Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

125. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 22, 1988, 11:05 a.m.–2:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The Secretary’s Meeting with Gorbachev February 22

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • George P. Shultz, Secretary of State
  • Colin Powell, President’s National Security Advisor
  • Paul Nitze, Special Advisor to the President on Arms Control
  • Michael H. Armacost, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
  • Jack F. Matlock, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow
  • Rozanne L. Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State (EUR)
  • Thomas W. Simons, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (EUR) (notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (interpreter)

• USSR

  • Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary, CPSU CC
  • Eduard Shevardnadze, Minister of Foreign Affairs
  • Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, First Deputy Minister of Defense
  • Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee
  • Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Deputy Foreign Minister
  • Yuriy Dubinin, Soviet Ambassador to Washington
  • Mr. Chernyayev, Special Assistant to the General Secretary (notetaker)
  • P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

Gorbachev welcomed the Secretary to Moscow. He said he was personally pleased to have him and his colleagues here. The two sides had good businesslike relations. He asked jokingly if relations could not be postponed for three or four years so they could work in a quiet setting.

The Secretary noted that Gorbachev had already met the leading contenders for the U.S. Presidency. There would be important elements of continuity in U.S. policy. The reason was that President Reagan had worked with Gorbachev, they had gotten the two sides onto a different course, and that was popular in the U.S. It had been interesting to see how attitudes in the Senate had evolved over the INF Treaty. Senators who had thought the public would be skeptical had discovered that pushing this was not popular. There were now over 80 votes committed to support of the Treaty, and the number was rising. This broad support assured that there would be important continuity. President Reagan’s contribution would have a lasting effect.

Gorbachev said he agreed with that analysis, but with one important addition. This situation resulted from more than just the good will of the leaders of the two countries. He thought there was a more substantial reason for it. Both countries were coming to understand that they could not continue the relationship as it had been. The whole world saw that. The Soviet Union and the U.S. should therefore consider how to improve, how to normalize their relations. There were thus important substantial reasons why continuity was the prospect. The two sides needed to rebuild their relations. With that he was agreed.

He had mentioned the President, Gorbachev said, but he thought in addition his associates, the Administration, were also becoming convinced, like the Soviets, that we have to seek good relations, consistently, persistently, without illusions. This was necessary for both countries. The postwar period had proved that nothing good could come from the arms race. Other ways were needed. The old ways had led to an impasse—with regard to security, with regard to resources, with regard to relations between the two powers.

The latest efforts had shown what was considered Soviet policy, Gorbachev continued. It had been reinforced by these practical deeds, seeking new steps in cooperation with the U.S. The U.S. side’s reaction or response to the suggestion he had made in Washington concerning cooperation on Afghanistan had been disappointing. The Soviet side had decided as a result to move with its own efforts. Now the U.S. side was more interested, and the Soviet side welcomed that. But the two sides should seek to move forward in all areas. This was considered policy. It was not just Mikhail Gorbachev. In the West they tended to personalize things. But this was more profound. By this he did not mean to imply there would be a surprise ending to the Gorbachev period. What the Western press was speculating was not true. He meant that this was the policy of the Soviet leadership. It had captured the sentiments of the people, workers, farmers. They wanted to improve relations with the U.S.

The Secretary said he agreed that the situation itself was producing changes. This was as important as leadership was for guiding them.

Gorbachev said then he was agreeing with the Secretary when he said that regardless of the U.S. elections or events in the Soviet Union he was convinced that this trend was gaining strength. At the same time, it was true in both countries that questions emerged, the question of whether we could trust each other. Soviet people were asking whether the U.S. was not outsmarting the Soviet Union. But perhaps such opposition sentiment helped: it did not allow us to rest on our laurels, it made us work, it made us think.

The Secretary interjected that sometimes people did not even recognize laurels.

Gorbachev continued that, more concretely, he had been trying to project a general point about the time remaining. It was true that with the elections coming up it would be harder to reach decisions, though diplomatic activity and dialogue would of course continue. But there was the question of what to bring to the President’s visit. As of now the sides could achieve a great deal, if they worked actively, intensely. But if one month were lost they could achieve much less. It was true that the hardest subject was START, but a great deal could be achieved.

The Secretary said he agreed that a lot of work was required, but START was certainly possible; and the President was pushing in that direction.

Gorbachev said he wished to say one thing: we did have experience, we could analyze it and draw the lessons about the effective use of time. He had concluded that since the sides had developed the pattern of meetings between the Secretary and Shevardnadze, in Moscow and in Washington, they should use it. Geneva once again smelled of mothballs since the Secretary and Shevardnadze had started working again. In Geneva they drank tea and built fires, but they used wet wood, producing a lot of smoke but no fire. Let us do big things, he suggested, in a friendly, even a comradely way—the Secretary might not like the word, but it was a good word. The sides should use that.

The Secretary said that in Geneva there was perhaps not a lot of fire, but there was certainly smoke. Gorbachev said there was smoke and fog. He therefore thought the stress should be on the Secretary’s meetings with Shevardnadze. They should use the pattern intensively. Halfway approaches were no good. They had a good thing going, they should use it well.

The Secretary said one thing to do was make the Geneva process do its work. They could use it between meetings. The day before he and Shevardnadze had agreed on a way to do that, so that when they met in Washington they could have a product they could work with. Gorbachev said he agreed with that. The efforts of the experts could be successful when the Secretary’s and Shevardnadze’s machinery was working at full speed; without that nothing happened. Decisions would be made in Washington and Moscow. The Soviet side now saw that decisions were needed in both the Soviet and the U.S. interest. Such meetings were necessary. He observed that the main actors on both the Soviet and U.S. sides were present. He suggested they get to work. The Secretary commented that here were the usual suspects, as Americans said.

Gorbachev said that in that context he wished to ask the Secretary for his impressions of his meetings in Moscow. It had been a marathon. He asked who planned it that way. The Secretary asked if Gorbachev would like a summary. Gorbachev said he would.

The Secretary began by saying there had been a continuation of the worthwhile human rights dialogue. Both sides had told the other about the things important to it. There had been a working group. He had only a preliminary report, but he knew the U.S. side had described the things that concerned it. It had been reassured, in general, to see continued progress. That was an important element in the overall picture. He had taken special reassurance from reading Gorbachev’s book and from what Shevardnadze said that the Soviet side was coming from its own analysis of what was happening in its country. That would give development a more secure place, and the U.S. side welcomed that.

Gorbachev asked to say that the process of democratization in all spheres also affected human rights and freedoms, the status of the individual in society. It would gain strength, and some problems would disappear as it gained strength. He welcomed the Secretary’s recognition that these matters were within the Soviet side’s jurisdiction, and his recognition that developments had a stable basis within the whole of Soviet society.

Turning to arms control, the Secretary reported that the sides had shared views concerning the INF Treaty. He had informed Shevardnadze that the ratification process was going well, that the Treaty had strong support, that he felt very confident. The U.S. side was organizing a group to administer implementation; we were preparing to go into business.

Gorbachev replied that there was full confidence in the Soviet leadership that the Treaty would be ratified in the Supreme Soviet, although for the first time the process was not as easy as before. They were being accused of having ceded too much for Soviet security. They had been trying to prove that equal security was assured, but were being asked how this could be when they had said it was assured before but had agreed to reductions four times as great as the U.S. There had been heated debate in the Foreign Affairs Commission. Akhromeyev said they were still fighting back. Gorbachev went on that there was still the general sentiment in the country that the Treaty would be ratified. Democratization was gaining. Everything was connected. The Secretary joked that he should tell Senator Helms to grab the Treaty before the Soviet Union changed its mind.

Gorbachev said one Soviet advantage was that the Supreme Soviet had more workers and farmers, and fewer politicians. But there were also questions from ordinary people. They were not about disarmament overall, but about why unilateral concessions had been made to the U.S. The Soviet side could not answer as he had said to President Reagan—that it knew he liked concessions. It had to explain things a different way.

The Secretary said he knew Gorbachev did not want all the details, but he thought there were aspects of the U.S. INF debate that were educational as the sides looked ahead. Gorbachev said he could see Senator Nunn and his Committee were putting on pressure. The Secretary said they were not doing so on this score. That was a debate between the Executive and the Legislative that was separate from this subject, and he thought the U.S. side had it in hand. In the end, he said, Senator Nunn and he could work together rather well. Gorbachev said the Soviet side also had the impression that the Senator was a very solid person. Not easy to work with, but solid. The Secretary said that was true. Gorbachev commented that it was always interesting to deal with that kind of partner.

The Secretary said there was a two-fold lesson to the INF debate.

First, people kept saying that the devil was in the details. Second, the subject of verification was a very important aspect of the debate. And it would be much more difficult for strategic arms than for INF, where classes of weapons were being eliminated. The lesson was to get at the details early, or it would not be possible to complete the treaty by the time of the Moscow Summit.

Gorbachev said he understood one point: before the President visited it would be necessary to have ratification of the INF Treaty. Otherwise it would be a useless, empty visit. The Secretary said he agreed, but there was no real doubt about ratification. He thought it would be completed by the end of April.

Gorbachev said he thought the Soviet side could agree on the importance of verification in the preparation of the START Treaty. He also believed the problem was more complex than for INF. The Soviet side was ready for cooperation, for intensive, even new forms of verification compared to the INF Treaty, as had been said in Washington. The sides were now doing reductions for real. Verification was needed to assure the U.S. side and the Soviet side that there would not be one-sided advantages in reductions. The U.S. side should take the same approach. Otherwise there would be no movement.

The Secretary said that he agreed, and that to come to grips with this, both sides needed more information on the other’s forces. He and Shevardnadze had agreed the day before to instruct the Geneva negotiators to produce drafts of the two protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding in time for Shevardnadze to come to Washington, on March 22 or thereabouts.² He had talked to Admiral Crowe and the other chiefs. They were doing a lot of agonizing. But they were ready. Shevardnadze had said Akhromeyev and his colleagues were in the same position. This was an important and serious matter.

Gorbachev said that since verification seemed the most difficult issue, perhaps it should receive priority attention now. Perhaps there should be a special group of experts—say scientists and military people—to single the thing out, not just as part of the general work.

Shevardnadze said he and the Secretary had particularly discussed ways to intensify this work, especially on SLCM’s, but this could be expanded to other matters.

Gorbachev said the work should encompass production, inventories, deployment areas on land, at sea, under water. Of course the two sides would need reciprocal information on each other. Without it verification efforts could not be successful.

The Secretary said he agreed. The two sides would see to it that the Geneva delegations were equipped with experts who could work competently and effectively, so that by the time of the Washington meeting there could be results. It was a good thing to set deadlines for them.

Gorbachev said it was a matter of fundamental (printsipialno) importance that in this process of seeking solutions to all problems of strategic arms, including ABM, the sides proceed from the provisions of the Washington statement.³ He said this because the draft document proposed by the U.S. at Geneva reflected the U.S. approach to strategic stability. President Reagan had taken that approach in Washington too. He (Gorbachev) had made clear from the outset that this was not the way to a solution. Together they had managed to find acceptable language on the subject. But if that were changed there would be no solutions. As was said here, one had to build a bridge across rather than alongside a river.

The Secretary said he agreed that the Washington statement should be the Bible, so to speak, of what we were doing.

He continued that he wished to make some comments in the space and defense area. The U.S. side believed that it was essential, if we were to reach a strategic arms agreement, that there also be a treaty or agreement dealing with this. It was important that it be separate, but in any case it had to be there. The U.S. side believed that the essence of that agreement was contained in the Washington joint statement. It proposed basically to take the language there as the fundamental basis for the agreement or treaty. The sides did not need lawyers to change it. Central to the concept was the idea that there should be an agreed length of time not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They had talked enough about that—they had not agreed, but they had talked a lot—and enough for them to agree that that period would exceed the length of time involved for reductions of strategic arms.

Gorbachev said the Washington statement had had two aspects and not just one. The first concerned interpretation of the ABM Treaty as it was understood in 1972. The second concerned the non-withdrawal period the Secretary had mentioned.

The Secretary said there had been a third element. The statement had used the Soviet side’s language on what each side could do, with six months’ notice, at the end of the agreed period. So there were three elements.

Gorbachev said that actually there had been a fourth element. In the U.S. side’s comments on the Washington statement, it was saying that either side could withdraw at any time when it judged there was a threat to its supreme national interest. This negated the rest of the agreement. It provided for unilateral withdrawal, and then there would be no agreement. Complete clarity was needed on this, for both the U.S. side and the Soviet side. He did not think the U.S. side would want a situation where the Soviet side could decide to withdraw that way.

The Secretary said that, with due respect, he thought the Soviet side was creating an unnecessary issue here. That language was practically standard in all our agreements. It was in the present ABM Treaty. It was in no way related to anything else but a supreme national interest. The U.S. side would be glad to make a statement along those lines. It was a standard provision.

Gorbachev said he thought the exchange would be useful for continued work on this question.

The Secretary continued that the question of the 1972 Treaty and what “understood” meant was a matter of some controversy. Both sides knew that. There was more work to be done on that subject. Here Shevardnadze had made a suggestion that the U.S. side welcomed, and would go home thinking about. This was to look at the verification aspects of our discussion, and see if in there there was not some way to resolve this issue. He had a feeling that if the sides worked on that they might perhaps find a answer. But he knew more work needed to be done.

The Secretary said he would like to go back to the strategic arms treaty, and make some more comments. Looking at the verification issues, they were all difficult, but those concerning mobiles were a special and more difficult problem, and those concerning SLCM’s even more so. There had been special discussion of each issue in the meeting the day before. The U.S. side had had the position on mobiles that they should be banned, basically because anything agreed to would be so difficult to verify. But both sides had been working on the verification issue. Part of the discussion had been conceptual, part of it explicit. The sides were not home free. But he was somewhat more confident than in times past.

Turning to SLCM’s, the Secretary continued that Akhromeyev had spoken strongly on it in Washington.⁴ The U.S. side had examined the suggestion the Soviet side had made. It was still at a loss to see how it could be confident about verification. But the U.S. side was prepared to keep working. It also agreed that there were certain things that could be done: at a minimum this was an area that had to be treated; there should be a limit to nuclear-armed SLCM’s; the U.S. side would be willing at the right time to set a number we would be prepared to live with; we would like to have it verifiable. The U.S. side did not see how that could be accomplished. But it did see that a limit was necessary, and was prepared to step up to the issue.

Gorbachev said that many things on strategic offensive arms had been worked on. In Washington the sides had been able to note progress on some aspects, and to take some important steps. With regard to certain concerns that the U.S. side had expressed, the Soviet side had given some more thought, and was in a position to take some additional steps.

The U.S. side had raised the issue of sublimits, Gorbachev went on. The sides had agreed on a sublimit of 4900 warheads on ICBM’s and SLBM’s. This was a basis. Continuing on sublimits, he believed the Soviet side could speak of an additional sublimit of 3300 on ICBM warheads and another of 1100 on heavy bomber warheads. Then the U.S. side had raised the issue of the heavy bomber warhead sublimit. The Soviet side understood the U.S. side needed it to be bigger than 1100, say 1300. If the sides agreed on 4900, then they might agree to add or subtract 200, if that was a problem for the U.S., say to 1300 on heavy bomber warheads and 5100 for ICBM/SLBM warheads. This was assuming that was a problem for the U.S.

Gorbachev continued that the Soviet side also thought there was agreement concerning Soviet heavy ICBM’s—on 154 launchers and 1540 warheads. There could also be a ban on development, production and deployment of new heavy ICBM’s and SLBM’s. This could be agreed, but the sides would need criteria. The Soviet side was also ready to reach agreement on the limits of acceptable modernization of existing heavy missiles.

In connection with that, Gorbachev continued, the Soviet side thought the sides could write into the treaty a ban on heavy SLBM’s and a ban on heavy mobile ICBM’s, and a provision for non-conversion of non-heavy launchers into heavy launchers. The Soviet side was ready to specify all that.

The Secretary had raised mobiles, Gorbachev continued. He understood there had been movement on that. To remove ambiguity, the Soviet side was ready to specify the number of mobile launchers and to specify limits on deployed and non-deployed ICBM’s.

With regard to verification, Gorbachev said, the Soviet side believed that the problem with respect to mobile missiles could be solved. He did not wish to go into the details. Soviet experts agreed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found.

The Secretary had spoken about SLCM’s, Gorbachev went on. The Soviet side did believe, as it had said in Washington, that this was a fundamental problem. If no solution were found it would devalue all the efforts of the two sides on START and ABM. It would make them pointless. He would use the fashionable word “compensation.” SLCM’s could be the start of a new arms race. He understood that the U.S. position was to agree there should be a specific limit on SLCM’s, but to doubt that it could be verified. But if the U.S. agreed to the concept of comprehensive verification, including national technical means, inspections, and limits on types of ships and submarines on which they were deployed, then the task of assuring effective verification could be accomplished. If two elements were combined—verification with the obligation of both sides to abide by and not violate the agreement, and access to production facilities, ships and submarines—then the problem could be resolved. If there were no such access this could be more difficult. Systems could be configured—with lead packaging, shielding—to make it more difficult. But that would not be good for an agreement. It would be deception.

To sum up, Gorbachev said, he saw good possibilities of moving forward, and doing so faster. Solutions were possible.

The Secretary said he welcomed Gorbachev’s comments that he saw things moving forward. He was uncertain about all the subtleties and complications. But he could see important strides in what Gorbachev had said.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on two questions Gorbachev had raised.

Returning to SLCM’s, the Secretary said that on-site inspection, at least in certain cases, and identification of types of ships and submarines both give us problems. We would have to think hard on this issue. We were prepared to set a number and live with it, but we were not at all confident about verification. However, we would keep working.

Gorbachev said “now you are afraid of verification.” Once the Soviet side has accepted a U.S. proposal, the U.S. side took it back. It was becoming almost a routine.

The Secretary said he did not know how Gorbachev’s navy was, but to ours the idea of people tramping around inside nuclear submarines was not attractive. We would keep working on the issue. Gorbachev said the Soviet navy was positively enthusiastic about the idea. Akhromeyev said the Soviet side’s missile people, the ICBM people, had resisted the idea of U.S. inspectors on their bases till the very end. But the Soviet Union had a government. The U.S. side also had people in power, but they did not seem to be able to break the resistance of the navy people. Gorbachev commented that there was after all a government (vlast’) in both the Soviet Union and the United States. Akhromeyev said the Soviet side had broken their land-based people, but the U.S. side could not break its sea-based people. Perhaps that was because the Secretary was a Marine. Gorbachev said he thought that was an old bias. The Secretary offered to turn the floor over to General Powell.

With reference to the proposal for an 1100 sublimit, the Secretary continued, the U.S. side had no desire to change the 4900 sublimit. It recognized that 4900 plus 1100 equalled 6000. This was an automatic regulator. If either side wanted more than 1100 warheads on heavy bombers and ALCM’s it would have to cut ICBM’s. There was an automatic tradeoff there that both sides recognized. But in discussing this with Shevardnadze the day before, it had come through to him that this was not the problem. It had seemed to him that the Soviet concern reflecting uneasiness [was?] with the rule for counting ALCM’s.

Gorbachev said that was another point that had not been discussed, but what the Secretary said was true. It seemed to him that there was added clarity on that question. The Secretary replied that the way the matter had been left was that there was more work to do on that counting rule. As that progressed and the Soviet side got more comfortable with it, the 1100 number would probably fade away. What he had gotten was that the counting rule problem had generated the new number. The U.S. side recognized that it would have work to do on it.

Gorbachev said that as far as ALCM’s were concerned there were two important elements. The first was the need for clarity on the long-agreed principle that long-range strategic cruise missiles were those with a range of over 600 km. The second was that we should agree to a specific number of cruise missiles for each type of aircraft, and, as the Secretary had said, that this should be within the 6000 warheads limit. He thought it was possible to reach an understanding on this. He did not see insurmountable obstacles to it.

The Secretary said that he agreed.

Gorbachev continued that nevertheless there were also new problems emerging. To deal with them the sides should add more experts, and make them work harder. The Secretary replied that the experience of the other treaty had shown that when one problem was solved, five more emerged. There needed to be an effort to put on more expert manpower and get them working intensively.

Gorbachev said he wished to repeat: it was his view, he was convinced, that if the sides began to work intensively right now, they could prepare good documents, good results, for the President’s visit. The Secretary said we were determined to do that, and the President was as determined as Gorbachev. When Shevardnadze came to Washington the Secretary would keep him up all night. Gorbachev said he would give Shevardnadze a big suitcase.

Shevardnadze said there had been a good discussion of nuclear testing. Gorbachev said it seemed to him solutions were possible in this area. He did not wish to lose time on it.

What worried him, Gorbachev continued, was the U.S. position on chemical weapons. Shevardnadze said it was his impression that the Secretary of State was worried about it too. The Secretary asked if Gorbachev were worried that the U.S. side was pushing too hard to get the job done.

Gorbachev recalled that the U.S. draft convention submitted in 1984 had called for complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union had later decided to join this, and do so in a big way. This had not been an easy step. Then, suddenly, Mrs. Thatcher’s enthusiasm had cooled. Then the Soviet side got information that this was as a result of a sign from Washington. Then the U.S. side’s enthusiasm had cooled too. The Soviet side knew there was a dog buried somewhere, as the saying went. It did not know whether it was buried in the White House, in the State Department, or in the Pentagon. What would the Secretary say to a proposal to prepare by the time of the Summit a substantive statement on a chemical weapons ban which expressed the determination of both countries to complete the agreement?

The Secretary said he would favor it.

Gorbachev said that perhaps he should appreciate this statement of welcome, since the Secretary was always talking about the difficulties and complexities of chemical weapons production banning. Perhaps the U.S. and the Soviet Union should designate one chemical weapons production facility where the verification procedures that had been developed could be tried.

The Secretary said that was the first time he had heard of that idea. He did not have a response, but it was an interesting idea. In general there was nothing like actually doing something. The managers might see if they could fool the inspectors. It did not seem to him a bad idea. He would probably be criticized for saying that.

Gorbachev said it seemed to him that with regard to the verification of nuclear testing they had walked around the problem for a long time. Then they had agreed to an exchange of inspectors, and now things seemed to be moving. If one sat around and said the road was difficult, that there were many hills to climb, one never climbed them.

The Secretary said he would cease to talk about the difficulties, and simply work on the problem. In all seriousness, he went on, he thought, and the President also thought, that the potential dangers of the spread of chemical weapons were immense. The genie had been in the bottle a long time, and now it was out. Unless we could do something in a comprehensive way, as we had with nuclear non-proliferation, the danger was great. We needed to get a handle on this some way.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary what else he would like to discuss.

The Secretary said the two sides had discussed conventional arms, and the desirability of getting negotiations going. Of course they would not be bilateral, but among the 23. The U.S. side would like to see that go forward. They would hear the report of the working group on this today. Gorbachev had also mentioned the topic in his book. He had nothing more to say on that subject, but wished to take note of it.

Gorbachev said he could only confirm the Soviet side’s interest in seeing the process take a tangible form. The longer the question of a mandate dragged out, the longer it was undecided, the more suggestions there would be from various quarters, especially the military-industrial complex, for compensation. That might start a new process that would be hard to curb. The U.S. side should bear in mind that the Soviet side wanted to work actively with it. It was important to be clear. The compensation approach was just not the right one.

The Secretary said that the two sides should go to work in Vienna. This was true for the mandate as such, but it was also true with regard to the importance of a balanced outcome among all elements of the CSCE process. There was a way to go. Let us work, he said; we should make some decisions. Gorbachev said, “Good.”

The Secretary reported that he and Shevardnadze had spent all night on regional issues.⁵ He thought it was the most thorough discussion on them they had ever had. He could not say he felt there had been any particular outcome, but there had been a good exploration, a further maturation of the two sides’ discussions. For instance, this was true on Angola and Cambodia, where there was possibly promising follow-up.

The Secretary said he would be interested in Gorbachev’s reactions to the discussion on the Iran-Iraq war and on Afghanistan. He had told Shevardnadze that he welcomed Gorbachev’s statement on Afghanistan, which presented some perspectives. We wanted Geneva to be the last round, to end the laborious process. As that happens people seek assurances, including the U.S. side, and he had tried to explain that in detail. He would welcome Gorbachev’s views, including his views on the Middle East, to which, for better or worse, he was heading.

Gorbachev said the Secretary and Shevardnadze had found a good time, in the dark of night, to discuss somber issues.

Gorbachev said he would first like to make a general comment to help the two sides understand what role there was for efforts to resolve regional conflicts. The first thing he wished to say was that the Soviet Union and the U.S. should give the whole world an example of how to cooperate on these issues. If they did conflicts could be resolved. But it would be necessary to be less one-sided, to take account of the interests of all parties. The Secretary said he agreed with that.

Gorbachev continued that under any other approach conflicts could not be resolved. He was saying that because he could still see mistrust on the part of the Americans. The U.S. side did not trust the sincere Soviet desire to cooperate to help resolve very painful conflicts. Perhaps this resulted from the fact that it had been mistrusting the Soviet Union for a long time. Probably this resulted from the NSC attitude. According to information he had received, at the NSC there was still the attitude that the Soviet Union was today and would be tomorrow a country with which the U.S. would clash. If that was the approach it would be hard to get solutions.

The fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were present everywhere in the world could however be interpreted very differently, Gorbachev went on. As he had said to the Secretary and also said publicly, he had drawn the conclusion that we were in a sense locked together, and should cooperate. He thought that this approach made it possible to find solutions to problems. It was a conceptual approach, but it was valid for finding solutions.

Let us see how it works with regard to Afghanistan, Gorbachev continued. He had brought to Washington and conveyed first to the American side the Soviet plan of action. He had asked for American cooperation to resolve this very painful problem. The Soviet side had also taken into account the American side’s suggestion that it was necessary to complete the Geneva agreements without waiting for the formation of a coalition government, without linking these two things. The U.S. side had said that a coalition government could not be created with bayonets; the Soviet side had agreed.

The conversation in Washington on that matter did not turn out well, Gorbachev went on. The Soviet side had believed that the situation around Afghanistan was one on which the two countries could cooperate, could give an example of how to approach such conflicts. In order to push the U.S. side he had made his statement. Now the U.S. side had begun to move.

Now, said Gorbachev, it seemed that some things which had been agreed should be dropped. If both sides wanted a neutral and independent Afghanistan, if both sides believed that the Afghans themselves should discuss and decide their government, what was unacceptable in what he had said?

The Secretary should see, Gorbachev continued, that after the agreements were signed the possibilities of both sides for influencing things in Afghanistan would become more limited. After his statement it had already become harder for the Soviet side to talk to its friends in Afghanistan. Each was thinking of his own interest. That was natural.

But the Soviet side still thought the U.S. had a role to play, Gorbachev said. It welcomed that. The U.S. side had wanted the Soviet side to declare it would withdraw, to set a date. That had now been done. He welcomed the Secretary’s statement hoping that the next Geneva round would be the last. But the Soviet side could not dance to the changing moods of the parties there. The matter was too important. The Soviet Union could not dance a polka with any of the parties. Yet even now there were some who were impudent enough—he used the word—to say that the Soviet Union was announcing withdrawal for propaganda purposes.

The Secretary said that did not include the American side. It took what Gorbachev had said at face value. Shevardnadze had told him what was intended six months before, and he had been confident ever since.

Gorbachev said he wished to reiterate that in Afghanistan the Soviet Union had no intention of creating a bridgehead, or a base, or a road to warm seas. That was nonsense. It had never had such plans, and did not now. He could assure the Secretary of that. So he had one request, one thing to communicate. He requested the U.S. side to work to facilitate the early signing of the Geneva agreements, and to work on implementation of them to make Afghanistan neutral, non-aligned and independent. Both sides should work on that. The best thing would be for implementation to be bloodless.

Gorbachev suggested they turn to the Middle East. The Secretary said that before that he would like to say a word on Afghanistan. He would not repeat to Gorbachev what he had told Shevardnadze about our concerns over the Geneva process, which we wanted to see work well. We had changed our mind from what had been said in Washington about the difficulties of forming a coalition government. Gorbachev interrupted to say that government would not be formed in Moscow, or in Washington, much less in Pakistan. The Soviet side was now finding out about contacts among the Afghans themselves of which it had been unaware. It would not as simple as all that. But it was necessary to be realistic.

The Secretary suggested that they go on to Iran-Iraq.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary to tell the President he hoped the two countries would be able to cooperate on resolution of the Afghan problem.

On the Iran-Iraq problem, Gorbachev said, the Soviet side had been making efforts to see ways to resolve the problem. It had seen some new elements of cooperation emerging between our two countries, both bilaterally and in the Security Council, and welcomed that. It believed this was important both for the specifics of the problem and for future prospects in the Security Council, and valued this. It thought this should not fade away. It was ready to cooperate in the next stage as well.

At the same time, Gorbachev went on, it seemed to the Soviet side that differences were emerging in the Security Council, also between other members. The Soviet side had not failed during its Presidency; it was up to the U.S. side to be successful during its Presidency. The Soviet side would see what it could do to help.

The Secretary said he had spoken the day before about a little different approach. There had been no agreement on it, but it was somewhat different. The U.S. side had been thinking of a second or follow-up resolution that would have three components instead of just one:

—As now, a mandatory arms embargo against the non-compliant country, Iran. There were also two new ideas:

—An effective date would be set at some time in the future, 30 days or so. Thirty days might not be right, but we were thinking of some date, perhaps thirty.

—We would ask the Secretary General to form a special negotiating group, or name a special emissary, in any case some such device, which would focus the full attention of someone other than the Secretary General on the issue, seeing that he has so many other duties. This negotiating element would be new. The negotiator would have a date to work against. We would know that he could come back to the Security Council before the date if he chose. He could say that he was making headway on this or that aspect, and the date could be postponed if he chose. He would have that tool. This idea came out of the discussions of the day before.

Dobrynin interjected that this was more flexible.

Gorbachev said the two sides should discuss all possibilities between them. The idea was new to the Soviet side in that kind of interconnection. The U.S. side could assume that the Soviet side would try to make a constructive contribution in that connection. It believed in something very important which he had said to the President: let us seek to ensure that the conflict did not spread in a more dramatic way to many countries. The Soviet side was for consistent steps, but they needed to be carefully thought out.

Gorbachev asked if the U.S. had considered the possibility of some step to reduce its presence in the Gulf, or did it fear that such a step would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. He thought the task the U.S. side had set for itself could be accomplished with fewer warships.

The Secretary said the task the U.S. set for itself had remained constant, and had been successfully accomplished. The U.S. side had recently reduced two capital ships and reconfigured its force to reflect the changing situation. What had changed was not the task but our estimate of what was needed to accomplish it. The U.S. side had no desire to keep its presence at anything like the present scale. It would like to reduce that presence. He asked Admiral [General] Powell to comment.

General Powell said Shevardnadze had raised this issue, and this had given him the occasion to point out that only two additional combatant ships had figured in our buildup over the previous eight months. Most of the force consisted of minesweepers and carriers that constituted no offensive threat. They were intended to face the mine operations threat we were most concerned about. We now knew that threat better, and that was why the previous week we had announced our adjustment. We hoped to go further as the threat was reduced, and as we understood the threat better.

Gorbachev joked that the Iran-Iraq war continued, but for the time being our discussion of it had ended. The two sides had agreed they should continue to consult. The Iranian problem was also present in the Afghanistan problem, he remarked. It had to be carefully weighed. The Secretary commented that it was also present in the Middle East problem, as they had discussed the previous night. Gorbachev said that was correct. It seemed that the Iranians wanted fundamentalists to prevail in forming the government in Afghanistan, and not only there. The Secretary said they were probably willing to take over the Kremlin, and joked “Welcome to Washington.” Gorbachev replied that he did not really think they could take over either the Kremlin or Washington, though they might be praying for that.

Turning to the Middle East, Gorbachev said the Soviet side had examined the new American suggestions, based on what it had received from Ambassador Matlock and communications from those Arabs with whom the American side had talked. He first of all welcomed the fact that there was some process—a weak one, but still a process—of cooperation, seeking to resolve this old international problem.

The Soviet side had waited for the U.S. side to reach the important conclusion that without Soviet participation the problem would be difficult to resolve. He believed he could find points of convergence in the efforts to resolve it. The Soviet side wanted a fair solution that took into account the interests of the Arabs, of Israel and of the Palestinians. It did not think that an approach which ignored the interests of any of the parties would work. He thought that was in a way the basis of the U.S. approach. There were perhaps some differences, but generally that seemed to be the way. One could not ignore the interests of any party. It was in that light that people looked at the proposals the U.S. side was now putting forward.

And the fact was, Gorbachev continued, that many people thought that despite the elements of flexibility the proposals seemed based on the old approach of using the conference idea as a cover for separate agreements among a limited number of countries. For example, Syria was left out. There remained in the proposals a negative attitude toward the resolution of the Palestinian issue and toward the PLO. Everyone had noticed that.

Gorbachev continued that if, on the one hand, this was a proposal to seek a truce, to relax current tensions, to have the West Bank and Gaza issues linked to efforts for an overall settlement, people would understand. If not, it would be something quite different. The Soviet side had also proposed a preparatory meeting for a conference, that would permit both multilateral and bilateral efforts. People understood that. But if there were just to be talks to provide cover for separate deals of the Camp David type, people would know this and be against it. They knew that Camp David was dead. It would not lead to a useful end result. That was why so many had doubts.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary how he envisioned things going. The proposals he had formulated seemed very vague. Perhaps that was deliberate. Perhaps they were not thought through, or perhaps that was deliberate. But there was confusion. He suggested to the Secretary that before he go to the area he think them through. Because if the U.S. were to join the Soviet Union’s and the U.S.’s allies, for instance in looking for a general political settlement—of course there could be interim settlements and steps—then that would be one thing, that could open a path in the Middle East. But if the goal was to ease tensions in order to pacify the Arabs, to take the edge off, then the effort to extinguish the flames could hardly be supported by the Soviet side.

The Soviet side was ready to seek solutions that were in the interests of all, Gorbachev said. Points of convergence could emerge. The Soviet side was ready to cooperate. He thought the Secretary should go on to complete the document that had been shown to the Soviet side.

The Secretary said he would like to make a few comments.

He said that our sense was that procedures—both the international conference and bilateral procedures—had reached the point of sterility because they did not contain enough substance. The day before he had gotten the sense that the Soviet side agreed. So the approach the U.S. side had taken was to identify the general outlines of a settlement that might be accepted, and on that basis to try to get a chain of international and bilateral negotiations going. People might be ready to enter who were not ready now, because they could then feel more comfortable about the substance. That was the essence of the idea.

The Secretary continued that we now want to see all the issues of concern to people up on the table promptly, within the year, including things that could change the situation immediately, or at least over a short period, and things having to do with the so-called final status. He had to say that this notion was sharply different from the Camp David concept. We believed that the touchstone of the final status had to be Resolutions 242 and 338.⁶

As the U.S. side conceived it, the Secretary went on, if the parties agreed the process could be kicked off by an international conference. Such an event, under the right circumstances, ought to happen promptly. The U.S. side believed that Israel had to be ready to sit down with each of its neighbors, not just with Jordan but also with Syria, with Lebanon—with Egypt it already had a peace treaty—and that the Palestinians had to be included in negotiations directly, in the context, we believed, of a joint delegation with Jordan, to negotiate about the West Bank and Gaza. In the U.S. view the PLO as such had disqualified itself by its advocacy of violence and of the elimination of the State of Israel. As he had said many times, the U.S. was ready for dialogue with the PLO when it changed its position on that matter.

The Secretary continued that he planned to go to the Middle East after returning to Washington to report to the President on his conversations in Moscow, initially for four or five days. He would see what the reactions were. The people there always wanted him to come, and he had always been reluctant to go. Once he had said he was coming they had all told him why it would not work. Each immediately staked out his extreme positions, at a minimum to make a point. They knew it, but did not realize it in their gut.

But, as Gorbachev had said, it was impossible to impose solutions on others. Israel was finding that out, as others had found it out in other situations.

So, the Secretary concluded, by the time Shevardnadze came to Washington he would have visited the Middle East, and Shamir would have been to Washington. Either then or before, if there were pertinent information the U.S. side would consult further on this matter.

Gorbachev said he thought the present situation in the Middle East was unique. Internally people there understood the fact that a way out must be found. And in the international community there was virtual unanimity in favor of an international conference. There was no other realistic forum. Therefore some steps to normalize the situation were eagerly awaited. He believed that some steps were possible if they took into account—and he wanted to stress this—all parties. He asked why Syria and the Golan Heights had been omitted from the U.S. proposals.

The Secretary said that they had not been.

Gorbachev said he would not argue in favor of an international conference; he knew the U.S. side’s suspicions would not calm down. But because there was no acceptance of a conference in the U.S. proposals, even their positive parts seemed doubtful to some people, based on what Ambassador Matlock and the Arabs had told the Soviets.

Gorbachev said he welcomed the Secretary’s visit to the area. The visit of a U.S. Secretary of State could always be useful. It would provide an opportunity for them to tell their concerns to the Secretary, and for him to explain his thoughts to them. Perhaps there could be fruitful next steps. He was positive toward the Secretary’s visit, but he asked the Secretary to take his initial judgment into account.

The Secretary said he thought Gorbachev’s stress on taking the interests of all parties into account was right, was a wise observation.

Gorbachev said the Soviet side was ready for exchanges of views on this. It would try to make a constructive contribution. He invited the U.S. side to get rid of its suspicious attitude toward the Soviet Union and its policies in the Middle East. He believed the concept—that the U.S. had to have clashes with the Soviet Union in all latitudes and longitudes—should be abandoned. He believed the two countries should seek common approaches. For 45 years they had tried to build policies based on opposition. They should try for the next 40 or 50 years to build on the possibilities for cooperation. That would really change the world.

The Secretary said an important element of this should be exchanges on the shape of the future, trends in the economic, technological, military and political areas. He had no crystal ball, but he thought we needed, to coin a phrase, new thinking. If it was applied it might show the nature of our interests to be a little different from what it had been thought to be.

Gorbachev said he thought it was now a realistic possibility to discuss how to harmonize the interests of states. This was even true for the developed countries. At first glance it seemed unacceptable, since it seemed to mean someone would stick hands in their pockets, as they were used to doing to others. But that was only at first glance. If one looked more profoundly it was definitely true that all developed countries had a stake in seeing the process evolve on all continents, because the accumulation of economic and social problems could strike a heavy blow at the developed countries, and destroy the system of communication they had established. The Secretary said he agreed with that.

Gorbachev said the fact that we were seeking harmonizing did not mean international equalization, the creation of a drab and equal world. But all were interconnected, and needed to seek ways to harmonize on an international basis. He had tried to set this forth in an article timed for the last UNGA session. Perhaps things could continue as they were for twenty or thirty years, but that would be a huge mistake. We needed to understand that it was time to gather stones, as the saying went.

If she heard that portion of the conversation, Gorbachev went on, Mrs. Thatcher would say he was indulging in dreams and illusions. But he believed what he said was true, and that this had to be tackled. It was not dreams but the imperative of the times. If we could not devise adequate mechanisms for dealing with them we were in for a lot of trouble. The house would develop cracks and shatter. In fact, in many developed country international organizations that process was underway. It would be painful, but solutions could be found. In the recent EC meeting the Federal Republic had had to contribute 20 billion DM to solve common problems. The Secretary said Mrs. Thatcher had needed a better deal, and gotten it. Gorbachev said he knew that.

Gorbachev suggested that the two sides try to give some impetus to the work by having U.S. and Soviet scientists work on international problems, devise some kind of solution in that area. Some efforts were underway in the UN, but they would take a long time. A bilateral approach was better, and for that matter Soviet scientists were already working on these problems under instructions. The U.S. had completed the Senate hearings on the fate of the Soviet Union and had its conclusions. Now it should turn to these economic problems.

The Secretary said he had no doubt many would be glad for a chance to hear Soviet views and advance ours. We were doing this in two fora. The first was our planning talks. One round had taken place in Moscow, another would take place soon in Washington. The second was our Joint Commercial Commission. In the session with Ryzhkov that morning, a suggestion had been made.⁷ Ryzhkov had suggested that the two sides find some aspects of economic relations they could develop and turn into something suitable for the Summit. There was a bandwagon, and the political side was rolling, but the economic side was not going quite so fast, and Ryzhkov wanted to hook onto the bandwagon. That was an interesting idea, and, the Secretary said, he would take it up with Secretary of Commerce Verity, who would be coming to Moscow the following month, to see what could be done.

Gorbachev said the U.S. side had not decided how to act in that area of the relationship, and it was not allowing other Western countries to act in that direction. But he believed the idea of a consortium was interesting. The Secretary noted that Ryzhkov had mentioned it too. He said Ryzhkov was an impressive and interesting man. He had had three sessions with Ryzhkov, and all had been useful. Gorbachev said he was pleased to hear that. He thought it could allow the Secretary to do away as soon as possible with the approach of seeing the Soviet Union personalized in one person. At the same time, he did believe that it was consistent with Soviet political philosophy to say it was pointless to deny the contribution of individuals, including political people.

Moreover, Gorbachev went on, perestroika was generalizing⁸ new forces, new people, in the political, economic, cultural spheres. An interesting point had been made to him by Indian Ambassador Kaul. He said he had been asking around Moscow what perestroika meant, and was getting confused. But then he went to provincial towns, where things were on their way, and then it was clear. Whereas in the West the information was that the Soviet leadership was split, that perestroika was threatened, that the military was unhappy and would one day slap the table. The Secretary said jovially that he thought the military-industrial complex ran everything, that that was the explanation. Gorbachev said “like in your country.”

The Secretary said he had found it important to get visitors to go beyond New York and Washington. Gorbachev replied that everyone said that to see America you had to go across America. Shevardnadze said he hoped to get to Boston on his next trip. Gorbachev said he should go to Princeton. He himself remembered the fine young people from Princeton at the Secretary’s luncheon in Washington. The Secretary said they were from Yale, the rivals.

Gorbachev said his visit to Washington had been an important event. It had generated many hopes in the Soviet Union and the world. It seemed that those who had been saying that if the U.S. and the Soviet Union could do something it would have a good impact were right. This impression was growing. The two sides should push on.

Gorbachev asked the Secretary to convey his regards to the President and all members of his cabinet. He was ready to reciprocate the great attention he had received in Washington. Of course the content of the visit would be very important. This was unavoidable. It meant work, work, and more work. The Secretary and Shevardnadze had begun working a 24-hour schedule. They would have to go over to a 48-hour schedule.

The Secretary said the President had asked him to give Gorbachev his regards, and to say he was looking forward to coming. He shared the view that the visit should accomplish as much substantive progress on all aspects of the relationship as possible. Gorbachev said he welcomed that, and shared the view.

The Secretary told Akhromeyev that he was serving as a mailman for Admiral Crowe, who had asked him to give Akhromeyev a letter if he saw him.⁹ Akhromeyev thanked the Secretary.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons on February 23. The meeting took place in the Kremlin.
2. See Documents 132–139.
3. Reference is to the “Joint Statement on the Soviet-United States Summit Meeting,” December 10, 1987. (Public Papers: Reagan , 1987, Book II, pp. 1491–1497)
4. Documents relating to Akhromeyev’s conversations at the December 1987 Washington Summit are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XI, START I, 1981–1991.
5. See Document 123.
6. See footnote 4, Document 44.
7. See Document 124.
8. An unknown hand crossed out “generalizing” and wrote “generating” above it.
9. Not found.