Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

256. Editorial Note

From November 19 until November 21, 1985, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva. The memoranda of conversation from the Geneva summit meeting are printed in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Documents 150–159.

On November 21, the United States and Soviet Union released a joint statement at the conclusion of the meeting. The statement noted that the discussions had “covered the basic questions of U.S.-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

“While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side’s view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

“In this connection, the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

“They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America, and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.”

The joint statement also noted agreements reached on specific issues. These included: security, the Nuclear and Space Talks, risk reduction centers, nuclear nonproliferation, chemical weapons, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the process of dialogue, Northern Pacific air safety, civil aviation and consulates, environmental protection, exchange initiatives, and fusion research. (Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, pages 7–10)

Reagan and Gorbachev offered remarks on November 21 in the International Press Center in Geneva. Following Gorbachev’s remarks, the President expressed his personal appreciation to the people and Government of Switzerland for welcoming the U.S. and Soviet delegations and then stated: “We’ve packed a lot into the last 2 days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh start in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we have done this. General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held comprehensive discussions covering all elements of our relationship. I’m convinced that we are heading in the right direction. We’ve reached some useful interim results which are described in the joint statement that is being issued this morning. In agreeing to accelerate the work of our nuclear arms negotiators, Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace. I believe that we have established a process for more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These 2 days of talks should inject a certain momentum into our work on the issues between us, a momentum we can continue at the meeting that we have agreed on for next year.

“Before coming to Geneva, I spoke often of the need to build confidence in our dealings with each other. Frank and forthright conversation at the summit are part of this process, but I’m certain General Secretary Gorbachev would agree that real confidence in each other must be built on deeds, not simply words. This is the thought that ties together all the proposals that the United States has put on the table in the past, and this is the criteria by which our meetings will be judged in the future.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, page 1411)

Also on November 21 in Geneva, Secretary of State George Shultz briefed the press and took questions. Echoing the President’s remarks, Shultz stated: “The President came to Geneva with a constructive approach and with an effort to make a fresh start in our relationship with the Soviet Union, and I think he achieved that fresh start.

“All of us who have worked in support of the two leaders who met here this week, I think, share the view that perhaps we have a process underway that can lead to a more stable and constructive relationship. Of course, as both men basically emphasize, that remains to be seen. And we will be looking, over the coming months and years, to see what truly happens. But at any rate, we have made a fresh start.”

In response to a question as to whether the summit meeting had turned out as he expected, Shultz answered: “It’s hard to know exactly what to expect in meetings of this kind. But what is set out in the joint statement, I think, represents a first step in the sense that some concrete things were put down and moved along as well as a process started, that interaction.

“But I believe that the most important thing that happened here is that these two individuals took this over completely. It was very much their meeting, and they spent a lot of time together. It got to be a problem for the schedulers because every time they got together they went much longer than was thought. But that was really what we came here for and was very fruitful. And I think that length of time and the intensity and the frankness and the scope of what was talked about between the two by the fireside really went beyond anything I could have expected, although I felt myself that that kind of pattern was the desirable way to do it.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 1986, pages 11, 13)

Reagan departed Geneva on November 21 for Washington. That evening, at 9:20 p.m., he addressed a joint session of Congress at the Capitol. His remarks were broadcast live on radio and television networks. The President provided an overview of the summit structure and context before describing the issues under consideration at the summit: “We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer, but one that really is safer. I am pleased to report tonight that General Secretary Gorbachev and I did make a measure of progress here. We have a long way to go, but we’re still heading in the right direction. We moved arms control forward from where we were last January, when the Soviets returned to the table. We are both instructing our negotiators to hasten their vital work. The world is waiting for results.

“Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent in appropriate categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal—offensive reductions. We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of missiles—and all of this with tough verification. We also made progress in combating, together, the spread of nuclear weapons, an arms control area in which we’ve cooperated effectively over the years.

“We are also opening a dialog on combating the spread and use of chemical weapons, while moving to ban them altogether. Other arms control dialogs—in Vienna on conventional forces and in Stockholm on lessening the chances for surprise attack in Europe—also received a boost. And finally, we agreed to begin work on risk reduction centers, a decision that should give special satisfaction to Senators Nunn and Warner who so ably promoted this idea.

“I described our Strategic Defense Initiative, our research effort, that envisions the possibility of defensive systems which could ultimately protect all nations against the danger of nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of views. Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority. I made it clear that SDI has nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating nonnuclear defense systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the safer, more stable world that we seek. Nations could defend themselves against missile attack and mankind, at long last, escape the prison of mutual terror. And this is my dream.

“So, I welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev that we are a nation that defends, rather than attacks; that our alliances are defensive, not offensive. We don’t seek nuclear superiority, we do not seek a first-strike advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of my fundamental arms control objectives is to get rid of first-strike weapons altogether. This is why we’ve proposed a 50-percent reduction in the most threatening nuclear weapons, especially those that could carry out a first strike.

“I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a reciprocal program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We’re offering to permit Soviet experts to see firsthand that SDI does not involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to visit comparable facilities of the Soviet strategic defense program, which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years. Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research reveals that a defense against nuclear missiles is possible, we would sit down with our allies and the Soviet Union to see how together we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defense, which threatens no one.

“We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia—those places where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against regimes which obviously do not represent the will or the approval of the people. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. We discussed human rights. We Americans believe that history teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors. Human rights, therefore, is not an abstract moral issue; it is a peace issue. Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on my proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Americans should know the people of the Soviet Union—their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America’s deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

“As you can see, our talks were wide ranging. And let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn’t. We remain far apart on a number of issues, as had to be expected. However, we reached agreement on a number of matters, and as I mentioned, we agreed to continue meeting, and this is important and very good. There’s always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking to each other instead of about each other.

“We’ve concluded a new agreement designed to bring the best of America’s artists and academics to the Soviet Union. The exhibits that will be included in this exchange are one of the most effective ways for the average Soviet citizen to learn about our way of life. This agreement will also expand the opportunities for Americans to experience the Soviet people’s rich cultural heritage, because their artists and academics will be coming here. We’ve also decided to go forward with a number of people-to-people initiatives that will go beyond greater contact, not only between the political leaders of our two countries but our respective students, teachers, and others as well. We have emphasized youth exchanges. And this will help break down stereotypes, build friendships, and, frankly, provide an alternative to propaganda.

“We’ve agreed to establish a new Soviet consulate in New York and a new American consulate in Kiev. And this will bring a permanent U.S. presence to the Ukraine for the first time in decades. And we have also, together with the Government of Japan, concluded a Pacific air safety agreement with the Soviet Union. This is designed to set up cooperative measures to improve civil air safety in that region of the Pacific. What happened before must never to be allowed to happen there again. And as a potential way of dealing with the energy needs of the world of the future, we have also advocated international cooperation to explore the feasibility of developing fusion energy.

“All of these steps are part of a long-term effort to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. No one ever said it could be easy, but we’ve come a long way. As for Soviet expansionism in a number of regions of the world—while there is little chance of immediate change, we will continue to support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom. But we have also agreed to continue, and to intensify, our meetings with the Soviets on this and other regional conflicts and to work toward political solutions.” (Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book II, pages 1412–1414)

In his November 23 radio address on the summit meeting, the President summarized his November 21 address before Congress. At the conclusion of the radio address, the President stressed: “If there is one conclusion to draw from our fireside summit, it’s that American policies are working. In a real sense, preparations for the summit started 5 years ago when, with the help of Congress, we began strengthening our economy, restoring our national will, and rebuilding our defenses and alliances. America is strong again, and American strength has caught the Soviets attention. They recognize that the United States is no longer just reacting to world events; we are in the forefront of a powerful, historic tide for freedom and opportunity, for progress and peace.

“There’s never been a greater need for courage and steadiness than now. Our strategic modernization program is an incentive for the Soviets to negotiate in earnest. But if Congress fails to support the vital defense efforts needed, then the Soviets will conclude that America’s patience and will are paper thin, and the world will become more dangerous again. Courage and steadiness are all important for freedom fighters, too. I made it clear in Geneva that America embraces all those who resist tyranny and struggle for freedom. Breaking faith with freedom fighters would signal that aggression carries no risk, and this we will not allow. My fellow Americans, we are entering a season of hope. If we remain resolute for freedom and peace, if we keep faith with God, then our American family, 238 million strong, will be even more thankful for next year.” (Ibid., pages 1417–1418)