Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986–January 1989

7. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, November 6, 1986, 8:05–9:40 a.m.

Secretary Shultz’s Meeting with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The Secretary
  • Amb. Ridgway
  • Amb. Nitze
  • Amb. Hartman
  • Amb. Kampelman
  • Amb. Matlock
  • Mr. Linhard
  • Mr. Parris
  • Mr. Zarechnak (Interp.)

• U.S.S.R.

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Dep. FornMin. Bessmertnykh
  • Amb. Karpov
  • Mr. Mikul’chak
  • Mr. Palazhchenko (Interp.)

Shevardnadze opened the meeting by asking when the Secretary would have to leave. The Secretary replied that, as he understood Shevardnadze had to leave Vienna at 10:00, he had planned accordingly.² Shevardnadze confirmed that his plane would leave Vienna at 10:00.

The Secretary indicated he had a number of points to make on subjects which had not been discussed the day before.³ He understood that Shevardnadze had something to say on chemical weapons and conventional arms, and was looking forward to hearing his views.

The Secretary recalled that General Secretary Gorbachev had raised in Reykjavik the question of increasing information flow between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The U.S. had since considered his specific ideas. We felt that, in general, a halt to interference in radio broadcasts—and not only of jamming of the Voice of America—would be a positive development. We were still considering the General Secretary’s interest in renting a radio station in the U.S., or in working with a neighboring country to locate a Soviet transmitter near the U.S. The proposal posed difficult legal and technical issues, but we were interested in exploring every possibility.

At the same time, we were also interested in broader discussions aimed at improving the flow of television programming, films, and printed information between our two countries. USIA Director Wick was working hard to see what, in concrete terms, might be possible. If the Soviets were willing to do so, the Director would be in touch with his Soviet counterparts to explore the matter further.

General Secretary Gorbachev had also raised in Reykjavik the question of U.S. visas for Soviet trade union leaders. The Secretary remembered this issue from his days as Secretary of Labor,⁴ and we had looked into it since Reykjavik. It turned out that there were some Soviets that U.S. labor leaders would like to see visit the U.S. Anatoliy Marchenko, a Soviet worker who we felt had been unjustly imprisoned for his support of basic human rights, was one such case. If Soviet authorities were prepared to allow people of concern to our labor leaders to visit the U.S., we were willing to be equally flexible on a one-to-one basis for Soviet trade union officials.

Moving on to the bilateral and other issues addressed by working groups the night before, the Secretary recorded the U.S. understanding that the Soviets would be prepared in the context of meetings of the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Review Commission to discuss humanitarian issues. It was also the U.S. understanding that both sides agreed the bilateral work program agreed to in Reykjavik should continue to be implemented.

The Secretary next raised terrorism. He noted that the U.S. had welcomed Soviet statements condemning the Karachi hijacking attempt.⁵ In light of those statements, he hoped the Soviets were following closely emerging evidence which made it clearer and clearer that there had been Libyan involvement in the incident. We had been disappointed, on the other hand, by the Soviet Union’s reaction to evidence developed by the British judicial system of Syrian involvement in the attempted bombing of an El Al airliner.⁶ The Secretary knew that British Foreign Secretary Howe had provided the Soviet Union with specific information in this regard. We hoped that the Soviets would consider this information carefully, along with the more concrete question of what steps should be taken as evidence became clearer of official Syrian involvement in international terrorism.

Shevardnadze in response first addressed the question of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union continued to regard this as a promising area, and believed, on the basis of its assessment of the current state of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, that it should be possible to reach agreement next year on a convention to ban chemical weapons. The Soviets had accepted U.S. views on the timing and procedures for destruction of CW stocks and on the verification of that process. Shevardnadze had said yesterday that Moscow would be prepared to address outstanding verification issues on the basis of the U.K.’s proposal of earlier this year.⁷ The terms of this proposal were closer to the U.S. starting position than to that of the Soviet Union. Soviet representatives in bilateral discussions of the issue in New York had now been instructed to put forward fresh ideas which took U.S. views into account on the issue of non-production of CW by civilian facilities.

In short, a lot of work had been done in this area. The Soviets were willing to do more. Shevardnadze emphasized in this regard how stringent the Soviets were prepared to be on the verification question. But they had the impression that there had been no reciprocal movement on the U.S. side. The bilateral consultations now underway in New York were therefore of “critical importance.” They could “make or break” prospects for a convention. In view of the new circumstances that had been created by recent proposals, it would be appropriate for the U.S. to reconsider its own position, and respond to the situation created by British and Soviet moves on verification.

With respect to conventional weapons, Shevardnadze acknowledged in advance that it would not be useful to get into a detailed discussion. But he sought the Secretary’s clarification on two points.

First, what was the U.S. view of a possible “Stockholm II” option for addressing the question of conventional arms in Europe? The question was relevant because the mandate for a second phase of the recently concluded Stockholm conference⁸ would have to come out of the Vienna Review Conference⁹ which had begun the day before.

Shevardnadze’s second request harkened back to an earlier suggestion by Gorbachev that NATO and Warsaw Pact working groups developing positions [on] European conventional arms reductions maintain “working contacts” with one another. What was the U.S. view of such an arrangement? If the Secretary were not prepared to answer in detail now, perhaps the issue could be discussed through Ambassadors at a later date.

The Secretary said he had four points to make in response.

First, we regarded the verification provisions worked out in Stockholm as important indicators of the workability of such arrangements. We would be watching carefully to see how well they worked in practice.

Second, we had been disappointed at the lack of a serious Eastern response to the most recent Western proposals in the Vienna MBFR negotiations. These proposals had reflected a major change in the West’s position. There had been no real Eastern response, and we hoped that the Soviet Union and its allies could review the bidding, especially on the central question of verification.

Third, and with direct reference to Shevardnadze’s questions, both sides had emphasized publicly our commitment to the ideal of strengthening stability and security in the whole of Europe. NATO’s May 30 Halifax statement¹⁰ had been followed by the Warsaw Pact’s June 11 “Budapest appeal.”¹¹ We applauded the Soviet acceptance of the Western concept of conventional arms control from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO’s high-level conventional arms control task force was currently engaged in a thorough review of conventional arms issues. As its report was due in December, the Secretary would like to hold off answering Shevardnadze’s query on working group contacts until the study was complete. Shevardnadze nodded his agreement.

Finally, the Secretary expressed the strong U.S. view that discussion of arms control as such should be on an alliance-to-alliance basis, as distinct from confidence building measures, where other countries could play an important role.

On chemical weapons, the Secretary welcomed what Shevardnadze had said, especially his emphasis on the importance of verification. We would be interested in further discussion of this issue. We remained convinced of the need for rapid, mandatory inspections; otherwise it would be difficult to cope with the problem. But we were dedicated to pursuing the problem further. The Secretary confirmed Shevardnadze’s request for clarification as to whether the Secretary was referring to bilateral consultations in New York as the channel for such a discussion.

Shevardnadze next replied to the Secretary’s points on media access. While he would again eschew details, Shevardnadze noted that the basis for any discussions in this area should be the principle of reciprocity. The questions involved in the regulation of information flow were indeed complex, especially as they related to the smaller countries and the developing world. That was why the Soviets supported the creation of a major forum for the discussion of such issues. For their part, the Soviets were prepared for discussions on the bilateral plane between appropriate agencies.

The Secretary noted that he would inform Director Wick of this and have him be in touch with his Soviet counterparts. Shevardnadze agreed, urging only that the Secretary emphasize to the Director the importance of reciprocity in this, as in all fields. The Secretary countered that reciprocity was indeed a good principle, and suggested the Soviets apply it by stopping their jamming. The U.S. did not jam radio transmissions.

Shevardnadze replied that in fact information from other countries did not reach the United States the way it should. When confronted with that fact, the U.S. always hid behind the explanation that its media was privately owned. But the situation was not as simple as that. In any case, this was an area the two sides’ negotiators could address. The Secretary agreed they would have plenty to do.

Returning to the subject of trade union visas, Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary of a point Gorbachev had made to the President in Reykjavik—no obstacles were placed by Soviet authorities in the path of U.S. labor leaders wishing to visit the U.S.S.R. They received visas. The same approach was required of U.S. authorities if reciprocity were to be applied. Instead, the U.S. sought to choose who would come to the United States. This was unacceptable. There were 90 million Soviet trade union members; how could the U.S. make such choices?

The Secretary pointed out that the proposal he had made was based on a strict application of the reciprocity principle—you choose one; we choose one. Shevardnadze replied that the Soviets did not make the choices. To try, he said, would only lead to confusion. He did not even know, for example, if Marchenko were a union member. Probably he was not. It would be better to let the trade unions themselves make their own arrangements, without official interference.

The Secretary said he could tell Shevardnadze what position U.S. trade unions would take. We had consulated with AFL-CIO leader Lane Kirkland in formulating the proposal the Secretary had just made. It fully reflected Kirkland’s views.

Shevardnadze (after prompting by Bessmertnykh) pointed out that the State Department had in the past denied visas to many Soviet trade union leaders who had been officially invited by American unions. Shevardnadze did not want to reduce the issue to an exchange of complaints, and he recognized it could not be solved in Vienna, but there was a fundamental decision to be made: if both sides favored contacts between trade unions, let the unions themselves make the decisions.

The Secretary noted that the words “trade union” had different connotations in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The difference in concepts was at the root of the problem. Shevardnadze cautioned that it would not be possible to change the structures of the two countries. It made more sense to adapt visa policies to existing structures. The Secretary suggested that the issue might appropriately be discussed at a future meeting of the Bilateral Review Commission. Shevardnadze agreed, adding that it might also be examined at the level of deputy foreign minister or ambassadors. The issue should not be put off, as it involved “millions.”

Turning to the Secretary’s remarks on terrorism, Shevardnadze pointed out that the Soviets had addressed this issue repeatedly and that Moscow’s position was well known. He had touched on the matter the day before in his speech, as had the Secretary. The Soviet Union was ready to cooperate in efforts to prevent terrorism, to eliminate the conditions in which it could exist, including with respect to civil aviation.

As for the disappointment the Secretary had expressed in connection with the Soviet reaction to Syria’s alleged involvement in the El Al bombing attempt, Shevardnadze observed that Foreign Secretary Howe¹² had not expressed similar disappointment when the two had discussed the issue. The Foreign Secretary had repeated the points he had made in the House of Commons. But Syria had also made an official statement on the incident. It was impossible simply to dismiss that statement. There was, Shevardnadze complained, much talk about “evidence” of Syrian involvement, but no evidence had been produced. Howe had said he would provide such evidence. “We’ll see,” Shevardnadze commented.

There had also been allegations, he continued, of Libya’s involvement in the Pakistani episode. Thus far, however, the Soviets had seen no evidence of such involvement, even in contacts with the Pakistani government. It was true that the Soviets’ relationship to the Pakistanis was not on a par with that of Washington’s. Perhaps the Pakistanis had provided the U.S. with something more concrete. The Soviets would welcome anything which would help them look more seriously into the question. So, on terrorism, Shevardnadze concluded, perhaps that was enough said.

As for the MBFR talks,¹³ Shevardnadze reminded the Secretary that the Eastern side had made counterproposals since the Western offer to which the Secretary had referred. The East’s proposals had been good proposals, and they could be discussed. The Soviets were not without hope that the Vienna negotiations could be brought to a successful conclusion. There were differences between the two blocs. But these were due mainly to a one-sided approach by the West.

The questions at issue in the Vienna negotiations dealt with Central Europe. What did the Soviets see taking place in these talks? Soviet territory (to say nothing, Shevardnadze noted parenthetically, of the territory of Soviet allies such as Poland and the GDR) would be subject to inspection. But key U.S. allies (such as the U.K.) would not be included in such a regime. France was not even a participant in the talks.

Nonetheless, the Soviets were for a positive conclusion to the negotiations. “Major decisions” might nonetheless not be possible in the current forum. Rather, the two sides should look to an overall solution on the scale of Europe as a whole. In this context, Shevardnadze noted, the Soviet Union at Stockholm had made a fundamental decision to open up its territory to inspection, while, again, the U.S. had been able to stand aside. This was not a complaint, it was a fact.

The Secretary interjected that Shevardnadze’s statement was not correct. The U.S. was part of an alliance. It maintained large numbers of forces on the territory of countries which were subject to inspection and transparency. So the U.S. was not excluded.

The Atlantic-to-the-Urals concept was one which the U.S. supported, the Secretary continued. But in MBFR, we had found that, despite all the recent Soviet talk of verification and willingness to take the subject seriously, we found when we made concrete proposals that the East was not prepared to “operationalize” the concept. That was one reason why, when we were preparing for the Vienna meeting, we had included verification among the issues on which we had done papers for working with the Soviet side.

Shevardnadze asked if the two should discuss MBFR further. The Secretary thought, in view of time constraints, that they probably should not. After all, the negotiations had been going on for 15 years already. Shevardnadze quipped that, as they had had so little success discussing how to stimulate the Geneva discussions, perhaps they should focus on those in Vienna.

Shevardnadze then proposed that group leaders on each side report on the working session of the previous night. The Secretary, noting that the report could be short on our side, replied that we would nonetheless be glad to hear the Soviet assessment. Shevardnadze asked Bessmertnykh to lead off, asking that he confine his remarks to no more than 5–7 minutes.

Bessmertnykh volunteered that participants on both sides could probably agree that they were disappointed in the results of the session, even if they might describe differently the reasons for their disappointment. During the course of the talks, the Soviet group had become convinced anew that—at the level of experts—the U.S. would like to revise some fundamental agreements reached in Reykjavik by the leaders of both sides.

The U.S. participants, Bessmertnykh complained, had been unable to produce a single proposal to “enrich” the U.S. position as outlined in Reykjavik. The two sides had carefully considered the document¹⁴ Shevardnadze had given the Secretary the day before, a document, Bessmertnykh emphasized, based on the Reykjavik agreements. It had proved impossible, however, to reach agreement on any of the questions covered by the document. At the same time, the Soviet side had been surprised by the U.S. group’s attempt to create, in the name of the President and General Secretary, documents which did not contain what had been agreed to in Reykjavik, and which contained material which had not been agreed there.

Throughout, Bessmertnykh continued, a common element of the U.S. approach was an apparent desire to descend from the “high ground” of the Reykjavik meeting to a lower, pre-Reykjavik plateau. Even when the Soviet group tabled compromise language which would have allowed the two sides to continue to work on one of the main outstanding issues—the strengthening of the ABM Treaty regime—the U.S. group had had no answer. So, Bessmertnykh concluded, the session was disappointing. But it had also been necessary, as it had made possible a clearer view on the Soviet side of the U.S. approach “at the expert level” to these issues.

Invited by the Secretary to respond, Ambassador Nitze indicated that, at the outset of the previous night’s discussion, the U.S. had proposed a serious comparison of Soviet and American documents on the table. Our purpose was to clarify where agreement existed—both in the documents concerned and in fact, and to confirm our understanding of areas of disagreement reflected in the U.S. documents. Bessmertnykh had rejected this approach, insisting instead on posing a specific question: how did the U.S. interpret the ABM Treaty. Concluding that the Soviet side was seeking an authoritative description of U.S. views on this point, Nitze had provided a detailed response. Kampelman and he had also made clear that our delegations in Geneva were prepared to continue the discussion.

The U.S. group had then returned to its proposal that both sides’ documents be compared to confirm areas of agreement and disagreement. Initially, the Soviet participants appeared to want to focus exclusivly on areas of agreement. Nitze had felt this was not a correct approach, as it was equally important to have a clear understanding of areas of disagreement if there were to be subsequent progress toward eliminating such differences.

The depth of disagreement on the correct approach became evident during the discussion of START, Nitze continued. The Soviet preference for addressing only issues common to both papers led them to reject any reference to an issue of fundamental importance to the U.S.—the question of sublimits and whether they should be a subject for discussion. The U.S. had raised the issue in Reykjavik, and, while it had been impossible to reach agreement on appropriate wording, Soviet representatives had clearly indicated it could be addressed later. Bessmertnykh would allow no references to this commitment—an important matter of fact on which the record was clear. Instead he sought to convey a sense of agreement when none existed. In its own document on START, by way of contrast, the U.S. had sought to describe the two sides’ differences straightforwardly and fairly. We had found no cooperation on the Soviet side.

There had also been difficulty discussing points we thought had been agreed in Reykjavik, for example on INF. It had been the U.S. impression that there were substantial areas of agreement on this basket of issues. Both the Soviet and U.S. documents seemed to confirm this impression. But the Soviet group had avoided agreement on joint language.

Finally, in an attempt to continue serious discussion of the issues involved, the U.S. had tabled the following language:

“The U.S. Secretary of State and the U.S.S.R. Minister for Foreign Affairs have agreed to hold discussions, at the expert level, with a view to bringing the two sides’ positions closer together where common ground and remaining significant differences exist, based on the discussions and progress made in Reykjavik and on subsequent work in Geneva and Vienna. The results of those discussions will be considered by the two Ministers, inter alia, in the context of continued exchanges at their level.”

When Nitze finished reading the document, the Secretary observed that the initiative had been an effort to respond to the question Shevardnadze had raised the day before in their private meeting: “what should be done between rounds in Geneva?”

After a whispered exchange with Bessmertnykh, Shevardnadze remarked that he had not expected anything different from the experts’ discussions. He and the Secretary, after all, had been no more successful at clarifying the key question of what their two leaders had agreed to in Reykjavik. Therein lay the major reason for the disappointment both group leaders had reported.

Speaking frankly, Shevardnadze said, his exchanges with the Secretary in Vienna had been the least productive of those they had conducted to date. This was disappointing. The Secretary would now be reporting to the President, as Shevardnadze would be to the Soviet leadership, and to Gorbachev. For his part, Shevardnadze would say that his discussions in Vienna had confirmed that current U.S. positions boiled down to old, “mothballed” pre-Reykjavik positions plus the concessions and compromises recently made by the Soviet Union. While it would leave a “bitter aftertaste,” this was what he would have to report.

Asking to make an additional point, Shevardnadze recounted how, after Reykjavik, he had been left with the impression that the U.S. felt the Soviet Union needed an improvement in relations, the resolution of nuclear arms issues, more than the United States. Here, too, he cautioned, the principles of reciprocity and equality should be the guide.

Shevardnadze felt that it would be “pointless” for the two sides to adopt a joint statement on his meetings with the Secretary. As for what should be done next, he had informed the Secretary the day before of the Soviet Union’s intention to present on November 7 the paper he had handed over the day before. That paper, of course, had been based on what had been agreed to by the two countries’ leaders in Reykjavik.

Shevardnadze noted that the Geneva talks would go into recess November 11 or 12. Until they resumed, the Soviets would be prepared to consider arrangements acceptable to the U.S. side to continue discussion of these issues. It did not rule out further working level discussions, or even exchanges at the ministerial level. But meetings for their own sake were a luxury the Soviets did not feel they could afford. It made no sense to assemble so many people for a meeting on something neither side wanted.

As to the specific suggestions made the night before on further meetings, the Soviets had proposed a “higher-level” working group to discuss “the most important issues, like the ABM Treaty.” That proposal remained on the table.

Shevardnadze asked rhetorically if there were anything else. In response to a prompt from Dubinin that he had not addressed bilateral issues, Shevardnadze acknowledged that the situation was better in that area. Meetings on bilateral and regional questions were in train and should continue.

The Secretary said he agreed with Shevardnadze’s last point and would comment on that publicly. As to possible meetings between Geneva rounds, the U.S. remained willing to have an exchange of the sort Ambassador Nitze had described. We were prepared in that context to describe our view of what the ABM Treaty says, and to hear Soviet views on the subject. We hoped that the Soviets would be interested in having such a discussion at some point. For the moment, they did not appear to be. So our proposal also remained on the table. There would be ways to exchange views further as both sides considered the conversations which had taken place in Vienna. And at some point we would have to decide where to go from here.

The Secretary continued that he would have to say publicly that the U.S. had come to Vienna prepared to discuss the full range of the promising results achieved in Reykjavik. We had tried to identify areas of agreement and difference so as to be able to work on the problems remaining. We had brought along statements designed to do so, and a team capable of addressing the issues seriously. So we had been disappointed when the Soviet side was not prepared to do that. The U.S. was prepared to be patient. As the Secretary had said publicly, we regarded Reykjavik as a potential watershed. For the first time in the post-war era, the meeting there had raised the hope of reversing the process of accumulating ever-greater numbers of nuclear arms. We had welcomed that.

Shevardnadze commented that, in describing the results of Reykjavik, what was important was not nice words and phrases, but positions. Here there were clearly deep disagreements. The Secretary agreed, noting that it was therefore important to identify them, as well as areas of agreement, so as to build on what had been achieved in Reykjavik.

Shevardnadze agreed that all this could be taken into account, but stressed the need for “guidance.” The Soviet side had until the Vienna meeting thought that such guidance had been provided in Reykjavik at the highest level. Now the situation was different. All that they thought had been agreed had been destroyed.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. was not destroying anything. A vast amount of territory had been covered in Reykjavik. We should hold onto that.

Shevardnadze agreed, but said it would now be difficult to add to what had been done or not done. The Soviets the day before had proposed working level exchanges on “the most difficult questions.” Shevardnadze encouraged the U.S. to consider this proposal. He assured the Secretary that Soviet negotiators had strong nerves. They were prepared to wait for years to achieve progress, as they had in Vienna.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. had found Shevardnadze’s idea suitable as a vehicle for between-round discussions. The proposal Nitze had outlined was a direct response. It might be possible to discuss the idea at greater length in Geneva. Shevardnadze agreed that the matter should be looked at once again. He noted, however, that the Geneva negotiators already had a heavy load, and expressed fear that the matter would be lost sight of. If the objective was really to accelerate progress in the Geneva talks, it was important to discuss “the most important question” as soon as possible.

Shevardnadze indicated that he understood how, in the wake of the Reykjavik meeting, “all of you” had been under a heavy load. Perhaps there had not been adequate time to reflect on the significance of the meeting. After the U.S. had had more time to take this into account, the two sides should consult on what direction to take.

Shevardnadze concluded the meeting by asking the Secretary to stay behind for a brief private session.¹⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S Records, Memoranda of Conversations Pertaining to United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz—Shevardnadze Vienna, 11/87. Secret. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
2. After meeting with Shevardnadze, Shultz traveled to Paris to meet with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac.
3. See Document 6.
4. Shultz was Secretary of Labor from January 1969 until June 1970.
5. In telegram 15505 from Moscow, September 8, the Embassy reported on a September 6 TASS statement condemning the attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 to Karachi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860680–0336)
6. In telegram 19053 from Moscow, November 4, the Embassy reported that elements of the Soviet media had “raised the possibility of Israeli or American military action against Syria” over the attempted bombing of an El Al flight from London to Tel Aviv in April 1986 (the so-called Hindawi Affair). The Embassy noted that Soviet officials had downplayed the Hindawi Affair in conversations with Embassy officials but had “highlighted possible Syrian-Israeli tension” in conversations with Arab diplomats.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860841–0301)
7. Reference is to the British proposal in August to allow a signatory to an international treaty banning chemical weapons to demonstrate its innocence within ten days to avoid on-site inspections.
8. Reference is to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, which concluded on September 19.
9. The third follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Vienna Review Conference, reviewed negotiations on arms control and disarmament in addition to human rights.
10. Telegram 172344 to all NATO capitals and the European POLAD collective, May 31, transmitted the ministerial statement issued at the conclusion of the Halifax Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council along with a separate Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control that called for “increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels” and announced a high-level task force on conventional arms control. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860422–0584)
11. In telegram 4692 from Stockholm, June 13, the Embassy reported on the Warsaw Pact’s response to NATO’s Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D860459–0413)
12. British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe.
13. Reference is to the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, ongoing from 1973 to 1989.
14. See footnote 9, Document 6.
15. No memorandum of conversation of this meeting was found.