Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

123. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 8:45 p.m.–1:10 a.m.

SUBJECTS

• Conventional Arms, Regional Issues (Central America, Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, Angola, Cambodia, Korea, Middle East)

Participants

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • National Security Advisor Powell
  • Under Secretary Armacost
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Oakley
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnyak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Shevardnadze Counselor Tarasenko
  • USA Department Deputy Chief Mamedov (Notetaker)
  • (MFA Interpeter)

Conventional Forces

SHEVARDNADZE opened the session by suggesting a brief discussion of conventional weapons. THE SECRETARY invited him to proceed.

SHEVARDNADZE indicated that the Soviet approach was based on what Moscow considered to be the President’s and Gorbachev’s instructions at the Washington summit to intensify efforts to find solutions to the problems of conventional arms control. This was a complex area, but Shevardnadze wanted to single out one problem—the most important one.

Briefly reviewing the development of the Soviet position on the place of short range nuclear weapons in discussions on a European conventional arms mandate, Shevardnadze proposed that U.S.–Soviet bilateral groups be established to develop a mutually acceptable formula. This, he pointed out, would enable negotiators in Geneva to reach closure on a mandate, so that substantive preparations could get under way. Shevardnadze knew that NATO would be meeting at the summit level the following week; Shevardnadze would be meeting with Warsaw Pact foreign ministers in Prague February 23–24. It would be well if the U.S. and Soviet Union could take/outline a common approach to the problem in these fora. Shevardnadze suggested that the matter be either referred to Vienna or to a special working group.

THE SECRETARY said that DAS Charles Thomas of his delegation would be prepared to review whatever the Soviet side had in mind. He noted that big conceptual differences remained between the U.S. and Soviet positions on how to treat battlefield nuclear weapons. Nor was that the whole story. We continued to insist on the need for a balanced outcome at the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference. Amb. Schifter was working on these issues. So perhaps Thomas could listen and the matter could be reviewed before the Secretary left. The Secretary asked Powell to comment.

POWELL noted that, as an infantry officer and former commander of the 5th U.S. Corps in Germany (“the finest in all NATO”), he was always interested when the subject of conventional forces came up. He had had to cope with the problem of asymmetries in Europe from the viewpoint of a corps commander. For the moment, however, the discussion might best be referred to working groups.

SHEVARDNADZE commented that, while further discussion was necessary, what was needed was closure on a mandate. The Soviet side was prepared to address the question of asymmetries. As Gorbachev had said in Washington, the Soviets were prepared to lay their cards on the table.

THE SECRETARY observed that it was good that Defense Ministers and Chiefs of Staff were now talking. That would be an important contribution to our bilateral dialogue. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was no accident; it reflected the level the relationship had achieved. Such contacts were unprecedented. THE SECRETARY noted that it was just one of many examples of new thinking. To general laughter, SHEVARDNADZE, in a reference to the Secretary’s luncheon toast, quipped that he was aware that the U.S. had had new thinking for 200 years.

Regional Overview

Shevardnadze then suggested that the conversation turn to regional matters, asking the Secretary to lead off.

THE SECRETARY said he thought the two sides could take some encouragement from the fact that their regional dialogue seemed of late better to be coming to grips with the issues.

The Secretary had read with great interest General Secretary Gorbachev’s February 8 statement on Afghanistan,² and had noted Gorbachev’s observation that “regional conflicts are bleeding wounds,” not only for the nations involved, but for the wider international community. This was a very pertinent observation. We shared the General Secretary’s analysis. In fact, the President in 1985 had put forth similar ideas.

So, the Secretary continued, we were on a good track. We agreed that national reconciliation was the key to solving most regional conflicts. But this goal was elusive when foreign troops remained deployed in countries against the will of a significant segment of the people of those countries. Outside powers could encourage national reconciliation, but they could not impose solutions. In helping to create the necessary conditions for such solutions, the verified removal of foreign military forces and restraint on the flow of outside arms were key factors. And in some cases, proscribing by agreement the establishment of foreign military bases or foreign deployments of military forces could contribute to promoting national reconciliation and remove local areas of conflict from the contention of foreign powers. Finally, the U.S. and Soviet Union had to be ready, as part of the international community, to think about international efforts at refugee resettlement, reconstruction and development.

The Secretary reiterated that the U.S. welcomed Gorbachev’s pledge that the Soviet Union would spare no effort to resolve regional conflicts. He assured Shevardnadze that the U.S. would be prepared to do its part, because Gorbachev was profoundly correct in identifying such conflicts as the underlying source of wider tension—a point on which Gorbachev and President Reagan had agreed in Geneva.

While in Moscow, the Secretary hoped he would have the opportunity to discuss every issue on the regional agenda. In many, there appeared to be a more fluid, looser situation than a year ago. It would be up to the ministers to see what advantage could be taken of that. The Secretary believed that, while some of the issues were still very tough, the ministers’ own relationship had developed to the point that they could talk candidly about the realities they saw, about what each side was or was not prepared to do to foster concrete solutions. It was in that spirit that the Secretary had come to Moscow.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that a new atmosphere seemed to be pervading the regional dialogue. New situations seemed to be emerging which raised the possibility of real progress and concrete solutions. The Secretary was correct in identifying a new trend toward national reconciliation—a new harmony. That trend was evident in Afghanistan, but also in Kampuchea, where Sihanouk and Hun Sen were deepening their dialogue. There were also hopeful signs in Central America and Southern Africa. So the growth of a trend toward national reconciliation was one positive element.

A second was a stronger role for the U.N., and particularly the Security Council, in the resolution of regional conflicts. The Afghanistan settlement which was beginning to come into view would not have been possible without the efforts of the personal representative of the Secretary General. While his efforts had as yet produced no spectacular successes, the Secretary General was actively involved in the search for an end to the Iran-Iraq war, and was becoming more active with respect to Southern Africa.

A third positive factor was the greater activity of regional powers. This trend was most pronounced in Central America and Southeast Asia, but also, to a lesser degree, in Southern Africa. With respect to the Iran-Iraq war, the weight of regional states had also made itself felt. This was an interesting and encouraging trend.

Fourth was the growing importance of U.S.-Soviet cooperation in dealing with regional conflicts. Both sides understood that they could not be the “lawgivers” of the planet. But the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship was an important factor in the international environment. The signing of the INF agreement in December had had an impact throughout the entire planet.

These four trends created conditions, Shevardnadze continued, for real solutions to regional problems. The Secretary was correct that there were many converging views between the two sides. It was important not to miss the opportunity to harness all constructive forces in seeking an end to regional conflicts around the globe.

Central America

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze’s analysis was apt. On Central America—which Shevardnadze cited as an example of cooperation among the Contadora countries, we had been encouraged by the emergence of a dialogue among the five Central American presidents themselves, as opposed to the wider Contadora forum. The Secretary suggested taking up each region in turn.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, proposing that, since the Secretary had mentioned Central America, the discussion begin there. The Soviets, for their part, had noted U.S. statements of support for the Guatemala Agreement, and considered them important. Shevardnadze recalled Gorbachev’s offer in Washington to cease Soviet military aid to Nicaragua if the U.S. would do the same for states hostile to Nicaragua’s government. Perhaps the concept was not “popular” in Washington, but Moscow felt it was worth exploring.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Congress had declined to provide support for the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. The U.S. was thus out of that business. If the Soviet Union would also leave the field, with respect to the Nicaraguan government, it would be well for all concerned.

SHEVARDNADZE quipped that perhaps the two sides should draw up a paper. THE SECRETARY said unilateral declarations would be better.

In a more serious vein, SHEVARDNADZE said that the Congress was one thing—the Administration another. THE SECRETARY pointed out that the Administration could do nothing without appropriations. SHEVARDNADZE asked if Moscow should deal directly with Congress in that case.

THE SECRETARY suggested that the two turn to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan

The Secretary expressed the U.S. view that a real opportunity had emerged for a political resolution. Afghanistan was an important issue in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. It would have a dramatic impact were withdrawals to begin by the time of the President’s trip to Moscow, as the General Secretary had hinted. This would be very positive. Both the U.S. and Pakistan fully supported the Geneva process and had said so publicly. We hoped that the next round would be the last.

Two issues, the Secretary explained, now needed to be faced: completing the Geneva agreements; and facilitating a comprehensive settlement.

On the first set of issues, the task was to fill in the remaining blanks in the Geneva instruments. These involved timing and modalities of Soviet withdrawal.

With respect to a timetable, we had been encouraged by the General Secretary’s willingness to speak in terms of less than a year. We had noted previous statements setting the goal for a complete withdrawal by the end of 1988. We believed this should remain the goal. A short timetable would facilitate negotiation of subsequent phases and make withdrawal easier.

We also welcomed the Soviet acceptance of the principles of phasing and frontloading, and now needed to nail down the details. The Pakistanis had proposed that fifty percent of the Soviet force withdraw in the first three months of the withdrawal period. We supported that, and understood that Moscow might be considering a quarter of their troops in each of the three next three month periods. Such a schedule would make sense.

We also believed it essential that substantial troop movements begin immediately when the agreement entered into force, and that preparations for withdrawals—such as assembly in staging areas—be observable between signing and entry into force. The Secretary suggested that the Soviets might want to drop a figure—perhaps 20,000 troops—to be moved out during the first week or two, or at least before the summit meeting. This would give an important sense of irreversibility to the process.

The areas the Secretary had mentioned, he said, were important because the obligations to be undertaken by Pakistan and the U.S. were frontloaded. Were we to act as guarantor, we needed to be able to reassure the American public that there would be no “partial troop withdrawal.”

Also important was the concept of a military standdown. Soviet experts had said, and we agreed, that such an arrangement could expedite the troop withdrawal process. We had noted Soviet statements that during the withdrawal period Soviet troops would engage in no military operations, except to defend themselves against direct attack. Both sides should work to ensure the effectiveness of such arrangements. Recent statements by resistance chief Khalis suggested that the resistance was willing to work with the Soviets to set up ceasefires. A shorter timetable, frontloading and a standdown would make it easier to elicit resistance cooperation. A U.N. monitoring force might also have a role to play.

With respect to refugee resettlement, a major goal of the agreement was to create conditions conducive to the return of the refugees. Beyond careful implementation of Instrument III, this would require massive supplies of foodstuffs, seeds, agricultural implements, and other non-military humanitarian assistance.³ For that reason, the U.S. intended to continue furnishing humanitarian aid to refugees in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Indeed, this was a burden which should be widely shared, and we assumed that the Soviet Union would do its part.

Moreover, the Secretary pointed out, it appeared that concern over the refugee resettlement question lay behind President Zia’s having recently focused on the question of interim government arrangements. The Secretary recalled that, during the Washington summit, the U.S. had argued that linking this question to Soviet withdrawals would complicate matters. Now the Soviet Union had, in fact, delinked the two issues. But Zia had, apparently, reestablished a linkage.

It was important to recognize, nonetheless, that in so doing Zia had obtained something positive from the resistance—consideration of an interim government which would include representatives from the current regime. It was also our understanding that the resistance were prepared to have such a government sign the Geneva accords. It was not yet clear that it would be possible to establish an acceptable interim government, but the effort was worth making.

The Secretary next indicated he wished to raise an issue which the two sides had not discussed before: the cessation of Soviet military aid to the Kabul regime once an agreement entered into effect. This issue loomed larger as closure in Geneva became imminent. The key to promoting stability, should an agreement be reached, would be to avoid actions that would encourage continued warfare or complicate the search for international reconciliation. For its part, the U.S. was prepared to cease military aid upon the entry into force of a satisfactory Geneva agreement.

Noting that the Declaration of Guarantees under discussion in Geneva obliged guarantors to “invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan,” the Secretary said that the U.S. assumed that Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan constituted such interference. Perhaps this was not an issue, but it would be well to be clear about it. We assumed that both guarantors would cease military assistance once an agreement came into force.

This was important to us, as it would create a symmetrical situation with respect to the guarantees the two sides would undertake on non-interference, including military assistance. It would be impossible domestically for us to sell an asymmetrical arrangement on this point. In this regard, we had noted Marshal Akhromeyev’s remark that Soviet troops would withdraw with their equipment, and knew of First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov’s statement to the Pakistanis that Kabul had all the military resources it needed. The Secretary welcomed the spirit of those statements, and emphasized that Soviet assurance that military deliveries to Kabul would cease with the commencement of withdrawals would be an important element in the overall picture.

In conclusion, the Secretary said that he would welcome Shevardnadze’s reactions and views. The U.S. wanted to do all it could to make the next round in Geneva the last one, and to enable the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan as Gorbachev had proposed.

SHEVARDNADZE opened his remarks by quipping that he wondered what Vorontsov and Armacost had been up to.

This was not, the Foreign Minister said, the first time that he and the Secretary had discussed Afghanistan. As a party directly involved there, the Soviet Union had a strong stake in resolving the problem as quickly as possible. Shevardnadze could once again assure the Secretary on the instructions of the Soviet leadership that a final decision had been made to withdraw.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had believed him when he told him that during their September, 1987 meeting in Washington. He did not doubt it. The question which had to be addressed was, “how”?

SHEVARDNADZE said that in any complex process, there were distinct phases. The same was so for Afghanistan. At the present, the most important task was to complete the Geneva talks. Otherwise, prospects for a settlement could become quite different. All kinds of unforseeable options could emerge if no solution were possible.

The U.S. was well aware of the agreements which were emerging as a result of the Geneva process. That process had been going on for five years with the participation of the Afghan and Pakistani governments. Only one document—dealing with the withdrawal of Soviet forces—remained to be agreed. The Soviet Union had now clarified its position. The precise number of months of the timetable was not an important issue. The Soviet and Afghan governments had reached an agreement on this point. Shevardnadze agreed that it would be ideal if it proved possible to begin implementation of a Geneva agreement by the time of the President’s visit to Moscow. That was the spirit in which the Soviets had made their decision; that was an important factor in the dates they had chosen. The most important factor was that the President was coming. Withdrawals should have started by then.

THE SECRETARY noted that this point had not been lost on us.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that it seemed to him that the U.S. and Soviet Union now needed to join forces to bring the Geneva process to a successful conclusion. Anything which complicated the process should be set aside. For if the process did not come to a successful conclusion, other options might emerge. The Soviet plan was therefore linked to the next round in Geneva. If closure was reached and an agreement signed, Soviet forces would begin pulling out as planned. As to the precise timing of the withdrawal, that was a prerogative of the Soviet and Afghan governments, in accordance with the agreement which they had reached.

THE SECRETARY asked if Shevardnadze would not pass on relevant details of the agreement.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that, once the Geneva talks had reached a conclusion, the U.S. and other interested parties could be informed on the numbers, strength and other elements relating to the withdrawal. It was hard to describe such factors in detail without solving the basic problem. The General Secretary had said, however, that Moscow was ready and willing to withdraw the major portion of Soviet forces during an initial phase, if circumstances permitted.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that the U.S. needed more detailed information to be able to decide whether any agreement which might be reached was satisfactory. We assumed that we would receive the information we needed to make that call.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that agreement would be reached in Geneva on the timetable for Soviet withdrawal. There was already agreement that the major portion of the troops would be removed during an initial phase. As to specific numbers, phases, etc., these would become clear once agreement had been reached in Geneva.

As for Zia, he seemed to be looking at a variety of options. He talked about creating a new government, but no one had any idea how such an effort could succeed. The task was complicated; there were many factors. But if he really wanted Soviet forces to withdraw, this could be achieved through bringing the Geneva process to conclusion.

Shevardnadze recalled that at one point he had called on the U.S. to lend support to efforts to form a coalition government in Afghanistan. Even then, there had been doubts in Moscow that this was feasible. Now there was no alternative to completing the Geneva process. If the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Pakistan stayed out of the way, the Afghans would settle their own affairs. The Afghans were tired of war; the refugees wanted to return home. They would find a solution. But if the U.S. and Soviet Union or Pakistan sought to impose a new government, it would be nothing more or less than interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.

As for the refugee question, Shevardnadze questioned the notion that the Kabul government could not establish the necessary conditions for resettlement. The refugees’ return was the key to any settlement. An entire instrument in Geneva was devoted to the issue. It provided the guarantees necessary to encourage the return of all refugees—even Hekhmatyar⁴ and other fundamentalists.

As for aid to the refugees, Shevardnadze thought it would be well for the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to coordinate thinking on the matter. The Soviet Union was ready to do its part. 100,000 refugees had already come home, and Moscow was helping with their resettlement. The U.S. could also play a role. So the question of the refugees was not hopeless, as the instrument on refugees made clear.

THE SECRETARY asked if the Soviets visualized a role for the UNHCR. That seemed to the Secretary a pretty good concept.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that it was not a bad concept. This was a channel which could be used. But government channels should not be ruled out—whether the government was a coalition government, a transition government, an interim government, or what have you.

THE SECRETARY asked for clarification that it was the Soviet position that the UNHCR could serve as a channel for refugee relief assistance, that aid could also flow through the government—interim or otherwise, and that it could also go directly to groups in Afghanistan. There were a variety of possibilities.

SHEVARDNADZE replied only that, at this point, there was no agreement on the final instrument. The implementation of the various elements of the agreement remained to be discussed. These issues could be addressed without delay once the Geneva process reached closure.

Turning to the Secretary’s points on terminating Soviet military assistance to the Kabul regime, Shevardnadze said that the question of the disposition of Soviet military equipment in Afghanistan would also be addressed once agreement had been reached in Geneva. Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan and the Soviet Union undertook to do certain things, and the U.S. undertook certain guarantees. If one now sought to break up what had already been achieved, the Soviet side might have to revise its position on withdrawal. The work in Geneva had been underway for five years. There was provision in the instruments for all “everything.” Pakistan, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. had undertaken certain commitments. There could be no retreat from this.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that SHEVARDNADZE had not addressed the issues he had raised on military assistance.

SHEVARDNADZE said he had difficulty in doing so. It was not possible to ignore the fact that the Kabul regime was a legitimate government with which the Soviet Union had certain agreements and, thereby, certain responsibilities. Since the establishment of relations in 1921, many major agreements had been reached between the two countries. If the U.S. were now to insist that the Soviet Union terminate its commitments to the Afghan government with respect to the supply of military assistance, the Soviet Union could make the same claim with respect to U.S. military aid to Pakistan. All U.S. aid to the resistance went through Pakistan, yet Moscow did not seek to impose a cut off of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan.

The situation might be different once the Geneva process had come to an end, Shevardnadze said. Perhaps there would be no need to supply weapons in that case. Perhaps the Afghans could find a common language which would make such supplies unnecessary. Thus, Shevardnadze would formulate the problems as follows: until the Geneva accords were signed, there should be no new conditions. Otherwise, the whole process could unravel. The Soviet decision to withdraw had not been an easy one. To hinder its implementation would be totally unjustified.

As for Pakistan, Zia’s approach could not be considered serious. After negotiating for five years with the Kabul regime, Zia had told Vorontsov he would sign in Geneva on March 30, but not on March 15. What difference did two weeks make?

In short, Shevardnadze concluded, real possibilities had opened up for resolving the problem of Afghanistan. Would the U.S. seek to encourage them? At the Washington summit, the President and the Secretary had said that Afghanistan should be resolved as soon as possible. The Soviet decision to withdraw had not been an easy one.

THE SECRETARY replied that the U.S. supported the Geneva process. We wanted the next round to be the last. We wanted to see the General Secretary’s announcement implemented.

Our role, however, was to be one of guarantor. As such, we would be under an obligation to end our own military assistance upon entry into force of a “satisfactory” Geneva accord. That meant we had to decide what was “satisfactory.” The Secretary had sought simply to give Shevardnadze a sense of the major factors which would affect our decision. Thus, he had outlined our views on frontloading, and we had noted Gorbachev’s apparent willingness to accept this concept. We also wanted to make clear our views on ceasefires, and had done so.

We also wanted to be certain that the Soviet interpretation of the Declaration of Guarantees meant that the Soviets, like we, would in fact terminate military assistance once an agreement entered into force. We felt it was important for Moscow to have in mind the things which would affect our decision on whether such an agreement was “satisfactory” in terms of our willingness to act as a guarantor.

In the same vein, we had wanted Shevardnadze to have the benefit of our views as to why President Zia felt it important to address the question of an interim government in Afghanistan. It was not clear whether or not the Afghans would be able to bring this about. We hoped they would.

SHEVARDNADZE interjected that the Secretary was touching on some very important questions with respect to relations between sovereign states. Moscow had important obligations to the government of Afghanistan. What kind of government that would ultimately be was not clear. But the Soviets could not just abandon their commitments. There was a legal issue here.

Frankly, Shevardnadze considered,⁵ the U.S. should have considered the matter more carefully before expressing its willingness to serve as a guarantor in Geneva. It would appear that, when it made this commitment, Washington did not believe that the Soviet Union would withdraw. It now appeared that America was introducing new demands, just when prospects for a real settlement were materializing. The Soviets wanted to withdraw their forces. The details of the withdrawal would become clear once an agreement was reached. Moscow was not trying to hide anything. But introducing new complications had to be avoided. Shevardnadze suggested that the Secretary consider how the U.S. would react were Moscow to insist on the termination of U.S. aid to Afghanistan.⁶

Quoting from the Declaration of Guarantees, THE SECRETARY pointed out that the language on non-interference did not provide for exceptions on the basis of prior understandings. Noting that the two sides appeared to agree on the desirability of Afghan neutrality, he pointed out the incompatibility of a situation such as that of, e.g., Austria, with the provision of military assistance from one of the superpowers. We simply wanted to reassure ourselves that the Soviet side shared this view with respect to Afghanistan. From Shevardnadze’s reaction, the Secretary was not sure this was the case. It was important to be clear on such matters as the end game approached. He asked Armacost to comment.

ARMACOST said he had two points to make. First, he recalled that in 1985, when the U.S. had been asked to undertake the role of guarantor, we had made clear that our agreement was contingent on a “satisfactory” accords being reached in Geneva. Obviously, we had to see the terms of any settlement before we could provide a definitive commitment to guarantee it.

Second, the fact that the current Afghan government was unable to exercise a fundamental function of sovereignty—control of its national territory—was a serious consideration. A major struggle was in fact taking place on Afghan soil. The Kabul regime exercised effective control over only a small portion of that territory. The resistance, on the other hand, exercised control over much of the country. Now we were being asked, in effect, to terminate assistance to groups which controlled a majority of Afghanistan’s territory, while a faction which exercised significantly less control continued to receive aid. We had felt that an interpretation of the Declaration of Guarantees which imposed no new obligations on either party could help resolve this dilemma.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that he had tried to outline the considerations which would influence the U.S. decision on whether it could undertake the role of guarantor for a Geneva accord. We thought the agreement which was emerging was something we could support. We wanted to do so. We therefore wanted to be clear on Moscow’s views, and wanted the Soviet side to understand our own.

SHEVARDNADZE reiterated that it was impossible to start a new process after five years in Geneva, when an agreement was in sight. If the U.S. wanted the problem of Afghanistan solved, the accord had to be signed. If the U.S. was so certain as to the weakness of the current Kabul government, what was its concern? As for the Soviets, their obligations would pertain regardless of whatever government is in Kabul following the withdrawal of their forces. They could not simply nullify existing agreements.

The U.S. might consider the current government illegitimate. The Soviet Union disagreed. It had all the attributes of a sovereign government. Many states recognized it. It was represented in the U.N. Pakistan had negotiated with it for five years. This could not be ignored. The Soviet Union had obligations to Afghanistan and it would meet them. In the future there would be no flow of arms to Kabul, only food. But Moscow could not unilaterally nullify agreements which had been reached with “kings and emperors.”

The main thing was that the Soviets wanted to get out of Afghanistan. As for what followed, it was not up to Moscow to determine the future of Afghanistan. The Soviets would welcome a neutral, nonaligned sovereign Afghanistan. But that was not something for the U.S. and Soviet Union to impose. Whether Afghanistan looked like Austria or Finland was up to the Afghans. Perhaps, after a Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan would move toward neutrality. But that would be determined after a Geneva agreement was reached. Once that had occurred, moreover, the Soviet side could be more specific with respect to their plans for withdrawal.

Should it prove impossible to reach agreement in Geneva, other options could emerge. This was not in the U.S. interest.

THE SECRETARY noted that Shevardnadze had said that the Soviet Union would be sending food rather than arms after its withdrawal. He hoped somebody had written that down.

SHEVARDNADZE said, “no.” What the Soviets were after was peace in Afghanistan; no war, no bloodshed. This was what served Soviet interests. Shevardnadze and the Secretary had discussed this many times. The Secretary in the past had said that resolution of Afghanistan was a key in U.S. perceptions of the Soviet Union. Shevardnadze had interpreted this as the words of one who was in favor of a just settlement of the problem. So, now, Moscow was complying.

THE SECRETARY said that the two ministers’ past discussions of Afghanistan had often concluded with the recognition that we saw matters differently. That was why we had welcomed the General Secretary’s recent statement. We believed the Soviet Union intended to withdraw. We were trying to help with that, and wanted to encourage the process in Geneva. That was why we had outlined the conditions which we considered important. We would continue discussing the issues with Pakistan. We would be available when the Geneva talks resumed. We hoped the process would be fruitful. There was no question that withdrawal would have an enormous impact on American perceptions.

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his thoughts. The Foreign Minister predicted that they would have an “intense” discussion of Afghanistan in March if there had been no agreement in Geneva.

THE SECRETARY said that we would study the situation.

Iran–Iraq War

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers next take up the Iran-Iraq war. He pointed out that the problems of Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq and the Middle East were the problems of a single region.

THE SECRETARY agreed, observing that it was a mistake to see the issues Shevardnadze had referred to as isolated.

On the Gulf war, the Secretary said he had been briefed by Armacost on the Under Secretary’s exploration with Vorontsov of a new concept—that of some kind of time interval between a vote on an enforcement resolution and its entry into effect. ARMACOST added that the key to the concept was the notion that the resolution would automatically take effect on a date certain in the absence of Iranian compliance.

Noting that the concept would seem to put pressure on the diplomatic process, THE SECRETARY said that it struck him as a good idea.

VORONTSOV commented that it might give the Secretary General some useful flexibility.

SHEVARDNADZE asked Vorontsov to explain the concept.

VORONTSOV indicated that an enforcement resolution would go into effect when the Secretary General felt the time was right.

THE SECRETARY clarified that entry into effect of the resolution would be deferred to a date certain unless the Secretary General felt that there was sufficient progress to propose delay to a subsequent date. Such an approach would deal with certain things that the U.S. and Soviet Union had felt important, and would provide some extra leverage.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the idea was interesting . . . but not so simple to implement. He wanted the Secretary to know that Moscow had told the Iranians that, if they did not recognize UNSC 598,⁷ the Soviets would at some point vote for an embargo resolution. Soviet representatives at the UN had been instructed to cooperate in work on a second resolution. Work was in fact underway on the basis of the UK draft, which, Shevardnadze noted in passing, was too much like previous, ineffective resolutions on South Africa for Moscow’s liking. But perhaps it would be possible to perfect the text. But the situation was far from simple. The positions of China and of non-permanent members were uncertain. So there was a lot of work to do if there were to be a second resolution. The document itself had to be right; there had to be certainty it would pass.

As for the option Armacost and Vorontsov had come up with, it was interesting. It could make discussion of a draft embargo resolution easier. But what worried Shevardnadze was this: what if there were a second resolution and the war continued. That was likely to happen. Then there would be the same problem as with South Africa with respect to enforcing an embargo. Moscow was willing to vote in favor of an embargo; but the effectiveness of such a measure was open to question.

Shevardnadze reported that the Iranians had just hinted to Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovskiy that they might be changing their attitude. Shevardnadze was not yet prepared to accept this at face value, and Petrovskiy had not yet returned from Teheran to make a full report. But if the Iranian position with respect to 598 was changing, that would be significant. Perhaps it would be best to allow sufficient time to check this out; if Iran remained adamant, the Soviets would support a second resolution. As the Iranians would soon be visiting Moscow, Shevardnadze would have an early opportunity to clarify the matter. All of this, Shevardnadze said, was by way of informing the Secretary what was happening on the “Iran front.”

THE SECRETARY recalled that, when Gorbachev was in Washington, the Secretary had told him that, while Iraq clearly accepted 598, Iran clearly did not. U.S. intelligence, the Secretary had pointed out, suggested that Iran was still playing a game to keep the UNSC from taking action. “The check was in the mail.” Gorbachev had said, “Yes, I guess that’s right.” It thus seemed that both sides agreed that there was a need to act, both to end the war and to strengthen the prestige of the UNSC.

A mandatory arms embargo should be voted, the Secretary affirmed. But the U.S. would be willing to delay entry into force of an embargo for thirty days with the provision that the Secretary General could ask for a postponement if negotiations were making progress. This seemed to be a reasonable proposition.

As to the effectiveness of an embargo, the Secretary felt it could be considerable. An embargo might not be perfect, but it would represent a binding commitment. States which violated it could be approached. Costs to Iran would climb; it would have difficulty obtaining spare parts. Results would not come overnight, but, over time, it would help shut down hostilities. To enhance effectiveness of an embargo, moreover, the U.S. would be prepared to consult on means of enforcement, including by means of blockade.

The key thing, however, was to take action. The Secretary had been looking forward to the present meeting to hear Shevardnadze’s views. If the U.S. and Soviet Union stood together, other countries, including the PRC, would fall in line. Beijing had informed us it would vote for an enforcement resolution if other permanent members did. The Secretary said that he hoped the issue could be revisited before he left Moscow. If something could be recorded on the subject in a final statement, it would be a constructive step.

SHEVARDNADZE said he wondered why Iran had not as yet followed up on its preparations for a massive land offensive against Iraq. VORONTSOV suggested that the Americans had convinced Khomenei to hold off. SHEVARDNADZE said that if Iran threw its full weight into a “final offensive,” he was not sure Iraq could hold the line, despite Iraq’s determination to fight “for 100 years.” This would be deeply disturbing to Moscow in view of the Soviet Union’s special relationship to Iraq. Shevardnadze admitted to concern that a second resolution could remove whatever “brake” was holding Iran back.

THE SECRETARY asked if Powell would respond to the questions Shevardnadze raised.

Admitting that one could never be certain of Iranian motivations, POWELL pointed out that previous Iranian offensives had resulted in loss of life comparable only to the slaughter of World War I. The Iranians were undoubtedly aware of the thoroughness of Iraq defensive preparations. They might have concluded that the certain losses were not worth the dubious potential gains. THE SECRETARY observed that the Iranians would attack if they thought they could prevail. Their concern for lives was not great.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the two sides agree that the Secretary General should intensify his efforts. Perez de Cuellar had yet to make full use of the authority granted him in 598. Moscow had urged him to designate a special representative on the war with a mandate similar to that of Cordovez on Afghanistan. Shevardnadze called on the U.S. to endorse that recommendation.

The U.S. should not doubt Moscow’s determination to see the war end, Shevardnadze stressed. The Soviet Union was anxious with respect to Iraq’s staying power. Moscow’s own prestige would be involved in a defeat. Moreover, the Soviet Union wanted American warships out of the Gulf. Shevardnadze acknowledged that their mission was not directed against the Soviet Union, but they were too close to Soviet borders for comfort. The sooner that situation could be defused, the better for Moscow.

What then might be recorded in a joint statement? The two sides could express their support for implementation of UNSC 598 and “effective steps to implement” the resolution, including by the Secretary General. There could also be language indicating that the two sides were considering next steps in terms of implementing 598.

As for the formulation which Armacost and Vorontsov had come up with, it was not a bad one. But Iraq would have to be consulted. Shevardnadze added that Moscow was in favor of active measures, and reiterated that, if a second resolution was necessary, the Soviets would work with the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said he was agreeable to working on joint statement language. He did not want to “over-interpret” Shevardnadze’s words, but believed that the kinds of things which might be said were:

—The two sides supported 598;

—They supported a second resolution and will work on the basis of the UK draft toward preparing one;

—They agreed on the need for a special UN effort to take advantage of the leverage provided by second resolution during a specified period. The second resolution would enter into effect on a date certain unless the Secretary General informed the Security Council that a postponement would be worthwhile in light of what he was accomplishing.

VORONTSOV reiterated Shevardnadze’s point that, as Iraq was an interested party, it would have to be consulted.

THE SECRETARY pointed out that Iraq favored a follow-on resolution.

VORONTSOV questioned whether Iraq would agree on the advisability of the “date certain” approach. Had the U.S. consulted with Baghdad?

THE SECRETARY replied that we had not. He knew that the Iraqs had been in favor of a passage of a resolution within 90 days. It seemed likely that they would welcome a resolution which went into effect two months earlier. Perhaps the U.S. and Soviet Union could put the idea forward together and consult other interested parties later.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the joint statement confine itself to the following elements:

—Support for 598;

—Enhancement of the role of the Secretary General and his Special Representative;

—“Maybe” a third point: “We will start active work to prepare subsequent steps for implementation of 598.”

Shevardnadze explained that the third point referred to work on a second resolution.

THE SECRETARY suggested that Ridgway and Bessmertnykh work on the problem. For the U.S. to accept language on the Gulf War, however, it would have to reflect determination and decisiveness.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the two Ambassadors could work on it overnight. He quoted a Russian saying: “Bright ideas come on a dark night.”

Korea

THE SECRETARY said he had a few words on Korea. A new, elected President would take office in South Korea on February 25. This would be the first peaceful transition of power in the ROK’s history. The new president was a savvy man, a surer, more reform-oriented leader. He represented a fresh face, who would take every opportunity to showcase South Korea’s great vitality. In this connection, the Olympics would be much on his mind.

The Secretary noted in this context the significance of the KAL 858 bombing.⁸ The Soviet side had seen the evidence implicating North Korea. Over fifty nations had condemned the act. At a minimum, the Soviet Union ought to caution Pyongyang.

For its part, the U.S. wanted to see the two Koreas play a larger role in world events. Both should be U.N. members. The Soviet Union should consider the situation created by the transfer of power in Seoul, and the opportunities this created. The Secretary added that he had the greatest respect for the new president’s predecessor, and the instrumental role he had played in bringing about the peaceful shift to civilian leadership.

SHEVARDNADZE remarked that it remained to be seen how the new South Korean president would behave. Kim Il-sung, however, had been the leader of North Korea for decades. One knew he could be believed.

THE SECRETARY said that, from what we knew about Kim, this was hardly a reassuring statement.

SHEVARDNADZE said that Moscow had a different view. The General Secretary in handing over Kim’s message had asked that the U.S. consider the initiative objectively. What was so bad about the North’s initiatives? What was wrong with confederation? With reductions of armed forces? The North had made proposals for sweeping reductions in forces on the peninsula, reductions which would mean the end of the military standoff there. The only thing that the U.S. could object to was the requirement that its forces and bases be removed. The U.S. might not like that, but objectively it made good sense. The Soviets had relayed Kim’s proposals not because he was their friend, but because they were worthwhile. As for South Korea, it had no reason to fear the proposals.

With respect to the KAL bombing, the Soviets had not themselves investigated the matter, but had difficulty understanding why North Korea should be blamed. It was hard to see how the bombing could prevent the Olympic Games from taking place. How would such an act benefit the North. There was no proof of North Korea’s culpability; rather, there was a lot of hoopla. As time passed, Shevardnadze suspected that the incident would be determined to be a provocation. By whom, he was not sure.

As for the Olympics, the Soviet Union had said it would compete. It would have been a good thing to hold parallel games in the North. This would have contributed toward reunification.

THE SECRETARY responded that, as regards U.S. troops in Korea, it was the South Koreans, rather than we, who would worry were they to be withdrawn. They remembered the invasion and geography made Seoul particularly vulnerable.

As for the KAL bombing, we considered the evidence of a North Korean security agency role very powerful. Moreover, there were precedents—in the Rangoon bombing.⁹ The only thing that surprised us in view of such evidence was South Korea’s restraint.

As for Kim’s initiatives, what were needed were not grandiose steps of the type he was proposing, but realistic confidence building measures which were already on the table.

SHEVARDNADZE urged the U.S. to look more carefully at the North’s proposals. They merited careful consideration. He questioned the utility of confidence building measures against the backdrop of enormous concentrations of military forces on each side of the DMZ. Shevardnadze said that the Secretary exaggerated the threat posed by the North.

POWELL noted that he had commanded a batallion in Korea. From personal experience he knew that there were vivid memories in the South of 1950, when Seoul was so quickly overrun. The only thing that had changed since then was that Seoul and its suburbs had grown. As for dialogue with the North, when faced with actions like the KAL bombing, the South could have little confidence in Pyongyang’s sincerity. Powell said he had personally reviewed the evidence, and was convinced the world would see the KAL bombing as an act of terrorism, not a provocation. The motive had clearly been to demonstrate that South Korea was not a safe site for the Olympics.

SHEVARDNADZE replied that terrorism could serve as an instrument of provocation. The leaders of North Korea were reasonable people who would not resort to such means. As for the threat to the South, objectively it was not there. South Korea had a far larger population than the North; it had a million and a half men armed to the teeth; it had the help of U.S. military forces in Korea; it had a thriving economy. The North could never hope to challenge Seoul militarily.

THE SECRETARY said that the troop levels Shevardnadze had cited were incorrect. POWELL pointed out that the economic development to which Shevardnadze had alluded was taking place under the protection of strong South Korean and U.S. military forces. The South wanted no repetition of 1950.

ARMACOST noted that there was a fundamental difference between starting with big proposals or work on the basis of more realistic initiatives already on the table. The North’s refusal to take a single constructive step in such areas as family reunification had eroded its credibility. It was hard to see how bolder proposals could be carried out when simple ones were not.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the North Koreans had made simple, practical proposals as well, e.g., meetings between representatives of the two countries. Shevardnadze reiterated that the presence of U.S. bases on the peninsula was not a helpful factor.

Middle East

THE SECRETARY gave an initial, lengthy presentation covering our current analysis of the situation in the Middle East, of his forthcoming mission to the region, and of the role we hoped Moscow would choose to play.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the Secretary had a “complicated” trip ahead of him. The situation had become more acute as a result of Palestinian mass protests, and especially in the wake of Israel’s resort to repression. The situation required more active efforts by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as well as by the UNSC and regional parties.

Shevardnadze said he appreciated the Secretary’s recent letter.¹⁰ He felt that the approach the Secretary had outlined contained a number of interesting points. Shevardnadze said he agreed that, without a step-by-step approach, no solution was possible.

Shevardnadze had devoted a lot of consideration to the Middle East since receiving the Secretary’s letter. He continued to believe that an international conference was the best approach. This was not just a fixation, although Moscow had long advocated the idea. But the “more than explosive,” situation now developing made the Soviet proposal for a special meeting of foreign ministers of UNSC permanent members particularly timely. Such a session could take stock of the emerging situation and consider how a conference might best be configured to deal with it.

In such a context, much of what the Secretary had described could be considered. The point was that it was not an either/or proposition. Moscow did not want a conference for its own sake; it wanted a setting which could embrace “the overall substance” of the region and at the same time make possible active bilateral contacts and negotiations. No other approach was possible. A conference would facilitate contacts between all parties. Calling on the UNSC permanent members to take the first step toward a conference reflected the recognition of their influence on the regional parties. A serious approach to a conference would produce measures to normalize the situation in the region and establish a solid base for a long-term settlement. Thus, Shevardnadze urged the U.S. to review its position with respect to a conference. To date, Moscow had the impression, the concept had not been seriously considered.

Noting that the Secretary had referred to Camp David, Shevardnadze stressed that Moscow rejected the approach the accords reached there symbolized. After the Secretary visited the region, however, perhaps the time would be right for a serious discussion—perhaps a day or two’s worth, and particularly of the place of an international conference in any search for a settlement. The idea enjoyed broad support internationally; even in Israel, not all were against it. Perhaps the U.S. could use its influence there.

Noting that the Secretary had urged the Soviet Union to consider its position on diplomatic relations with Israel and Jewish emigration, Shevardnadze said that Moscow had indicated—and Peres knew—that “this question” could be resolved in a positive way were a conference to be convened. On the other hand, the Soviets could not support an approach which relegated a conference to the back burner.

(THE SECRETARY briefly described our notion of how a conference might fit into the approach we had in mind, and suggested that he and Shevardnadze could discuss the issue further in Washington in March. He noted that Murphy and Pelyakov might also have met by then. He suggested that, if anything positive emerged from his Middle East trip, he could make Murphy available. He again urged Shevardnadze to consider how Israeli’s perception of a Soviet role, and of the utility of a conference, could be affected by movement on issues of interest to Jerusalem. The Secretary felt that emigration was particularly important in this respect.)

Returning to the subject of an international conference, SHEVARDNADZE clarified that he had in mind a forum which would do more than simply facilitate contacts. It should have the ability to solve problems.

Moscow had given considerable thought as to how this might be done. There might be groups dealing with overall regional problems (e.g., “geographic questions”). There could also be bilateral contacts and negotiations which would be part and parcel of the conference.

Moscow understood the Israeli concern that Israel might be isolated at an IC. That was why the Soviets had proposed to include UNSC permanent members, several of whom were friends of Israel, and could ensure the effectiveness of a conference.

Shevardnadze again urged the Secretary to give the idea of a conference further thought. Shevardnadze was convinced no more suitable means would be found. All players but Israel had already accepted the concept. Even Peres had expressed his support.

In any case, Shevardnadze was ready to meet at any time with the Secretary on the subject, or to make Vorontsov or other Soviet officials available. The Secretary had expressed some interesting ideas. Coupled with the idea of a conference, they had potential. But without a role for a conference little would be possible.

THE SECRETARY noted that the concept which Shevardnadze had just described seemed to differ from our own. He agreed that further discussions might be useful at a later stage.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, and then briefly returned to the subject of Jewish emigration. Israel already had enough problems on its hands. If it sought to link emigration to the question of an international conference, there might be no conference. Then where would the process go?

Moscow was dealing with the issue. 8,000 Jews had emigrated. What should the Soviets do now? Force people to leave? All constraints on emigration had been removed. Those who had no secrets would be allowed to leave. As Gorbachev had said in Washington, there were no other obstacles. The Secretary could tell that to the Israelis. They should also bear in mind what he had said earlier: that the convening of a conference would open up useful channels for resolving many problems.

THE SECRETARY said it had been a good discussion, very substantive and reflecting the current state of the relationship.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed, and the meeting adjourned.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. Reference is to Gorbachev’s speech in which he announced that the Soviets would withdraw from Afghanistan within 1 year. (“Text of Gorbachev Statement Setting Forth Soviet Position on Afghan War,” New York Times, February 9, 1988, p. A14)
3. Documents pertaining to the implementation of the April 14, 1988, Geneva Accords are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XXXV, Afghanistan, 1985–1989.
4. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leader of the Mujahadeen resistance in Afghanistan.
5. An unknown hand crossed out “considered” and wrote above it: “stated.”
6. An unknown hand crossed out “Afghanistan” and wrote below it: “Pakistan.”
7. United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, July 20, 1987, which called for a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.
8. Reference is to the November 29, 1987, bombing of a South Korean civilian airliner en route from Baghdad to Seoul with no survivors.
9. Reference is to a February 8, 1988, assassination attempt on South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan.
10. Documentation pertaining to U.S.-Soviet dialogue on the topic of the Middle East peace process, including Shultz’s letter, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Dispute.