Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

138. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 23, 1988, 11:40 a.m.–2:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze of the USSR (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• US

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary of State George Shultz
  • Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci
  • Chief of Staff Howard Baker
  • Deputy Chief of Staff Kenneth Duberstein
  • Colin L. Powell, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
  • Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost
  • Ambassador Jack Matlock
  • Counselor Max Kampelman
  • Ambassador Paul Nitze
  • Ambassador Edward Rowny
  • Assistant Secretary of State Rozanne Ridgway
  • Robert E. Linhard, NSC
  • Thomas Simons (State, Notetaker)
  • Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC (Notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• USSR

  • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin
  • Ambassador Yuriy Dubinin
  • General Nikolay Chervov
  • Ambassador Victor Karpov
  • Ambassador Aleksey Obukhov
  • Foreign Ministry Deputy Director Georgiy Mamedov
  • Foreign Ministry Official Teymuraz Stepanov
  • Foreign Ministry Official Sergey Tarasenko
  • Pavel R. Palazhchenko (Interpreter)

The Soviets arrived at 1135 in the Oval Office. Following initial pleasantries and a multiwave photo-op, the President opened the meeting by saying that he wished to raise a few personal thoughts before convening the larger plenary session. He noted that there remained only two more months before the proposed Moscow summit and that much which we hoped to accomplish there would be decided now. He said we should strive for maximum results in all areas, but also should be sure that progress was solid. (C)

Then the President turned to human rights, affirming that they were literally at the heart of the US-Soviet relationship. He said that encouraging progress had been observed in the USSR over the past two years, including the release of many political prisoners and the emergence of a freer environment for political expression. He said that some inconsistencies were disturbing, with first loosening and then tightening seen in various areas. But, as he had told the General Secretary in December, it remained vital that we maintain a continuing dialogue on human rights. (S)

The President said he had explained many times that our concerns about human rights did not represent an intrusion into the USSR’s internal affairs but the natural concerns of a nation of immigrants who sympathized with the plight of people in their former homelands. The treatment or mistreatment of former fellow countrymen had an impact on US public opinion, making it difficult to deal with the USSR when that impact was negative. The President noted that dozens of political prisoners remained incarcerated, including many religious prisoners. He said that it would be particularly meaningful in the year of the Millenium of Christianity in Russia, were religious prisoners released. He said that the plight of refuseniks and divided spouses continued to be unfortunate. At this point he gave to Shevardnadze a list of cases of particular interest to the US.² He then noted that it was about time to announce the decision on Moscow summit dates (29 May–2 June 1988) on the portico. (S)

Secretary Shultz asked whether Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had any points he wished to raise in the relative privacy of this smaller meeting. The Foreign Minister replied that he felt no need to keep private his agreement that there should be a regular and continuous dialogue between the two countries on human rights and humanitarian issues. He noted that he and the Secretary had recently begun a new phase of this constructive, continuous, and businesslike dialogue. This area required the active attention of political leaderships. Shevardnadze said he wanted the President to know that he had proposed to the Secretary of State a permanently functioning arrangement in the human rights area which would involve legislators and working groups on both sides. He urged that issues be fully discussed and not allowed to pile up. He proposed exchanges of information on legislation and consultations among lawyers, for example, on policy toward capital punishment, especially on the sensitive matter of capital punishment for minors. He said that he also had given over to the Secretary a list of individual human rights cases of interest to the Soviet side and expressed confidence that they would be considered. The Oval Office meeting then broke for the announcement of summit dates. (S)

PLENARY MEETING IN CABINET ROOM

When the plenary session convened in the Cabinet Room at 1200, the President noted that the discussion had already begun and invited Secretary Shultz to start this round. (U)

Secretary Shultz said that the now regular pattern of small meetings with principals, including Colin Powell and Roz Ridgway on the US side, had been applied during this ministerial. He noted that working groups on all the arms control issues and on regional conflicts had met, that ambassadors had met on bilateral matters, and that working-group talks on human rights would be underway during the day. He said that all areas of concern were in play and that reports would be heard about them. But, first, he asked whether the Soviet visitor would like to comment on the overall ministerial. (S)

Shevardnadze began by conveying to the President the personal regards of Mr. and Mrs. Gorbachev who, he said, warmly remembered their visit to Washington and their talks with the President and with the American people. They believed that this was a truly historic occasion. In the dynamic of US-Soviet relations, especially regarding security issues, Shevardnadze continued, the first constructive phase of the relationship starting with Geneva in 1985 could now be said to be over, and we were moving into a new phase. There was no need, he said, to elaborate on the importance of the INF agreement signed in Washington. The General Secretary had recently received the President’s message conveyed through Secretary Shultz saying that the US side was willing to move forward on security issues, especially to accomplish a 50% reduction of strategic forces within the context of compliance with the ABM Treaty and the parameters of the Joint Statement agreed to in Washington.³ (S)

Shevardnadze observed that he had had 23 meetings with Secretary Shultz, and could report that the dialogue was constructive and businesslike. Good experience had been gained in using a unique mechanism involving summits—an unprecedented fourth summit now impending—and the continuing dialogue of foreign ministers and experts. Now the state of US-Soviet relations was focused particularly on the task of completing a 50% START agreement. The President and the General Secretary had instructed the ministers and, in turn, the Geneva delegations to accelerate their work. The latter had prepared very substantial documents—on inspection, elimination and conversion, and an MOU on data exchange—which provided a basis for progress. Informed by the INF experience, these were important forward steps, in Shevardnadze’s view. Despite many areas of disagreement and little time to resolve them, Shevardnadze said there was a good basis for a joint effort to reach a 50% START agreement by the Moscow Summit. The Soviet leadership believed, he said, that, while difficult, this goal could be achieved. (S)

Shevardnadze observed that this ministerial would lay a good basis for the Moscow summit if there was agreement on the basic question of compliance with the ABM Treaty. The General Secretary had said and the President had agreed that there would be no 50% reductions agreement if there were no agreement on the ABM Treaty, according to Shevardnadze, and it was important to be guided by this in preparing for the summit. Additional requirements existed to amplify on certain aspects of verification so as to assure against circumvention. Shevardnadze said that he had shared new suggestions with the Secretary. Another very complex issue, he continued, concerned SLCM. As discussed since Reykjavik, without a solution to the SLCM problem no START agreement could be hoped for, but a basis for proceeding had been achieved. First, it had been agreed that there would be a limit on SLCMs. The Soviets had proposed a ceiling which, whether accepted now or not, provided a basis for discussion. Both sides agreed that the verification problem, secondly, was very difficult, but susceptible to solution through hard work by the experts. The Soviet side had presented to Secretary Shultz a comprehensive concept for SLCM verification. It had not yet heard a response, but understood that this might take time to study. Shevardnadze said this concept deserved serious study, and expressed the conviction of the Soviet side the SLCM limits could be verified. Another issue, he said, concerned ALCM counting rules. Both sides had proposed counting rules, and now the effort to reach agreement must be intensified. (S)

Shevardnadze said it was realistic to work for documents on nuclear testing for signature in Moscow. There were two aspects that needed to proceed in parallel, the preparation of protocols and the preparation of joint verification experiments. If willingness to accelerate both processes existed, a basis for agreement existed. The Soviet side had accepted the US technical approach and the US side did not object to the Soviet seismic approach. Moving to chemical weapons, Shevardnadze said that, since a completed convention banning chemical weapons was not realistic by the time of the Moscow summit, then a statement on accelerating the effort to complete a convention should be sought, a worthwhile draft of which had been submitted by the Soviet side. (S)

Regarding conventional arms, specifically in Europe, Shevardnadze said there was every reason to accelerate work on defining the mandate and substance of talks. Good progress was being made and acceptable language was attainable. Gorbachev, Shevardnadze recalled, had said the Soviet side was ready to put all its cards on the table, all its forces data. It was ready to begin negotiating on all asymmetries regarding conventional arms. Even before negotiations, it was ready to publish jointly all data about weapons pertinent to the goal of limiting conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals, data covering Warsaw Pact and NATO countries. The Soviet side was ready to publish data by region, including central, southern, and northern Europe. (S)

This in broad outline, Shevardnadze said, was the state of his dialogue with the Secretary. As to regional matters, he said he could not yet report conclusions. Agreed language regarding Afghanistan had not yet been reached, but he was hopeful it could be reached based on the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces. There had been discussion of Iran-Iraq and the Middle East, but no agreement yet; there would be discussion of Central America and Kampuchea, and some on southern Africa. (S)

This was the agenda, the mosaic of the ministerial, Shevardnadze said, and the ministers would work in a businesslike manner to build a good basis for the Moscow summit. After this ministerial in Washington, Shevardnadze proposed another ministerial in Moscow, suggesting a date somewhere in mid-May, to assure that the Moscow Summit was as productive as possible, something the Soviet Union and its people keenly desired. (S)

LUNCH DISCUSSION

Repairing for lunch in the Roosevelt Room at 1315, the party sat down at 1325 for a discussion that ranged over many topics. The President provided some background on the room and the construction of the West Wing. Shevardnadze observed that Franklin Roosevelt was the most fondly regarded US president in the USSR because of the wartime alliance and expressed the hope that something of that spirit was in the process of being revived. He said he felt very positive that the two sides’ defense ministers had recently met. Secretary Carlucci observed that this was a good precedent and noted that it was unprecedented that two adversary states had begun a dialogue on military concepts and doctrine, saying that we had much to learn from and about each other. Queries about the age and health of former Soviet foreign minister Gromyko (reported to be fine by Shevardnadze) led to observations about FRG Foreign Minister Genscher. Shevardnadze characterized him as reasonable and flexible, but did not wish to label him cunning, saying that while heading a small party, he held a key position. Secretary Shultz agreed that Genscher was important to all our deliberations and held a kind of swing vote. Shevardnadze noted that a visit to Moscow by Chancellor Kohl had been announced. (S)

The Vice President shifted the discussion to Korea by noting that former South Korean president Chun had recently visited and had expressed concern about the security of the summer Olympics. Shevardnadze responded that the Soviet side had decided to participate and expected no security problems, at least from North Korea; he said he had no doubt that North Korea would not be the cause of security problems. The Vice President said this was good to hear because we had no influence over North Korea but had manifold concerns. Secretary Carlucci said this had come up in his conversations with Soviet Defense Minister Yazov. While granting that the USSR might not have a lot of influence over North Korea, he urged the Soviets to exercise what they had to prevent any terrorist activities on the part of the North. Shevardnadze said he understood the concern but said he did not think Kim Il Sung would plan such activities because they would hurt his and North Korea’s prestige. Carlucci said he hoped this was right, but concerns remained. The Vice President said such concerns were spurred by the recent bombing of a South Korean airliner.⁴ Shevardnadze said he had no particular knowledge but believed that North Korean complicity could not be proved. The Vice President asked whether the Korean woman involved, who had confessed to the plot, was some sort of double agent. Shevardnadze responded that this might be and that, while he was not an intelligence expert, he thought all kinds of things were possible. (S)

Secretary Shultz observed that the evidence of instigation of this bombing by North Korea was not limited to the woman’s confession, but included corroborative information about patterns of movement, locations, and phone conversations involving North Korea. He said that the Soviet Foreign Minister’s statement of confidence about North Korea’s motives and behavior was important, but that it was impossible not to reflect on the airline bombing and the earlier Rangoon bombing. (S)

Shevardnadze said he could not fully understand the extent of our concern because Kim Il Sung could see there was no prospect of blocking the Olympics. More likely a small group of terrorists of some kind was involved in the episodes cited. Shevardnadze said he knew Kim personally and, respect him or not, felt it was out of the question that he would authorize such atrocities. The President said one theory held that the North Koreans aimed to hurt the Olympics and the South by making people afraid to fly there. Shevardnadze said he was confident that the Olympics would be held and establish many new world records. In the ensuing conversation about sports, the President observed that the Olympics grew out of the Greek tradition in which wars would be suspended to hold the Olympic games. This prompted the Vice President to tell an Olympic play-on-words joke involving a pole vaulter, who turned out to be a Czech, not a Pole, but was indeed named Walter (the whole matter constituting an “Olympic” translation problem for the US interpreter Zarechnak, which he successfully solved). (S)

The President in turn told the story of how General Secretary Gorbachev, seizing the wheel of his car from his chauffeur in the interest of speed, was pulled over by a Soviet traffic cop and then immediately let go because, having Gorbachev as a driver, the passenger in the back seat must have been truly important. Shevardnadze opined that the President had authored this joke, and offered one of his own—on Prime Minister Thatcher. God, it seems, was querying Reagan, Gorbachev, and Thatcher on their public records. After receiving satisfactory reports from the first two, He said to Mrs. T., “Now how, my daughter, are you doing?” To which the Prime Minister responded, “First, I am not your daughter, and, second, you are in my place!” Shevardnadze said he understood the President to be the original source of this joke. (C)

The President said he had only one story about going to heaven. Three men appeared at the Pearly Gates and were told, with room for only one, the place would go to the representative of the oldest profession. First, a surgeon claimed it on the basis that God had done surgery in making Eve from Adam’s rib. Second, an engineer claimed it because God had to “engineer” the world out of chaos in six days. The third, an economist, finally got the spot by asking, “Where do you think the chaos came from?” Shevardnadze said this joke must have been about Soviet Gosplan (State Planning Agency). Secretary Shultz winced at the thought that he was once an economist, and then proposed that the joke was really about the US House of Representatives. (C)

The President related a true story about Mrs. Thatcher at a London economic summit. Berated openly by a colleague for her very authoritarian chairmanship of the proceedings, Mrs. Thatcher responded to the President’s asking why she put up with such criticism by saying, “We women know when men are being childish.” Indeed, the President confessed, Mrs. Thatcher ran a tight meeting, but not excessively so. (C)

As the meal concluded, Secretary Shultz observed that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had summarized the ministerial; he proposed that views from some of the US participants be sought. He noted that the President’s brief remarks in the Oval Office mirrored lengthier discussion by the ministers on human rights, discussions which had become systematic, regular, and reciprocal. He noted that there was a balance sheet of pluses as well as minuses. He said the US side would continue to bring up areas where it felt the Soviets were not living up to their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. CSCE in Vienna was one area, Secretary Shultz continued, where the US and the Soviet Union needed to work more together. The pace in Vienna was falling behind the pace of US-Soviet relations and indeed behind developments within the USSR. He could not explain this, but said we needed to move ahead in Vienna toward a balanced outcome, not least because such an outcome was required to move forward on conventional arms talks. Therefore the ministers had agreed that our ambassadors in Vienna would intensify bilateral consultations aimed at moving the proceedings there into high gear. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that talks in the afternoon would concentrate on Afghanistan, but that the Middle East, Iran-Iraq, and Central America would also get attention. On Afghanistan, he said, almost all was in place for a solution except an outcome properly balanced (a reference to symmetry on requirements to cease arming the parties). He said the search for a solution on this question, so far unsuccessful, would continue. (S)

The President mentioned the requirement for a second resolution in the UN Security Council aimed at ending the Iran-Iraq war, noting the barbaric chemical attack by Iraq on one of its own villages held by Iran, killing some 3000 people. (S)

Shevardnadze asked to say a few words in response to Secretary Shultz’s overview. He said if the documents in Geneva were signed in the near future, then Soviet forces would be on the way out of Afghanistan even before the President came to Moscow, with half withdrawn in three months and the remainder gone by the end of the year, while the President was still in office. This, he said, was one of the most complex regional problems. As to Iran-Iraq and a second resolution, Shevardnadze said that work should be finished on the text of a second resolution. Within a week or ten days, the Secretary General would meet with the foreign ministers of Iraq and Iran. If Iran did not support Resolution 598, then the USSR would vote for a second resolution and had told this to Iran. The Soviet side had doubts, he said, as to whether an embargo would actually help end the war because both sides had great stocks of weapons; he feared it might become even more cruel. But the Soviets did agree to work on the text of a resolution and, at some stage, to adopt it. This was the spirit of the discussion when Shultz was in Moscow and continued to be the Soviet position. Secretary Shultz said it was important to state publicly that the US and the USSR would endorse a second resolution if Iran failed to endorse 598. Shevardnadze replied that this should happen only after the Secretary General had met with the Iranian and Iraqi foreign ministers. He added that Iran now claims to support the Secretary General’s plans to implement 598; it must be pressured to give a straight answer. In a week’s time we would know. (S)

Secretary Shultz turned to arms control topics noting the importance of coming to grips with chemical weapons. The US side, he said, wanted to see results in the effort to get a ban on chemical weapons. Toward this objective he said that maybe a suitable statement for issuance at the Moscow summit could be constructed. He then asked Ambassador Nitze for a run-down on arms control. (S)

Ambassador Nitze reported that one large working group on arms control had subdivided into several separate groups on nuclear testing, conventional arms, START, Defense and Space. Verification problems generally, ALCMs, mobile ICBMs and their verification, heavy ICBMs, and SLCMs had been addressed. The two protocols on elimination and inspection and the MOU on data tabled in Geneva had been examined and some progress made on eliminating differences. Nitze observed that it would be important and feasible to exchange data called for by the MOU even before completing the full outline of the START agreement because the first informed the second action. The US side moved from 6 to 10 as an ALCM counting rule in response to Soviet concerns, but the Soviet side still had problems with the US position. (S)

Shevardnadze charged that the US was understanding the ALCM carrying capability of its very good bombers. Nitze responded that the counting rule of 10 was fair for the force as a whole. He went on to say that mobile ICBM verification had seen hard work and some progress. On heavy ICBM, the sides’ positions were clear and disagreed. There remained problems on sublimits, but progress was being made. The main problem remains SLCMs, where the Soviet side, Nitze reported, had made substantive proposals which the US side was examining. (S)

Shevardnadze agreed that the MOU on data was important; categories needed to be defined; it would provide the basis for speeding up exchange of data. But, he said, it remained unacceptable that SLCMs were not included. Nitze said that the sides should start exchanging data as soon as possible. He then broached Defense and Space. (S)

Shevardnadze interjected by proposing to the President that the language of the December Joint Statement simply be used as the text of a document to be signed in Moscow. Not only had the two top leaders already accepted it, others present had worked on it, including Shultz, Carlucci, Baker, and Powell. If the Washington language on the ABM Treaty was still in effect, then things could move boldly ahead. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded that this matter was actively being discussed; the Washington language was valid. But, he said, it contained areas of ambiguity which even the Soviets could see. This had to be cleared up. (S)

Shevardnadze said that efforts were being made to go beyond the Washington language; these might lead in a negative direction which would be unfortunate. (S)

The luncheon broke up at 1435. Departing, Shevardnadze asked the President to consider the proposal of spending more time and doing more travel in the USSR than currently planned. (C)

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, 3/88 Washington/Shultz—Shevardnadze. Secret. Drafted by Simons. The meeting took place in the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, and the Roosevelt Room at the White House.
2. Attached but not printed is an undated list entitled, “Cases of Special Interest to the U.S.”
3. See Document 128.
4. See footnote 8, Document 123.