s Entertainment,” as an opportunity for unstructured discussion of the issues. SHEVARDNADZE said he had told John Whitehead the previous evening that he was at the Secretary’s disposal.

The Secretary briefly ran through the Wednesday schedule, beginning with a morning small group meeting focusing on regional issues. The ministers would then break briefly before Shevardnadze’s visit to the White House, which would include a working luncheon. Should there be agreement on dates, they could be announced in a short joint press event immediately thereafter. The ministers could then reassemble at the Department for two to three hours of concluding discussion. They would hold separate press conferences thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the arrangements the Secretary had outlined corresponded to Soviet desires, and could be considered agreed.

THE SECRETARY indicated that the U.S. would be prepared to issue a joint statement at the end of their discussions if there were something to report. Ambassadors Ridgway and Bessmertnykh could look into this, as they had done so successfully in the past. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach.

ABM Treaty

SHEVARDNADZE asked if he could raise one question with respect to the Nuclear and Space talks. The issue was sensitive, and he had not wanted to address it in either the plenary meeting or in working groups. It had to do with the ABM Treaty.

Until recently, Shevardnadze explained, Moscow had been convinced that the President and General Secretary Gorbachev had reached a meeting of the minds on this question. The Washington Summit had produced a statement on the subject. It had not been easy to reach agreement on the language of the statement. But there had been agreement.

On January 22, however, the U.S. delegation in Geneva had introduced a new draft document on the ABM question.³ When the Secretary had come to Moscow, he had seemed to agree with Shevardnadze that the solution to the problem which had arisen was to incorporate the language of the Washington Joint Statement⁴ into the new document on defense and space, and to work on that basis. Shevardnadze recalled that the Secretary had referred to the Washington Statement as a “Bible,” which should not be complicated with new language.

The ABM Treaty existed and there was a need to reaffirm the two sides’ attitude toward it, Shevardnadze affirmed. The attitude had found expression in the Washington Statement. As to the form, there was an understanding that a separate agreement on the subject should be concluded. But negotiators in Geneva seemed unable to agree on how to go about this. Thus, Shevardnadze asked himself, should the two sides stick to the Washington Statement? Or should they seek new language to interpret what had been agreed? This was an important question.

Shevardnadze said that it had proven impossible to elaborate a joint draft document in Geneva, because the U.S. January 22 proposal was incompatible with the Washington Joint Statement. Perhaps it would be best just to confine the effort to the Washington Statement itself. All that would be needed in that case was to amplify verification considerations to ensure against violations.

THE SECRETARY volunteered to describe the U.S. view. We agreed that there should be a separate agreement. We agreed that the Washington Statement should serve as our “Bible.” The Washington Statement had treated certain issues: the concept of the non-withdrawal period; what the parties could do at the end of the period; that no later than three years before the end of the period there would be strategic stability discussions; that, during the non-withdrawal period, each side would do research, testing and development, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. liked those words, the Secretary said. We realized, however, that they could be interpreted differently. In this connection, he noted Shevardnadze’s suggestion in Moscow that there was a need to focus on verification of any new agreement. Soviet proposals had contained some of the same predictability ideas that the U.S. considered important. The Secretary thought that it might be possible to use the discussion of predictability to reduce ambiguities created by the final words of the Statement. We were thus trying to be responsive to Soviet suggestions.

The Secretary noted that another issue which had come up after Washington, and which he had discussed at some length with Gorbachev, was the “supreme national interest” problem. The Secretary had made the point that this was standard language in all treaties to which the U.S. was a party. We had not intended for it to be an escape hatch for deployment, and were prepared to say so. The Secretary felt that his conversations in Moscow had made this less of a problem.

That then, was the U.S. approach, the Secretary concluded. The ministers needed to find a way to reaffirm all of this to their negotiators. The Secretary had the impression that the drafting process in Geneva had become more difficult than it had to be. Part of the problem was that the issues being discussed in Geneva were not “Geneva issues,” but issues which had to be resolved at a political level. This made for frustration on the part of the negotiators, but it appeared that the two sides’ basic approaches were not dissimilar.

SHEVARDNADZE emphasized that he had raised the issue in private because he felt an urgent need to decide “right now” on a document dealing with the ABM Treaty. Once this were accomplished, it would be possible to move boldly in all other areas. This was a fundamental issue which needed to be resolved at the ministers’ level. It could not be done in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY said he was willing to try while Shevardnadze was in Washington. He was sure that there were areas where they could make progress, but he was less sure that they could complete the job. We had been working on ideas for responding to Shevardnadze’s suggestions on verification, but they could not yet be considered mature. The Secretary was prepared to push where he could, but he was not certain it would be possible in Washington to eliminate all the ambiguities of the Washington Statement.

SHEVARDNADZE stressed the importance of identifying at the political level what had and had not been agreed to on this issue. For example, both nine and ten years had been mentioned in connection with the non-withdrawal period. This point could be left blank for the moment. They should take the same approach to other questions. But the negotiators could not go on talking forever in Geneva without results. It would affect other areas. Shevardnadze suggested that the experts be told to look into the problem so that they could report by the following afternoon what was and was not agreed.

THE SECRETARY said he thought this was a constructive approach. He agreed there was a need to get this negotiation back on track. One of the advantages of trying to work a joint statement, he pointed out, was that it highlighted areas of difference and agreement. The two sides ought to try to get to that point.

On the question of amplifying the verification aspect of the ABM Treaty, the Secretary agreed that this was not a problem for Geneva—it was for capitals. There was a need to bear down in this area so that, when a START agreement was completed, there would be a parallel understanding on Defense and Space. The Secretary knew Shevardnadze would agree that, if there were massive reductions in strategic arms, there would be a parallel need for predictability on the defensive side.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the issue be taken up the next morning.

THE SECRETARY said that he would see that the U.S. working group was alerted to the ministers’ conversation. We would try to organize ourselves to deal with the issue. The Secretary said he would put Counselor Kampelman on the job.

SHEVARDNADZE urged that the Washington Statement be the basis for the effort. If the two sides retreated from that Statement, nothing could be achieved.

THE SECRETARY and POWELL said, “Absolutely.”

Nuclear Testing

Turning to nuclear testing, THE SECRETARY observed that, in Moscow, he had felt agreement had been reached to go for a “high option”—draft verification protocol language by the present meeting so that there could be a significant nuclear testing event at the Moscow summit. Since then, the Soviet delegation’s insistence in Geneva that a joint verification experiment (JVE) precede agreement on protocol language had threatened to preclude not only ratification of pending testing treaties by the time of the summit, but even completion of the verification protocol.

The U.S. did not believe that the JVE was necessary to complete the protocol. What was necessary was for the Soviet side to agree that the U.S. was entitled to use CORRTEX whenever it chose to verify compliance. The Secretary had thought this issue had been resolved in Moscow. This had made possible agreement on the “high option.” We were still prepared to seek the most ambitious outcome, and we were aware that both sides had tabled drafts in Geneva. But we would need to work hard to make up for lost time. For our part, our negotiators had returned to Washington and were ready to work hard. We were puzzled as to where the Soviet side wanted to go. It was up to them to set the pace. We wanted to get the job done. But if Moscow insisted on doing JVE’s first, there was no way.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had looked into the matter, and concluded that work on the JVE and protocol should proceed in parallel. It was possible to proceed in this manner.

THE SECRETARY agreed that it was possible, but pointed out that a JVE could not be done in time for the summit. It might be possible to agree on the design for the JVE. It might be possible to agree on protocol language. But the actual conduct of JVE’s required certain physical preparations. These were not easy. They took time.

SHEVARDNADZE argued that parallel work on JVE’s and the protocol need not delay anything. Time would tell whether or not the JVE could be conducted before a summit. Shevardnadze was certain that a formula could be found for the protocol. He reminded the Secretary that the Soviet side had already agreed to the use of CORRTEX, noting that seismic methods should not be ruled out. The sooner the JVE were conducted, the better. That did not mean that the protocol should be delayed. The two should go forward in parallel.

THE SECRETARY acknowledged that that was one approach. He suggested that the experts work hard on the problem during Shevardnadze’s stay. He reminded Shevardnadze, however, that if the two pending treaties were to be ratified, time had to be alloted to legislative hearings, voting, etc. The process would not take as long as the INF Treaty, which was shaping up nicely. But we had hoped that, once INF was out of the way, we would be in a position to present the testing treaties for ratification. The sooner we had revised protocols, the better.

SHEVARDNADZE expressed confidence that a formula could be found.

POWELL noted that the U.S. was working hard to design JVE’s which would meet our needs, but pointed out that no tests could take place before early summer—after the summit. He agreed that work should continue on a parallel basis, but warned that time was short if the two sides were to seek advice and consent before a summit.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that the issue could be revisited the next day. It would be a mistake, he said, to delay the JVE until after the summit. It could be done sooner.

Afghanistan

Moving to Afghanistan, THE SECRETARY recalled that the two ministers had discussed the issue the previous fall in the Secretary’s private office.⁵ Shevardnadze had told him then that Moscow had decided to withdraw. The Secretary had accepted that. The ministers had agreed that it would be in the interest of all concerned were that to happen as soon as possible.

In the intervening months, they had discussed the problem a number of times. Some things had fallen into place or were about to. There had been extensive discussion of a possible interim government. The Secretary had shared some views with Shevardnadze at various points, and the Soviets had subsequently broken the linkage between their withdrawal and establishment of an interim regime. All seemed to agree that agreement on an interim government was desirable, but it was a hard thing to bring about. The Secretary believed that the Pakistanis had come to see that, too, although they felt that the more that could be done, the better.

Thus, the remaining issue was one which, in large part, had to do with the way any Geneva accords presented themselves. We felt that the accords must present themselves as balanced. The U.S. could not be asked not to support those it had supported, while the Soviet Union was allowed to continue supplies to those it had supported. What one guarantor was allowed to do, the other should be, as well. Otherwise, there would be a perception of imbalance. This was something the Secretary and Shevardnadze had discussed at some length in Moscow. The Secretary felt that there were a variety of ways to get at the problem. But it appeared that our attempts to engage the Soviets had hit a stone wall. So the Secretary had been looking forward to Shevardnadze’s visit to see what progress might be made at their level. He would be interested in the Foreign Minister’s views.

SHEVARDNADZE said that what he had told the Secretary in his private office remained in effect. The Soviets had decided to withdraw. They had announced a timetable: Gorbachev had initially indicated it would be ten months; in Geneva they had agreed it could be nine. The U.S. had raised phasing of withdrawals, and Moscow had decided on that, as well. Half its forces would be out in the first three months, the rest in the remaining period. Shevardnadze could not provide any further breakdown. He had personally looked into the matter, and it could not be done. But this was not a fundamental issue. By the end of the year, the withdrawal would be complete—and this would happen under the Reagan Administration.

As for the relationship between withdrawal and establishment of an interim government, Shevardnadze said, this was something which could not be worked out in the context of the Geneva talks. Whether one talked in terms of an interim government, a coalition government, or a transitional government, such an approach was not realistic. If one looked at the range of players—from the current regime, to the Peshawar “7”, to Zahir Shah and his supporters, to the internal combatants, it was clear that it would be very hard to find a common language. It would take time. The Soviets did not want to postpone their withdrawal by establishing a linkage to interim government arrangements. Let the Afghans decide the matter.

There was a better approach, Shevardnadze suggested. Cordovez had indicated he would be prepared in a “private” capacity to use his good offices to mediate among the parties in the wake of a Geneva agreement. The Soviets and Afghan government had not yet endorsed his mission. But now the Kabul regime had reached the conclusion that such an attempt would be not only possible, but desirable. Thus, once Geneva were signed, work could get underway promptly on a coalition government.

Shevardnadze noted that the problem had recently been complicated by Hekmatyar’s election as leader of the Peshawar Alliance. Hekmatyar was a fundamentalist, a person of extreme views. It was doubtful that he could deal with the Zahir Shah faction, to say nothing of the current regime in Kabul. Hekmatyar had said he did not rule out that, in the event of an agreement in Geneva, the camps now in Pakistan would be moved to Iran. It was no accident that he had come to the fore at this juncture; trouble was in store. This had made the possibility of any linkage between withdrawal and interim government arrangements even less workable.

As for the situation in Afghanistan itself, things were winding down. Skirmishing continued, but with waning intensity. Shevardnadze had previously told the Secretary that Soviet troops had been withdrawn from twelve provinces. The figure was now thirteen, maybe fourteen. In some villages, counter-revolutionary forces reigned; in others, the Kabul regime held sway. But they lived as neighbours. That was the Afghan way. It had taken the Soviets time to understand this.

As to the problem of supplying arms, Shevardnadze wanted the Secretary to understand the situation. Since 1921, the Soviet Union had cooperated continuously with Afghanistan in various fields, including the military. Weapons being supplied to the current regime were in accordance with the terms of a bilateral treaty. It would not be understood if Moscow now sought to break that contractural relationship. Much thought had been given this point by the Soviet side, and Shevardnadze could tell the Secretary that Moscow could not accept such a step. The decision to withdraw had not been an easy one. If followed by “such an action” it would not be understood. The Soviet Union had said it did not drop its friends. Were it to cut off their weapons, it would not be understood.

Thus, Shevardnadze, said, cooperation would continue with the current regime, as it had under the King. Moscow had no desire to terminate a relationship which had existed for decades. Afghanistan was a neighbor. The Soviet Union wanted normal relations with it.

But this raised a question. Were Afghanistan to become a neutral state, as the Soviet Union wished, what would its status be? Neutral status could be incompatible with a military supply relationship. But that would have to be decided in the future.

Another question was the military aid supplied by the U.S. to Pakistan. This was done on a government-to-government basis. The Soviet Union had no problem with that. As for those supplies which went to “anti-government” forces, the Soviet Union considered this illegal. It would be in Moscow’s interest, and in the interest of all countries in the region, for that aid to stop. If the U.S. continued such aid, it would be inconsistent with any obligations it might undertake as a guarantor of non-interference. Thus, the ideal solution would be for the U.S. not to supply Hekmatyar.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that this would be ideal for the Soviet Union, but not for the U.S. The Soviet Union, would also take on the role of a guarantor in the event there was a Geneva agreement. If the Geneva accords required that a guarantor stop the supply of arms, it applied to both guarantors equally. There had to be a consistent standard. The practical effect of such an arrangement would not be so great. The political effect would. What was needed was a way of balancing things; it was largely a question of how it appeared. The Soviet Union would have withdrawn its forces. All the factions would have to work out the aftermath. It would not be easy, but that was their task.

In the meantime, the Secretary stressed, there had to be a balance. The U.S. wanted to settle. It was in everyone’s interest that the situation in Afghanistan be settled in an orderly way. We wanted to work something out. We hoped it was possible to find a balanced way of expressing what would take place. The Secretary had been asked how this might be done. He had said that there were various ways, but that experience had shown that it was possible to work out some very difficult problems with the Soviet Union. Both sides seemed to want to resolve this one.

SHEVARDNADZE said that there was a big difference between U.S. and Soviet aid with respect to Afghanistan. Soviet assistance was on the basis of an intergovernmental agreement. The factions the U.S. supported were not the government of Afghanistan. At the same time, Shevardnadze recognized that the U.S. had a moral and political responsibility to those it had supported. There were various options for dealing with this problem.

The first, as he had suggested earlier, was for the U.S. unilaterally to end supplies to the resistance. As much as Moscow might welcome such an outcome, Shevardnadze acknowledged that it would be unacceptable to the U.S.

A second outcome—although an undesirable one from the Soviet standpoint—would be for the U.S. not to sign on as a guarantor of the Geneva accords. The problem with such an option was that the U.S. would thereby remove itself from participation in the resolution of one of the most acute problems of the time. This was not desirable to Moscow, but could be considered. Under such a scenario, the Geneva accords would be mostly a bilateral document, with the Soviet Union participating to the extent it dealt with the dates for the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Shevardnadze emphasized yet again that this option was not desirable.

A third variant took as its point of departure the fact that the documents elaborated in Geneva did not deal directly with the question of arms supply. Thus, the issue could be omitted from the discussion entirely. The U.S. might at some point, e.g., in the event the Afghans resolved their internal political differences, decide assistance was no longer necessary. In the meantime, maybe the issue should just be dropped. Obviously, if Shevardnadze were asked by the press, he could not say he approved of the U.S. supplying forces hostile to Soviet friends. But that was the U.S.’s business.

Summing up, Shevardnadze reiterated that the first option was the ideal, but would not be acceptable to the U.S. The second was probably as unacceptable to the U.S. as it was undesirable to Moscow. The Soviets would prefer another outcome. It believed that the U.S. had a voice to be heard. U.S. involvement would make for a more stable settlement.

THE SECRETARY said he agreed. He suggested that what Shevardnadze had described as the third option held the most promise. Noting that the Geneva accords imposed certain obligations on Pakistan with respect to what went across the border, the Secretary emphasized the need to be able to state that, as far as the U.S. was concerned, we would be able to supply those whom we had aided if the Soviet Union supplied those it had supported. If we saw that the Soviet side had ceased its assistance, the U.S. would no longer have to continue its own supply effort.

In any case, the Secretary pointed out, humanitarian aid would continue. The refugees would have a tough time of it when they returned. They would have an urgent need for seed, supplies, equipment.

The Secretary proposed that the two sides make an effort while Shevardnadze was in Washington to find a way in the context of Shevardnadze’s third alternative to describe an arrangement which would be balanced in such a way that both sides could live with it. The Secretary did not know whom Shevardnadze might charge with the task, but the Secretary would ask Under Secretary Armacost to work the problem. They ought to get to work the following morning. There were a variety of possibilities which should be explored openly.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, seconded by Middle East Countries Department Chief Alekseev, could work with Armacost. It seemed to Shevardnadze that, in the event the two sides agreed to sign the Geneva accords, it would be unnecessary to advertise that arms supplies were continuing, since the Geneva accords did not address that issue. At the same time, he supposed, Congress would probably ask questions.

THE SECRETARY assured him that this would be the case. The U.S. would have to be able to say that what we would do would depend on what the Soviet Union would do. But, he reiterated, the experts should have at the problem and come up with some ideas. If they had something to say to the ministers, they could interrupt them. It would be well to reach some meeting of the minds by the time of Shevardnadze’s session with the President.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the two sides appeared to have the basis for a good discussion the following morning. If it proved possible to reach agreement on the military aid question, he added, and if the Afghan parties agreed to Cordovez’s private mediation, the only obstacle to signing in Geneva was the question of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Briefly reviewing the history of the matter, Shevardnadze pointed out that Pakistan was insisting on language in Geneva which referred to respect for the “internationally recognized border”—i.e., the Durand Line. But Afghanistan had withheld recognition of the Durand Line since 1922, because it artificially divided the Pushtun nation. India also had an interest in the matter, which it had registered with the Kabul government and the U.N. Afghanistan had proposed a simpler formulation—“existing borders”—to resolve the issue. Shevardnadze expressed the hope that, if the other issues he and the Secretary had discussed could be resolved, Pakistan would withdraw its demands on the border issue. This would make conclusion of the Geneva accords a real possibility.

Central America

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two ministers brief their delegations on their discussion, and be prepared to meet again the following morning at 8:30.⁶

SHEVARDNADZE said he would first like to ask a question. What about the troops that the U.S. had sent to Honduras? Would they stay there?

THE SECRETARY replied that our troops had been sent to the region at the request of the Honduran government, and in response to Nicaragua’s incursion across into Honduras. We had indicated that the force would be withdrawn within about ten days from the date of their arrival. But no precise dates had been sent. POWELL noted that this meant withdrawals could start the following weekend.

SHEVARDNADZE said he raised the question because he had been asked on arrival in Washington what the Soviet response would be. He had said that he was concerned that, at a time when Soviet forces were to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, another country was moving its troops in elsewhere. If these were just exercises, it was not a good idea.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Honduras, confronted by a Nicaragua heavily armed by the Soviet Union, had “screamed for help.” We had provided a symbolic movement of troops. There was no intention that they should become involved in combat.

SHEVARDNADZE said that was for the U.S. to decide. But the best, most reasonable solution was for them to return home quickly.

THE SECRETARY noted that Nicaragua had now withdrawn from Honduras territory, noting parenthetically that there was no way Sandinista forces could have “innocently” wandered across the sizeable river that separated the two countries. Ceasefire talks between the Managua government and the freedom fighters had taken place on schedule that same day. The U.S. continued to believe that success in those talks, followed by national reconciliation and greater openness in Nicaragua as called for by the Guatemala accords, was the way to go. But the fact that Soviet arms supplies to Nicaragua were higher than the previous year, despite the cut-off of U.S. aid to the freedom fighters, was not a good sign.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled Gorbachev’s Washington summit suggestion that both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. halt supplies of arms to the countries of Central America, with the exception of police weapons. This was a serious proposal. Nicaragua had accepted it. If a country’s neighbours were not receiving weapons, the first country would not need them either. What Nicaragua needed was to address its serious economic problems. Shevardnadze said he pressed the issue not to embarrass the Secretary, but because Moscow was interested in a serious discussion.

The ministers ended the meeting, agreeing to meet the following morning at 8:30.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in Shultz’s outer office at the Department of State. In a memorandum he sent Reagan later that day, Shultz reported: “My overall impression is that the Soviets have come ready to work. Shevardnadze brought with him a large delegation, with particularly strong regional and human rights expertise. Moreover, their instructions seem at first blush to be to make progress.” (Reagan Library, Shultz Papers, Memoranda for the President (03/11/1988–04/02/1988))
2. March 23; see Document 138.
3. The January 22 plenary statements, during which the U.S. side tabled a draft Defense and Space treaty, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I.
4. See footnote 3, Document 125.
5. See Document 72.
6. See Document 133.