56. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Shultz in Bangkok1
207459/Tosec 130140. Subject: Message From Paul Nitze. For the Secretary From Nick Platt. Three copies to S/S Quinn only.
1. Entire text Secret. Paragraphs 2–10 contain the text of a highly sensitive memorandum from Paul Nitze to the Secretary in the Eggplant series. Please make certain that no one besides the Secretary and Charlie have access to it.
2. I have reflected on our June 17 presentation and the July 1 Soviet response.2 I am increasingly convinced the Soviets in fact misunderstood your original presentation.
3. In the points we passed to Dobrynin the essence of our idea was that, were there radical reductions on the offensive side, the need for compensatory defenses would correspondingly be “diminished.”3 The Soviets could have misread this to suggest that, with large cuts on the offensive side, we would seek to deploy fewer new strategic defenses than we might otherwise seek to deploy. They may well have missed the trade we were actually suggesting.
4. It is likely the Soviets misread our June 17 approach as simply a reiteration of the offer of discussions regarding a possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance that Max has been pressing in Geneva. In fact, Max has told the Soviets this round—again in the context of a [Page 203] possible transition to a more defense-reliant balance—that reductions in offensive arms would reduce the need for defenses. A close reading of the paper Dobrynin left off on July 1 suggests a Soviet interpretation of our June 17 presentation as more of the same.
5. There is conceivably much to gain, and little to lose, in making sure the Soviets in fact understand what we had in mind. Our offer—adequately clarified—could provide the framework for a settlement of the nuclear and space arms questions. Failing that, it would still leave us well-positioned to make the case with publics, allies and Congress that we had made every effort to break the impasse in Geneva. But as things stand now, the record is not clear on our offer.
6. I have also done some thinking about when we might want to correct this Soviet misunderstanding, that is, make clear the nature of the actual deal that we are prepared to explore.
7. One alternative would be for you to do so in Helsinki. This would let you outline the deal directly to Shevardnadze, could give him a “plum” to take back to Moscow, and could get your working relationship off to a good start.
8. On the other hand, several reasons argue for us to move to correct the Soviet misunderstanding prior to Helsinki, preferably by an approach here before Dobrynin departs.
—The longer we leave the July 1 Soviet response on the record without any response, the more difficult it will be to correct their misinterpretation. If we leave their response unchallenged, your approach to Shevardnadze in Helsinki would appear to be a “new” offer. It could suggest to them that we are overly anxious for agreement were they to believe we were coming forward with a “new” offer just six weeks after they had turned down one high-level approach. For tactical reasons, we should thus seek to tie any clarification to the June 17 presentation, making clear they are one and the same. This is easier done sooner rather than later.
—If we do not clarify our offer until your meeting with Shevardnadze, we cannot expect that he will be prepared adequately to explore our approach, let alone to set in motion a process that could lead to agreement at the November summit. He most likely would instead note your presentation and say he would get back with a response later. If, on the other hand, we clarify the deal here and ask that Shevardnadze be prepared to address it in Helsinki, you should be able to have a real dialogue.
—Waiting until Helsinki to clarify our offer costs us not only three weeks in our timetable for the November summit; it could delay high-level substantive discussions by nearly two months. Clarifying our offer to Shevardnadze at the end of this month means that subsequent [Page 204] exchanges would have to take place via letter or through Embassies; you would not have another chance for a face-to-face session until late September at the UNGA.
9. I know you are preoccupied with other issues at the moment but felt these points should be called to your attention. I have not spoken with Bud about this, nor have I shown him the draft talking points I prepared July 2 in response to Dobrynin’s non-paper.4 If you share my view that on balance there is something to be gained by removing a probable misunderstanding prior to Helsinki, it would be important to attempt to catch Dobrynin with such clarification prior to his departure; in the absence of Dobrynin, then Sokolov could send the clarifying points to Moscow. Although in similar circumstances Art Hartman would be ideal for such a communication, he is not aware of the substance of the June 17 meeting. Hence, clarification should be done here in Washington. I have tried to see Bud (to close the loop on Max’s draft aide memoire), but he continues to be difficult for me to reach.5
10. I will take no action until instructed by you.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum, Lot 91D257, Eggplant I, June, July, August 1985 NP. Secret; Immediate; Nodis/Adam. Drafted by Nitze; cleared by Pearce and Platt; approved by McKinley. Shultz was in Bangkok from July 8 to 10 to meet with Prime Minister Prem and other Thai officials.↩
- See Document 43. The July 1 Soviet response was not found.↩
- See Documents 43 and 55.↩
- The draft talking points were not found.↩
- Not further identified.↩