Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

38. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 29, 1985, 9:40–10:53 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Continuation of Secretary Baldrige’s Report on His Trip to China, India and the Soviet Union (U)

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• Secretary Malcolm Baldrige
• Donald T. Regan, Chief of Staff
• Admiral John Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Lionel Olmer, Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade
• Ambassador Jack Matlock, NSC Staff
• Roger Robinson, NSC Staff

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Secretary Baldrige turned to the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and observed that he sensed in his meeting with Gorbachev that Soviet insecurity about being treated as equals is a theme which seemed to run through the General Secretary’s remarks. He then turned to Lionel Olmer for additional comments in this area. Mr. Olmer told the President that the refusniks in the Soviet Union had an overwhelming admiration and respect for him and that the President is viewed as being the difference between utter despair and hope. He added that the refusniks view the next 12 months as crucial and that they see a clear connection between trade and human rights. Mr. Olmer commented that the refusniks are not talking about the trade which affects our national security. He said that they believe that in the past there have been too few carrots in our trade relations and too many sticks. In other words, that the current pressure on the refusniks could be eased with a commensurate easing up of our trade policy toward the Soviet Union. (C)

The President stated that he still believes that quiet diplomacy is the best approach—similar to the way in which the U.S. achieved the release of the Pentecostalists from the basement of our Embassy in Moscow.² He commented that it puts the Soviets in the corner by talking about our human rights objectives publicly. The President indicated that if we do not mention our specific human rights objectives publicly we can help them (refusniks) because of the greater flexibility of our system. (C)

Secretary Baldrige proposed considering a 3–4 month hiatus period on the emigration issue where we would “put away the two by four and see what happens.”

The President stated that there was no question about the Soviet inferiority complex which he said is also hurting us in Geneva. He continued that the Soviets rely totally on their military, and it is only the military which makes them a superpower. The President then went through a hypothetical discussion to illustrate his point on human rights along the following lines: we want to increase our trade with the USSR, but we are under pressure from our people to increase emigration; increased emigration would help us be more forthcoming on things the Soviets want; we are not talking about interfering in their internal affairs but rather showing how their internal provisions are merely constraining our ability to be more helpful. (C)

Secretary Baldrige then turned to Jack Matlock (NSC) and asked if he had any further comments on human rights. Ambassador Matlock stated that he believes there may be merit in examining the idea of conveying to the Soviets unofficially what sort of U.S. reaction could be expected from specific Soviet steps in the human rights area. For example, if emigration increased to, say 10,000, we might give more encouragement to currently licensable exports of equipment for energy exploration and production. With 25,000, we could take further steps, and so on. Chief of Staff Regan stated that we have to be very careful with such an approach. (C)

The President stated that is what we did in the mountain retreat with Dobrynin on human rights. He stated he conveyed to Dobrynin that we could not live for four years with those people in the basement (Pentecostalists) and all of a sudden one day it was resolved. When we lifted the grain embargo (n.b. probably meant renewed the long-term grain agreement),³ it was portrayed as something we wanted to do anyway. (C)

As the meeting concluded, Secretary Baldrige told the President that he wanted to take a look at some of our technology controls, particularly in cases where three or four countries are providing the same technology that we are controlling. He restated he thought we should look at this issue inside of the Administration. The President responded that he thought so too. (C)

1. Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron May 1985 (5/5). Confidential. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum of conversation. Robinson sent it to McFarlane under a May 30 memorandum, recommending McFarlane approve it.
2. Documentation on this is in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, and vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Documents 12, 34, 46, and 74.
3. A renewal of the Long-Term Grain Agreement with the Soviet Union was signed on August 25, 1983. See Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. IV, Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985, Document 76.