Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 3, 1985

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Jack Matlock, NSC
• Mark Palmer, EUR
• Ambassador Dobrynin
• Oleg Sokolov, Soviet Embassy DCM

SUBJECT

• Reagan-Gorbachev Summit; Helsinki Meeting

The Secretary opened by saying that in his press conference this afternoon and in this meeting he wanted to convey that the President regards the upcoming summit as a very serious matter.² We expect the process of advance discussions and work to make as much progress as possible. We regard the meeting today as the beginning of a process which will unfold through contacts between our governments and embassies in Moscow and here, in his meeting with the new Foreign Minister in Helsinki, and presumably in a meeting in New York as well. The Secretary noted that the President’s invitation for the Soviet Foreign Minister to come to Washington stands. We presume that Shevardnadze will be coming to the UNGA. Dobrynin said that he also has this presumption, but he did not know this for a fact.

The Secretary then noted that in his press conference today, he had been asked if he was going to Moscow. He had responded that there is no plan for him to do so. This did not mean that he necessarily would not go. The President thinks that we should do all that is necessary to make the summit a good meeting. The Secretary further noted that we are aware of the many differences between us, that we have two differing systems, but we want to find some accommodation.

Dobrynin asked what kind of preliminary agenda we had in mind? What issues do we expect our leaders to cover? How would we use the month before Helsinki? General Secretary Gorbachev had said that we should use this time before a summit for active work on issues to see what we can accomplish and to exercise mutual restraint. We have a kind of stage-by-stage process, including the meetings between the Secretary and the Minister.

The Secretary said that before we started on the process and substance of summit preparations, he would like to know what kind of guy the new Soviet Foreign Minister is.³ Dobrynin said that he is more direct than Gromyko, less reserved. By this he didn’t mean that Gromyko was any different when he was with his own people than he was with the Secretary. That was just his character. Shevardnadze has a sense of humor. He is more natural. He does not have much experience in foreign affairs. He has been on some foreign trips, parliamentary and party, and he has held international symposia in Georgia, but he has not been in a negotiating situation government to government. He will have a different style from Gromyko.

The Secretary then said he would like to begin by talking about procedures. We have not heard back whether the Soviets accept the time of 2:00–5:00 p.m. in Helsinki.⁴ Dobrynin suggested that maybe we had not had an answer because Gromyko foresaw there was going to be a change. The Secretary said we need to nail it down now. We had thought that since the meeting will be in our mission, if the new Foreign Minister wishes, he would be happy to invite him to a light lunch at 1:00 p.m. This would not be for business and there would be just the two of them with interpreters. Dobrynin asked if he was suggesting a tete-a-tete that would precede the meeting from 2:00 to 5:00, and the Secretary said yes, for about an hour.

The Secretary continued that if it seemed after the regular meeting that it would be useful to have more time, he was prepared to do that. If the meeting runs a little longer than three hours, that would be OK because there is some time before the Finnish dinner that evening. But he also noted that some of the most productive times with Gromyko came when there were more than one meeting, and both sides had time to consider between sessions and then get back together. Therefore, he was prepared to stay through lunchtime the next day, if necessary. He was not pushing for this second meeting because he will have been travelling a lot and wanted to get back to Washington as soon as possible.

The Secretary said that we should be discussing here and in Moscow what combination of substantive issues we want for the summit and the beginnings of an agenda. When you get two strong-minded men in a room, they frequently find their own way, but it would be useful to have some sense of how they will spend their time. Dobrynin said that we also will need to see what can be done in advance.

The Secretary said this will be an important meeting; things will be going on in advance and if it is successful it will establish an agenda for us to carry out afterwards. Dobrynin interrupted to emphasize that we should aim at things that could be solved before and announced at the summit. The Secretary said he agreed with that. We should use the deadline of the meeting to make as much progress as possible.

The Secretary then said we need to block out the kind of approach that we should take. Perhaps the way that Gromyko and he had proceeded in January in Geneva provides the model. There were morning and afternoon meetings; they kept pretty much to times that had been set; met again the next morning and left open time for a fourth meeting. There were not a lot of social events. This worked out pretty well as we needed the time to work between meetings. Of course, the US did give a little reception. Dobrynin said this would have to be mutual; there would have to be two events this time. He said that we have a lot of time to decide about social events, but it is something Shultz and Shevardnadze could discuss in Helsinki.

Turning to substance, the Secretary said both sides feel arms control is the centerpiece. He gave a quick appraisal of how we see things. With regard to MBFR, we would not lay a big wager on progress. It is not that we should not try, but history shows that this is not a fast moving negotiation. Dobrynin said that he regretted the Secretary’s view on MBFR. Couldn’t our two bosses get this moving and get some Soviet and American reductions. We could begin with some withdrawals which would be a symbolic gesture—ten, fifteen, or twenty thousand—just to show some willingness. This could cut through all the complications. We have five months left, but already the Secretary is saying nothing can be done in this area.

The Secretary said he was not precluding progress here, but trying to construct a mental chart with headings about probabilities and importance. This could help us to focus on what is more likely to yield results if we push. In MBFR, there are some very important verification problems. If the Ambassador was saying this is a priority item for the Soviet Union, we would be glad to know that. Dobrynin said this is not the highest priority, but in a second category.

Continuing, the Secretary said that there are also the issues under discussion in Stockholm. We have created working groups and the structure of a deal has emerged. This is a place to push. We know that Ambassador Goodby has been invited to visit Moscow.⁵ In our view, there is more potential here. This is a multilateral negotiation and so we cannot do it just between the two of us, but when we are together, generally the others go along. One way to push this is to say let’s start to develop the language of an agreement. This does not mean we are now in agreement, but drafting gives a focus and a way of getting a handle on how to phrase things and resolve problems.

The Secretary continued that the third arms control area he wanted to mention was that of chemical weapons. He felt in Vienna that Gromyko had agreed that this is an important area. Chemical weapons have potential for getting out of hand around the world. It is hard to see how we can get agreement overall, but we are prepared to talk about it. We made concrete suggestions in Vienna. The Soviet side has not taken them up, but we urge you to look at them again. They might move the ball slightly. Would you want to set out on a quiet effort to see if we can get somewhere on this? Dobrynin agreed that chemical weapons were rather dangerous. He said the Soviets proposed that our representatives get together on this subject in Geneva. They were disturbed that our representatives had had nothing to say. The Secretary suggested that the Soviets should do a little and we do a little; we can see what we can do.

The Secretary turned to nuclear non-proliferation, noting that we had proposed a statement and that this was apparently agreeable to the Soviet side. We were prepared to have the two leaders do this in their meeting.

Dobrynin asked about nuclear testing. The Secretary said we are prepared to talk about it. We put an interesting proposal to him and we thought at one time that he considered it interesting too. But after we did it, they found it less interesting. We understand sensitivity about changing treaties that we already agreed to, but we could do things separately that would improve our ability to do calibration and verification. Dobrynin commented that apparently we had nothing new on this. What about resumption of CTB talks between the UK, the US, and the USSR? The Secretary responded that they should think some more about our testing proposal. They have a new General Secretary and a new Foreign Minister—live a little. Dobrynin said that he had gotten the Secretary’s message. The Secretary then noted that these are sensible things that could be done. They are not terribly intrusive and would change the environment here.

The Secretary then turned to regional issues. In Helsinki, we would like to have more discussions of these issues with the new Minister. We can talk in our own right and as preparation for the meeting between our two leaders. We have started down the path of experts talks with meetings on the Mideast, southern Africa, and Afghanistan. You have also proposed discussions on East Asia and Central America and the Caribbean. We think that East Asia is the next logical topic and will be ready to talk about this in Helsinki and maybe set it up. We can then consider Central America and the Caribbean. These are healthy things to have and we welcome them.

In the Afghanistan talks, the Secretary said we were somewhat disappointed because there was no motion. Of course, there is the UN setup which we support. We had the impression from Rajiv Gandhi that the Soviets are taking another look at Afghanistan and that if we also take another look, there might be some progress.⁶ The Indians seem more willing to work on this issue. We might talk about this in Helsinki. We want to support Cordovez.⁷ Our perception is that you are putting a lot of pressure on the Pakistanis and also inside Afghanistan with military offensives. Maybe that reflects your desire to deal with this issue on the ground, but if not we want to assure that we have no interest in keeping the war there going. We want a political settlement.

Dobrynin said he wanted to draw the Secretary’s attention to two points in Gorbachev’s letter to the President.⁸ They had hoped the US would show some sign of urging the Pakistanis to be more moderate and to reduce US assistance inside the country. Gorbachev had pointed out that this would not go unnoticed in our relations. Although he considered the US-Soviet talks on Afghanistan to be useful, they did not lead anywhere. The US is increasing support to the rebels. Moscow is for peace in Afghanistan and ultimately for withdrawal. We welcome your and Mr. Armacost’s statement that you are not set on “bleeding” us.⁹ The Secretary said that that was the word that Gromyko had used and we were pointing to it. Dobrynin said he would pass the message to his Minister. The Secretary said he would like to discuss Afghanistan in Helsinki, but if neither of us had anything new to say, we could of course pass on to other subjects.

On Europe, continued the Secretary, we still have the question of the Nicholson case. Maybe the military discussions are making some progress, but the more unequivocal the Soviet statements are, the better. We also see some improvement in the Berlin air corridors. The distances allotted are better, but they are not enough. Gromyko had said and Gorbachev’s message reiterates, that we should try to manage so that the period leading up to the summit would be stable. We agree with that. Dobrynin responded “What about Nicholson?” The President’s letter dwells on this at too great a length.¹⁰ The Secretary said that at the moment what is needed is a clearer understanding on how Soviet forces will conduct themselves so that our men will not get shot. Nicholson was in a clearly marked car, in uniform, etc. Dobrynin said that they had delegated this matter to their military authorities. They are on the spot and know best how to handle it. We (presumably the MFA) are leaving it to them. The Secretary said that the question is what emerges from those discussions. Dobrynin said that on the Berlin air corridors, the US had received a clearcut answer. This was based on post-War agreements. This had been dealt with at the technical level, but because the US had brought it up at the government-to-government level, we replied in the same way.

Dobrynin continued that he needed to know what the Secretary wanted to discuss in Helsinki with Shevnardnadze at Helsinki. He needed to inform him so the Foreign Minister could be prepared on the details. Should our two leaders spend time on such questions as these? This is unnecessary. The US has the right to raise any subject, but is this just being used as an example of the sort of thing that should not happen before the summit or a subject for the discussions? The Secretary said he was not suggesting that the two leaders spend all their time on issues like the Nicholson case and the Berlin air corridors, but that we must handle such issues well so that they do not blow up on us. They are examples of two things that should be resolved so they do not affect the atmosphere. We should handle these in a manner so they do not come up. Neither has been dealt with to our satisfaction to date.

The Secretary then returned to Afghanistan for a moment, noting that the US had made a proposal to let the ICRC work on the prisoners issue and was awaiting a response.

He then turned to the “Madrid/Helsinki issues” (i.e. human rights). The Ambassador, Gorbachev, and Gromyko always say that you will not negotiate about these issues and that you cannot be asked to violate your own laws. We are not seeking to do that. It is not necessary to go through all the cases; you are familiar with them but it is important for you to point out to your leaders that this is a sensitive area. The Ambassador knows this country well and should tell his leaders that this is a fact. The USSR can take actions unilaterally, consistent with your laws and this would help a great deal. Divided spouses, in particular, is an issue covered in the Helsinki agreements. This is a subject where Soviet unilateral action—not bargains, not negotiation—would make a big difference.

Moving to the bilateral area, the Secretary noted Mac Baldrige had had what we considered a good visit to Moscow.¹¹ Dobrynin interrupted to say that they also considered it to have been a good visit, not for solving problems but for achieving some basic understanding. The Secretary continued that we were prepared to move ahead on non-strategic trade. We will have talks on fishing soon; we are working on the fur skins issue. There are a lot of nuts and bolts to do in this area. If we can make a little bundle of non-strategic trade issues and prepare that for the summit, that would be good. Also, some time before the summit, there could be an agriculture visit to the Soviet Union. Secretary Block could go to the Soviet Union in September or October.

The Secretary then noted there is a list of things that the Ambassador was familiar with that we should try to get accomplished. On Pacific Air Safety, we hope the Soviet side will come to the next meeting with a constructive position. If that issue is resolved, we can open up discussions on civil aviation. Both sides have had talks with Pan Am; they feel the need to make money on the Moscow route this time. Dobrynin confirmed that they had had talks with Pan Am and said a Soviet delegation is coming here for additional talks this month. The Secretary commented that there is an obvious pattern to these issues—a walk, if you will. There is also a relationship to the consulates. If we get into the civil aviation discussions and the Soviets still want a consulate in New York, then we could quickly set up our Kiev and New York consulates. It is up to us to manage the process and to push it ahead.

The Secretary continued that we also have the exchanges agreement negotiations. We think it is important to recognize that television has a role in the modern world. Dobrynin said that they had given Ambassador Hartman time on Soviet television. The Secretary said we think it important to have this in in the exchanges agreement. We also think that exhibits are very important to have as before.

The Secretary said that if we had agreements in all of these areas, we could wrap a ribbon around the four agreements and hand them to our two leaders at the summit. We suggest that we work to push these issues under negotiations and that we keep in close contact here and in Moscow on them.

The Secretary continued that he hoped your new Foreign Minister will meet with Art Hartman soon so we can get to know him better. On the question of an agenda for a summit, we should come forward with our ideas but should avoid getting caught up arguing over the agenda. It is also important to think about how to use our time in Helsinki, whether we should set aside some special time to discuss Geneva issues. Dobrynin said we should concentrate on things in this period that we can get done. The Secretary said he agreed that we should concentrate on important things and try to get them done. The sooner we can hear the Soviet views on the Helsinki schedule and about Washington and New York in the fall the better. The President’s time is always tight. Dobrynin asked if the President would go to the UNGA. The Secretary said he would not go up early, but perhaps around October 24 when the special commemoration would be held. The Secretary noted that Gromyko usually came for several weeks and that he too would go up as usual to hold his “dentist’s office.” Assuming that Shevardnadze comes to the UN, it would be good for him to spend some time with the President personally. Dobrynin said that we would probably get news about the Helsinki meeting earlier than we would about New York and Washington.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (2/8). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and Palmer on July 6. The time and location of the meeting were not noted. On July 3, Shultz sent Reagan a one-page memorandum summarizing this meeting. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 52.
3. On July 3, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “We’re all agreed the new Soviet Foreign Minister is there to hold the fort for Gorbachev. We also decided—now that the meeting with him has been announced—that we must do nothing to raise public expectations. I said we must paint with a broad brush & not give the press specifics as to our agenda.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 478) See also Documents 53 and 54.
4. In a July 3 memorandum to Shultz, Kelly noted that there were “practical possibilities for working in more time with Shevardnadze” in Helsinki, and he suggested Shultz discuss this with Dobrynin during their meeting. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (7/3/1985); NLR–775–13–72–3–5)
5. In telegram 4568 from Stockholm, June 18, Goodby reported that in a private meeting on June 14 Grinevsky extended him an invitation for further consultation in Moscow in late August. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850429–0214)
6. See footnote 3, Document 46.
7. UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez was appointed in February 1982 as the Secretary General’s Personal Representative to negotiate a political settlement in Afghanistan.
8. See Document 46.
9. In telegram 190216 to Moscow, June 21, the Department transmitted a summary of Armacost’s June 19 meeting with Dobrynin after the June 18–19 U.S.-Soviet talks on Afghanistan during which he “reiterated that our objective was not to bleed the Soviets, but to achieve a settlement.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
10. See Document 23.
11. See Documents 32 and 38.