70. Letter From the Ambassador-Designate to the Federal Republic of Germany (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz 1
Although I have been “out of the loop” on arms control and strategic topics for more than a week now (a long time for Washington), I wanted to send you some ideas on this broad subject before departing for Bonn.2 In this memo, I will step back a bit from the current negotiating situation in Geneva and analyze the evolving US-Soviet strategic balance. I then will ruminate on what these trends mean for our negotiating strategy in Geneva. Finally, I will make a few suggestions on how to relate our negotiating posture to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.
Strategic Trends
Despite the overall success the Reagan Administration has had over the past four years in accelerating the modernization of US strategic offensive forces, the momentum of the Soviet offensive buildup has continued unabated. Thus, the Administration still faces basically the same problem it confronted when it entered office in 1981: The Soviet buildup is gradually, but steadily undermining the US strategic deterrent—the lynchpin of American defense policy and NATO’s strategy of “flexible response.” In particular, the vulnerability of US fixed ICBMs (the Minuteman force), bomber forces, SLBM ports and command, control and communications facilities to increasingly accurate Soviet ICBMs has grown, and thus remains the principal weakness of the US deterrent. Looking ahead, the Soviet acquisition of less vulnerable strategic systems (mobile ICBMs like the SS–24 and 25), combined with increased vulnerability of US systems, means that the credibility of the US deterrent will be further eroded over the next decade.
It is, of course, debatable what this means for strategic stability and East-West relations in the 1990s. I do not believe that the shifting strategic balance foreshadows, at some stage, a Soviet nuclear “bolt from the blue” designed to disarm the United States and to thus secure, for the USSR, worldwide domination. Nor do I believe that, on the basis of a Soviet perception of nuclear advantage, we are likely to experience a “nuclear ultimatum” issued by Moscow, designed to force us to back down from “front line” positions around the world. (We [Page 264] should recall that the high-point of Soviet nuclear diplomacy—Khruschev’s “saber-rattling” in the late 1950s and his installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962—were a function of strategic weakness, not strength.) Instead, the emergence of what Sam Nunn has called a condition of “parity-minus” is likely to have two critical implications: First, in intense regional crises of the future, the United States will be deprived of its own ability to play the nuclear card, as for example, President Nixon skillfully did in ordering a nuclear alert to deter direct Soviet military intervention in the 1973 Middle East war. Second, the growth of Soviet strategic nuclear power will gradually, but inevitably lead to a loosening of Alliance ties, with Europeans increasingly questioning the credibility of the US nuclear guarantee and Americans, reflecting on the danger attached to the commitment to NATO, increasingly seeking to circumscribe that commitment. Indeed, some Americans, on both ends of the political spectrum, will assert that the time has come to shuck Alliance responsibilities altogether. Thus, in the next decade, the Soviet strategic buildup could mean (a) that the United States will be deprived of an important tool for crisis management and (b) that the United States and its key Allies will drift further apart.
The Potential Role of SDI
There are, of course, a number of theoretical ways we could cope with this problem. The United States, in close consultation with the Allies, could begin a process of disengagement from Western Europe and Northeast Asia with the understanding that the Europeans and the Japanese would pick up the slack. As superfically attractive as such an option would be for some, it is neither politically nor economically feasible. How would the US nuclear umbrella over Germany and Japan be replaced? Would these nations, together with other Allies, spend what was necessary to sustain credible conventional defenses? The net result of pursuing this option would most likely be an unprecedented crisis within the West and a weakening of overall military capability—a situation that Moscow would be only too willing to exploit.
Another, more realistic option is for the United States to respond to growing Soviet offensive nuclear capability by accelerating its own offensive programs; in particular, reducing the vulnerability of existing US systems by deploying more survivable replacements. Of course, this is largely what we are attempting to do right now: the ALCM and the ATB are meant to enhance bomber survivability and penetrability, the longer-range Trident SLBMs give submarines greater ocean-operating area and thus greater protection and the Midgetman SICBM would be mobile, thus escaping the vulnerability of fixed-site missiles. The problem here is not our technical capacity to respond to increasing strategic vulnerability, but our political and economic willingness over the long haul to take the necessary steps. The MX is a sad case in point. [Page 265] It has been under development for more than a decade and when it finally is deployed, it will be in numbers too small to affect the overall balance (the Carter Administration wanted 200!) and, of course, it will also, mainly for reasons of domestic politics, be as vulnerable as the Minuteman. I am pessimistic, then, about the US ability to keep pace with the Soviet offensive by offensive improvements of our own. Already, an arms race “weariness” is setting in among the American public and on Capitol Hill, not to mention the Allies. The President has done a magnificent job in explaining why the strategic balance must not be permitted to worsen further, but can we count on future Presidents to be so courageous and persuasive?
Obviously, this is where SDI comes in. Whatever the potential for strategic defenses to render nuclear weapons obsolete in the 21st century, it is clear, as the President said in his Strasbourg speech, that the near-term promise of SDI is to enhance deterrence, not to replace it with some alternative strategic doctrine. I have seen enough analytical work to convince me that if coupled with a prudent program of offensive modernization (cruise missiles, Trident and the MX), a moderately-sized, layered defense system (perhaps not even utilizing boost-phase intercept) would, in the mid-1990s, neutralize Soviet offensive advantages. As a number of SDI advocates have pointed out, even with an increase in Soviet warheads, Moscow’s ability to convincingly threaten fixed ICBM and other high-value military targets would be vastly degraded if we possessed the ability to complicate—to a significant degree—Soviet nuclear targeting plans. This, in turn, would strengthen the US hand in future crises and strengthen the credibility of US and NATO strategy. Given our technological strength in competing in the area of strategic defense and our political weakness in competing in other areas, SDI seems the way to go.
Needless to say, SDI—like offensive force improvement—also faces tough political sledding. The idea that we are moving the arms race into a new realm continues to have currency, in Europe and at home. And the fact that SDI deployment would require wholesale changes to the ABM Treaty, if not its abrogation, makes a serious effort at strategic defense all the more controversial. The home-grown concern over SDI has not escaped the Soviets and is one reason they have made it Public Enemy Number One. Another, more important reason is undoubtedly that we have plunged onto technological terrain on which the Soviets know they will find it difficult to keep pace. But whatever the reason, the Soviet decision to vilify SDI as an impediment to arms control and as an American attempt to regain strategic superiority has only compounded the pressure on the program from those in the West who worry about irritating the Soviets.
[Page 266]SDI and Geneva
Is there a way out of this dilemma? In theory, arms control could provide an answer. If we are able with the Soviets to negotiate substantial reductions in both sides’ offensive systems, then the requirement for strengthening deterrence through the judicious exploitation of strategic defense would decline and, depending on the characteristics of any actual agreement, could even disappear. The question is whether an agreement covering offensive forces, one that significantly reduces the vulnerability of US systems, is really negotiable. On this, the jury is still out. In the 1982–83 START negotiations, the Soviets showed little inclination to discuss reductions in the most threatening component of their strategic forces, land-based ICBMs. But the United States, for its part, was equally unwilling to address trade-offs that might have made an offensive arms agreement possible.
Two developments have emerged that may have changed this situation. The first, of course, is SDI. It is possible that in confronting a race in new strategic defense technology that they fear they will lose, the Soviets are now finally ready to accept balanced cuts in offensive forces in order to place constraints on SDI. It is not the purpose of this memo to describe in detail what such a deal might look like (I have outlined some specific ideas in an earlier memo to you),3 but a plausible arrangement might consist of (1) 30–40 percent reductions in overall offensive forces (SNDVs and warheads), including appropriate sublimits on fixed and heavy ICBMs and (2) a ten-year ban, excluding research, on SDI and ASAT testing and deployment, coupled with an extension of the six-month notification requirement to abrogate the ABM Treaty to two to four years. Under the logic of such a proposal, the near-term necessity of SDI deployment would be obviated by the constraints placed on the Soviet offensive buildup and the United States, over the longer term, would preserve the option, through continuing SDI research, of transitioning to a greater reliance on defense. That said, in making such a proposal we could also tell the Soviets that rather than simply reaffirming the existing ABM Treaty, it could be modified to permit both sides to deploy defenses to protect their offensive forces. To enhance our leverage in negotiations, I would also explicitly state that in the absence of an agreement that reduced the threat to our offensive forces, we would abrogate the ABM Treaty in the not-too-distant future.
The second new factor is Mr. Gorbachev’s ascendancy. Gorbachev, after years of stagnation in Soviet policy, is an activist and, as Oleg [Page 267] Sokolov told me recently, we should not underestimate his plans to transform both Soviet domestic and foreign policy. It is unclear, however, whether Gorbachev is serious about achieving a meaningful agreement in Geneva or is more interested in utilizing sophisticated propaganda and public diplomacy in an effort to pressure us to abandon SDI unilaterally. Gorbachev’s possible penchant for the latter course—nuclear grandstanding—is perhaps revealed by his recent nuclear testing initiative.4 However, in truth, there is no way of telling how Gorbachev would respond to a US proposal linking substantial offensive cuts to limits on SDI. I believe that Gorbachev is most likely to try to have it both ways: Early on, pressuring us through a propaganda offensive into unilateral concessions while preserving the option for real negotiations later should his arms control gamesmanship fail.
Under these circumstances, a strong case can be made for continuing to fence off SDI from the Geneva bargaining process and waiting Gorbachev out while engaging in active arms control gamesmanship ourselves. After all, didn’t this strategy serve the Administration well over the last four years or so? While the answer to this question is essentially yes, there are several reasons to believe that this approach will not work now. As sketched out above, we are moving into a period of greater Soviet activism. Soviet hints of flexibility in START, combined with suggestions that they are prepared to live with SDI research, will reinforce Western voices calling for negotiations on strategic defenses. Secondly, as much as we try, it will not be possible to keep expectations surrounding the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in November completely in check, particularly if, as I expect, the unfolding Soviet peace offensive is meant to put the President on the defensive in Geneva. And even if we make it through Geneva without putting SDI on the table, over the longer haul fencing off SDI in the negotiations will pose considerable political risks here at home and abroad. The Soviet campaign is sure to continue and more importantly, the SDI program will sooner or later bump into the ABM Treaty, which will only serve to strengthen the claim that SDI spells the end of arms control.
Seizing the Initiative
Accordingly, I favor a different course. We should seize the arms control initiative and force the Soviets to put their money where their mouth is. By this, I mean formulating an approach, like the one outlined above, which would hold out the possibility of fixed-duration limits on SDI deployment in return for meaningful offensive arms reductions. Would the Soviets go along with such an arrangement? In a way, it doesn’t matter, because we should be able to profit both from Soviet [Page 268] acceptance and intransigence. If Gorbachev is willing to play ball, we would be in the position—for the first time—to curb the growing Soviet offensive threat. By agreeing to permit continuing SDI research, we would also keep the strategic defense option alive. Politically, meanwhile, the President would be in a strong position in Geneva because it would be he, rather than Gorbachev, that was seen as taking the lead in the negotiations.
If, on the other hand, it becomes clear that Gorbachev isn’t interested in a deal along these lines, we would then be in a far stronger position to proceed with SDI on our own, including the eventual abrogation of the ABM Treaty. The problem we face now is that SDI is viewed by many as an excellent bargaining chip that so far we have been unwilling to use in the negotiations. Thus, if we came forward with a proposal that envisaged constraints on strategic defense and the Soviets then turned us down, we would be in the strongest possible position with the Allies and the Congress to proceed with near-term SDI testing and deployment. Although there would still be those that opposed SDI under any circumstances, I think we could make a convincing case that having tried the arms control route and failed due to Soviet obstinacy, there was no other responsible alternative to pursue.
The kernel of my argument, then, is that the INF experience is relevant for SDI. Our ability to deploy controversial systems is directly dependent on our being seen as making a serious effort to achieve an arms control solution. My worry is that by failing to heed the INF lesson, we will not only lose whatever opportunity exists for achieving a good agreement in Geneva, but that we could also lose the opportunity to create a strong consensus around SDI. Ironically, then, rather than posing a threat to SDI, Geneva may be an indispensable element in saving it.
Needless to say, there are potential pitfalls in the approach outlined here. It is always possible, and indeed likely, that the Soviets could avoid a direct response to a new US proposal and by temporizing, push us to agree to more prohibitive SDI constraints and/or less significant offensive reductions. Such attempts must be strongly and publicly resisted. We must be able to explain to the Congress and the Allies the overall concept of a new negotiating approach—responding to the Soviet challenge to stable deterrence—and why a second-rate agreement would not meet this objective. But having watched this Administration cope before with Soviet negotiating tactics, I’m sure you could succeed in this task. In sum, there are strong arguments for formulating a new position in the coming weeks that could be previewed in the meetings here and in New York with your new Soviet counterpart. I believe that such a proposal would: (a) give the President the high ground in November; (b) allow us to take the initiative in the Geneva [Page 269] negotiations; (c) create a strong foundation of public support for SDI and (d) contribute ultimately to the stabilization of deterrence through the end of the century.
It’s worth a shot.
- Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (7/29/1985–7/31/1985); NLR–775–13–80–5–4. Secret; Sensitive.↩
- Burt was appointed Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany on July 18 and presented his credentials on September 16.↩
- Possible reference to Document 62.↩
- See Document 68.↩
- Burt signed “Rick” above his typed signature.↩