Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, July 31, 1985, 2–5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S. SIDE

  • Secretary Shultz
  • Ambassador Hartman
  • Ambassador Kampelman
  • Ambassador Nitze
  • Assistant Secretary Ridgway
  • Ambassador Matlock
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer
  • Interpreter D. Zarechnak

• SOVIET SIDE

  • Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
  • Ambassador Dobrynin
  • MFA Deputy Minister Komplektov
  • Ambassador Kvitisinskiy
  • Lt. General Detinov
  • MFA Press Spokesman Lomeiko
  • MFA Chief of Staff Chernishev
  • MFA Deputy Director Tarasenko
  • Translators: Pavel Palazhchenko
  • Mr. Uspenskiy²

Secretary Shultz introduced Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to the system of simultaneous translation equipment, and noted that this was just an experiment. If it worked, fine, but if it didn’t, he should feel free to say so. Shevardnadze agreed.³ He then said that for Georgians, women are very special. By including Ambassador Ridgway in our delegation we were trying to disarm him.

The Secretary said that he had what is alleged to be an old Georgian saying “May your feet bring luck to this house”. He wanted to add the hope that Shevardnadze’s presence would bring luck to all the efforts we are making to bring positive results to our countries. The Secretary went on to say that he had to rely on Ambassador Nitze as an historian—but it is said that some SALT I negotiating sessions took place in the room they are meeting in, so that is a certain part of history.

The Secretary then said that he would like to welcome Mr. Shevardnadze on behalf of the United States. He wished to send his regards to President Gromyko. They have logged many hours across the table together and he believed they have a good working relationship. Sometimes their sessions had been stormy and sometimes productive, but they were able to maintain a relationship and the Secretary wanted to convey his warm regards and congratulations on his new position. Shevardnadze responded that Gromyko had always told him about the Secretary and their relationship.⁴ If there was to be any change, he could only hope that their meetings would be more productive. The Secretary said that he agreed and that they might establish more of a conversation.

Shevardnadze said that the way that he saw the meeting today was that they should proceed from the fact our two countries face a very responsible moment—when General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan will soon be meeting. This is awaited not only by our people but by the entire world. A lot depends on this meeting, including the political climate in the world. He would structure his comments as follows: First he would see how this meeting should be approached overall. Then he would look at certain components of it. Since there was not much time, he would try to use his prepared remarks.

The Secretary said that he fully agreed that our responsibilities are great. We must ensure that we do our work well so that the meeting of the two leaders can be as productive as possible.

Shevardnadze said that this is a meaningful time. The world expects us to have a constructive approach. We should strengthen the basis of peace and confidence.

Shevardnadze pointed out that the fact that an agreement had been reached for our leaders to meet was a positive element. The goal of the present meeting should be to delineate the general political and practical steps to be taken to prepare for the summit. Both sides needed to give a political impulse to our relations, and restraint should be exercised in our bilateral relations as well as in our international affairs in order not to make the situation more complicated and in order to provide for a good summit meeting. The main task of the summit would be to move forward on the essential issues between the two countries. The principal such area is the area of security. This is the question which determines our relations in practice, and this is the issue we should begin with.

If our two countries wish to end their confrontation and end the arms race, producing a more stable climate, they need to improve their relations. Avoiding or postponing the resolution of these issues is not possible, and to continue to have the type of confrontation that has existed in previous years is very dangerous. The “safety margin” has been eroded. For this reason it is necessary to get down to specific work on all aspects of our security relationship and not to waste time. The Soviet side would be ready to orient itself towards a constructive dialogue, and towards mutually acceptable solutions to a very wide range of issues. It hoped that the U.S. side was also prepared to do this. Our peoples expect that the talks will be productive. Our countries do not have the right to fail.

The Secretary asked whether Shevardnadze intended now to go into specific areas. If so, perhaps the Secretary could do his general introductory points now. Shevardnadze said perhaps he should continue, but Dobrynin said no, to let the Secretary go ahead.

The Secretary said he agreed that we needed a work program and that it should be productive. As we see it, the meeting between our two leaders is kind of a high exclamation point in an ongoing process. We should do as much as we can beforehand, have as many results as possible. But the meeting should also be for agenda-setting, a kind of springboard. It should give a political impulse as Shevardnadze had said. President Reagan regards the relationship as leaving much room for improvement. He had asked the Secretary to say that the U.S. is ready to work at this; we are prepared to make agreements if they are in our own interest, and we assume that you feel the same way. Therefore, we need to define things which are in our mutual interest.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make one amendment to Shevardnadze’s outline. While agreeing that security issues—arms control and regional questions—are essential, another essential element in the relationship involves the interplay of views in the realm of human rights. The Secretary referred to the points he had made to Shevardnadze at the Finnish dinner the previous night.

(At that time, the Secretary had told Shevardnadze that he had raised the names of individuals and made a strong point about human rights in his speech that day because the Final Act requires attention to this subject. He also wanted to be certain that Shevardnadze understood that these cases are very important to us, that movement on these cases is important. This is simply a fact of life. Having made this the centerpiece of his speech and having raised it again with Shevardnadze that night, he did not feel obliged to continue at great length in their meeting on Wednesday.⁵ But it was critical for Shevardnadze to understand the central role of human rights for Americans and for our relationship. Shevardnadze rejoined in a fairly friendly manner that when he came to the United States he could speak about black unemployment and that would embarrass the United States. The Secretary said so be it; Shevardnadze could do what he had to do. This was the gist of their conversation on Tuesday evening).⁶

The Secretary said that human rights is a subject the President has in mind. Thinking of Shevardnadze’s point about the need for a positive atmosphere, they could do things here which would help.

Shevardnadze said that if we are to talk seriously about human rights, we need to talk about the need to live in peace; the right to life itself is the most fundamental right of all. Thus, security issues are the core issues and avoiding them is not possible.

The Secretary said he agreed that there is a certain indivisibility of these issues.

Shevardnadze then read a lengthy prepared text. He said that sometimes our views don’t agree, but we need to find ways to reach agreement. Shevardnadze indicated that he wished to convey the Soviet approach to the issues, realizing that they did not always coincide with the U.S. approach, but a frank expression of the Soviet position was important for reaching future agreement.

U.S.S.R.–U.S. relations have a profound effect on international relations. The entire world is very worried that Soviet-American relations are at a very dangerous point. One might think that there are difficult issues which require time and effort to resolve. But, it is difficult to understand when there is refusal to take comparatively easy steps which could increase stability and trust. One such area is the question of no first use of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union took an obligation before the whole world not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.⁷ If the U.S. would also take such an obligation, many issues could be viewed differently. The same applies for adoption of CBM measures and the principle of non-use of military force. The U.S. should ratify the TTBT and PNE Treaties and resume negotiations on a CTB.

Shevardnadze said that he would like to stress the new initiative taken by General Secretary Gorbachev, i.e., the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions beginning on August 6 and lasting through January 1, 1986.⁸ The Soviet moratorium would continue to be in effect after that date if the U.S. were to agree to a similar moratorium beginning January 1.

The two sides could do much that was positive and should do so. Gorbachev had indicated in his message to President Reagan that the U.S. side should see this step as one which is aimed at the reduction of nuclear arms. It would be a good example for other countries and an important contribution to improving the international climate and decreasing the military danger. Such productive steps should be examined in preparing for the summit. The question of a freeze on nuclear weapons should also be examined in this context.

The pivotal issue in our relations is the question of security. The last round of negotiations in Geneva produced no movement on the U.S. part. The Soviet side felt that the U.S. was not willing to see and resolve issues in accordance with the agreement reached between Shultz and Gromyko in January. There had been many meetings, but no agreement. And this was not accidental since the practical steps being taken by the U.S. are leading to the creation of new space attack weapons. Instead of reaching an agreement on the non-militarization of space, the U.S. side is proposing to create rules on how to militarize space, on how many and which weapons to have there. If the arms race is extended into space, the efforts to reduce nuclear arms will be futile, and the competition in the military area will become more dangerous in all its aspects.

Despite the U.S. explanation, the U.S. does not wish to have a mutual agreement, but closes all the doors which open such a possibility.

In the area of strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, the U.S. was continuing to adhere to those principles which led to a dead end before. In the area of strategic arms, the U.S. delegates in Geneva proposed a solution which would not decrease them, but increase them as a result of deployment of long-range cruise missiles of all types. These weapons are new and very dangerous, often attack weapons.

The U.S. side has a similar approach with regard to medium-range nuclear weapons, i.e., it does not wish to have an agreement, but wishes to use the negotiations for other purposes. It is clear that U.S. medium-range missiles are an addition to the U.S. strategic arsenal. Their purpose is not only to upset the regional balance but to gain global superiority and a first-strike capability on the part of the U.S. and its allies. There are even those who speak of a decapitating strike.

This is particularly serious since it is joined with the U.S. concept of an anti-ballistic missile shield to cover U.S. territory. The U.S.S.R. makes its judgments not only on the basis of what is said in Geneva (although that, too, is significant), but also on the basis of statements by officials of the U.S. Administration, and especially on the basis of the practical steps taken by the U.S. in the military area. The Soviet conclusion is that the U.S. wants to accelerate the arms race. The U.S. “Star Wars” plan brings the world closer to a much less stable situation.

How should the Soviet Union respond to this? It will not simply disregard it, but will take the necessary steps to prevent being left at a disadvantage.

The Soviet side considers that security should be achieved not through military superiority but through honest resolution of the issues of nuclear and space arms on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union is not seeking unilateral advantage. Future generations would not forgive us for commencing a race in space arms. So long as space attack weapons still do not exist, it is easy to put a stop to such a race. The Soviet Union wants to have strategic equilibrium at a lower level.

Turning to medium-range nuclear weapons, Shevardnadze said that efforts should not be made by one side to outsmart the other. There is no possibility of doing this because of the great intellectual and technological capabilities of our countries. Our strategic weapons should be reduced, and channels should not be created to by-pass this. In considering medium-range nuclear weapons, not only the weapons of NATO, but also those of England and France must be taken into account, as should U.S. carrier-based aircraft, since they are an important part of the strategic balance. Neither side should have first-strike weapons near the borders of the other.

If there is agreement in Geneva, the Soviet side would be prepared to halt its deployment of SS–20s in Asia as long as there was no substantial change in the strategic situation in that area. The U.S.S.R. has also taken another constructive step, i.e., it has declared a moratorium until January on all counter-measures which it is taking in Europe. The U.S., however, was not following suit, and this was a shame, since this is an opportunity which should not be wasted.

The Soviet side has been told there are untested elements of flexibility in the U.S. position. But where are they? Do they really exist? On the basis of equality and equal security, there can be agreement on a significant reduction of nuclear weapons on both sides, and the Soviet Union is prepared to go quite far in this direction. The Soviet Union is in favor of genuinely radical reductions in nuclear weapons. The U.S. should think carefully about what we are offering.

Shevardnadze recalled the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on all types of nuclear weapons under negotiation in Geneva.⁹ The Soviet side has proposed such a moratorium as the beginning of the process of reduction and final elimination of nuclear arms. This would be the first step and within a month or two specific levels could be proposed, provided that space weapons were banned. Space should remain peaceful. It is regrettable that the U.S. side does not wish to respond on the essence of the proposal. The U.S. also does not wish to talk about the Soviet proposal of a separate moratorium on space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. It is clear that such partial measures would be easy to implement and would have a positive influence on everything else. The Soviet side considered that the proposals made by it in Geneva should be looked at anew by the U.S. side. Accusations which have been made regarding alleged Soviet intransigence or that there has been an absence of Soviet proposals are ill-founded.

The U.S. assertion that it is lagging behind the Soviet Union in nuclear arms is not correct. An objective approach needs to be taken. There needs to be a political will to prevent the occurrence of a dangerous military event.

There was a great deal to think about regarding areas of forward movement, and this would be important in preparing for the summit. The above complex of questions would be an important and perhaps the central issue at the summit. There are, of course, other items on the agenda.

The question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a permanent fixture of the Soviet-American agenda. The sides have areas of mutual interest in this, and they recognize it. There are, however, also questions of concern which the Soviet side has transmitted to the U.S. side. There has been a preliminary exchange of views between the two sides on the possibility of a joint statement at the summit regarding the area of nuclear non-proliferation. On the whole, the Soviet Union is in favor of this, and the two sides need to work on how they should stress their commitment to it.

The NPT Review Conference will take place in about one month, and the Soviet side suggests that U.S. and Soviet representatives could get together after the conference, and, bearing the results of the conference in mind, could draft a text for examination by the leadership of the two countries. Whether this would be a separate statement or part of a larger concluding document could be decided later.

Shevardnadze indicated that he would like to say a few words about chemical weapons. At present our representatives in Geneva are talking to each other about this subject, and the Soviet side is in favor of stepping up the pace of their work. If the U.S. side agrees, instructions could be given to the delegates there to have consultations on all aspects of a chemical weapons convention. Such consultations would be useful. It would be very important to have a ban on chemical weapons. There are many complex sides to this issue, and experts need to get together to talk about it. Sometimes, talks are one thing, and practical political actions are another. Both sides must monitor the progress made in the area of chemical weapons and their destruction.

The U.S.S.R. is concerned about U.S. binary weapons. If the U.S. side prefers to have an agreement on chemical weapons, the Soviet side would be ready, and at the summit as well, to try to arrive at a common understanding on questions on which a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and destruction of stockpiles would depend.

Shevardnadze wished to say a few words about the CDE Conference in Stockholm. The Soviet side had recently heard from the U.S. side about the latter’s readiness for constructive work on CBM’s, security and disarmament. But the Soviet side was afraid that U.S. actions do not correspond to its words. At the conference, there is a desire to start concrete work on a draft final document, a desire to combine non-use of force as well as military technical measures. We hope the U.S. would be more constructive and would urge some of its allies to be more constructive also. The time is ripe for this. All of the CDE participants could put together an outline of a concluding agreement. The U.S. could be assured that any positive change in the situation would be noticed by the Soviet side. The entire situation would be positively influenced by productive dialogue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. The Soviet side believes we can make this an asset for the summit.

Shevardnadze wished to dwell briefly on the MBFR negotiations. It seemed that these negotiations were treated as an “unloved stepson” by the United States. The Soviet side was surprised that Secretary Shultz had indicated to Ambassador Dobrynin that there were no prospects of reaching an agreement on MBFR at the summit.¹⁰ The U.S.S.R. considers that consultations on this issue should continue. It considers that this is one of the issues that could be agreed between the sides without a great deal of effort, although at present the two sides do not have much to show for it. The Soviet side would like to ask the U.S. leadership to look again at its proposals concerning an initial reduction of U.S. and Soviet forces. The two countries could give a good example of increasing security and cooperation in Europe.

Shevardnadze said that he had spoken about the importance of European cooperation yesterday. The Soviet Union is in favor of continuing the CSCE process and doing so substantively. This has always been its position of principle and reflects the conviction that relaxation of tensions is important for all countries, and all countries should work towards it. Most of the CSCE participants take such an approach. The Helsinki Final Act was an expression of the good will of the participating states and their desire to find mutually satisfactory solutions and balance the interests of all concerned.

The past ten years of the Helsinki process have been uneven, and have not gone as well as first envisioned. The Helsinki process has been idling in place, and, what is more important, questions of European security have been left off to the side. What often happens is that questions of human rights are put to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in order to cover up the dangerous actions of the other side and to disclaim the other side’s responsibility for not fulfilling its obligations under the CSCE.

Shevardnadze said he was astonished at Secretary Shultz’ speech the preceding day.¹¹ The Soviet Union considers that such issues are its own internal affair. The Soviet side wonders why the U.S. made no mention of questions of security and cooperation in Europe, or mentioned them only in passing.

If we are to expect serious results from the summit, we should create a good environment for that meeting. What would happen if Shevardnadze would come to the U.S. and read a list of unemployed and homeless people, giving their names? He would not want to do this.

The sides should look to the future in a constructive vein. The next CSCE Review Meeting was scheduled to take place in Vienna in 1986. The main thing was to develop a positive experience in Europe.

The U.S.S.R. considered that the Cultural Forum to be held in Budapest this fall and the Human Contacts meeting in Bern in April should be conducted in a businesslike way, and that normal intergovernmental relations should not be replaced by other issues.

With regard to regional issues, if the U.S. and U.S.S.R. wished to improve their relations, they needed to see what could be done with regard to regional issues; a great deal depends on this. It is important to establish a dialogue and to look for points of convergence. There have already been meetings on the Middle East, Southern Africa, and Afghanistan. However, the Soviet side is waiting for a reply from the U.S. on arranging consultations on the Far East, Southeast Asia, and Central America. In such consultations, we would need to seek political solutions of differences through peaceful means. It is difficult to seek mutually acceptable measures if no restraint is shown in practice in the Middle East, Central America, and Southern Africa.

The Soviet side feels that there needs to be discussion of Central America. It has expressed to the U.S. leadership its concern over the policies and acts of the United States which lead to an increase of tension in relation to Nicaragua and Cuba. Such a policy on the part of the U.S. cannot but influence Soviet-American relations.

The last issue Shevardnadze wished to turn to was the issue of bilateral relations. He said that although there had been changes for the better in these relations recently, these changes were not yet tangible. It was the U.S. side that initiated the worsening of these relations and the Soviet side would expect it to take concrete steps to change this abnormal state of affairs. The Soviet side is prepared to work on the specific issues which it has described.

A package of issues exists in our relations. Agreement has now been reached in Tokyo with regard to flights in the North Pacific area, and the Soviet side believes, and the U.S. should agree, that this will lead to a discussion of renewal of the Air Transportation Agreement between the two countries. This can also effect the establishment of consulates general in Kiev and New York and the renewal of the Exchanges Agreement.

This, of course, did not exhaust all of the bilateral relations between the two countries, but resolution of these issues could lead to the resolution of other issues as well; for example, the Soviet side was waiting for a reply from the U.S. side about continuation of discussions on the Soviet-American maritime boundary in the Bering Sea. This could also be one of the areas for discussion at the summit.

Shevardnadze indicated that these were the types of questions which should be discussed by the two leaders at the summit. Both sides should work with each other in order to prepare thoroughly for it.

Shevardnadze concluded by joking that perhaps he had violated the rules for these meetings by talking so long.

The Secretary said that Shevardnadze was not at all out of order, since they must take whatever time is needed. In fact, the Secretary may himself need even more time as he has got all of his own material to go through and in addition wanted to address Shevardnadze’s points as well. Shevardnadze said that they didn’t think all questions could be responded to today. These were complex matters and all he had wanted to do was give an outline. Also this was their first meeting.

The Secretary said that for him the simultaneous translation process had gone well. Shevardnadze should see how it works for him. Shevardnadze said that since the Secretary had endured it, he would too. The Secretary said no, that if it were not right for him, he should stop using it. Shevardnadze then said “as is convenient to you.”

The Secretary said that he found much to agree with and much to disagree with in what Shevardnadze had said. He would try to sort this all out. First he would make a comment overall. On the Geneva meeting between the two leaders we were in broad accord with one exception (human rights.) He noted as a general set of things that the topics are exactly the sort of things that they should be trying to advance. So in general, we are in accord. He now wanted to take the issues one by one.

But perhaps first one comment about the importance of being careful not to upset things, as Shevardnadze had said, and to take positive steps to enhance the prospects for the meeting between the two leaders. There are a number of activities that tend to inflame things. We have had some discussions of the Nicholson shooting. We need to handle such matters much better and we still have a long ways to go on this case. The other incident in the zone was handled quickly and well and is not an issue at this point. We had discussions of the Berlin Air Corridor. At the technical level some progress has been made. But nothing can blow up faster than Berlin. Some of your statements during the TWA hijacking were inflammatory. The U.S. finds the buzzing of our rigs in the Bering Sea unnecessary and an example of the type of thing where restraint is called for. As a general proposition, we are ready to work with the Soviet Union. We recognize that we have different systems and that we are competitive, but we don’t want this competition to explode. We have no military or aggressive intentions. He wanted to assure Shevardnadze of this fact.

The Secretary then said that he wanted to turn to security issues, following the outline which Shevardnadze had made. He had a general comment which cut across this field. We don’t feel there is much to be gained by broad declaratory statements that cannot be verified. That goes for big things like Geneva and lesser things as well. We need content and procedures to verify what has been established. We say this in the spirit of what it takes to build confidence and also with our Congress in mind. They have to ratify agreements and the first question they ask is how we can be sure to verify what is being carried out.

The Secretary then said he wanted to turn to nuclear testing. It would be a positive advance to put some controls over testing, but we have concerns with verification. This is precisely the problem we have with the 1974 and 1976 agreements (TTBT and PNET) which Shevardnadze had mentioned. He had discussed this with Ambassador Dobrynin and undoubtedly the Minister was also very familiar with it. There are things that can be done and in that spirit the President had made his proposal last year and again this weekend to advance verification.¹² That is part of our problem with the Soviet moratorium as well. Beyond that, we are concerned with the moratorium because as we view it, the Soviet side has moved ahead with more modern weapons so they need testing less. In addition, we have the experience of the early 1960’s when the Soviet Union had broken out of a moratorium with a big testing program. President Kennedy had then said we should never again be involved in a moratorium without the means of verification. For that matter, a freeze also presents problems of the same type.

By contrast, the President’s proposal is operational and practical. It also recognizes the Soviet point that it is not a good practice to change agreements that have already been signed. This is not necessary. If you carry out the suggestion we have made, it will lead in a positive direction. The Secretary asked the members of his delegation whether he had left anything out. He noted that Nitze usually kicked him if there was a problem. Shevardnadze looked around to find Kvitsinskiy and said that he forbade Kvitsinskiy to interfere as he had been unable to reach an agreement.

The Secretary said that he would like to turn now to the Geneva issues which are of transcendent importance and should be addressed by our leaders. To the extent these matters can be advanced, they should be. Our negotiators are ready for give and take; they are there with good faith and good will. The President has shown his commitment by his decision on interim restraint.¹³ We have had two positive SCC agreements. But basically on substance in Geneva no special advance has been made. We think that this is not our fault, but yours. We pick up newspapers and find so-called new Soviet ideas. Congressmen go to Moscow and something is raised with them. But we get nothing in Geneva. The Union of Concerned Scientists gets a letter that some say provides a signal that research would not be banned; but when we ask, we are told that this is a misinterpretation and that research is included in the ban.¹⁴ Still we hear nothing in Geneva. We recognize that there is going to be some propaganda. Each side will be working with various groups.

But we feel we have sent competent negotiators to Geneva. Our people feel we have a professional crew. If the Union of Concerned Scientists or Congressman Solarz receive proposals, they are not in a position to evaluate them.¹⁵ When you go out like that, we don’t take you seriously. There are three competent negotiators and you should take them seriously. We feel we haven’t seen that. There was a bit more conversation in the second round, but it still wasn’t great.

The Secretary continued that we feel the groups are related; this was agreed in Geneva. Each side gave its views. We felt that discussions in the three groups could go forward. If in one of the three groups there was progress, this could be brought forward and we could look at it. We don’t think it is the right way to have nothing in the strategic and intermediate range groups if we are not in agreement in space/defense.

We need to get at it in Geneva. There is much to say, but we are not negotiating here. Let us make the people in Geneva earn their living, and make them work. We agree they need a political impulse if they are to get something accomplished. If there are stumbling blocks, then it is up to Shevardnadze and the Secretary to see what they can do. If there is still a problem, then the President and the General Secretary can kick rear ends. But we must clarify what the problems are.

The Secretary said he wanted to look at his notes on the comments that Shevardnadze had made here. He noted Shevardnadze’s statement that we had other purposes in mind with arms control. The Secretary wanted to state that we don’t have any other purposes; that we would like to see the negotiations succeed and we would like to see them result in radical reductions. Both sides have set as a goal no nuclear weapons. But we have to take a radical step to get there. We believe that if we take radical steps, if the United States and the Soviet Union move to much lower levels, we can then go together to the other nuclear states and say that they must join us if we are to proceed to zero nuclear weapons. This is how we should approach the French, British and Chinese.

In sum, the United States is preparing for the next round with great care. We are ready to make it a genuine and concrete round. Shevardnadze and he should tell the negotiators to produce something useful for the two leaders—not half-baked, but something good. The Secretary went on that with regard to the President’s SDI program, it has no offensive capabilities. The only potential nuclear explosion in space is from the Soviet ABM system around Moscow. The United States has no ABM system at all and no ASAT system at all. We are paralleling what you are doing; we are very impressed with what you are doing in defense. So we are for examining a concept in which stability is strengthened and the danger of a first strike lessened. This ought to be attractive to you and we want to discuss it with you. We find it interesting that Mr. Gromyko used to call for a more effective defense; he was right.

The Secretary said there was one other thing with regard to the ABM Treaty. We are very concerned with what we consider to be a violation. Krasnoyarsk is a problem in itself and a problem with regard to the ABM Treaty—which, incidentally was also predicated on reductions in offensive arms. We also have a Congress which is deeply concerned about what appears to us to be a violation.

The Secretary, looking in Ambassador Ridgway’s direction, said that during our last election campaign Vice President Bush got into trouble when he talked about “kicking ass”; but that is what we’ve got to do with our delegations.¹⁶

With regard to non-proliferation, the Secretary welcomed Shevardnadze’s comments that there is some convergence here. We could look at whether a statement on this would stand by itself or be part of a communique. We have given the Soviet side a draft and we are prepared to have Ambassador Kennedy work with his counterpart right after the Review Conference. So it is agreed by both sides that we will do that. We are disappointed that you did not want to do this before the NPT Review Conference; in any case we will move in accordance with your suggestion. The Secretary had made reference a number of times to the fact that this has been a productive area for us. At the Review Conference itself we should stay away from polemics and the U.S. will conduct itself this way.

The Secretary continued that with regard to chemical weapons we agreed with the need to work on them. This could be the sleeper in the arms area. If possession and use escalate, and chemical weapons are much easier for countries to produce than nuclear weapons, this could be very bad. So we are ready to tell our representative in Geneva to step up activity. We note your statement about binaries. They are safe to store and have been developed only as a deterrent. We would like to do away with chemical weapons, but here again a major problem is verification. This is a very hard problem to solve.

We have two suggestions of an operational sort that don’t solve the CW problem, but they help. We have advanced them before. One is an invitation for Soviet experts to visit the United States and discuss the technical aspects of destruction. This might help give the technical people a better view of the problem. This is not a big thing, but at the technical level it would be worthwhile. Our second suggestion is with regard to the Iran-Iraq war. There is no question chemical weapons have been used and there is a potential for major use. We are prepared to send a team to Moscow to see if we can do something about it. We don’t know precisely what, but perhaps a joint demarche or some kind of statement in Geneva. So we agree that we need to work actively in Geneva and we have a couple of suggestions.

The Secretary then went on to CDE. He noted that the Soviet side has invited our negotiator to come to Moscow early in September. We have accepted. We agree that this is an area in which we can make progress. And we agree that the way to do this is to get into drafting.¹⁷ This highlights the issues and helps us to see what the guts are. What we are seeking to do is to make a combination of the idea of non-use of force with practical technical confidence building measures which give confidence to the idea of NUF and strengthen a sense of security in Europe. He noted that Shevardnadze had said CDE could become an asset in Geneva for the two leaders. The Secretary agreed and said that we should go ahead and try.

On MBFR the Secretary said we will work at it. People seem to make whole careers out of this, and even pass files on to their grandchildren. He noted that Shevardnadze had said we should make some headway. So let us scratch our heads and see what we can come up with.

On CSCE the Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had made some comments. We support the process. The Secretary had identified yesterday some of the benefits. One of them is that you get to meet people whom you don’t normally see. He noted that Shevardnadze had commented that he found the Secretary’s speech “astonishing” and that he rejected it and would make some comments when he comes to the United States. He should help himself. It would be easy to get such lists together as there are people who spend their time gathering such information freely. We are strong on self-criticism in the United States. If Shevardnadze has suggestions, we would be glad to have them.

But the things that the Secretary had mentioned are part of the CSCE process, like freedom of religion. He just wanted to say once again that, aside from the fact that each of us is responsible for internal decisions and each has his own laws, motion in these fields which affect deep human emotions would have a very positive effect on the atmosphere. Shevardnadze had said that he did not like certain aspects of the Secretary’s speech; the Secretary could pick on parts of Shevardnadze’s speech.¹⁸ At the press briefing yesterday, Roz Ridgway had put it well when she said “you gave your speech, and we gave ours.”¹⁹

Turning to regional questions, the Secretary said he agreed with what Shevardnadze had said about the usefulness of experts’ talks. We can’t say that we can point to any breakthroughs, but we have shared information; these talks do help make our views more clear and they help avoid miscalculations. So we consider it positive to do them. The Soviet side had suggested East Asian talks and we think this is a good idea. In your paper you have suggested holding them in Moscow, and we are prepared to do them there—in the first two weeks of September, if that is agreeable. If the Soviet side will let us know about this period we can then find specific dates. We will send Paul Wolfowitz, who is Roz Ridgway’s counterpart and an Asian expert to head our team. He and I traveled in Asia recently.²⁰

We also agree that talks on Central America would be useful after we have had the East Asian talks. We will find some time this fall to have those discussions. You mentioned concerns about Central America. We are very concerned about Nicaragua. We are seeing the establishment of a pattern of government that is not in line with what is happening in the rest of the hemisphere. We have incontrovertible evidence that they are interfering in other nations in the region. They are arming at a level beyond all others. You know our position. At the same time we would welcome your thoughts and we can have a discussion after the Asian experts meet.

The Secretary continued that in the East Asian area he had just returned and again had been impressed by the dynamism of countries from Korea to Japan and down through Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. The big sore point in the region is the occupation by Vietnam of Kampuchea. We believe ASEAN’s approach to solving this problem is correct and we support it. We oppose restoration of the Pol Pot regime and we feel that if free elections are conducted that would not be the result. Whatever the Soviet Union can do, and it has considerable influence with Vietnam, this would be a positive contribution. We have people who go to Hanoi quite a bit, so we have a first-hand experience. There is a sharp contrast with Thailand and other countries there. Hanoi is standing still with regard to economic development; isolation is bad for them, but this is the result of their actions in Kampuchea. On Korea, we favor dialogue and something is developing. We support the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the United Nations. This might help them and us as well.

Afghanistan is a problem which cries out for resolution, the Secretary continued. We noticed that when Rajiv Gandhi visited the United States he seemed to have positive thoughts. All sorts of conditions have been laid down. But it is possible to state the matter simply in our view. There are three million refugees outside the country. There is a need to create conditions that would allow them to return within a framework acceptable to the Afghan people. This can’t be done while Soviet troups are there. We have no interest in using this issue. We are prepared to do our part to help bring about a settlement. We have no interest in an Afghanistan hostile to the Soviet Union. We understand that it is as close to your borders as Nicaragua is to ours, so a non-aligned Afghanistan would be fine with us.²¹

On bilateral matters, the Secretary continued, there are a number of things which are being worked on and should be pushed. The meeting Secretary Baldrige had in Moscow was positive. He was among those who have been received by Gorbachev and come back to say that he is a good interlocutor.

We are pleased that our representatives have been able to reach agreement in Tokyo on North Pacific air safety. We are anxious to see that implementing procedures are put in place. This has to do with straying aircraft so we can make this agreement operational. So we don’t see any difficulty if we both put pressure on here and move ahead. On the assumption that this is going forward we are prepared to have talks on civil aviation. We understand that Pan American and Aeroflot have talked. We also understand that the agreement has lapsed. We suggest that we start early in September to discuss a new agreement and we are prepared to host talks in Washington. Any agreement should have equitable treatment of the companies, including traffic service.

Shevardnadze had mentioned consulates. The Secretary thought that if we could get going, this is among the things that we could get together before the Geneva meeting. But there are things that need to get done now. This is not just a question of an announcement. We need to have a good look at the buildings in Kiev. We are prepared to do this and do it simultaneously. We are ready to go.

The Secretary continued that on the exchanges agreement there are some remaining issues. He would just highlight TV appearances and exhibits at least at previous levels.

The Secretary noted that Shevardnadze had mentioned talks on the demarcation line (Maritime Boundary Talks.) We agree that this is desirable and we are prepared for another round early in the fall—say September or early October. We are prepared to hold the talks in Washington; we should set them up through diplomatic channels.

Shevardnadze had also mentioned other areas and the need to reinvigorate them. We have reached accord on an agricultural cooperation agreement. Secretary Block would be in Moscow in late August, Housing Secretary Pierce would be there in September, and Environment Administrator Thomas would be there in November. As a general matter we agree on the need to reinvigorate such bilateral agreements.

The Secretary said that he had one additional suggestion; that we move more aggressively to expand cooperation in the peaceful uses of space. We did have cooperation in this area. We continue to believe that a joint simulated space rescue mission would be a good idea. We are prepared to negotiate a new agreement to replace that which lapsed in 1982. It could cover areas like planetary exploration, life sciences and other area. He then gave Shevardnadze what he described as a “non-paper”.²² He commented that he did not know whether the Soviets had such a bureaucratic term. When the Soviet side had time to consider it, we would be pleased to hear from them.

The Secretary then said he had some comments with regard to some arrangements for the meeting between the two leaders in November. The physical atmosphere makes a difference. We have a team in Geneva and understand that the Soviets also have one there. We don’t know the Soviets’ conclusions. The Swiss have suggested that we use one of their chateaux; they would make it available as a meeting site. They have told us that they are concerned about providing absolute security, so they want a place with some space from the road, an area not very populated where they can let the press in and out. From our point of view, it is important for the leaders to have a place where they can talk in a relaxed manner and perhaps take a walk in the grounds. So, the Swiss suggestion makes sense to us. We would be happy to set a time fairly soon to have our two teams go there and make a selection. It is well to get this settled early so arrangements can go forward.

The Swiss also said they would like to host a fairly sizeable reception. As they are the host, we are inclined to accept. Of course, we need to decide this together. We think that November 20 would be a good evening for this reception. Beyond that we think we should not schedule anything during the lunchtimes so that each delegation will have the time to focus on business. But we are ready to see what informal dinners could be held. We would be pleased to host a dinner, and if you wanted to do so as well, that would be good. We believe that we should keep these quite small so that while we would have them informal, they would consist of the people involved in a direct way—not necessarily just those in the meetings, but directly involved.

The Secretary said there were one or two aspects of a more personal nature which he would like to do separately with Shevardnadze and the two Ambassadors for a few minutes in the next room. But before doing that, he just wanted to note that Shevardnadze would be coming to New York and that would be a time to advance the issues. The Secretary and his wife also want to be sure that Mrs. Shevardnadze is entertained properly. So we need to get an idea with regard to dates. We know that General Secretary Gorbachev will be meeting with Mitterand October 2–5. This means that Shevardnadze would be leaving the United States before then. We need to focus on scheduling his meetings in the United States as soon as possible because the President’s calendar is always very busy. He and Shevardnadze should meet first in New York, as is usual, and then he could come down to Washington to see the President.

The Secretary then asked how it had gone for Shevardnadze with the earplug. It had saved them one hour and twenty minutes. He found it o.k. Shevardnadze affirmed that the “experiment” worked well.

Shevardnadze continued that his overall impression was that a group of questions were emerging around which there could be positive solutions. He and the Secretary and the experts in various fields in preparation for the summit could begin practical work. He saw some positive elements. The very fact that the leaders would be meeting and a group of questions can be agreed upon—maybe not the most important, but still serious issues—this was good. So, we have a minimum program that can be achieved, but we should strive for a maximum program. We should come up with serious proposals for the summit. It seemed that destroying detente was not hard, but recreating it would not be so easy. He wanted to say frankly that if SALT II had been ratified, matters would have proceeded more normally. But he would not rake up the past. We had had some bright moments, of which our wartime cooperation was an example.

The Secretary agreed, and said that this cooperation was for an objective of tremendous importance and we all should be grateful for the defeat of Hitler’s Nazism. Shevardnadze said that he had just received a group of war veterans, including an American, and that we could learn from that generation. The Secretary noted that he had fought in that war (Shevardnadze interjected that he knew the Secretary had been in the war), in fact had been in the Pacific as a Marine. Marines felt that this was the highest calling. One of the most moving things that had happened to the Secretary was the time he spent in the war cemetery in Leningrad.

Shevardnadze commented that, therefore, there was a lot to borrow from history and also some things not to borrow. He had been struck by remarks of Richard Nixon about the possibility of using nuclear weapons having been explored against certain countries. We should go forward and remove the differences facing us today. The Secretary had raised some questions for which there was not time today. But on the Nicholson and Berlin Corridor questions, the Soviets have known official positions which he would not change. A lot depends on the group working in Geneva. Much depends on a successful outcome in Geneva. He could guarantee that they will push Kvitsinskiy. He has nowhere else to go; otherwise he will be unemployed. He had been told that the U.S. representatives were building a building there. But we must make serious preparations for progress in this round. There were wars that lasted ten years, thirty years, one hundred years, but there is no time now to postpone solutions. He had talked with Kvitsinskiy and their scientists. He was not an expert, but he is convinced that we are now in a state of rough parity, and above all in nuclear weapons. If we don’t proceed on this basis, we will have serious trouble. If we accept that we have rough parity, then solutions will come. This is an issue of basic importance. You are in favor of verification; we are in favor of prohibition. Which problem is basic and which relates to superstructure? First let’s agree on the problem and then do verification. Surely we can determine whether a side is exploding nuclear weapons with all of the scientific advances that we have.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised the ABM system around Moscow and Krasnoyarsk. There is nothing in the Soviet Union that violates the ABM agreement. The U.S. knows why we are building Krasnoyarsk. We declared formally and there will be no other declaration here. The Soviet side will not violate the principles of this agreement. He could give an example of a building in Greenland that is a violation. We should not go down this path.

Shevardnadze noted that the Secretary had raised Vietnam; he would not reply on the others. Perhaps it would not be diplomatic, but he must say that if the Vietnamese are not living a good life, the American hand was certainly there. If it had not been for the war, they would not be in this situation. So he did not think this was an appropriate statement. The Secretary interjected that he wanted the record to show that this was one point on which they did not agree.

Shevardnadze continued that it was nice that there is emerging a more normal tone in their discussion of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union is in favor of a political solution (the Secretary interjected “good”). The two states there should find a solution. Pakistan and Afghanistan. We should facilitate that process.

On verification, Shevardnadze said he recalled there was discussion of this in the tripartite talks that had taken place on a comprehensive test ban. So here is something to look at.

So, Shevardnadze concluded, there are a large set of questions before us. It is important concretely to determine our attitude. In Washington and in Moscow we need to study our positions, to study what has been stated here and to decide what to put to our leaders. We need to speed up this process. At the next session between the two of them, he and the Secretary can have a more concrete discussion of those things they are readying for the summit, and those things that are not quite ripe for settlement. The main thing was not to disappoint people. As for practical arrangements, he was not quite ready yet. The U.S. side knows the tradition—today we host, then you host. Tehran had been the only exception. This can be discussed and explored. This is not too complex to resolve. He knew his General Secretary was looking forward to the meeting and that he was prepared to make his contribution. Shevardnadze said that he was so new himself that his own schedule was not quite ready. But he hoped in a week to be able to communicate to the Secretary. He thought this had been a useful and a frank meeting. If our representatives take less walks in the woods and work more, then the summit can proceed at a good level. He would like to say that he had thought a lot about his meeting with the Secretary in advance, about the Secretary’s experience and the fact that he was a newcomer and inexperienced. So our meeting looked to be of an unequal nature. But then he had found out that you have experience, but we have the truth.

The Secretary said he would leave that comment lying there, but he had a few comments to make. First, our two leaders should have a good meeting. This was the main thing. They should have a useful and productive exchange. We need to do our preparations for this to happen. So, the two men are the main thing. Second, we have a lot of things that we are working on; surely we can get something accomplished, other things ought to be done, and still others will perhaps be more difficult. We should not force the pace where this is not in our interest, but we should try if there is something positive to do. This is all for the good. In any case, the President will want to have a discussion of those issues. So, we should get done what we can get done. Third, we should try to get out of the meeting a sense of the future. We want it to be prospective to establish a perspective and an agenda for the future. So here the main thing is to chart a course and to give an impetus to further work.

The Secretary continued that we will have to say something to the press afterwards. He would comment briefly to the press and then Ambassadors Ridgway, Hartman, and Matlock would have a backgrounder but they would not provide detail. It would be useful to agree what words we will use to characterize the meeting. He thought of words like interesting, useful, frank, businesslike, and productive. We had tried an experiment with regard to simultaneous interpretation and it had worked. We had accomplished in three hours what it otherwise took us six hours to do. The meeting was productive in the sense that it advanced our planning for the November meeting; we identified things to work on. We discussed the full range of things before us; arms control, bilateral and regional issues, and we discussed human rights, since you challenged my speech. Shevardnadze turned to the members of his delegation and asked whether it wouldn’t be desirable to agree on a common approach. He noted that this is the first stage in preparations for the summit, that this is the main aspect of their meeting, and that we should roll up our sleeves and make that meeting between our leaders productive.

The Secretary and Ambassador Hartman then took Shevardnadze and Dobrynin into an adjoining room. The Secretary noted that Mrs. Reagan plans to travel with the President to Geneva and hopes that Mrs. Gorbacheva will be coming. If Mrs. Gorbacheva is interested, Mrs. Reagan would like to plan some joint activities. Could the Soviets let us know how Mrs. Gorbacheva feels about this? The Secretary also suggested to Shevardnadze in the context of the Soviet desire to create the right climate for the Geneva meeting that it would be useful for them to moderate their propaganda approach. Shevardnadze noted that while the Soviets could control their side of that equation, he wondered whether the USG could reciprocate. He noted that he had just read an article that reported a sale of thousands of videogames to American children which had them carry out an attack on Moscow. But he agreed that this was an area we should look into.

The Secretary then escorted Shevardnadze out to his car.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, 1985–1986, F.2, Memcons—Shultz/Shevardnadze Meetings Helsinki and New York. Secret; Super Sensitive. The meeting took place at the U.S. Ambassador’s residence in Helsinki. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Under an August 7 covering note to McFarlane, Matlock forwarded the memorandum of conversation and noted: “You may want to peruse it quickly to get a feel for the presentational style employed by Shevardnadze, which is more businesslike and less polemical than Gromyko’s, but which—in Helsinki at least—hewed closely to traditional Soviet positions. For the most part, both sides refrained from making totally new proposals. (The one exception was our proposal to renew negotiations on a space cooperation agreement.)” In his memoir, Dobrynin commented on the meeting: “Shultz and Shevardnadze came no closer to resolving the problems that divided us, but the atmosphere was noticeably more friendly than during similar meetings with Gromyko, and Shevardnadze came away with an appreciation of Shultz’s professionalism and the personal contact with him.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 577)
2. Nikolai Uspensky is the correct name for the Soviet interpreter. In several meetings, the notetaker used a variation in the name or mistakenly recorded the Soviet interpreter as Yuri Uspensky.
3. In his memoir, Soviet interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko explained: “Through diplomatic channels, Shultz had proposed that most of the discussion be with simultaneous rather than consecutive interpretation, which would save time if it worked well but could be dropped if it didn’t.” He continued: “It did look like a risk at the time, particularly because Shevardnadze had so little time to prepare for the meeting and because simultaneous interpretation created greater pressure and required quicker reaction. So the decision to accept Shultz’s suggestion was made almost at the last minute. It later became the rule that most of the full-scale meetings with delegation members and experts were interpreted simultaneously, while the one-on-one or small-group meetings had consecutive interpretation. The arrangement worked well, since both forms of interpretation had their advantages suited for particular settings or situations. But in Helsinki it was a first.” (Palazchenko, My Years With Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, pp. 31–32)
4. Palazhchenko wrote of the meeting: “I was also worried about Shevardnadze. If he had been so nervous just reading his speech, how would he fare in a face-to-face meeting with the experienced George Shultz? I was to be pleasantly surprised. Shevardnadze seemed much more confident and relaxed than the day before, and he went through the meeting with Shultz with little apparent effort.” He continued: “Shultz was watching Shevardnadze closely, in a sharply appraising way. One could see that he was keenly interested—there was none of that characteristic cool and even seemingly indifferent look of his. He spoke confidently, with the calm assurance of a pro but, I felt, without arrogance. The two men were to spend hundreds of hours together in the next few years. I don’t know whether on that day in Helsinki they believed they would establish a personal and very human relationship, and whether they wanted such a relationship then. None of it was yet apparent; the beginning was quite formal. But neither was there any animosity or mutual anger. Shultz and Shevardnadze were not in the combative mood that had characterized U.S.–Soviet relations in the previous years.” (Ibid., pp. 34–35) Both Shultz and Shevardnadze spoke at the ceremony marking the tenth anniversary of the Helskini Accords. For Shultz’s speech, see footnote 5, below. For Shevardnadze’s speech, see footnote 18, below.
5. Reference is to Shultz’s July 30 speech delivered at the 10th anniversary ceremony of the Helsinki Accords. In his memoir, Shultz wrote of this speech: “Early in the opening session I delivered a hard-hitting speech on Soviet violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act: denial of emigration and travel, suppression of religion, repression of individuals who constituted a Helsinki watch group (including Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov), and jamming of radio and TV transmissions. I named names. The president had approved of this departure from our usual approach of private diplomacy. On the anniversary of this agreement to respect human rights, the United States had to speak out publicly about Soviet violations. I saw Shevardnadze again during a break in the session. ‘Did you have to deliver such a tough speech?’ he asked me. ‘I just stated the facts, and I look forward to discussing this subject privately with you,’ I replied.” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 573) For the full text of Shultz’s speech, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 1985, pp. 30–33.
6. Tuesday, July 30.
7. In a message to the UNGA Special Session on Disarmament read by Gromyko on June 12, 1982, Brezhnev pledged that the Soviet Union would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. See Documents on Disarmament, 1982, pp. 349–352.
8. See Document 68.
9. See Document 8.
10. See Document 55.
11. Dobrynin commented in his memoir that Shevardnadze asked: “‘Did you really have to make such a speech?’ Shultz seemed very complacent and quite satisfied by the mass of publicity the speech had received in the United States. But Shevardnadze clearly realized that such public statements by the secretary of state made it more difficult for him and Gorbachev to search within the Politburo for a flexible new approach to the Reagan administration.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 576–577)
12. See Document 69.
13. See footnote 2, Document 41.
14. Gorbachev’s July 6 letter to the Union of Concerned Scientists stated “in all certainty that the Soviet Union will not be the first to take weapons into outer space. We shall make every effort to persuade other countries too, and above all the United States of America, not to take such a fatal step.” (Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 376–378)
15. This is likely a reference to a message on various arms control issues passed to Representative Stephen Solarz during a meeting with Colonel General Chervov, when Solarz led a congressional delegation to Moscow from July 3 to 6. In telegram 9121 from Moscow, July 8, the Embassy provided a summary of the meeting, which covered prohibition of SDI research, warhead reductions in the “context of an agreement on SDI,” the Krasnoyarsk radar, and chemical weapons on-site inspections. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850479–0681) In telegram 229633 to Moscow, July 26, the Department reported that “according to a July 11 New York Times article that was also apparently picked up by the International Herald Tribune, Colonel General Nikolai Chervov, of the Soviet General Staff, told Rep Solarz on July 3 in Moscow that the USSR would be prepared to accept a total ban on chemical weapons if the Soviets were allowed on-site inspection of private American chemical plants as well as govt-owned facilities.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850533–0547) See also Leslie H. Gelb, “Soviet General Amplifies Offer of 25% Arms Cut,” New York Times, July 11, 1985, p. A1.
16. Reference is to a remark Bush made after a Vice Presidential debate with Democratic nominee Geraldine Ferraro. See Dale Russakoff, “Bush Boasts of Kicking ‘A Little Ass’ at Debate,” Washington Post, October 13, 1984, p. A8.
17. An unknown hand drew a bracket in the margin next to this paragraph and underlined the sentence “And we agree that the way to do this is to get into drafting.”
18. In telegram 10516 from Moscow, July 31, the Embassy reported that the highlights of Shevardnadze’s July 30 speech carried in the Soviet press avoided “polemical extremes,” reaffirmed the “value and necessity of detente and peaceful coexistence;” emphasized “European relations for the international climate and international security,” and placed “greater emphasis on nuclear issues in general than on space-strike weapons.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850543–0881) For the text of Shevardnadze’s speech, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XXXVII, no. 31 (August 28, 1985), pp. 1–5. An excerpt of the speech is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1985, pp. 446–449. See also footnote 4, above.
19. No record of the briefing was found.
20. An unknown hand placed a bracket in the margin next to this and the next paragraph.
21. An unknown hand drew a bracket in the margin next to this paragraph.
22. The text of this non-paper is in telegram Tosec 150032/232636 to the Secretary’s Delegation in Helsinki, July 30. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])