Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

1. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• Reykjavik Chronology

Attached is a detailed chronology covering the meeting between President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, held in Reykjavik, Iceland on October 11–12, 1986. This document has been prepared, as a one-time exception to the normal practice of not publishing records of such meetings, in view of the extraordinary nature of the Reykjavik meeting.

The document is a chronology, not a negotiating record. Recipients should [be] meticulous in characterizing it correctly. The distinction must be maintained since it is imperative not to erode the principle that negotiating records are not distributed.

This document may be disseminated on a limited basis to appropriate officials within the government involved in arms control negotiations. It may be drawn upon in public and media discussions concerning the Reykjavik meeting by those authorized to discuss that meeting. Since the document is considered FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY, and to preserve the precedent that records of such meetings are not normally distributed, copies should not be provided, in whole or in part, outside the Executive Branch.

Attachment

Chronology of Events²

Washington, October 18, 1986

ICELAND CHRONOLOGY

The following is a chronology of the events during the meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland. It is provided for the use of US government officials and spokespersons, and can be drawn upon in briefing on this subject. However, this chronology is not intended for general public release.

Thursday, October 9

The President left Andrews AFB aboard Air Force One at about 9:45 am on Thursday morning, October 9. He arrived in Iceland, landing at Keflavik airport, Iceland at 7:05 pm. where he was greeted by officials of the Government of Iceland. He then proceeded to the residence of the US Ambassador to Iceland, Ambassador Ruwe, arriving there shortly after 8 pm. The President stayed in the Ambassador’s house during his stay in Iceland.

After arrival, and through the evening, the US traveling team established offices in a centrally located school building. When the team arrived, they noted that above the door of the building someone had appropriately hung a large sign calling the school the “IEOB” (Iceland Executive Office Building).

Coordination of all activities was maintained through the Operations Coordinating Committee operating from the top floor of the school building. The primary substantive work over the first evening was to ensure that all last-minute changes to the President’s preparatory material were completed. This included a review of the material for the President’s meeting on Friday with President Finnbogadottir of Iceland. Staff also monitored progress on reaching agreement with the US Congress on aspects of the Continuing Resolution.

Friday, October 10

Early Friday morning, the President met privately with a few of his most senior advisors to discuss his plans for the day and to be briefed on events that had occurred during the night.

At 10 am, Secretary Shultz met with some of the US team in Ambassador Ruwe’s office in the US Embassy. The purpose of this meeting was to lay out the game plan for providing the expert, substantive support for the President in Iceland.

At 11 am, all participants joined the remainder of the US traveling team in a meeting in Hotel Holt. This meeting, chaired by White House Chief of Staff, Donald Regan, reviewed security and laid down the basic rules for dealing with the public and press during the talks.

At 11:30 am, the President met with a core of senior staff and selected experts. The first event was a briefing and discussion focused on the general background of the Iceland meeting and on non-arms control issues. This session was held around the table in the dining room of the residence. Present were the President, Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Mr. Speakes, Mr. Henkel, Mr. Thomas, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Nitze, and Colonel Linhard. After a bit more than an hour, the group took a short break to permit the table to be set for lunch.

The conversation continued over lunch, with the discussion turning to the area of arms reductions. Following lunch, again after a short break to permit the dishes to be cleared, the group reconvened once again to complete the discussion of the arms control area. At this point, Assistant Secretary Richard Perle and Ambassador Max Kampelman also joined the discussion. This preparatory session ended at about 2:30 pm.

During the remainder of the afternoon, the President studied preparatory materials and had a formal welcoming session with the Icelandic government. The President met with President Finnbogadottir of Iceland and other senior Icelandic officials from 4:30 to 5:10 pm.

Also on Friday afternoon, selected members of the US party provided press backgrounders on the key issues. This was purposely completed before the agreed press blackout was to go into effect.

At 7 pm, Larry Speakes issued a statement on US nuclear testing policy. This statement was a direct result of extensive work accomplished both in Washington and in Iceland. The main points of the statement were as follows:

“In order to make progress toward our goals, encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate verification improvements, and ensure the necessary national consensus for our objectives, the President has decided to take two new steps:

[“]First, the President will inform General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik that if the Soviet Union will, prior to the initiation of ratification proceedings in the Senate next year, agree to essential TTBT/PNET verification procedures which could be submitted to the Senate for its consideration in the form of a protocol or other appropriate codicil, the President will, as a first order of business for the 100th Congress, request the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the TTBT and PNET. However, if the Soviet Union fails to agree to the required package of verification improvements prior to the convening of the 100th Congress, the President will still seek Senate advice and consent, but with an appropriate reservation to the treaties that would ensure they would not take effect until they are effectively verifiable.

[“]Second, the President will inform the General Secretary that, once our TTBT/PNET verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties have been ratified, the President will propose that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.”

That evening, the President dined with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan and Admiral Poindexter and had the opportunity for one final review of the most critical issues.

Saturday, October 11

On Saturday morning, the President had a series of briefings with his senior staff and a small core of experts, putting the finishing touches on the points that he wished to make with the General Secretary.

At 10:15 am, the US team left for Hofdi House. Besides the President, also included were the Secretary of State, the White House Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, Mr. Speakes, Mr. Henkel, Mr. Thomas, Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Ridgway, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, and Colonel Linhard.

As host for the first meeting, the President was the first to arrive. At 10:30 am, the General Secretary and his team arrived. After a greeting, and a short photo opportunity, the two leaders began a private session (with only notetakers and interpreters) in a small room in the right rear corner of the first floor of the house. The US and Soviet delegations went upstairs to waiting areas on the second (top) floor. The US side had two holding rooms and a bathroom on the left side of the house. The Soviet side had similar rooms on the right side of the second floor. Both teams shared a common, large meeting room, in the center rear of the house, where they could hold informal conversations over coffee while waiting for any requests by the leaders.

During the morning session, General Secretary Gorbachev made the following proposals in the form of a non-paper entitled “Directives for the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and the USA to prepare agreements on nuclear disarmament”:

1. On Strategic arms. The General Secretary proposed that the leaders instruct their foreign ministers to draft an agreement to reduce by fifty percent the strategic offensive arms of both sides “taking into consideration the historically formed distinctive features of the structures of the Parties’ strategic forces.” In short, he proposed that both sides simply cut in half inventories in certain critical categories of systems, including heavy missiles. No specific categories were identified, but the idea was clear. He also called for a solution with regard to limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs).

2. On LRINF missiles. He proposed that the ministers draft an agreement on the complete elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe with “the nuclear potentials of Great Britain and France not to be affected or taken into account.” He also stated that negotiations would be initiated on shorter-range, intermediate-range missiles (SRINF), missiles with ranges below 1,000 kilometers. In this regard, he indicated to the President orally that such systems could be frozen and the subsequent negotiations focus on their reduction. In the Soviet non-paper, he proposed that negotiations should be initiated on Soviet and US medium-range systems in Asia as early as practically possible. In response, the President made absolutely clear the US and Allied requirements for reductions of Soviet SS–20s in Asia. At this point, General Secretary Gorbachev indicated no flexibility on the issue of reductions of the over 500 warheads on Soviet LRINF missiles (SS–20s) in Asia—rather he proposed the elimination of LRINF missiles in Europe and subsequent negotiations on the missiles in Asia.

3. On the ABM Treaty issue and “on banning nuclear tests”. In the Soviet non-paper, the issues of the ABM Treaty and, as they termed it, “on banning nuclear tests” were treated as one single area.

With respect to the ABM Treaty, the non-paper suggested that for the purpose of “strengthening the regime of the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” an understanding be reached that neither side would exercise its right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a period of ten years. In addition to strictly complying with all the ABM Treaty’s provisions throughout that period, the Soviet proposal added that testing in space of all missile-defense space elements would be prohibited except for research and testing carried out in laboratories. The non-paper also carefully noted that this would not entail a ban on the testing of such fixed land-based systems and their components as are allowed under the ABM Treaty. It went on to say that subsequently (after this 10 year period), the sides would negotiate “further mutually acceptable solutions in this area”. Finally, in the Defense and Space area, the document called for additional efforts to achieve mutually acceptable agreements banning anti-satellite systems.

With regard to nuclear testing, the Soviet text called upon the US and Soviet Union to “resume” negotiations on the “complete cessation of nuclear tests” as early as practically possible. In the course of these negotiations, the Soviets suggested that questions relating to verification, lowering the threshold of the yield of explosions and reducing their number, and to the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET), could also be examined. Finally, in this area, the document noted that the “initiation of negotiations on banning nuclear explosions shall be a condition for working out an agreement on strategic arms.”

In his oral presentations, the General Secretary made the point that the Soviets were prepared to accept the US structure for addressing what they termed the ABM Treaty issue. By this the General Secretary meant that the Soviets now proposed a structure under which first there would be a 10-year period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, followed by a period of from 3–5 years of negotiations on “further mutually acceptable solutions in this area”. The President corrected him by describing the US proposal in this area that had been initially offered in his July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev.³ The President pointed out that while both the US and Soviet proposals involved periods in which the deployment of advanced defense were prohibited followed by periods of negotiation, there were significant differences between the approaches.

The US proposal, contained in the President’s July letter to the General Secretary and reiterated in Iceland, was that both sides should confine themselves through 1991 (5 years from now) to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. After that time, should either side wish to deploy advanced defenses, that side would offer a plan which provided for the sharing of the benefits of strategic defense in association with the reduction and total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles. After 2 years of negotiations on this plan, if no agreement had been reached, either side would be free to deploy advanced defenses after giving the other side six months prior notice.

Unlike the Soviet approach, there was no mention of a commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty (a treaty that the Soviet Union had already violated) in the US proposal. And, unlike the Soviet proposal, at the end of the 2-year negotiations, both sides would have a right to deploy defenses.

In discussing the US proposal, the General Secretary made the point that he did not believe that the US would ever share the benefits of its research, since it was reluctant to share technology of any kind with the Soviet Union. The President pointed out that, under the terms of the US proposal, he was prepared to sign a treaty now that would commit the United States to share these benefits in association with an agreed plan to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles.

In the conversations between the President and the General Secretary on nuclear testing, Mr. Gorbachev did not press the President to agree to join in the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium. Instead, he proposed that negotiations resume on the elimination of testing. He said these negotiations could be bilateral or trilateral (US-UK-USSR). He outlined the agenda described in the text of the document cited above. Finally he noted that during these negotiations, each side would do whatever it wished with respect to testing or not testing.

At about 11:15 am, the leaders asked Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to join them in the discussion. This discussion lasted until about 12:30 pm. At that point, both leaders and their advisors departed Hofdi House and returned to their respective headquarters for lunch.

During the morning, the remainder of the US expert group (including Ambassador Rowny, ACDA Director Adelman, Asst. Secretary of Defense Perle, Lieutenant General John Moellering of the JCS, and others) waited on call at the US Embassy. When the Presidential motorcade arrived, the President and his senior advisors debriefed the expert group on the morning’s events. Following the initial debrief, the arms control experts group began study of the Soviet positions. The President went to the residence for lunch.

From 1 pm to 2 pm, the President had lunch with the same group that dined with him on Friday with the exception of Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Matlock and Colonel Linhard, who were working with the experts group.

At about 2 pm, the experts group joined the President and his other senior advisors in the dining room of the residence to have one final discussion before the afternoon meeting. At that time, the President decided to propose a series of two working sessions (one on human rights and one on arms control) and the experts group began to focus its efforts to prepare for such a contingency.

At 3:15 pm, the President motorcaded back to Hofdi House for the afternoon session. The same senior team that was there for the morning session returned to Hofdi with the President, with the exception of Ambassador Matlock, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman and Colonel Linhard—all of whom remained behind involved in preparations for the evening sessions.

During the afternoon session, the two leaders, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze continued their discussions. The President delivered a long presentation of the US positions on START, INF, Defense and Space, Nuclear Testing and Risk Reduction. The discussion then turned to the other non-arms control issues on the agenda.

The President raised specifically a number of human rights issues, handing over to General Secretary Gorbachev a package of materials on Jewish emigration, divided spouses, divided families, and dual nationals—including lists of names, graphs, charts and talking points. Gorbachev accepted the package, noting that he was similarly concerned about human rights in the United States.

The President and the General Secretary also discussed a number of regional and bilateral issues for the remainder of the afternoon session. The work by experts on non-arms control issues later that evening was based upon the full discussion and resulting foundation laid by the two leaders during the Saturday afternoon session. The meeting ended at about 5:45 and the President returned to the US Embassy.

At about 6:15 pm, the President met with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan, Admiral Poindexter, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, Asst. Secretary Perle, ACDA Director Adelman, and Colonel Linhard in the US Embassy. The President reviewed the afternoon’s discussions and gave guidance for the evening’s sessions. He explained that the General Secretary agreed to have the two groups of experts meet at Hofdi House beginning at 8 pm that evening to see if they could agree on a joint instruction to Foreign Ministers covering the major arms control topics under discussion and also the other major agenda areas. At about 6:45 pm, the President returned to the Ambassador’s residence.

Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter then met with Assistant Secretary Ridgway and the members of the group working the other agenda areas (other than arms control) to provide more specific guidance for the evening’s work.

That evening, the President had a private dinner with Secretary Shultz, Mr. Regan and Admiral Poindexter. During this dinner, a number of contingency options on arms control issues were discussed for potential use if needed the next day.

From 7 pm to 8 pm, the arms control experts group finalized their preparations in the US Embassy, and then departed for the Hofdi House. This team, led by Paul Nitze, met with a Soviet team headed by Marshal Akhromeyev, Chief of the Soviet General Staff, for about 10½ hours in an effort to develop draft guidance to foreign ministers on START, INF, Defense and Space, and nuclear testing. The US team found Marshal Akhromeyev prepared for frank discussion and open to explore both sides of every issue.

The US and Soviet groups made considerable progress on START, but the Soviets made this contingent on US acceptance of their position on Defense and Space, which involved additional restrictions on SDI which went well beyond those imposed by the ABM Treaty. The Soviets stuck to their unforthcoming position on INF, and refused to accept U.S.-proposed language aimed at bridging the differences between the two sides’ characterization of negotiations on nuclear testing.

With respect to START, the groups agreed that there would be an overall limit of approximately 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles consisting of ICBMs, SLBMs and Heavy Bombers; and, an overall limit of no more than 6,000 warheads consisting of ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and heavy bombers armed with bombs and SRAMs, with each such heavy bomber counting as one “warhead” under the 6,000 limit. The Soviets repeatedly refused to consider sublimits on these systems, saying each side should be free to allocate its 6,000 nuclear weapons as it saw fit, although they agreed that the agreement reached during the discussions at Reykjavik would not preclude further discussion of sublimits at Geneva. The Soviets agreed that reductions would involve significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles, but failed to define what the term “significant” meant. Both sides also agreed that there shall be mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—with any numerical limit on SLCMs not included in the 1,600 carrier or 6,000 warhead limits mentioned above.

The Soviets reiterated, however, that their agreement to such strategic reductions remained linked to an agreement in Defense and Space calling for non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years and additional restrictions on research that went beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty.

With respect to INF, the Soviet side would not budge from the Gorbachev formula provided earlier in the day—that is an agreement on zero/zero in Europe, with no cuts in Asia until a subsequent negotiation. After some discussion, they suggested a freeze on SRINF at the current levels for each side (which codify an advantage to them of approximately 120 to 0). The U.S. team was just as adamant that there would be no agreement on systems in Europe without a simultaneous agreement substantially reducing SS–20s in Asia, and that we could agree to zero in Europe and zero in Asia.

The US side also pressed the Soviets on the issues of verification, the duration of an interim agreement, and on the proper limitations on SRINF missiles, saying we saw no reason why the two sides could not agree on these points while acknowledging differences over the question of SS–20s in Asia.

On the issue of the duration of any interim INF agreement, the US proposed agreement that US and Soviet INF missile systems will remain subject to, and constrained by, any such interim agreement until the sides complete negotiations and agree to further reductions in these systems.

On verification, the US proposed that there be agreement that there will be specific verification measures which include:

(1) a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter;

(2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and

(3) effective monitoring of the remaining LRINF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspection.

On the SRINF issue, the US side proposed that there be agreement to limits on SRINF missiles no higher than the current Soviet levels and other constraints on SRINF missiles which will take into account the capabilities of these systems and reflect equality between the US and the Soviet Union.

The Soviet side would not agree with the US formulations. They argued that the next step was to have the leaders address the problem of Asia, and with this solved, these other areas could be resolved.

In the area of Defense and Space, the Soviets refused to consider any formulation other than their own—agreement to non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for at least 10 years, and agreement to a ban on all but laboratory research on space-based ABM systems. The U.S. team suggested that foreign ministers be instructed to examine three questions:

—“How can activities with respect to the investigation of advanced strategic defenses be synchronized with the shared goal of eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles?

—Under what conditions and in what general time frame could both sides consider a transition to an increased reliance on advance strategic defenses?

—Until those conditions are met, what common understanding about ABM Treaty restrictions on activity associated with advanced strategic defenses can be reached?”

In response, the Soviet side simply reiterated the proposal which Gorbachev outlined earlier to the President.

Turning to Nuclear Testing, the only essential difference between the US and Soviet positions was that the Soviets wished to portray the negotiations, which we both agree should take place immediately, as being for the purpose of prohibiting all nuclear testing. The US side introduced language which called for both sides to agree to begin negotiations on nuclear testing. The agenda for these negotiations would first be to resolve remaining verification issues associated with existing treaties. With this resolved, the U.S. and USSR will immediately proceed, in parallel with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, to address further step-by-step limitations on testing leading ultimately to the elimination of nuclear testing.

The Soviet side rejected this proposal. Even when the US side pointed out the extent to which this language accommodated the Soviet agenda, the Soviet side insisted on its alternative formulation based on the document provided earlier to the President, which was unacceptable to us because it characterizes the negotiations as on the “elimination of nuclear testing” which the US side felt did not reflect the agenda correctly. The Soviet approach also failed to indicate the relationship between the retention of nuclear weapons and the need to test them, which the US feels is a simple fact.

The discussions described above ran from 8 pm on Saturday night to about 2:30 am Sunday morning. At that time, both sides requested a break to consult with their leaders. Members of the US team met with the Secretary of State in his hotel room at the Hotel Holt, and discussed the situation with Admiral Poindexter who was at the British Ambassador’s residence. The teams returned to the Hofdi House and reentered discussion shortly after 3 am. The discussions continued until about 6:30 am Sunday morning.

During the same evening, a US team of specialists on the other major agenda areas also met with a team of their Soviet counterparts. The discussions of this group ran from 8 pm on Saturday night to about 2:45 am Sunday morning. They covered bilateral issues, human rights and humanitarian issues, and regional conflicts. The Soviet side, headed by Alexander Bessmertnykh, included Ambassador Dubinin, Mr. Primakov, Mr. Shishlin, and Mr. Mikolchak. The U.S. team, headed by Ambassador Ridgway, included Mr. Rodman, Ambassador Hartman, Ambassador Matlock, and Mr. Parris.

On bilateral issues, the two sides agreed on a work plan to accelerate ongoing bilateral negotiations on a variety of subjects, including nonproliferation; risk reduction centers; nuclear energy safety; thermonuclear fusion; space cooperation; transportation; maritime search and rescue; maritime radionavigation; energy and science; combatting terrorism; maritime boundaries between the US and USSR; consulates in New York and Kiev; and search and rescue satellites.

In the human rights field, the two sides had a frank discussion of the importance of the issue in the relationship. The US side discussed such issues as emigration, dual nationals, divided spouses, and divided families, noting that the President had raised the broad subject with the General Secretary and had handed him a packet of materials. The two sides agreed to study further the question of institutionalizing the human rights/humanitarian dialogue “within the framework of bilateral consultations at the expert level.” In a draft public statement that was negotiated ad referendum, the two sides agreed on wording that stated: “Humanitarian and human rights issues were also discussed. Both sides stated their positions and expressed readiness to continue exchanges of views on these issues.”

Regional conflicts were another subject of this working group’s discussions. The US side stressed the crucial importance of these issues to the health of the overall relationship (witness the experience of the ’70s) and argued that this dialogue was worth continuing even if many of the discussions seemed unproductive. The US side then spoke about Afghanistan, Angola, Central America, and Iran-Iraq, also mentioning the Middle East and Cambodia. A vigorous discussion ensued, particularly on the Middle East, where the Soviets made a pitch for their idea of a preparatory meeting for an international conference. Overall, however, there was nothing new in the Soviets’ presentation of their positions on regional issues.

Sunday, October 12

At 8 am on Sunday morning, both US groups of experts briefed Secretary Shultz and Admiral Poindexter, providing them written reports of the night’s work for the President.

At 9 am, these two advisors and Mr. Regan briefed the President and discussed the plan for the next (and supposedly final) meeting at Hofdi House.

Shortly before 10 am, the President’s motorcade left for Hofdi House. The decision had been made to have all the senior US experts available at Hofdi House for this final session. This made the US working quarters on the second floor of the house much more crowded than they had been during the first day.

Shortly after 10 am, the General Secretary and the President once again began their discussions with Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze participating. The two leaders discussed the results of the previous night and endorsed the work plan developed by the experts group on non-arms control issues. During the Sunday morning discussion, General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to eliminate all Soviet SS–20s in Europe and reduce Soviet SS–20s in Asia to 100 total warheads in return for the elimination of all US PERSHING II and GLCM warheads except for 100 warheads in the United States. The discussions ran until after 1:30 pm, well beyond the time that they were scheduled to end. With some language to work with in the START area, and new agreement in the INF area but no language reflecting this agreement, the two leaders agreed to meet again at 3 pm to see if they could reach any closure on remaining issues.

When the Soviet team departed, the US team (which had already gotten into the motorcade cars) was called back into Hofdi House. A small group was formed (Secretary Shultz, Admiral Poindexter, Ambassador Nitze, Ambassador Kampelman, Asst. Secretary Perle and Colonel Linhard) to quickly draft language in the Defense & Space, INF and Nuclear Testing areas.

About 2:15 pm, while this work was in progress, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrived with a small team of advisors and the two groups had a short conversation to confirm the purpose and scope of the afternoon’s activity.

At about 3:00 pm, as this short session was completed, the President arrived and the US team met with the President and Mr. Regan to discuss how to approach the upcoming session with the General Secretary. It was at this session that the following proposal, which built upon ideas that had been discussed previously as contingencies at the senior advisor level and with the President, was discussed and approved for use by the President. The text of the proposal was as follows:

“Both sides would agree to confine themselves to research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, for a period of 5 years, through 1991, during which time a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals would be achieved. This being done, both sides will continue the pace of reductions with respect to the remaining ballistic missiles, with the goal of the total elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by the end of a second 5-year period. As long as these reductions continue at the appropriate pace, the same restrictions will continue to apply. At the end of the 10-year period, with all offensive ballistic missiles eliminated, either side would be free to deploy defenses.”

In reviewing this language, the President noted that the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles would also eliminate the remaining 100 Soviet and US LRINF warheads, and all remaining SRINF ballistic missiles that would not be covered by the conclusion of the INF agreement. This fact, he noted, allowed the proposal to fully complement the other agreements reached.

At 3:30 pm, the President and Secretary Shultz reentered discussions with the General Secretary and Foreign Minister. At about 4:30 pm, the President came upstairs to meet with his advisors. He carried with him a typed sheet containing a Soviet counter-offer which called for: a 10-year commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty; a prohibition against the testing in space of all space components of missile defense, with such research confined to laboratories; an agreement to a 50% reduction in strategic offensive arms within the first 5 years; and, an agreement that in the next 5 years the remaining strategic offensive arms would be eliminated. It contained no mention of any subsequent right to deploy defenses.

The President discussed with his advisors the demands made by the Soviet side, especially the change in the terms for the second 5 year period. Based on his guidance, a revised US proposal was drafted to the effect that the USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions while continuing research, development and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 percent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten year period, either side could deploy defenses if it so chose unless the parties agree otherwise.

The President returned to the meeting room with Secretary Shultz at about 4:45 pm. Early in the discussions of that session, the President asked the General Secretary what he meant by the phrase the elimination of “all strategic forces.” The General Secretary responded that he would favor elimination of “all nuclear weapons.” The President indicated that the elimination of all nuclear weapons was also his goal. In this exchange, the President was reflecting his willingness to discuss the details, including timing, of a plan to eliminate all nuclear weapons in conjunction with a plan to reduce conventional arms or otherwise assure conventional force balance. No details of such a plan were discussed at Reykjavik.

After this exchange, the focus of the discussion returned to the two positions on the table at that time on the issue of the treatment of Defense and Space. Some time after 7 pm, the discussion ended. The President could not agree to the reinsertion of language restricting critical SDI research only to the laboratory—and the General Secretary would not alter his position on this critical point.⁴

1. Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, NSC, Reykjavik Records—10/19/1986 (5). For Official Use Only. No drafting information was found. Memoranda of conversations from Reagan’s meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
2. For Official Use Only.
3. Scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
4. Shultz sent the President a memorandum on October 14 after meeting with Dubinin in Washington earlier in the day. “Dubinin said Gorbachev had repeatedly remarked on the good atmospherics of his meetings with you. The General Secretary, like us, had regretted that it had been impossible to nail down agreement in Reykjavik, but he felt that real progress had been made in a number of areas. The crux of Dubinin’s presentation was that the Soviets could not understand our strong objections to their proposal that research and testing of strategic defense technology be confined to laboratories.” The meeting ended with tentative plans for Shultz to meet Shevardnadze in Vienna in early November. (Reagan Library, Keel Files, Subject File, Iceland Planning (10/07/1986) (2)) See Documents 6 and 7.