Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

122. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, February 21, 1988, 2:40–5:40 p.m.

SUBJECTS

• Defense & Space; SLCM’s; ALCM’s; Backfire; mobile missiles; Nuclear Testing; CW; summit timing

Participants

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • National Security Advisor Powell
  • Ambassador Ridgway
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • EUR/SOV Director Parris (Notetaker)
  • Dimitri Zarechnak (Interpreter)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Deputy Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh
  • Ambassador Karpov
  • Ambassador Medvedev
  • Shevardnadze Counselor Tarasenko
  • MFA Notetaker
  • MFA Interpreter

Defense and Space

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by indicating he would like to endorse the Secretary’s remarks before lunch on the significance of the INF Treaty. Moscow remained convinced, however, that INF was only the first step.

As to the Secretary’s comments on the establishment of the On Site Inspection Agency, Shevardnadze could tell him that the Soviet side was in the final stages of setting up a similar agency and would soon be in a position to provide details. The entity would be composed of experts from both the defense and foreign ministries.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary in his remarks had referred a number of times to the Washington Summit Joint Statement. That was appropriate. In Washington it had been possible to agree on the main lines of a future treaty. A lot of work had been done before that in Geneva and by the two ministers; some work had been done since in Geneva. The Soviet side wanted to work in a businesslike fashion, and had given its delegation the instructions they needed to meet the task of completing a treaty on fifty percent reductions in strategic arms in the context of preserving the ABM Treaty, as had been agreed in Washington.

Shevardnadze noted that the two sides often accused the other’s delegations in Geneva of passivity. But, to a degree, such charges suggested that the ministers themselves were not doing enough. In that context, the Soviet side had welcomed certain recent positive moves by the U.S. delegation, and had made some of its own. Nonetheless, if a treaty were to be achieved, the momentum thus far was inadequate. So Shevardnadze endorsed the Secretary’s call for accelerated work in all areas.

Verification, Shevardnadze acknowledged, was the most difficult, sensitive and important set of issues. Moscow was prepared to examine every aspect of the question in a very positive way.

Parallel to that, however, one had to identify clearly the main obstacles to concluding a treaty. What were the fundamental political decisions which would be needed? That was where the Secretary and Shevardnadze should engage.

If the Secretary agreed with that proposition, the key became to clarify the future of the ABM Treaty. Shevardnadze said that, in reading reports from Geneva, he had the impression it was becoming central. If there were no such understanding, there would be no START treaty.

The fundamental approach, Shevardnadze recalled, had been worked out in Washington. The question of the duration of a non-withdrawal pledge had been discussed. The General Secretary had raised the possibility of a compromise in the Soviet position. But there had been agreement that, for a given period, neither side would withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Recent U.S. proposals in Geneva were disturbing in this regard. Indeed, the title of the U.S. draft treaty suggested an attempt to move away from the agreement reached in Washington. Shevardnadze did not intend to analyze the U.S. proposal, but he did want to stress that it was inconsistent with the Washington Joint Statement.² The matter should be reviewed in Washington. The ABM Treaty should be preserved as signed in 1972 and ratified by the U.S. Senate and Supreme Soviet, as had been agreed at the summit. Yet the thrust of the U.S. draft treaty was not to preserve the Treaty, but to return to the “old” U.S. approach of seeking Soviet agreement that any work short of deployment of actual ABM systems was consistent with the Treaty. The Soviet side disagreed with this approach, which was simply inconsistent with preserving the ABM Treaty.

Shevardnadze suggested that it would be useful to have a more detailed discussion of the matter with Gorbachev the next day.³ The Foreign Minister hoped that the Secretary would be able to give a definitive answer as to whether the U.S. was prepared to continue to work on the basis of the Washington understandings. If so, Shevardnadze was convinced that mutually acceptable formulations could be found.

Another problem which deserved attention, Shevardnadze continued, was violations of the ABM Treaty—an “old story.” The Soviet side was sure that the U.S. was concerned that no violations of the Treaty take place (NOTE: Shevardnadze gave the impression of speaking in the context of the non-withdrawal period). But there were ways of dealing with such contingencies—either through existing bodies or others. Defense Ministers, for example, could take up alleged violations in detail. Shevardnadze did not want to reopen old discussions (NOTE: Here, the implication seemed to be discussions of “permitted/prohibited activities”). But thought should be given to using existing mechanisms, including meetings of Defense Ministers, as well as considering how new ones might make a contribution.

Concluding his presentation, Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had focused in his opening remarks on START verification. Shevardnadze had started with the ABM Treaty to emphasize the need for clarity here if there were to be a START Treaty.

THE SECRETARY welcomed Shevardnadze’s agreement that the two sides should work hard on verification even as they addressed other issues. He suggested that delegations in Geneva be instructed to complete work on the data exchange MOU and two protocols by the time of the ministers’ March meeting. Giving them a deadline would impart a sense of urgency to their work. The Secretary said he had the impression Shevardnadze agreed to this approach.

SHEVARDNADZE said that he had not specifically addressed the question of focusing on verification in START because it seemed quite agreeable to him. MEDVEDEV interjected that the Soviet side would soon be making proposals based on those already tabled by the U.S.

THE SECRETARY said that this was good. As for the ABM Treaty, it would be good to have an agreement on the issues involved there in parallel with START. We believed that such an agreement should be separate from a START treaty, but both should be pressed. The fact that there would be an agreed period for START reductions and for non-withdrawal suggested there was a relationship. We did not like the idea of attaching the two, but we had no problem with a treaty which contained important substance. As for what to call it, the Secretary was certain that some sort of satisfactory descriptive title could be found.

Violations, the Secretary agreed, were something the Defense Ministers might take up. We would have to see what came of their first discussion. The Soviet side knew how strongly the U.S. felt about these issues.

THE SECRETARY said that it should be possible to reach agreement. We were already in the “ballpark.” We had worked out what would happen when the non-withdrawal period was over, i.e., the ABM Treaty would remain in force, but each side could give six months notice of its intention to withdraw. We had put the General Secretary’s words on this point in the Washington Joint Statement; now we should put them in a treaty.

The Secretary said he was aware that there since had been an argument in Geneva over whether during the non-withdrawal period the sides would be able to exercise the “supreme national interest” provision of the ABM Treaty. This was standard language used in all treaties. It was not an expression on our part of any intention to withdraw. The Secretary could not help but believe that, in the end, the Soviet side could accept such a standard formulation.

The most difficult issue, the Secretary continued, was what activities would take place during the non-withdrawal period. Various formulations had been tried in Washington before the language of the Joint Statement had been agreed. The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze in his remarks had used the formula, “as ratified by the U.S. Senate and the Supreme Soviet.” This suggested an acknowledgement that there was a difference in the two sides’ understanding on this point even in 1972, which, however, was not a major issue because of unclarity with respect to the meaning of the “other physical principles” language of the Treaty. We had subsequently come to the conclusion that the Soviet view at the time was the correct one.

But it probably would not be useful to get into a legalistic analysis of the problem. As a general proposition, the President believed that the U.S. should be free to test and determine if strategic defense was feasible. We realized that the General Secretary had a different view. To some extent, they had agreed to disagree on this point as long as there was an agreed period of non-withdrawal which would provide a sense of predictability.

In that regard, the U.S. felt there had been some progress in Geneva. We had proposed a package of confidence building measures. The Soviet side had not agreed to discuss these, but Shevardnadze in his comments on verification seemed to have picked up some of our ideas. Perhaps our proposals for such things as annual exchanges of information, access to tests, and laboratory visits—coupled with an agreed non-withdrawal period—could help provide predictability during that period.

As for other issues, the Secretary believed that everything would fall into place if it were possible to deal with the question of what was permitted during the non-withdrawal period. The Soviet side was familiar with the President’s views on this matter. We agreed on the importance of the ABM area, and on the need to have it treated in some way, although not as part of a START treaty.

POWELL endorsed the Secretary’s comments, and pointed out that the difficult issue was activities necessary to conduct ongoing national programs on both sides during the non-withdrawal period. Other elements of an agreement, he agreed, were already in place. He noted that the two sides seemed to be close together on the length of the non-withdrawal period and what happened thereafter.

SHEVARDNADZE agreed that the latter point was clear. Negotiations would begin three years before the end of the non-withdrawal period. The Washington Joint Statement had dealt with the issue.

THE SECRETARY suggested that, as a general proposition, it would be well to stick with the language of the Joint Statement in approaching this issue in Geneva. SHEVARDNADZE agreed that this was a good approach. Noting that it would be difficult to come to an understanding of the Joint Statement’s language, the SECRETARY proposed that the Geneva negotiators be instructed to work on this basis, but acknowledged that, ultimately, the task would devolve to himself and Shevardnadze.

SHEVARDNADZE cautioned against reopening in such a context a discussion of what was and was not permitted by the ABM Treaty. This would rekindle an old argument. Rather, the negotiators should focus on a verification regime which would provide predictability.

The Foreign Minister proposed that it be recorded that delegations should work on the basis of the understandings reflected in the Washington Joint Statement.

THE SECRETARY said that Shevardnadze’s suggestion for putting those understandings in the context of verification might be something that could be built on. POWELL endorsed this idea, noting that it went to the confidence building problem.

SHEVARDNADZE said that it would be well if the delegations worked on this basis.

SLCM’s

Shevardnadze introduced what he referred to as another “fundamental” problem—SLCM’s. Moscow knew the U.S. arguments regarding verification. The Soviets agreed it would not be easy. Gorbachev in Washington had alluded to existing devices which could be used to facilitate verification. The Joint Statement had contained important provisions on national technical means (NTM) and on site inspection (OSI). If these means were used, and the necessary political decisions were made, it would be possible to resolve all other matters.

Shevardnadze was sure the issue would come up with Gorbachev the following morning, because it had been the subject of several meetings of the Soviet leadership. If it were not resolved, it would be impossible to resolve the general question of strategic arms limitations. So Shevardnadze hoped that the Secretary had brought some new ideas.

He emphasized that what was needed was a political decision. As with the concept of 50% strategic arms reductions, once such a decision was made, the methodology would follow. The same was true with cruise missiles. Once there was agreement on ceilings, verification methods could be found. If there were differences, they could be resolved. So SLCM’s should be addressed in this framework. Ceilings were necessary, moreover, on both nuclear and conventionally armed SLCM’s.

THE SECRETARY reminded Shevardnadze that the START treaty was about strategic nuclear weapons. It had nothing to do with conventional weapons. There was no way that the U.S. would agree to limitations on our conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched. He felt the need to make this clear as a matter of principle.

As for verification, as the U.S. viewed it, the generic problem was a difficult one. That was why we had proposed, and Shevardnadze had now agreed, that we should start work now on the issues involved.

But there were different orders of difficulty as between systems. Mobile missiles were more difficult to verify than other missiles. SLCM’s were the most difficult of all. We had given the matter much thought. While we were not convinced we would be able to verify a mobile missile limit, we had been able to identify at least conceptually an approach to the problem.

With SLCM’s we were still at sea. We had no objection to limiting SLCM’s if the Soviet side were willing to accept a declaration that they would be limited to a specific level. We did not like that approach, but we were willing to take it. The Soviets could be sure that Congress would make us live up to any agreements we made. We would prefer something more verifiable, but the problem appeared intractable.

We had considered the possibility of using NTM to determine the presence of nuclear SLCM’s aboard ships, but we had concluded it would not work. We had the impression that the Soviet side had of late reached a similar conclusion. It was too difficult to distinguish between nuclear power plants and missiles. There were ways of shielding.

As for OSI, it had serious drawbacks, especially as regarded submarines. There was great reluctance on the part of the U.S. Navy, and the Secretary sensed similar reluctance on the Soviet side, to having people from the other side roaming around their subs.

So this was a problem. We could not be as confident as we could be even as regarded mobile missiles, which was also open to question. We were prepared to treat the problem of SLCM’s. We were prepared to treat the problem of a limit. We were prepared to live up to any commitments. But verification had us baffled.

POWELL, in response to the Secretary’s invitation to comment, reinforced the Secretary’s affirmation that conventional cruise missiles, whether air or sea launched, were not on the table.

SHEVARDNADZE challenged the U.S. side to read the Washington Joint Statement on that point, and proceeded to read the Statement’s language on SLCM’s. When he reached the words “nuclear armed” he hesitated, said he was sorry, and mumbled that he hadn’t noticed that before.

THE SECRETARY reiterated that the U.S. was prepared to agree to a limit on nuclear armed SLCM’s, and was willing to work to find a satisfactory means of verifying such a limit. We had not yet found such means. We had no special insights. Powell and the Secretary had met with the U.S. Navy the week before in Washington. The Navy had reaffirmed its lack of confidence on this point. They had not said it could not be done. But they could not imagine how to do the job.

The Secretary said that there was agreement between the two sides on the importance of SLCM’s and on setting a limit. We were willing to set a number. But how to verify the number was a big problem.

SHEVARDNADZE volunteered to summarize what had been said. The two sides seemed to be ready in Geneva to begin a discussion of SLCM limits, including specific numbers. The Soviet side had already proposed a number; the U.S. should follow suit. Specific types of submarines and surface ships on which SLCM’s would be deployed should be identified. Again, Moscow had already made proposals. Expert groups should be established to deal with verification, including by means of NTM and OSI. They could report any progress to ministers at their March meeting.

In short, on the one hand what was needed were political decisions on SLCM numbers and types of vessels; and, parallel to this, a serious discussion of verification. Why could the U.S. not provide a number? The two sides needed to proceed on two tracks.

THE SECRETARY observed that ceilings were one thing, types of ships were another. We were not prepared to go down that track, because of our neither-confirm-nor-deny policy. We were thus leary of defining which types of warships carried nuclear weapons.

SHEVARDNADZE protested that nothing was impossible. That was the Soviet approach to arms control and other types of questions. Moscow had proposed that two types of submarines and one type of surface ship be designated. But the issue could be revisited. What was needed was a decision in principle.

THE SECRETARY said that, as a matter of principle, the U.S. was not prepared to say that we would designate specific types of warships which carry nuclear-armed SLCM’s. We were willing to work on verification, but we wanted the Soviet side to have no question as to our doubts on the matter.

KARPOV said that Moscow had only felt that designating ships was the simplest approach to the problem. THE SECRETARY said he was only pointing out the problems with it.

SHEVARDNADZE urged the Secretary to give the matter further thought. This was a problem for both sides. Summarizing, he said that the discussion had produced three areas which required decisions in principle. If these could not be made during the present visit, perhaps they could be revisited in March. It was good that the U.S. was prepared to agree on a ceiling. Perhaps the working groups could discuss this. Shevardnadze proposed saying that, in principle, the two sides agreed that there should be a ceiling.

After consulting with Powell, THE SECRETARY agreed.

ALCM’s

SHEVARDNADZE said that there also appeared to be some confusion with respect to ALCM’s. He was not sure who was to blame for this. He was sure it was not the Soviet negotiators.

The question was counting—an important question. The delegations should find a way to resolve it. What was at stake was the U.S. insistence on using a very low number for counting weapons on a single bomber. The Soviet side knew that U.S. bombers were equipped to carry much larger numbers of ALCM’s. Taking this into account, the actual number of ALCM’s on heavy bombers would be well in excess of the number to be counted on bombers within the 6,000 START warhead limit. The correct number was the maximum number of cruise missiles for which a bomber was equipped. This was a proven method.

There was, however, another aspect to the problem—the range question. In the past, both sides had accepted a range of 600 km as the criterion for considering cruise missiles as strategic weapons. Coupled with the U.S. rejection of an 1,100 sublimit on heavy bomber cruise missiles, the higher range figure claimed by the U.S. would give it a significant unilateral advantage. This was a retreat from agreements already reached, and would not work.

THE SECRETARY said that we were prepared to discuss some of the issues Shevardnadze had raised in the working group. As with SLCM’s, the discussion needed to be confined to nuclear cruise missiles. Conventional cruise missiles were not on the table. This was a central point.

We were ready to discuss the range question. On the counting rule, we still have some questions. Our own approach was not a casual one. There were means of determining the capabilities of aircraft. One could go on from there. There appeared to be means of dealing with this problem.

The 1,100 bomber weapons sublimit was a real problem. It seemed to us an unnecessary constraint. If it had been introduced because of Soviet concern over our proposed counting rule, the solution was to deal with the counting rule itself. Perhaps the experts could work on that.

POWELL pointed out that there was no need for the 1,100 sublimit, since, for every bomber weapon we selected, we would have to eliminate one ballistic missile warhead. But this could be addressed in the working group.

THE SECRETARY repeated that the 1,100 limit appeared to have arisen out of concern over the ALCM counting rule. If it were possible to agree on the counting rule, perhaps that would take care of the need for a sublimit.

SHEVARDNADZE said, “that’s right.” It was one thing when an aircraft could carry only six weapons, and another when it could carry twenty. There had to be clarity on this question. The methods were well known. “The geometry is the same geometry.” As for distinguishing nuclear cruise missiles from others, Shevardnadze believed the problem could be solved. That, too, could be taken up by experts.

Backfire/Mobiles

Moving on to a new issue, Shevardnadze said it was time for the American side to drop its insistence on counting the Backfire as a heavy bomber. There were probably excessive demands in the positions of both sides at Geneva, but it was a waste of time to continue to discuss Backfire. There was not time for such discussions, and more important things to discuss. There was no reason to include the Backfire in a treaty.

As for mobile missiles, it appeared that the two sides were approaching a meeting of the minds. If agreement could be reached on a verification scheme, the U.S. proposal for a ban on mobiles could be removed from the table.

THE SECRETARY said that the Backfire was in fact a problem. Perhaps the working groups could solve it.

As for mobile missiles, the Secretary wanted first to make a few “philosophical comments.” Both sides were attracted to the concept of mobile missiles for survivability reasons. But the very reason for the survivability of mobiles made it difficult to verify their presence.

When considering how to verify a specific number of mobile missiles, we had come up with certain answers: by limiting the number; by corralling the missiles in ways which compromised to a degree the factor which made them survivable; by getting a better understanding of the other side’s operational practices. We, for example, would probably confine mobile missiles to corrals, where we could verify them. One could imagine different doctrines, some of which could be messy. So one needed a clear idea of what was possible, recognizing that there would be a trade-off between those factors which provided for survivability and those which enhanced confidence in verification.

Another question was the problem of non-deployed systems. These could be easily hidden in the case of mobile missiles. This raised questions of monitoring production, keeping track of stocks, etc. Dealing with such problems would require a high degree of intrusiveness. The U.S. assumed that Moscow was ready to allow this.

Thus, the U.S. still believed that a ban on mobiles would be best. But we recognized the investment that the Soviet side had in mobiles. We therefore wanted to expose Shevardnadze to the kinds of considerations we felt had to be addressed in verifying mobile systems. Our own approach had not yet entirely crystalized, but we had concluded that the problems involved were of a lesser magnitude than with SLCM’s

SHEVARDNADZE thanked the Secretary for his views. The Foreign Minister had found many interesting and constructive suggestions in what the Secretary had had to say that morning and after lunch. Shevardnadze was certain that Gorbachev would find them equally so, and, rather than try to address them in detail now, he would leave it to the General Secretary.

Shevardnadze could say that he felt the two sides’ discussion of the mobile missile issue inspired more optimism than in the past. Once the Soviet side had had a chance to consult with Gorbachev, it would have some suggestions to make. The General Secretary would have more tomorrow. Moscow had followed closely recent U.S. statements on mobiles, including that of Defense Secretary Carlucci. He had had some interesting ideas.

THE SECRETARY said he had another question to raise—sublimits. This was an issue which should be gotten out of the way. There were several numbers which could be dispensed with. The two ministers seemed to agree that the 1,100 ALCM proposal could be dropped if the counting rule question could be dealt with. The U.S. had recently dropped its proposal for a 1,600 limit on highly fractioned missile warheads. (SHEVARDNADZE said Moscow had noticed that.) The last item on the table was therefore the U.S. proposal for a sublimit on land-based ICBM’s. We had proposed 3,000. Akhromeyev in Washington had said that the Soviet Union had no plans to have more than 3,300 ICBM’s. We were prepared to agree to a sublimit of 3,300 and put the sublimit question behind us.

SHEVARDNADZE said that that was an interesting suggestion. He asked permission to sleep on it. He first needed to brief Gorbachev on this and other questions.

Nuclear Testing

Noting that time was short, THE SECRETARY proposed that the ministers address nuclear testing before adjourning. Both sides considered this question important. Much headway had been made, starting with Shevardnadze’s suggestion in this very room. Since then, there had been exchanges of visits to test ranges. The going was tough, because of the sensitivity of the subject matter, but progress was being made.

As the Secretary saw it, and thinking in terms of a Moscow summit, there were a variety of approaches to the problem which could be considered.

—One would be to announce in Moscow agreement on how to conduct Joint Verification Experiments (JVE).

—Another would be to announce agreement on a protocol, which the U.S. believed could be reached independent of progress on the JVE, which would enable both sides subsequently to present for ratification the 1974 and 1976 treaties on nuclear testing. This approach assumed that the Soviet side would agree that the U.S. could use the CORRTEX method for its purposes, the Secretary emphasized.

—A third approach would be more difficult—to complete the protocols very quickly, so that the two sides would be in a position to seek advice and consent on the treaties in time for the instruments of ratification to be signed and exchanged at the summit.

Obviously, the level of ambition varied considerably among the options. The Secretary felt certain agreement could be reached on the JVE. If there were no linkage to the JVE (and, the Secretary noted, it appeared the Soviet delegation was prepared to work on parallel tracks), announcement of a protocol also appeared do-able. But if the two sides wanted to move, the third option was there. If protocols could be done in a month, advice and consent could be sought immediately after action on the INF Treaty. But the protocol had to be ready. So it was up to the Soviets; the U.S. could go for either of the three variants.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the third approach was acceptable. He and the Secretary seemed to be thinking along very similar lines. The Soviet side believed that this was an area where it would be possible to do everything planned even before the President’s visit. Work on the protocol and JVE’s was going well, but could be accelerated further. Indeed, Shevardnadze had the impression that the Secretary was reading from his own talking points. So agreement could be recorded in the joint statement on nuclear testing.

A further question, Shevardnadze continued, was whether the two sides could go beyond the scenario the Secretary had described. Could they not, for example, agree to inform one another in advance of any nuclear test? Another possibility would be to limit the number of nuclear tests in a year. Perhaps the U.S. could consider this. Finally, since both sides were now prepared to move on the 1974 and 1976 Treaties, perhaps they could approach other nuclear powers—the British, French and Chinese—to adhere to them. Shevardnadze said he had raised this with British Foreign Secretary Howe, who had given no clear answer. All of this would give added weight to the approach the Secretary had mentioned.

THE SECRETARY said we could agree to speed up work on the protocol. The ministers could instruct their negotiators to complete a text by the March ministerial. As to Shevardnadze’s other suggestions, the Secretary said that he would consult with the UK, but that he was not in a position to respond. The question of announcing tests in advance might not be a problem, since we normally announced anyway. We would think about it. A yearly limit was more difficult. We needed to get the two treaties ratified first.

SHEVARDNADZE said that the U.S. should think further about his suggestions. The Soviets had initially adopted a global approach to the testing problem. They had now agreed to seek ratification of the two treaties as a first step. But it would not be inconsistent to have a yearly limit on the number of tests. The U.S. currently did twenty to twenty five per year; the Soviets were not far behind. It would be well to set a number, even if it were a high one. How about eight per year?

THE SECRETARY raised one additional concern—nuclear venting. There was an obligation to prevent such occurrences, but a number of Soviet tests had been a problem. This was a situation which could easily be remedied. The Secretary raised in hopes that it would be possible to eliminate the irritant.

SHEVARDNADZE said he was unaware of the problem. KARPOV said that Soviet experts said there was none. SHEVARDNADZE said that this was another reason to stop testing altogether.

Chemical Weapons

Noting that they had had a good discussion of nuclear testing, and opened up some good possibilities, Shevardnadze asked about chemical weapons.

THE SECRETARY said that the U.S. would like to see as promptly as possible a treaty banning CW. But there were certain issues which required careful attention: the details of verification, data exchange, how to include all CW-capable states.

The U.S. was ready to work hard. But an example might provide some sense of why we had concerns. The Soviet side had announced CW stocks of 50,000 tons. We had announced in more technical terms where our stocks were located, and what percentage of those stocks were located at each site. We had not provided gross numbers, since, for numbers to mean anything, there had to be agreement on the concept of what was a chemical weapon. Was it the substances themselves? Was it the delivery vehicle? Then, one had to identify the locations of these weapons. Then, one had to deal with the problem of production sites. Stockpile figures could be much larger or smaller depending on the conception one used. And that got into a lot of detail.

So, as the Secretary had grown tired of hearing in the INF end-game, the devil was in the details. The task now was to get on with verification. We also needed to consider how to bring other countries into a detailed discussion. The structure of a treaty was getting there. But it was hard going. We would like to conclude the process, but did not see how it would be possible to move as fast as some had suggested. We really had to dig into the hard work. We would do so as quickly as we could.

SHEVARDNADZE recalled that in Washington President Reagan had joined Gorbachev in a commitment to work toward final conclusion of a CW convention.⁴ Shevardnadze said he was always frank with the Secretary, and would be so in this case. It did not appear to be possible to engage as constructively with the U.S. in this as in other areas. Moscow had the impression that the U.S. was not interested in a convention because it would interfere with the start-up of its production of new CW. If there were no convention, and U.S. production continued, the Soviet Union would have to take appropriate measures, including the resumption of its own production. That production had stopped; yet the U.S. had resumed. The amounts were not important. The principle was. Moreover, the U.S. was isolated even from some of its closest allies—the FRG, the UK, Italy.

The problem of verification was admittedly serious. But data exchange should not be a problem. The Soviet Union had made proposals for a multilateral data exchange. It had accepted challenge inspections. There could be no question as to Moscow’s desire for a convention.

The Soviets had even opened up their destruction facilities. Some had complained that they had demonstrated only obsolete weapons. Shevardnadze had asked whether, when the U.S. showed its own weapons, it had displayed binaries. Should the two sides continue to work in this area? Or should they stop? Clarity was needed.

As for third countries, reasonable proposals had been made for dealing with the problem. A convention might come into effect only upon adherence of a certain number of states, or there might be a suspension period before entry into force.

For now, a more constructive overall approach was needed. In contrast to other areas, the U.S. position with respect to CW was simply unsatisfactory. Only the U.S. and France opposed an early convention. Production had to be terminated. The U.S. could not enjoy forever a monopoly on production.

Noting that Shevardnadze seemed to be seeking a clarification of the U.S. position, THE SECRETARY said he would try again. When he had served in the Nixon cabinet, the Secretary recalled, the U.S. had ceased CW production. No one else stopped.

The U.S. position today was exactly what it had been then. We were in favor of a ban. We believed CW proliferation was a profoundly dangerous tendency. We were ready to work hard on the problem. But we also were faced with the need to bring our own deterrent up to date to make up for the period when we had no production. Should an agreement be signed, all our stocks would be subject to its provisions.

SHEVARDNADZE called on the Secretary to look more closely at the problem. There was no way to tell how long the convention would drag on. In the meantime the U.S. was acquiring new stocks. What was the Soviet Union to do? The history the Secretary had recalled was past history. The Soviet Union had stopped production. If the U.S. was worried about numbers, it should work to conclude a convention. Procrastination was inappropriate and contrary to both sides’ interest.

Perhaps, Shevardnadze concluded, the issue could be discussed in detail during their next meeting.

THE SECRETARY said that he and the Minister could argue about binaries. As for procrastination, the U.S. wanted to move as quickly as possible. (SHEVARDNADZE interjected that, in that case, it should halt production of binaries.) THE SECRETARY said that the issue was extremely difficult. The U.S. was at a disadvantage because of the decade-long hiatus in its production. We needed a temporary deterrent. We believed our binary program could well prove a spur to negotiations.

SHEVARDNADZE offered to give the U.S. 25,000 tons of CW.

THE SECRETARY emphasized that no purpose was to be served by focusing on binaries. The U.S. was ready to focus on a treaty. We were doing so in Geneva.

SHEVARDNADZE suggested that the ministers discuss in detail during their next meeting means of bringing the convention to a conclusion. Perhaps during the President’s visit to Moscow it would be possible to make a statement on the need to accelerate work on a convention. If the U.S. and Soviet Union could prepare a sound document, it would be a positive step.

THE SECRETARY agreed to consider the idea.

Summit Timing

After a brief discussion of the agenda for that evening’s session, the Secretary raised the question of the timing of the President’s visit to Moscow. He pointed out that, over lunch, Soviet representatives had raised with members of his delegation the possibility of a mid-June summit. This would be too late for the President, due to commitments already on his June calender. The latest he could consider would be the last part of May. We would prefer the week before the last week in May, i.e., the week of May 23. But an alternative could be the week beginning May 30. We were aware of the importance of allowing sufficient time to complete work underway for the summit, and had no desire to schedule the visit any earlier.

SHEVARDNADZE said he would consult on this point with Gorbachev. Perhaps it would be possible to clarify the matter the next day.

After further discussion of the evening’s agenda, the meeting concluded.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Moscow—Feb 88—Shultz/Shev. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Parris. The meeting took place in the Guesthouse of the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
2. See footnote 3, Document 125.
3. See Document 125.
4. See Documents 107 and 108.