Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 29, 1985, 0422Z

231315. Subject: Presidential Letter on Nuclear Testing.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Chargé is to present text of letter from the President to General Secretary Gorbachev immediately, and in any case no later than noon Moscow time, to highest available MFA official.² You should note that the President had signed it on Saturday July 27; we will address separately the letter received today, July 28, from General Secretary Gorbachev.³

3. Begin text: The White House, Washington

July 27, 1985

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I appreciated your kind message following my recent operation, and am pleased to assure you that my recovery has been rapid. Actually, the cancellation of my public activities last week allowed me more time than I otherwise would have had to concentrate my attention on substantive issues, including those which have been part of our dialogue.

I have given the most careful attention to your letters of June 10 and June 22.⁴ Obviously, our views are still far apart on the practical aspects of most of the key issues facing us, and I believe that both of us will wish to pursue these matters in greater detail when we meet in November. Since we will be meeting before the end of the year, I will confine my comment at this time to a few observations which I hope may help us prepare for a constructive and productive meeting.

To be frank, my overall impression from your letters is that you have not yet seriously addressed many of the matters of deep concern to me which I have noted in our correspondence. However, if we are to narrow our differences and prepare the way for significant agreements, we must both be prepared to deal, in explicit and concrete terms, with the concerns of the other.

Reading your letter of June 10, I was astounded to note your allegation that the United States is developing “a new strategic weapon” to be deployed in space, as well as your statement that lasers could be used as disarming first-strike weapons and your subsequent charge that the United States is developing space weapons “capable of performing purely offensive missions.”

Mr. General Secretary, our scientists have informed me repeatedly that no element of our Strategic Defense Initiative is capable of application to weapons of mass destruction or to weapons which would be effective against hardened point targets on Earth such as missile silos. Now I am not debating intentions here (even though our intent is clear to confine our research to the (begin underline) feasibility (end underline) of defensive weapons), but am referring rather to hard scientific and technical facts as I understand them.

If our scientists really disagree on these points, I would appreciate concrete examples of what specific aspects of a program to investigate the feasibility of defense against missiles which have been launched could be distorted to produce an offensive weapon capable either of mass destruction on Earth or of use in a disarming first strike. Alternatively, we could arrange for our specialists to meet for a thorough discussion of this very point. If there is such a possibility, it would certainly be incumbent on both of us to act to preclude its realization in practice.

Since we have agreed to be candid, I must also tell you that the argument that Soviet research programs in the same scientific areas as those in our Strategic Defense Initiative are somehow fundamentally different from ours can hardly be expected to be persuasive to an impartial observer. As I see it, the only difference in our respective approaches to this research results from differences in our political systems. Ours requires us to debate every program in public; yours does not. Yet the research is in the same scientific areas, and I can perceive no basis for a claim that such research is destabilizing only when it is conducted by the American side. Have we not agreed to deal on the basis of equality?

So let us now finally get down to particulars and try to find a solution to the interrelated issues of offensive and defensive weapons. We will not find a mutually acceptable solution by recourse to propaganda or refusal to enter into the concrete negotiation necessary to realize our mutual goal of setting the world on a course toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

In respect to your letter of June 22, I can only say that it does not alleviate the concerns over compliance with past agreements which I described to you in my letter of June 10. I hope that the two of us and our representatives will find the way soon to address and resolve these concerns in specific fashion, since resolution of these questions is a key element in making progress on equitable arms reduction.

I am, of course, prepared to address your concerns as well, and have a suggestion which I believe would lay to rest one of the issues which your government has raised with us. This is in the area of nuclear testing.

As you know, in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 1984, I proposed several measures that could help increase mutual understanding between our two countries. Among these proposals, I asked that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the test site in the United States, and for ours to go to yours, to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapons tests.⁵

Since my address to the United Nations, I regret to say, U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the measurement of nuclear test yields has not yet been achieved. Most recently, the Soviet Union alleged that the U.S. nuclear test of April 2, 1985, exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold, and that the United States deliberately took steps to prevent Soviet national technical means of verification from establishing the true yield of the explosion. I wish to assure you, Mr. General Secretary, the yield of that test was less than 150 kilotons, and the United States took no steps to interfere with Soviet national technical means.

The United States has evidence provided by its national technical means of verification that the yield of a number of Soviet nuclear tests has exceeded 150 kilotons. Yet, the Soviet Government says that these tests had yields under that limit.

It is evident from our exchanges on this question that there are large uncertainties in the procedures used by both sides to estimate the yields of underground nuclear tests conducted by the other side. These uncertainties create mistrust that undermines the arms control process.

I take the Soviet concerns over U.S. compliance with the 150 kiloton testing limit very seriously, and believe they should be resolved promptly and definitively. Accordingly, Mr. General Secretary, I invite you to send Soviet technical experts to meet with their U.S. counterparts to discuss and review U.S. data obtained from a direct yield measurement of the April 2 test. I am confident that expert Soviet examination of these data will confirm that the yield of this test was less than 150 kilotons. I am willing to have such a meeting take place at or near the Nevada test site to allow Soviet experts to inspect the site of the April 2 test.

I also invite you to send Soviet technical experts to the Nevada test site to measure the yield of a U.S. nuclear test. The Soviet experts are invited to bring with them any instrumentation devices they deem necessary to measure the yield of this test. Upon your acceptance of this invitation, our experts can meet without delay to set a date and make arrangements for this visit.

I am making this invitation without preconditions to ensure that there are no obstacles posed by the United States which would make acceptance difficult. I believe it will be a useful step if we can eliminate the concerns the Soviet side has expressed on this matter and initiate increased cooperation between our two countries in this area.

Let me turn to several other issues. During the past two months our experts have held talks on Southern Africa and Afghanistan. I think the tenor of these meetings has demonstrated the usefulness of this dialogue. I want to reiterate my commitment to a process of regular exchanges on regional issues. On Afghanistan, in particular, I believe the talks underscored the recognition on both sides that the situation in that tragic country is an ongoing problem in our relations. We continue to be ready to discuss concrete steps that can contribute to the UN Secretary General’s efforts to develop a negotiated solution and lead to the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I am still convinced that a solution is possible which will protect the legitimate interests of all parties, that of the Afghan people to live in peace under a government of their own choosing and that of the Soviet Union to ensure its southern border is secure.

Beyond arms control and regional issues, I know that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze will have an opportunity to review those other elements of our bilateral relationship that might lend themselves to early resolution. There is also, as you know, a set of humanitarian concerns. You have stated that these are an internal matter. We believe they involve political commitments undertaken by the Soviet Union when it signed the Helsinki Final Act, particularly the issue of emigration. Apart from this, the desires of American citizens to be reunited with members of their families, as well as those who are entitled to American citizenship under our law and who wish to live in our country, are legitimate concerns. No changes in your laws or system are required to resolve these or the other matters we have raised with you.

Mr. General Secretary, we have an important, historic opportunity to put our relationship on a sound footing, sustainable for the long term. Our agenda is full of proposals which, if realized, can form the substance of a more constructive relationship. I am pleased that our Foreign Ministers will be meeting in Helsinki, and subsequently in New York to address them. I also hope to have the opportunity to discuss them personally with Minister Shevardnadze when he is in the United States this fall.

I am looking forward to our meeting in Geneva and believe that we should aim to draw up a joint agenda for steps to be taken to improve the relationship of our countries. If we can also agree upon mutually acceptable approaches to be followed by our negotiators on some of the important issues between us, that would be most helpful. In the meantime, it may be that some headway can be made on several of the issues that divide us, and if so, I would certainly welcome it.

Nevertheless, I feel that the value of our upcoming meeting should not be measured by the presence or absence of agreements to conclude, but rather by the degree to which it can contribute to narrowing our differences in critical areas and charting a course for constructive action in the future.

I will continue to give serious thought to the considerations you have raised in our correspondence, and hope that you will do the same in respect to the concerns I have voiced and the various suggestions I have made. As we prepare for our meeting, I hope you will continue to call to my attention those matters which you feel I should address, just as I will be communicating my thoughts to you. This should assist us both in ensuring that our meeting is as constructive and productive as possible.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Shultz

1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number]. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. The telegram was drafted by Pascoe from the text received from the White House; cleared by Palmer, Ridgway, Van Heuven, and McFarlane; approved by McKinley. Various drafts of the letter are in Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (6/8); and Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (8/8). See also Documents 64 and 67.
2. In telegram 10346 from Moscow, July 29, the Embassy reported that “Chargé delivered text of President Reagan’s July 27 letter to General Secretary Gorbachev at 1:15 p.m. July 29 (Korniyenko had just returned from seeing Shevardnadze off to Helsinki and therefore was unavailable for earlier meeting). Chargé explained that the President had signed this letter before receiving Gorbachev’s letter of July 28 on nuclear testing. The President’s letter therefore did not constitute a reply, and Chargé anticipated that a response to Gorbachev’s letter would be forthcoming. After reading the letter, Korniyenko ‘speculated’ that Gorbachev would not be fully in agreement with its contents, just as President Reagan had not entirely agreed with Gorbachev’s letter.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])
3. See Document 68.
4. See Documents 41 and 46.
5. On July 29 in Washington, Speakes read a statement at the daily press briefing announcing the President’s invitation to the Soviet Union to observe a nuclear test at the Nevada test site. (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pp. 953–954) For Reagan’s speech, see Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206; see also Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 289, footnote 4.