53. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State1

8857. For the Secretary From the Ambassador. Subject: Gorbachev Moves Again.

1. Confidential—Entire text.

2. The man who nominated Chernenko for Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in April 1984 and so persuasively argued why it was essential to keep the jobs of head of state and head of party in one man has turned his lawyerly skill to the opposite case. In a short and emotionless intervention Gorbachev made an equally good case for not combining the jobs. His basic point was that to galvanize the party in its “leading role” it was essential for the General Secretary to concentrate his energies on party work.2

3. What he did not say but what must have been understood by the loyal party folk in the hall is that he has managed in these short days since his elevation to eliminate his major opponent (Romanov), promote his most loyal and competent aides (Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and Chebrikov), and do what the Central Committee bureaucrats have [Page 191] wanted to do for a long time—i.e. get Gromyko out of the way.3 He has also managed to put the military in a secondary position. Rumors are flying that a major shake-up in the Central Committee staff will soon take place. The two new secretaries appointed on July 1 are definitely Gorbachev’s team. The main last change to be made—Prime Minister—apparently awaits the Party Congress.

4. Thus the conclusion must be drawn that he has amassed power faster than most experts had thought possible. He now faces the near-term tasks of re-making the Central Committee and drawing up the new edition of the party program and the next Five Year Plan—all of which should be in place by the time of the February 1986 Party Congress. He also faces all the continuing internal problems and difficulties within the empire—which will probably be more difficult for him to overcome. But he does this with a confidence that appears to come from youthful energy, a strong belief in orthodox communism, and a fine political and public relations sense.

5. On foreign affairs he has not yet set his mark. Appointing a neophyte like Shevardnadze to be Foreign Minister will make it easier for Gorbachev and the party apparat to step into what has been for almost thirty years the preserve of Andrei Gromyko. Shevardnadze is now a full Politburo member but essentially a man known for rooting out corruption and making agriculture work more efficiently. Over time we should see many changes at the top of the Foreign Office. Exciting times. I assume that Shevardnadze will go ahead with Gromyko’s schedule and you will have an opportunity to size up this handsome, southern activist who has a lot of success behind him but unknown views on foreign policy. My colleagues who have met him in Georgia say that he has always had a big interest in foreign affairs and spoke knowledgeably from a brief.

Hartman
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850465–0985. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis.
  2. Gorbachev maneuvered during the session of the Supreme Soviet for the “elevation of Gromyko to the Chairmanship of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and his replacement as Foreign Minister by former Georgian party boss Shevardnadze,” which signaled the “end of an era in Soviet foreign policy” and the remaking of the “political landscape of the Soviet Union.” (Telegram 8886 from Moscow, July 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850466–0753) On July 2, Reagan wrote in his personal diary: “N.S.C. briefing had to do with Gorbachev’s latest movement, the naming of Gromyko as Pres. of the U.S.S.R. It is a ceremonial job & possibly it was given to get a new face in the Foreign Ministry.” (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I: January 1981–October 1985, p. 478)
  3. In telegram 8886 from Moscow, the Embassy also reported: “Despite the effective support that Gromyko provided in garnering the General Secretaryship for Gorbachev, he has nevertheless been gracefully moved to the sidelines in the foreign affairs field. The post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium has little substantive content unless combined with another job. The naming of Eduard Shevardnadze to the Foreign Ministry, however, has deprived Gromyko of his institutional base. Our sense is that Gromyko moved upstairs only reluctantly and would have preferred to serve out his time as Foreign Minister.” See footnote 2, above.