There is a brief mention at the end of the letter of the question of a
summit. It appears that the week of November 18 is probably acceptable
although Gorbachev did not
respond directly on timing. Dobrynin said it was his assumption that there would be
no problem with this period since Gromyko had discussed the “second half of November” in
Vienna. But the idea of a Washington meeting and a later meeting in
Moscow is specifically not accepted. In his letter, Gorbachev says: “As to the place for
holding [a summit], I understand that there are motives which make you
prefer the meeting to be held in the U.S. But I have no less weighty
motives which, taking into account the present state of Soviet-American
relations, makes this variant unrealistic.” Thus a European site is now
on the table, and it is up to us to say whether this is agreeable. I
think they have a clear idea by now that Helsinki and Vienna are not
acceptable to us. We will need to discuss how to respond.
Attachment
Letter From Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev to President
Reagan6
Moscow, June 10, 1985
Dear Mr. President,
I noted the intention expressed in your letter of April 30 to share
thoughts in our correspondence with complete frankness. This is also
my attitude. Only in this manner can we bring to each other the
essence of our respective approaches to the problems of world
politics and bilateral relations. Saying this I proceed from the
assumption that in exchanging views we shall look to the need to
move forward on the key matters, otherwise one cannot count on a
turn for the better in Soviet-American relations. I understand that
you agree, too, that such a turn for the better is required.
To aim at a lesser goal, say, at simply containing tensions within
certain bounds and trying to make it somehow from one crisis to
another—is not, in my opinion, a prospect worthy of our two
powers.
We paid attention to the fact that you share the view regarding the
need to give an impetus to the process of normalizing our relations.
It is not insignificant of itself. But to be candid: a number of
points in your letter perplex and puzzle, and those are the points
on which a special stress is made.
What I mean is the generalizations about the Soviet policy, contained
in your letter, in connection with the deplorable incident with an
American serviceman. As to the incident itself, we would like to
hope that the explanations which were given by us were correctly
understood by the American side.7
Now turning to major problems. I also believe that agreement with
regard to general principles alone is not sufficient. It is
important that such agreement were also reflected in the practical
actions of each side. I emphasize, precisely, each side, since it
clearly follows from your letter that you see disparities between
the principles and practice in the actions of the Soviet Union.
It is very far from reality. There is nothing corresponding to the
facts in the assertion that the USSR in its policy allegedly does not wish to conduct
affairs with the U.S. on the basis of equality and
[Page 146]
reciprocity. No matter what area of
our relations is taken, it transpires from a really objective
assessment that it is precisely the Soviet Union that comes out
consistently for equality and reciprocity, does not seek advantages
for itself at the expense of the legitimate interests of the U.S.
And it was exactly when a similar approach was taken by the American
side, too, that substantial agreements could be achieved.
It is not an accident that all agreements reached on the subject of
arms limitation became possible only because the sides adhered in
working them out to the principle of equality and equal security. At
no point in time did the Soviet side demand more for itself. But as
soon as the U.S. departed from that principle, the process of the
arms limitation and reduction was ruptured. Regrettably this remains
to be the case at present, too.
If, nevertheless, the question of equality and reciprocity is to be
raised as a matter of principle, then it is the Soviet Union that is
surrounded by American military bases stuffed also by nuclear
weapons, rather than the U.S.—by Soviet bases. Try to look at the
situation through our eyes, then it will become clear, who can have
a real, substantiated concern.
Take then practically any issue from the sphere of our bilateral
relations, whether trade, or, for example, air or sea communication.
Is it that the actual state of affairs in those cases determined by
the Soviet Union being against equality and reciprocity? Quite the
contrary: the low level of those relations is a direct consequence
of the American side’s policy compatible neither with conducting
affairs as equals, nor with reciprocity in the generally recognized
meanings of these notions.
Or take the following aspect of the question with respect to
principles and adherence to them. With regard to third countries, we
impose neither our ideology, nor our social system on anybody. And
do not ascribe to us what does not exist. If the question is to be
raised without diplomatic contrivances as to who contributes to the
international law and order and who acts in a different direction,
then it appears that it is precisely the U.S. that turns out to be
on the side of the groupings working against legitimate governments.
And what about direct pressure on the governments whose policy does
not suit the U.S.? There are enough examples of both on various
continents.
I addressed these issues frankly and in a rather detailed manner not
to embark upon the road of mutual recriminations, but, rather, in
the hope that it will help you to understand correctly our approach
to principles and their practical implementation, to appreciate our
willingness to build our relations with the U.S. on the basis of
equality and reciprocity in a positive and similar perception of
these notions.
I think a lot about the shape the affairs between our countries can
take. And I ever more firmly believe in a point I made in my
previous
[Page 147]
letter: an
improvement in the relations between the USSR and U.S. is possible. There is objective ground
for that.
Of course, our countries are different. This fact cannot be changed.
There is also another fact, however: when the leaders of both
countries, as the experience of the past shows, found in themselves
enough wisdom and realism to overcome bias caused by the difference
in social systems, in ideologies, we cooperated successfully, did
quite a few useful things both for our peoples and for all other
peoples. Of course, differences and different views remained, but it
was our interaction that was the determining factor. And it opened
up confident, peaceful vistas.
I took note of the fact that you also express yourself in favor of
each social system proving its advantages in peaceful competition.
Yes, we proceed from the assumption that in this competition the
USSR and U.S. will defend
their ideals and moral values as each of our societies understands
them. But it will result in nothing good, if the ideological
struggle should be carried over into the sphere of relations between
states. I believe, you understand, what I mean.
The main conclusion that naturally follows from the mutual
recognition of the need for peaceful competition is that the
attempts should be renounced to substitute the dispute of weapons
for the dispute of ideas. One can hardly count on serious shifts in
the nature of our relations so long as one side will try to gain
advantages over the other on the path of the arms race, to talk with
the other side from the “position of strength”.
Mr. President, for understandable reasons the political leadership of
both our countries must have a competent judgement regarding the
existing and prospective weapon systems. It is extremely important
to avoid miscalculations whose irreversible consequences will
manifest themselves, if not today, then after some time.
In the past, a rigid, but at the same time quite fragile relationship
was established between the strategic nuclear weapons and
anti-ballistic missile systems. The only correct conclusion was
made—the Treaty of indefinite duration to limit ABM systems was concluded. It is only
due to that that it became possible at all to tackle as a practical
matter the problem of the limitation and reduction of nuclear
weapons.
The attempts to develop a large-scale ABM system inevitably set in train a radical
destabilization of the situation. Even the factor of uncertainty as
such will not only prevent any limitation of nuclear weapons, but
will, instead, lead to their build-up and improvement. Therefore,
when we resolutely raise the question and state that the
militarization of space is impermissible, it is not propaganda and
not a consequence of some misunderstanding or fear of “falling
behind technologically”. It is a result of a thorough analysis, of
our deep
[Page 148]
concern about the
future of relations between our countries, the future of peace.
There is also another aspect of the program of “strategic defense,”
which remains as if in a shadow for the broad public. But not for
responsible leaders and military experts. They talk in Washington
about the development of a large-scale ABM system, but in fact a new strategic offensive
weapon is being developed to be deployed in space. And it is a
weapon no less dangerous by its capabilities than nuclear weapons.
What difference does it make, what will be used in a first disarming
strike—ballistic missiles or lasers. If there is a difference, it is
that it will be possible to carry out the first strike by the new
systems practically instantly.
So, from any point of view, already the very beginning of the work to
implement this program is destabilizing, regardless even of its
final results. And it is precisely for this reason that it cannot
fail to serve as an impetus to a further upswing of the arms
race.
I think you will agree that in matters affecting the heart of
national security, neither side can or will rely on assurances of
good intentions. Any weapon system is evaluated by its capabilities,
but not by public statements regarding its mission.
All facts unambiguously indicate that the U.S. embarks upon the path
of developing attack space weapons capable of performing purely
offensive missions. And we shall not ignore that. I must say this
frankly. I ought to confess that what you have said about the
approach of the U.S. to the question of the moratorium on space and
nuclear weapons, enhances our concern. The persistent refusal of the
American side to stop the arms race cannot but put in question the
intentions of the U.S.
And what is going on at the negotiations in Geneva? The American side
is trying to substitute only a part of the agreed mandate for the
negotiations for the whole of it. An integral element is being
removed from the really agreed formula for the negotiations—the
obligation to prevent an arms race in space, to consider and resolve
all issues in their interrelationship. The American side has so far
done nothing to bring agreement closer. On the subject of preventing
an arms race in space the U.S. delegation did not present a single
consideration at all. I emphasize, not a single one. What for should
after that one be surprised: why, indeed, there is no movement on
the nuclear arms reduction?
I wish to mention, in passing, that the American representatives
maintain—this point is also contained in your letter—that it is
impossible to verify prohibition on scientific research. However, a
different thing is involved: a federal program of research
activities directly and specifically oriented towards the
development of attack space weapons, a large-scale ABM system with space-based
components. The very announcement of such a program is in clear
contradiction with the
[Page 149]
ABM Treaty. (Incidentally, if one
is to take the entire text of the “agreed statement” to the ABM Treaty, and not only its part
which is quoted in your letter, it is easy to see that it is aimed
not at weakening, but at strengthening the central provision of the
treaty—dealing with the sides’ renunciation of the development of
large-scale ABM systems).
As to the assertions that the USSR
is allegedly engaged in its own “large research program in the area
of strategic defense”, here, as Americans put it, apples are
confused with oranges. The Soviet Union does nothing that would
contravene the ABM Treaty, does not
develop attack space weapons.
Thus, the question of verification is in this case a far-fetched
question, if one is clearly to proceed from the premise that nothing
can be done—no matter what names one can come up with for it—that is
unambiguously prohibited by the ABM
Treaty.
Mr. President, I would like to hope that you will have another close
look at the problem of non-militarization of space, at its
interrelationship with solving the problem of nuclear weapons, and
from that angle—at the prospects for the Geneva negotiations. It is
in this objective linkage that there lies a resolution of the
problems of the limitation of nuclear arms, a real possibility to
get down to their radical reduction and thereby to proceed to the
liquidation of nuclear weapons as such. We shall not be able to
avoid anyway having precisely the complex of these issues as a
determining factor both for our relations and for the situation in
the world as a whole. This follows from the special responsibility
of our two countries.
I am convinced that we must and can be up to this responsibility. In
this connection I note with satisfaction your words to the effect
that our two countries have a common interest prevailing over other
things—to avoid war. I fully agree with that.
Now, with regard to what other steps could be taken, among other
things, to stimulate progress in Geneva. We are convinced that of
very important—and practical—significance would be the cessation of
all nuclear weapon tests. In this area a lot can be done by our two
countries. Specifically, we propose the following practical steps.
Putting into effect the up till now unratified Soviet-American
treaties of 1974 and 1976. Coming to terms on the resumption of
trilateral—with the participation of Britain—negotiations on the
complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and, acting
vigorously, working towards their speedy and successful conclusion.
Finally, we propose that the USSR
and U.S. interact in carrying out such a specific and very
substantial step on the part of all nuclear powers as a moratorium
on any nuclear exposions would be. We are in favor of introducing
such a moratorium as soon as possible.
The problem of prohibiting chemical weapons needs to be resolved. But
its resolution should be sought realistically. I must say that the
[Page 150]
positions which the
U.S. has so far had on a number of important aspects of this
problem, do not meet this criterion. We would like the American side
to pay attention to the proposals we have put forward. We agree that
bilateral consultations between our representatives would be useful,
for example, within the framework of the Geneva Conference on
Disarmament. It should be recognized, however, that the efforts
which are being made in the U.S. for the chemical rearmament, above
all, as concerns binary weapons, are not a favorable prerequisite at
all for removing chemical weapons completely and forever from the
military arsenals of states.
The state of things at the Stockholm Conference leaves one with an
ambiguous impression. On the one hand, it would seem that there is
common understanding regarding the need for an agreement on the
basis of an optimum combination of major political obligations and
military-technical confidence-building measures. One the other hand,
the Western representatives, the American representatives first of
all, clearly do not hasten to fill this understanding with specific
mutually acceptable—I emphasize, mutually acceptable—content. We are
for having a substantial understanding, really helping to enhance
confidence. Such are the instructions of our representatives. They
are prepared to listen to constructive considerations which the
American delegation may have. To put it briefly, we are for working
towards a successful conclusion of the conference.
I would like, Mr. President, to draw your attention to the
negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in
Central Europe. Sometimes we hear from the American representatives
that our proposals made last February “stimulate interest”.8 But it does not show at all at the negotiations
themselves. It would seem that reaching agreement on initial
reductions of the Soviet and American forces in that area would be
in your and in our interests in the interests of a military
relaxation in Europe. Could you look into it to see whether you
might find it possible to advance things in this area?
One of the sources of tension in the relations between the USSR and U.S. is a difference in the
assessment of what is going on in the world. It seems that the
American side frequently ignores the in-depth causes of events and
does not take fully into account the fact that today a great number
of states operate—and most actively, too—in world politics, each
with its own face and interests. All this immeasurably complicates
the general picture. A correct understanding of this would help
avoid serious mistakes and miscalculations.
[Page 151]
In the past we used to have a positive experience of interaction in
lowering tensions in some areas, in preventing dangerous outbreaks.
But it worked this way when the readiness was shown to take into
account the legitimate interests of each other and the positions of
all the sides involved in a certain situation.
We positively assess the agreement of the American side to have
exchanges of views on some regional problems. We expect it to accept
our proposal that a wider range of regional problems be the subject
of such exchanges and that those exchanges look to seeking specific
ways of settling tense situations. In this connection I took note of
the readiness, expressed in your letter, to work together with the
Soviet Union, so that the situation around Afghanistan would be
moving toward a peaceful settlement. I would like to have a more
clear understanding of how the American side is seeing it. Such an
opportunity is provided by the upcoming consultations of our
experts.
However, our opinions in this matter as well will be based upon
practical deeds of the U.S. From the point of view of achieving a
political settlement, and not only from that point of view, we
cannot accept what you say in your letter with respect to Pakistan.
We perceive the behavior of that country not only as not
corresponding to the goal of a political settlement around
Afghanistan, but also as dangerous and provocative. We expect that
the U.S., being closely linked with Pakistan and also taking into
account its own interests, will exert restraining influence on it.
The curtailing of its direct support to antigovernment armed
formations intruding into Afghanistan from Pakistan, would be a
positive signal from the American side. In other words, the U.S. has
the possibilities to confirm by actions its declared readiness to
achieve a political settlement around Afghanistan on the basis of a
just solution of the questions connected with it and to eliminate
tensions in this region as a whole. Such a mode of action will not
be left unnoticed by our side and would clearly work toward
straightening out Soviet-American relations.
Some kind of movement seems to be discernable in the area of strictly
bilateral relations between our countries. You, evidently, have
noticed that we support this trend. However, there should be no
misunderstanding concerning the fact that we do not intend and will
not conduct any negotiations relating to human rights in the Soviet
Union. We, as any other sovereign state, regarded and will regard
these questions in accordance with our existing laws and
regulations. Let us, Mr. President, proceed from this in order not
to aggravate additionally our relations. The development of our ties
can be based only on mutual interest, equality and mutual benefit,
respect for the rights and legitimate interests of each other.
We consider as positive the fact, that in some instances the once
diversified structure of Soviet-American relations starts—although
not
[Page 152]
very intensively, to
put it outright—to be restored and to be filled with content. In
particular, we consider useful the talks between our ministers of
trade which took place in Moscow recently. We intend to look for
mutually acceptable solutions in other areas as well, which
constitute the subject of discussion between us, and to expand the
range of such areas.
It is encouraging, that contacts, including those between parliaments
of our two countries, have become more active recently. As I have
already said to the representatives of the U.S. Congress, we live in
a time, when people shaping the policy of the USSR and the U.S., must necessarily
meet, have contacts with each other. To speak in broad terms, we
stand for building vigorously a bridge to mutual understanding and
cooperation and for developing trust.
In conclusion, I would like to confirm my positive attitude to a
personal meeting with you. I understand that you feel the same way.
Our point of view on this matter was outlined by Andrey A. Gromyko to Mr. Schultz
during their stay recently in Vienna. As to the place for holding
it, I understand that there are motives, which make you prefer the
meeting to be held in the U.S. But I have no less weighty motives
due to which, taking into account the present state of
Soviet-American relations, this variant is unrealistic.
Important international problems are involved and we should use the
time to search for possible agreements which could be readied for
the meeting. For our part, we are entirely for this.
Sincerely,
