Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

260. Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, January 8, 1986

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

Checklist and Overview of Next Six Month’s Events

Theme: In every major problem area we need to stay intensively but carefully engaged; whenever we stand back, events tend to take charge and run counter to our interests.

For example, we have lost ground since your meeting with Gorbachev in Geneva.² As events come along, they by their nature tend to put us opposite the Soviets. Unless we are active, the passage of time works against us.

With the Soviet Union we need to fix a date quickly. We want to get a sense of positive momentum going before the arms control negotiations begin again. How much flexibility in timing do we have?³

The Middle East peace process is nearing the end of one phase and the start of another. We have between now and March to see if anything can be made of the scattered and limited positive elements of the past year. If progress is not possible, we have to get ready for soured relations across the board with the Arabs and more attempts by the Soviets to increase their influence. To move things forward could require a high-profile American effort with an increased risk of visible failure. I will go over our ideas in detail with you next Wednesday.⁴

Southern Africa It is vital for us to keep the negotiating effort alive. Even when progress is not possible, the activity itself helps us keep the Front line States and others well-disposed to us. Chet Crocker is there now; we can assess the situation in detail after he reports on his visit.⁵

We need to move fast after Congress is back to get a hortatory resolution that puts Congress on record in support of Savimbi but does not force conditions on us or require an overt program.

In the spring we will face growing Hill pressure for more sanctions from those up for election this year. One idea is to dangle a trip to the U.S. in front of Botha as a means of inducing him to grant some changes.

Nicaragua and Contras Elliott Abrams is active on the Hill arguing for removal of restrictions on our aid to the Contras.⁶ It will be a tough battle, but we can win it if we go all out. We have to keep Contadora live or at least avoid the blame for its demise. Without a negotiating side to our strategy, our efforts to keep the military pressure on Nicaragua will be undermined. And security assistance is needed to keep the Core Four⁷ on track.

The Philippines The election February 7 could be fair and far-reaching in its consequences. Things could change, fast. We have to be fair and appear to be fair. A Presidential Observer Group for the elections will be important.⁸ If Aquino wins, we will have to find ways to show immediate tangible support. The Vice President should go to the inaugural. I would double back after Tokyo. If you go Southeast Asia before Tokyo, it would be hard to avoid a stop in Manila.

India-Pakistan Another area which requires careful, constant “gardening.” No high points ahead, but some tough decisions, particularly on assistance to Pakistan in view of the nuclear issue. A Presidential Trip in 1987?

Budget As the above indicates, our number one priority with the Hill is to protect the defense budget and security assistance programs. Unless we do, we cannot keep up the level of diplomatic engagement that our interests require.

1. Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Secretary’s Meeting with the President, (01/24/1986); NLR–775–18–99–1–3. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper. Shultz’s stamped initials appear at the top of the paper. The paper was prepared in advance of Shultz’s January 24 meeting with the President. In the same folder are a January 22 letter from Armacost to Shultz, a January 21 memorandum from Wolfowitz to Shultz with attached talking points, and a second January 22 memorandum from Armacost to Shultz, all concerning the Philippines and all prepared for Shultz’s meeting with Reagan. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met with Shultz and Poindexter in the Oval Office from 1:32 until 2:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President’s Daily Diary)
2. See Document 256.
3. In his memoir, Shultz described the segment of the meeting devoted to U.S.-Soviet issues: “I went to the President on January 24 and told him I wanted to set up a special group to work on our broad approach to arms control and our ability to initiate and react to the Soviets in this new stage. My idea was not to create a new decision-making body but rather to get all the key people together outside the petrified, stultified ‘interagency process.’ I wanted to create the general understandings within which detailed new proposals would be developed, thereby speeding up the process and rising above the usual carping. I advised the president that we had to respond to Gorbachev seriously. ‘Your response is going to be controversial,’ I said, ‘because your arms control community disagrees with your desire to get rid of nuclear weapons.’” (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 702–703)
4. January 29.
5. Crocker visited South Africa, January 12–14, as part of a larger trip to several African nations. For additional information, see Allister Sparks, “American Ends Visit to S. Africa: Crocker Criticizes ‘Economic War’,” Washington Post, January 15, 1986, p. A7. In telegram 1031 from London, January 16, the Embassy provided an overview of Crocker’s visit. At the time the telegram was sent, Crocker was in London to meet with FCO officials. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860038–0866)
6. For an overview of Abrams’ efforts at lobbying Congress regarding the resumption of military aid to the Contras, see Shirley Christian, “Administration Awaits Sign From Congress on Rebel Aid,” New York Times, January 3, 1986, p. A4.
7. El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala.
8. In telegram 5374 to Manila, January 8, the Department forwarded “a draft list of potential members of a possible U.S. observer delegation” to the Philippines, adding: “In compiling this list of potential official observers we considered the unique nature of the U.S. relationship with the Philippines, based on shared historical experiences and a common belief in basic democratic values; the broad range of our interests there—political, economic, social and strategic; the past nature of Philippine elections; and the concern among some influential segments of the American public with the human rights situation in the Philippines.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D860015–0924)