54. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)1
SUBJECT
- Gromyko’s “Elevation”: First Thoughts
Some of my initial thoughts on the personnel changes announced today are as follows:
Gorbachev Takes Charge: The most obvious is that Gorbachev has pulled off a brilliant tactical move which puts him in direct charge of foreign policy. He did this by passing on to Gromyko the trappings of high office, while seizing the real power lever. It is an excellent example of his instinct for political maneuver in the Soviet context. A weak leader like Chernenko needed the chief-of-state title to project a public image of authority which was in fact lacking. Gorbachev has the strength and shrewdness to settle for the power itself. The trappings can come in time, when potential rivals, or powerful barons (boyars in Russian terminology), are eliminated or severed from their power base.
Shevardnadze: Originally a tough policeman (he was for several years Minister of Interior in Soviet Georgia), he subsequently made a reputation as a no-nonsense executive, an enemy of corruption (for which Soviet Georgia is notorious), and a mild “reformer” of administrative practices, particularly in agriculture. He handled some explosive issues involving Georgian nationalism deftly, giving way just enough to take off the steam when faced with demonstrations over such issues as forcing more use of the Russian language in Georgia. (On this particular point, the Georgian nationalists actually won; as a Georgian, Shevardnadze may well have been sympathetic, and if so, demonstrated consummate skill in staying in Moscow’s good graces while giving way to Georgian national feelings.)
Like Gorbachev, he seems to have a flair for PR, and may be adept at projecting an attractive image to foreign audiences, in sharp contrast to the dour Gromyko. He was a favorite of Andropov and may have collaborated with the latter in his campaign to undermine Brezhnev’s authority. (Shevardnadze’s predecessor as Georgian Party chieftain, Mzhavanadze, was personally close to Brezhnev, and the charges of corruption against him foreshadowed the later campaign Andropov [Page 193] organized against Brezhnev’s family.) So, like Gorbachev, he is a wily operator, but as Foreign Minister he owes his position entirely to Gorbachev, who is also well placed to control his future, so we can assume he will work as a faithful executor of Gorbachev’s wishes.
Possible Purge of Foreign Ministry: To gain total mastery of foreign affairs, Gorbachev must do one of two things—or a little bit of both: (1) Bring the Foreign Ministry staff under his own control, through Shevardnadze, and/or (2) Beef up the status and operational clout of his own CC Secretariat staff dealing with foreign affairs. Regarding the former, it will be interesting to see whether Shevardnadze keeps Gromyko’s “U.S. affairs team” in place (people like Dobrynin, Korniyenko, Komplektov and Bessmertnykh) or replaces them. My guess is that some will be replaced, though some may be fast enough on their feet to convince the new boss of their indispensability. As for the Central Committee Secretariat staff, Gorbachev has already removed Zamyatin from head of the International Information Department. Rumors are flying in Moscow regarding other possible changes; with changes might come increased authority if Gorbachev wishes to build up an institutional counterweight to the entrenched MFA bureaucracy.
Implications for U.S.-Soviet Relations: I expect to see no major changes in the Soviet policy toward the U.S. in the immediate future. However, I suspect that both Gorbachev and Shevardnadze may be more inclined to step up attention to U.S. Allies, China and the Third World, rather than making U.S.-Soviet relations the linchpin of Soviet foreign policy as Gromyko tended to do. Coming from a region bordering on Turkey and Iran, Shevardnadze may well have a greater interest in Third World issues than Gromyko had (despite his rhetoric to the contrary). Furthermore, we have already seen signs of greater activity towards China, and I believe we will see much more in Western Europe, with perhaps more than one trip by Gorbachev there in the fall. (France seems certain in October, and Geneva plus perhaps something else in November.) We can expect some very attractive-looking blandishments waved in the faces of our Allies and their publics in coming months, whatever else happens.
Nevertheless, when all is said and done, relations with the United States will continue to preoccupy the Soviet leadership. The forays into other areas will be seen primarily as attempts to weaken U.S. influence and to put pressure on our positions. In the final analysis, though, they must deal with us, and they know it.
Implications for the Summit: Certainly, from now on, Gorbachev will take personal charge of the “preparations.” The Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Helsinki (which I presume will go forward as planned) may provide few signals; it may be little more than Shevardnadze’s warm-up for his presumed trip to the U.N. in September and the [Page 194] meetings he can expect here then. While he is getting his team in place, or establishing his authority over the existing team, I doubt that he will be inclined toward policy innovation. As we near November, however, minds will be increasingly concentrated on how Gorbachev can come out of the Summit looking a winner.
I suspect that we will see something of a “double track” approach. On the one hand, we will see a schedule of activities in Europe, and very likely some “initiatives,” which will make Gorbachev look good at home whatever happens at the Summit, coupled with steady pressure on us to give way on SDI—which the Soviets have set up as the symbolic issue in the relationship. On the other hand, we will probably experience a growing number of probes to determine where there may be some “give” in our current positions. The best summit result for Gorbachev would be to carry back something he could tout as a trophy, on the background of a triumphal tour of several West European capitals.
We have our work cut out for us.
- Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron July 1985 (1/8). Secret. Sent for information.↩