Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

6. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, November 5, 1986, 3:55–6:55 p.m. and 7:05–7:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting between the Secretary and Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. Side

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Tom Simons (notetaker)
  • Dimitry Zarechnak (interpreter)

• Soviet Side

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • P. Palazhchenko (interpreter)

The Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze, and offered him tea or coffee, noting it was self-service. Shevardnadze said that was the best way. He asked if the Secretary were tired. The Secretary replied that it was not too bad; he was able to sleep on an airplane. Shevardnadze said he also made himself sleep on a plane, though this was not easy to get used to. The Secretary said his plane was like an office in the air. Everyone was there, and there was a tendency to talk and meet.

The Secretary said they had a little time that evening and the next morning. Shevardnadze asked how long the Secretary expected this meeting to go on. The Secretary said as far as he was concerned it was openended. He could accommodate to Shevardnadze’s schedule. Shevardnadze said he could spend as much time as needed, but he had heard the Secretary had another meeting. The Secretary said there was a place he had to be at around 7:00 p.m., but it was a reception, so he did not need to be precise.

Shevardnadze said he thought it was good that they were meeting. If it had not been for the meeting in Vienna, this forum, they might have had to schedule a special meeting. They had needed to meet and talk. The Secretary said he agreed. Shevardnadze continued that they needed to see where we were, what stage we were at, what to do next.

The Secretary said this was a good way to express the right agenda. He had a suggestion on how to proceed when they resumed in the plenary. He felt, and the President felt, that the Reykjavik meeting had turned out to be a very good idea, because as the General Secretary had said, we are now in a new situation created by those meetings.

So much ground had been covered in such a short space, the Secretary continued, that it was not possible to go back on it. We had to recapitulate carefully, to go back and see what the differences and areas of agreement were, as the two of them had in Washington. It should be possible to do that; in any case we needed to discuss the issues and see where things stood.

To that end, the Secretary continued, what we had done was to get up a series of written statements—we could turn them over in the plenary or wherever Shevardnadze wished—of what we felt was agreed to, and with brackets where we had not agreed. It might not contain what the Soviets understood, but the purpose was to put these things down, and have something to work from in these matters.

In addition to the subjects that had been formally addressed in Reykjavik, we had also put down some things on the subject of verification. Both leaders had seemed to stress this, and we had tried to distill what the General Secretary and the President had said, and put together some propositions on the subject.

Shevardnadze said he thought this was the correct approach. He wished to say two words about the significance of the Reykjavik meeting. Just an hour after the meeting ended the Secretary had noted his disappointment and sadness at the fact that we had been so close to historic agreements, but that they had not happened. Mikhail Gorbachev in speaking to reporters had made the Soviet assessment very clear too: it had been an extremely important meeting, that set a new stage not just in Soviet-American relations but as a world-scale event, making an advance toward a nuclear-free world. His assessment was that this was a major achievement for both sides, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Of course at the press conference he had also made some critical judgments, but the tone and spirit had been optimistic, particularly the phrase that Reykjavik had not taken them farther from a Washington meeting of the two leaders.

Unfortunately, Shevardnadze went on, members of the U.S. Administration—and he had to say this frankly; he had been and had to be frank; their relations permitted him to be frank—had taken some actions in quite an opposite direction. Members of the Administration had also had differing assessments and interpretations of what had been agreed on by the two leaders. There had also been one-sided assessments, and this practice was not good for international relations, for relations between two great powers.

Shevardnadze continued that he had to recall the unpleasant feelings aroused by the recent series of expulsions.² They had not been useful either for the U.S. or for the Soviet Union. This was a pity; it was sad. He had spent 25 hours talking with the Secretary in New York, including on this problem. He would not elaborate on Soviet feelings and attitudes about certain statements on the U.S. side, but he asked the Secretary to let him mention one of them.

Shevardnadze said he thought an end should be put to talk about how you can only talk to the Russians from a position of strength, putting pressure on them. Frankly, he said, they in the leadership did not take this talk seriously. But their people heard this talk, a nation of 300 million, with their history, their dignity, their potential, their faith in the future. When the President said it was the strength of the U.S. that forced them back to the table, forced them to make concessions, this should not be said by leaders of the stature of the President of the United States.

Shevardnadze said he understood that everyone has domestic problems, party or election politics, maybe other considerations. But even in that respect such statements had not gained anything for the U.S. side. From the point of view of the Soviet state they had not paid dividends. Rather the contrary.

Addressing the Secretary, Shevardnadze said he should have no doubt that the Soviets wished to deal with the U.S. They had demonstrated this in Geneva, in Reykjavik. They were willing to discuss any problems. When on both sides there was a sincere desire, not just for dialogue, but for results, the talks had been productive.

Shevardnadze said he wished to ask the Secretary one question before they went to the plenary: should we stand at the level of mutual understanding reached at Reykjavik or not? Should we believe what the President and the General Secretary had said, or not? This was the simplest question, but also the most important question. Because if we started from the understanding that the President and the General Secretary had reached—agreement to begin a process of eliminating nuclear arsenals in ten years or twelve years—he recalled 1996—then all the other problems about nuclear arms—verification, and space, and the ABM Treaty, and SDI, and nuclear testing—could be seen in a new, wholly different context.

Shevardnadze said he understood we had turned out not to be ready for the discussion, but he asked whether we should be guided by the situation that had emerged. This was a question of fundamental significance. In the speech he had made that day he had not quoted the President’s words, but he had referred to them. They were in his notes. He had gotten into the habit of taking notes. Dimitry took notes; so did his interpreter. And he recalled that the President had welcomed the possibility of eliminating by 1996 not just offensive weapons but all other nuclear weapons, bombers, bombs, cruise missiles.

He understood, and the General Secretary understood, what had been said, and Gorbachev asked whether what the President had said was just an emotional outburst, or a statement by the President of a great power. What did it mean? This was a basic question.

Why had the question arisen in our minds, Shevardnadze asked. The fact was that the Soviets were faced with different interpretations, different versions by Administration members, except for the Secretary. Regan had expressed his opinion. The President had given a somewhat different opinion. Then Admiral Poindexter had given his version. The latest statement by the President was then different from that. If they looked at the U.S. delegation proposals in Geneva, they were not a continuation of the Reykjavik conversation; they did not reflect the level the conversation had had in Reykjavik.

Shevardnadze said he had considered his lengthy remarks to be necessary. He did think we needed clarity. The question was: shall we be guided by the Reykjavik understandings or not? Clarity was necessary.

The Secretary said he would like to comment on the points Shevardnadze had made.

He agreed that we had been through a rough patch with the expulsions that had gone back and forth. After the last action the Soviets took, he had consulted with the President, and then said, “That’s the end, we do not intend to take another step, let’s end it.” He wanted in no small measure to give Shevardnadze credit for helping him manage their way through this bad patch. Now we needed to go on and concentrate on the positive things we could do.

The Secretary continued that he believed that things which were very difficult to manage were likely to occur from time to time in our relationship. They would be a test to people in his job and Shevardnadze’s job. So we should manage these difficulties, and work things out, but nonetheless not make it impossible to continue with other things. He hoped that was where we were.

As to the question of strength, the Secretary continued, he wished to cast the matter slightly differently. He had gotten to know Shevardnadze, and felt he had a good personal relationship with him. He liked to see him and his wife when they met. But that was not the basic reason why he (the Secretary) was with him so much more than he was with the Foreign Minister of Hungary. Budapest was a charming city; he loved to go there; there were many Hungarians in our country. We honored Hungary. But he paid a lot of attention to the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union was such a consequential country in the world; it had strength. He assumed that, vice versa, Shevardnadze liked the Belgians, as he himself did. Belgium was an honored and important country. But it did not have the weight in the world that the United States did.

The President was very conscious of the importance of maintaining our capabilities, the Secretary went on, and he was proud that in his tenure these capabilities had improved. But he (the Secretary) understood Shevardnadze’s point, and would take it on board.

Insofar as Reykjavik was concerned, the Secretary went on, his purpose in trying to clarify matters between Shevardnadze and himself in this meeting was to try to get things as straight as possible. We should take this opportunity. That was the reason why the U.S. side had gone to the effort of putting things down on the paper he could give Shevardnadze. He was prepared if Shevardnadze was to have the people with him meet with the people on Shevardnadze’s delegation to go through these papers, to make things as clear as possible, and they could then meet the next morning. If that procedure was acceptable to Shevardnadze, they could follow it, and get as much clarity as possible.

With regard to the President’s attitude toward the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons, the Secretary said, that was indeed the President’s goal. He had said it before Reykjavik; he had said it at Reykjavik; he had said it since Reykjavik. It remained the President’s view of what we should be trying to do. What the things are that needed to be accomplished most after a certain point in moving toward that goal, and how rapidly it could be reached, presented a series of very hard questions that had to be worked at carefully. He did not have to tell Shevardnadze that; the Soviet side said the same thing. As we made reductions in deterrent capabilities, the two of us would need to be sure that balance exists in those capabilities and in the world. With all due respect, it was not just the two of us, but also other countries. It would take some doing.

As he viewed the Reykjavik meeting, the Secretary continued, the two sides had reduced their discussions to reasonably clear writing, on procedures anyway, for bilateral, human rights and regional issues. He had that document with him. They had worked out a reasonably careful statement on strategic arms, for a 50% reduction. They had gone some way through a careful statement on intermediate-range arms, although the delegation groups had not been able to come to grips with it Saturday night since it was not until Sunday morning that the two leaders, with the two of them present, had reached agreement on a global limit, with a figure.³ Where that left us on short-range missiles was not clear. We had differences on nuclear testing, but Shevardnadze had said that he thought a little effort could bring a definitive agreement into focus.

On verification, the Secretary said he thought the statements that had been made were very interesting. There had not been time to pin this down, so we had made an effort to do so. On space and defense, it seemed to him that discussion had focussed on three areas, but because they had not been able to finish they had not been able to pin this down very well.

Shevardnadze said there seemed to him to be contradictions in what the Secretary had said. Had the President said elimination of nuclear weapons was the end objective, or was this an agreement achieved at Reykjavik? He understood that there had been an agreement reached, not just that this was a final goal. There had been understanding reached for the elimination of all offensive weapons by the end of 1996, and then the President had gone on to say that all types of nuclear weapons should be abolished.

On medium-range missiles the Soviet side had made the major step on French and British systems, and also the step on Asia. On defense and space they had discussed important things, although agreement was not finalized. It was not just as a final goal, but as a result, that this was important. He had not said it that day in his speech, but he recalled that the President had said it would be good to instruct their delegations to work out an agreement to eliminate all nuclear arms, land-based, sea-launched, cruise missiles, to give it to the Geneva negotiators. He had not quoted Gorbachev, because there had been no contradictions there. But elimination of nuclear weapons had not been discussed as just a final goal. It had been more profound than that.

He agreed, Shevardnadze continued, that if we went forward on the formula the President had proposed all sorts of problems would emerge. He valued the Secretary’s proposal that we would have to proceed by stages. This was a legitimate and correct approach. There could be a first step, a second step, and the like. Third countries, England, France, China, would have to be taken into account. The problem of other countries also arose, countries with nuclear bombs. This could be resolved, we could make provisions for it in our joint work, we could discuss how to use international fora, to make sure that no madman endangered our countries.

But what he needed to hear from the Secretary, Shevardnadze went on, was whether we were to be guided by an agreement that the President and the General Secretary had reached or by something else. If we were not to be guided by the agreement to eliminate all nuclear arsenals, why would we be guided by the other understandings reached? After all, they had not been signed either. What then would remain as a result of Reykjavik?

Shevardnadze said he wished to recall the course of the dialogue there. He remembered it very well. First there had been the proposal for two stages. In the first strategic offensive weapons would be reduced by 50%. In the second all remaining ballistic missiles would be reduced. Then after the recess, in the meeting in which they had both taken part, there had been the additional development that all kinds of strategic offensive weapons would be eliminated by the end of the second stage. Then he recalled that the President went further on elimination of all nuclear weapons at the end of ten years. Was that agreement now in force, Shevardnadze asked, or was the U.S. now going back on it?

The Soviet side attached fundamental importance to this because they had proposed at Reykjavik that the General Secretary and the President adopt directives that the Foreign Ministers could use to finalize texts for agreements. He thought they could be used to formulate final points here for the President and General Secretary to adopt and give the Foreign Ministers to work into agreements. But in order to work seriously the Soviet side needed to know whether the two sides were to be guided by Reykjavik or not.

The Secretary replied that they needed to be. That was his guide. There was more clarity in some areas than in others. But on space and defense he wished to remind Shevardnadze that there had been a number of ambiguities, which had left them all tired and disappointed. Afterward the press had asked him why he looked tired and disappointed; he had replied it was because he was tired and disappointed. He wished to review these for Shevardnadze.

Shevardnadze interjected that he was sorry the Secretary had avoided answering his question: should be we guided by what the President had said, that all nuclear arsenals should be eliminated by the end of 1996? If so, we were in a completely new situation. Against that background we would have to look differently at the questions of nuclear arsenals, the positions of France, England and China, at new circumstances, at nuclear explosions. And some adjustments might be made in the outlook on SDI, because it was one situation where nuclear weapons continued to exist, and another where they no longer existed.

The Secretary reiterated that the President would welcome getting rid of all nuclear weapons. As he viewed it, the sooner the better. But he also recognized—and in the last hours of Reykjavik it had not been possible to spell this out—that this was an exceedingly complicated task. It was a task that disaggregated itself, so to speak. Our task is to find how the pieces fit together. There were different pieces. Some would take longer than others. It would take much time. Probably elimination of all nuclear weapons would be the most complex piece, the last step, so to speak.

As we viewed it, the most destabilizing weapons that each side had were ballistic missiles, the Secretary said. That was because each side could wipe each other out in 30 minutes. Once they were fired it was all over. They could not be called back. It was all over (here the Secretary snapped his fingers). This was very destabilizing, particularly with the MIRVs that have emerged.

Shevardnadze said that was the case for the U.S. side. (The Secretary replied that it was the case for the Soviet side too.) Shevardnadze continued that this was because, for example, the elimination of their nuclear arsenal would leave them nothing in Europe, but the British and French systems, which could not destroy the U.S., could still destroy the Soviets. That was destabilizing.

The Secretary said that of course it was, but he was seeking to categorize the most destabilizing systems, the ballistic missiles, the U.S. side’s, the Soviet side’s, anyone else’s, and since it is known how they are produced, it was better to have an insurance policy against someone who got hold of them. But they were the most destabilizing weapon.

The next most destabilizing weapons, the Secretary went on, were those delivered over long ranges, in other words bombers, submarines with cruise missiles, as distinct from ballistic missiles. But these were less destabilizing, because bombers could be called back, and anyhow took a long time to get there, and at least the Soviet side had very impressive defenses, whereas there are none against ballistic missiles. These weapons were therefore destabilizing, but in a different category.

And one might say, the Secretary continued, that there is a third category of all nuclear weapons. Bombers or cruise missiles with nuclear weapons were one thing; with conventional weapons it was different. They were not welcome if you were hit by them, but they were different.

And then when one talked about all nuclear weapons one had everything from various tactical weapons as such to things people produce that set off nuclear explosions. These were not destabilizing elements, but they had potent consequences, not just in what was blown up but, as the Soviet Chernobyl accident⁴ had shown, in secondary effects. This was not desirable, but it was not as destabilizing as other things. He did not pretend to be an expert, but he had been told that you could produce a nuclear explosive device and put it in a suitcase; it was that containable. So getting rid of these was very important, but also very difficult.

So, the Secretary continued, if Shevardnadze asked if the President was committed seriously to get rid of all nuclear weapons, the answer was yes. This was not just a statement. If Shevardnadze asked whether the President thought it likely in 10 years’ time, the answer was that he had doubts. If Shevardnadze asked if the President committed himself in Reykjavik to do this no matter what, the answer was no. There were so many complicated things to be worked out.

On Sunday afternoon nothing had been worked out, the Secretary recalled. There was the question of what to do after the ten years. There was the question of whether to treat short-range missiles under strategic or intermediate-range, not to speak of the question of what was permitted under the ABM Treaty, which received most of the focus. Nothing had been resolved, and we needed to work on it, to capture the momentum that had been there in what the two leaders had discussed and agreed on in complete seriousness on both their parts. He had no doubt about Mr. Gorbachev’s conviction.

The Secretary went on to say he also thought we could not let ourselves become so preoccupied with arms control issues that we did not pay attention to what causes tension and produces arms. The two men had talked about this and agreed that the underlying tensions needed to be addressed. Here we had had periodic discussions of tense issues, of points where the U.S. and the Soviet Union had interests and influence. These had been productive, but not very productive, and we would like to see them continued, as had been agreed at Reykjavik.

Most fundamental, the Secretary went on, were the issues that went to individuals, like freedom of religion, of movement, of emigration, of divided families and spouses. These created enormous tension in our relationship, and more fundamentally in East-West relations. He did not know if Shevardnadze had anything to say to him, but they had discussed it, and the two leaders had discussed it, and we had put it at the top of the list.

At any rate, the Secretary said, what we were prepared to do that day, that night, the next day, or of course beyond, was to take the pieces of Reykjavik, to clarify them as far as we could, to use the exercise as a means, in the format the Soviet side had suggested for Reykjavik: in his letter to the President Gorbachev had described it as a preparatory meeting, a means of giving instructions to people in the various areas where they were negotiating.

Shevardnadze asked what then remained of what Comrade Gorbachev and the President had agreed. He categorically disagreed with the Secretary on the question of strategic offensive arms and eliminating nuclear arsenals. This had been the subject of full mutual understanding. We could say that the conversation had developed dramatically. But this meant that on the main problems there had been full mutual agreement, including agreement on non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for ten years. After that they could not advance. But Shevardnadze recalled that the President had said they had reached solutions of historical importance, and that it was up to the Soviet Union to move on SDI. He had not cast any doubt on agreement on the other problems. If the U.S. did not now agree with this it should say so. The truth was the truth.

The Soviets did not use words lightly, Shevardnadze continued. The General Secretary had not done so when he talked to reporters in Reykjavik, and that was what the Soviets understood. On human rights and regional issues, Shevardnadze went on, he could say categorically that we either disassociate ourselves from what was agreed or be guided by what was agreed. Of course there had to be stages, and he understood that this gave rise to complex questions. He wished to stress that we could work on these questions, like that of the other nuclear powers. But we could not backtrack. It would be bad for the President, for future generations, if we backtracked. How could we believe Bessmertnykh and Mrs. Ridgway if we could not believe the President and the General Secretary?

The Secretary said he had tried to explain the U.S. view. He wished to ask a question: did the Soviet Union agree that at the end of the 10-year period both sides had the right to deploy if they chose to?

Shevardnadze replied that he thought what had been said at Reykjavik was quite clear. He thought the Soviet side had made serious concessions. They had agreed that research work could go on within the laboratory, broadly understood, as he had told the Secretary in Reykjavik. This implies the creation, or development, of mockups, prototypes and mockup systems, including ABM systems, and including space-based ABM systems. They had gone very far.

On the question of how to think about what to do after the ten years, Shevardnadze continued, they thought we should see what is revealed. We should see what science, research and practice produce. The Soviet side did not wish to deploy, but if they saw that there was no danger to them in the U.S. deploying, they would have no objection to the U.S. doing what it wanted.

Shevardnadze said he was asking a question. The Secretary and the President had said the U.S. was ready to accept a commitment not to withdraw from the Treaty for ten years and to observe the Treaty under the narrow interpretation. What did that mean? What is permitted, and what is not permitted, in terms of development of ABM systems?

The Secretary said Shevardnadze’s remarks showed we need a careful discussion of this and other complicated matters. What the President and the General Secretary had done was to break into new ground. Shevardnadze had just stated the Soviet position at Reykjavik, not the U.S. position. With regard to permitted activities, no one had made a statement on the narrow interpretation. We followed one in our work, but we believed the ABM Treaty had broad permissibility. We were ready to discuss this and go into detail on our views, at Geneva, or here for that matter. But at Reykjavik these issues had not been resolved.

If we asked where we were, the Secretary continued, the answer is that we were at a different and more promising stage than before Reykjavik, but that very serious difficulties remained. We needed to set down where we were. We had set down our formal position in writing, and assumed that the Soviet position was the one they had taken in writing too. We needed to try to capture the conversation and move it forward. We had tried to set that down and do that. That was where we were, in the Secretary’s view.

Shevardnadze replied that that day’s conversation reminded him of conversations they had had at Helsinki, at Geneva, in Washington.⁵ It seemed to him as if Reykjavik had never taken place. But the Soviet side believed that it had taken place and was a very important event. Apparently this was only the Soviet view, however. He had to conclude that we could not be guided by what had been formulated by the two leaders on strategic offensive weapons and on eliminating nuclear arms. This was the general conclusion he had to draw.

Secondly, Shevardnadze went on, he had thought till then, from the Secretary’s statements and the President’s and what they heard from U.S. allies, that the U.S. Administration was following a narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty. He asked if that were changing. He knew that the President had said he was for a broader interpretation, but then it seemed that the narrow interpretation had prevailed. The Soviet side was for strict interpretation of the Treaty. This was of fundamental importance to them. It was not their fault that the question had arisen. The fact that they had offered to put a timeframe on withdrawal from a treaty of unlimited duration was a serious concession.

The Secretary said that the U.S. view was not the same. They thought of our agreement to the ten-year timeframe as essentially an effort to accommodate Soviet concerns, to respond to those concerns; we accepted it, but it would be a change in the treaty. And the Soviet proposal to confine research to the laboratory was not a concession, but a narrowing of the treaty. If he were Shevardnadze he would try to sell it as a concession too, but it was a narrowing.

On the question of definition there were two operative matters, the Secretary went on. The first was what the treaty permitted. We had done a great deal of work on this, and we were prepared to discuss it and describe how we see the background, the history. We thought it had a broad meaning. Second, the President had chosen to manage his strategic defense program within boundaries that were less broad than what was permitted. But this did imply a position on what was permitted as we understood it.

Shevardnadze said the trouble was that we had different understandings and interpretations on the meaning of the treaty. In the past he had not been familiar with this, but recently he had studied it pencil in hand. He had to say that the U.S. approach was not consistent with the actual meaning of the treaty, if we were to say that observance of the treaty meant observance in the actual sense of the word. Perhaps the Secretary’s colleagues could explain the U.S. view.

The Secretary said this was precisely what needed to happen. This was what Reykjavik stood for. On substance a great deal had been done. There remained much to do, but it was in a more productive context. This was the meaning the world saw, and why there was such an uproar in Europe. The two leaders had come together, and they had talked more realistically than ever before about radical reductions in nuclear weapons, looking to their full elimination sometime, and some way. They had talked seriously about it, and this forced people to think about a new situation, in new ways, about new realities. He personally thought this was a good thing. But there was a long way to go to that reality. We needed to work on that here, and in Geneva.

The Secretary continued that he thought the reason it had been easier to “deal into” nuclear testing was that so much had been discussed before, whereas with space and defense issues less was achieved because there had been much less discussion, and this needed to be done on the basis of what had been said. But the instincts of the two leaders, as he had said to Shevardnadze before, were right on where the world was going. But big change was involved, and big change would take awhile, and involve a vast array of complicated subjects. We needed to be getting about that task.

Shevardnadze said the two of them would take a beating for backtracking on what their two leaders had agreed to in Reykjavik, in practical terms. But what he was particularly interested in, and what others would explain to their people, was how the U.S. saw what was permitted and what was prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Because if we regarded the ten-year period was purely formal, or if, as the President had once said, it was just a piece of paper, the question was why we needed to conclude such an arrangement. For the Soviet side, it believed the treaty should be strictly observed. More clarity was needed.

The Secretary said we had been ready to explain our views for a long time. We took treaty obligations very seriously, and we were concerned that the Soviets did not. He did not wish to belabor the point, but there was the Krasnoyarsk radar,⁶ and we were concerned, with reference to Shevardnadze’s point about a piece of paper.

He might go beyond that, the Secretary continued. The U.S. side believed the Helsinki Final Act and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to which the Act explicitly referred, inter alia obligated the signatory states to permit free emigration.⁷ That was one reason why he felt comfortable talking to Shevardnadze about the subject more frequently than, he was sure, Shevardnadze would like.

Shevardnadze said that when one side had a complaint about another side, this was not surprising. In relations among states that arises. But it should be a principle to be fair. The Soviet side had stated what the Krasnoyarsk radar would be. Let us not debate on that, he said. But let us hypothesize, he went on, that it was a violation. The Soviet side also believed that the U.S. radar in Greenland was a violation, and they had more arguments than the U.S.—the actual data, and the fact that it was outside national territory. Why had he mentioned fairness and objectivity? Because the Soviet side had proposed a way of resolving the issue that relieved both sides of burdens: for the Soviets, building theirs, and for the U.S., building and reconstructing theirs. If the U.S. were serious about trust, a political solution was needed. The decision should have been taken, but the U.S. did not want to take it.

The Secretary said the difficulty with Shevardnadze’s argument was that he had used the word “reconstruction.” The treaty explicitly recognized that existing radars could be maintained and modernized, which was what was happening to ours.

This was not the place to debate this issue, however. The question was how best to use the time remaining. He had made a proposal, and asked how Shevardnadze wanted to proceed.

Shevardnadze said he understood what the Secretary was saying, but “reconstruction” was different from what he had in mind. The problem was that the U.S. side was building a phased array radar, which was banned in the treaty. He was ready to discuss this with the Secretary, but his impression was that some members of the Administration did not want it to be resolved. Rather they wanted it to remain, so that they could repeat again and again that the Soviets were in violation.

He was afraid of experts’ debates, Shevardnadze went on, because he already had the feeling that what had been achieved in Reykjavik would be eroded if we transmitted instructions to the negotiators in Geneva. Indeed voices were already being heard there: Mr. Kampelman had said that the U.S. can withdraw from the treaty within the ten-year timeframe; reasons are already being given why the U.S. can withdraw. Of course the Soviet side would find arguments to respond to him, but the question remained from the outset: would we be guided by the agreements reached in Reykjavik? And it turned out we would not.

The Secretary said he believed we should, and he had told Shevardnadze how things appeared to us regarding strategic arms, ballistic missiles and all nuclear weapons. There had been no meeting of the minds on what would happen after ten years or on what the ABM Treaty means. We were ready to discuss that. What was different at Geneva was that real discussion was now possible, whereas before Reykjavik he would have said that it was not very productive.

Procedurally, however, the Secretary said he wanted to ask again how Shevardnadze wished to use their time together. They had another half hour that evening, his delegation was ready to work through the evening, and they would meet again the next morning. If Shevardnadze wished, we could use the time to look at the papers, but if he was not prepared to do so, obviously we would not.

Shevardnadze said good, let’s look at it. The Soviet side had also prepared some drafts.

He had to conclude, Shevardnadze commented, that the Secretary was more courageous than he was. The Secretary could discount what his President had said, while he could not backtrack on what the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leader of his country, had said. The Secretary recalled that at Reykjavik he had offered Shevardnadze an amnesty, and the offer still stood. Laughing, Shevardnadze said he was sticking to his word.

The Secretary asked Shevardnadze whether he had anything to say to him about individual cases or about emigration. Shevardnadze said he probably had nothing new to say. The lists which were normally handed over were being given consideration. Some cases had been resolved, others were being studied and were in the process of resolution.

That day he had addressed humanitarian questions in his speech, Shevardnadze went on, on instructions from his leadership. The Soviet side believed that in addition to specific problems that needed to be resolved, specific individuals and families, more fundamental work needed to be done, not just in the Soviet Union but also in other countries. Informally he could say that this was a very interesting area, and it needed more work.

The Soviets were bringing their domestic law and regulations into line with all their international obligations, Shevardnadze continued. But he had inquired, and found that the U.S. had much more work in store for it. In his speech he had mentioned the U.N. Bill of Human Rights, and he would urge the Secretary’s aides to look at the document and compare it to U.S. legislation. He was mentioning just some documents. There was also the International Labor Organization. The Soviet Union had had very difficult relations with it; that was earlier. But on questions of work, which was the organization’s main function, there were 167 conventions, and the U.S. had ratified just 7. He had found there were dozens of documents of international importance that were ignored in many countries.

When they really looked at it, Shevardnadze continued, they had concluded that major discussion was needed. This meant not so much a list of complaints against each other, but discussion in order to resolve problems that had piled up in this area. So on instructions from the Soviet leadership, and Mikhail Gorbachev in particular, he had proposed convening a European forum within CSCE, including the U.S. and Canada, and proposed to convene the forum in Moscow. They favored a high-level meeting, with participation by foreign ministers, experts, lawyers, other officials. It would not be a formal thing, but designed to improve actual practice in all questions. There were also questions in the Soviet case, and they would work on them, but other countries had no right to remain outside the process.

Shevardnadze said he was familiar with the Secretary’s speech that day.⁸ He himself had avoided that kind of discussion. He had many facts and complaints, and he could have produced them on the basis of existing international documents, but he had not done so. He thought it would not be a good use of the rostrum to engage in further confrontation in the Soviet-American relationship. And if the forum took place in Moscow, he thought it also needed a constructive approach.

The Secretary said we would study the proposal, and he welcomed the serious spirit of the Soviet approach. We would also welcome any steps the Soviets took on individuals or issues.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. side had put forward a proposal, which had seemed more or less agreeable, to establish a humanitarian working group. It would do exactly what Shevardnadze had described, engage in systematic discussion. He understood we had suggested December 1 for a first meeting.

Shevardnadze replied that perhaps in the context of the proposal they had just put forward the two sides could consider what needs to be done. It was important to know what position the U.S. would take. He did not rule out discussion at various levels, but we needed a major international discussion. We needed to tackle the issues scientifically, and take practical actions. The Soviets were not afraid of the problem. They would act on what would be decided.

The Secretary reiterated that he welcomed the spirit in which Shevardnadze and Gorbachev were approaching this, commenting that he would leave it at that.

The Secretary then suggested that perhaps they exchange papers, and report to the waiting groups on what was expected of them that evening. He wished to explain the U.S. papers⁹ he was handing over:

—a paper on strategic offensive arms, without brackets, essentially what their people had worked out in Reykjavik;

—a paper on intermediate-range arms, worked on by Nitze and Akhromeyev, but not complete because the leaders had not yet agreed, so that there were some brackets; but the Soviets might have other things to say;

—a paper on space and defense issues, with lots of brackets; here too the Soviets might want some changes;

—an effort to say something on verification, drawn on what the leaders had said, to say something new;

—something on testing, which had been worked on but not agreed;

—the joint public statement and work program developed by Bessmertnykh and Ridgway; this might perhaps be adjusted, since there had been some progress: we had concluded an agreement on space, the Soviets had tabled things on energy and transportation which we were studying; and

—a possible covering statement which says where we derived these things from—the Reykjavik events.

The Secretary said this was a package of papers, and we would have no problem on publicizing them. In fact there were arguments in favor of making them public—most of what was in them was known—but if we did that together it would have a greater stamp of authority. It would clarify not just where we agreed but where we did not agree. All these issues needed work.

In handing the papers over, the Secretary commented that they were held together by that essential of bureaucratic life, a paperclip.

Shevardnadze said that he had a shorter document, a kind of thesis-like collection of key provisions of agreements by the U.S. and Soviet sides, to be signed after further preparations, on strategic offensive arms, on medium-range missiles, on the ABM Treaty, on the prohibition of nuclear testing. He was ready to instruct his people to consider them together with the Secretary’s.

Shevardnadze said that if the Secretary permitted and time permitted, he would like the next day to have an exchange on chemical weapons and conventional weapons. The Secretary replied that he welcomed discussion of both topics. Shevardnadze said he would not be covering a great deal, but he did wish to say something.

He noted that the document the Soviet side was proposing was an unofficial translation, bound by two paper clips. The Secretary asked why one was larger than the other. Shevardnadze said that the big one was for Reykjavik, and the smaller one for backing away from it. (Actually, they were the same, but one was back-to-front.)

Returning to the question of how to continue, Shevardnadze said that at the plenum of delegations in Geneva on November 7 the Soviet delegation would put forward their proposals, based on all the arrangements agreed at Reykjavik. Then, since the schedule previously agreed called for a recess on November 11, that round would probably end. The next round was to begin only in early January. He put the issue to the Secretary as a kind of problem: should we wait for the next round, or contemplate desirable interim steps, meetings, consultations and the like? This was something that should be decided.

The Secretary asked if Shevardnadze had in mind meetings like those that had taken place the previous summer. Shevardnadze replied that that was one possibility. Or we could consider moving up the next round, say to the beginning of December. Or there might be some other possibility. He could not be precise, and perhaps the Secretary had some suggestions.

The most acute problem was what is permitted and what is banned under the ABM Treaty, Shevardnadze said. He attached special importance to this issue. It could be discussed at Geneva, or perhaps they could also set up a special group at a higher level, perhaps Deputy Minister, also including other agencies. This ought to be clarified as soon as possible. He felt that without clarity on this it was hard to expect any serious progress. He put the issue to the Secretary as a question. That was all he had to say. He did not see clear prospects, but believed we should go to work. He asked the Secretary whether they should instruct their aides jointly or separately.

The Secretary suggested that they go in together, describe their meeting, and say they had exchanged papers and agreed that the respective working groups should convene that evening to work over papers to see how far they could get with them, having in mind reporting to the ministers the next morning. He would be glad to have the groups meet at the Embassy. It was 7:00 p.m.; perhaps they could meet at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m.

Shevardnadze suggested that the groups themselves decide. He did not place much hope in their discussions, since he doubted that deputies could resolve what ministers had been unable to resolve, but they should have work to do.

The ministers joined the general meeting at 7:05 p.m., following a photo opportunity. Shevardnadze invited the Secretary to read the verdict. The Secretary said he could make a summary, as at the end of their meeting, and Shevardnadze could add or subtract.

The Secretary said the ministers had discussed almost all the topics one way or another. The Minister had said that the next morning he wished to have some time for chemical and conventional weapons. They had exchanged papers. He had given the Minister materials the U.S. side had prepared, which were designed to clarify where we had come to agreement, and through brackets where we had not. The Minister had given him papers the Soviet side had prepared, a more overall-type statement. They had agreed their staffs should examine these papers during the evening to see what could be made of them, and report to the ministers in the morning. He had offered the room they were in for 9:00 p.m. that evening, and the Minister, with a deference toward his colleagues that the Secretary admired, had said they should choose their own time and place.

Shevardnadze said the Secretary had described everything correctly. The next morning they would meet in the Soviet Embassy. He hoped they would not be empty-handed. He did not wish it to be thought that only chemical and conventional weapons were unresolved questions; they simply had not had time to cover them. It was now time for the ministers to relax, and for the assistants to work.

The Secretary said that Ridgway and Nitze would be the team leaders on the U.S. side, and would be in touch with their Soviet counterparts.

Shevardnadze concluded that the system was in place, and now functioned automatically.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze Vienna, 11/87. Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Simons. The meeting took place at the U.S. Embassy. Shultz was in Vienna November 4–6 to attend a CSCE Review meeting.
2. In telegram 18358 from Moscow, October 22, Hartman reported that the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had expelled five U.S. officials in retaliation for the U.S. expulsion of five Soviet employees in Washington suspected of espionage. See Document 2.
3. Reference is to Reagan’s meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik the morning of October 12. A memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
4. Reference is to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident on April 26.
5. References are to Shultz’s meetings with Shevardnadze in Helsinki, July 30–August 1, 1985; Geneva, November 19–20, 1985; and Washington, September 27, 1985. Memoranda of their conversations are scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986.
6. Reference is to the long-standing point of contention over whether the Soviet phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
7. Reference is to the Helsinki Final Act, signed August 1, 1975, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 10, 1948.
8. Reference is to Shultz’s address before the CSCE Review meeting, entitled, “Pursuing the Promise of Helsinki.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1987, pp. 47–50)
9. Copies of the papers are in Department of State, EUR/RUS, Political Subject and Chronological Files, Lot 2000D471, Shultz-Shevardnadze/Vienna 11/5–6/86.