259. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz1
SUBJECT
- Trends in 1986
In the speeches we have been producing, we have been expressing great optimism about the near-term and long-term future of the democratic world. I hope this optimism is justified. As we enter the sixth year of the President’s term, however, there are some serious negative trends that are bound to burden our foreign policy:
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- As you have noted, Gramm-Rudman2 spells not only the end but possibly even the beginning of a reversal of the President’s defense buildup. Just as our five-year buildup has put us into a strong bargaining position with the Soviets, several years of defense and aid cutbacks will undercut our position—especially if Gorbachev next year launches some serious reforms which stimulate Soviet economic growth and support a new burst of Soviet military growth.
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- In addition, the loss of Republican control of the Senate would be widely seen as a repudiation of the President and would instantly make him a lame duck with severely diminished political clout. We would find the Democratic Congress an increasingly aggressive and destructive force on foreign policy issues. This could affect everything—covert action, security assistance, Mideast arms, the Philippines, etc.—and we could be faced with even more restrictive legislation than we suffer from now.
All this makes 1986 a crucial year. It will be the year of our maximum strength vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Congress. We are almost certain to be weaker in 1987 and 1988. What follows from this?
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- It suggests that we are in our maximum bargaining position in arms control in 1986. As a general principle, we may be better off cashing in some of our chips in 1986 rather than “hanging tough” only to find our position eroding domestically in the following years. (The ASAT ban is a foretaste.)
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- In other areas (e.g., aid to the Contras and to Savimbi), we will face a similar problem. The Nicaraguans and Angolans will eventually start to hang tough themselves in expectation of being rescued by the Democrats. This might perhaps be cited as a reason for caution now, i.e., for not undertaking commitments we might not be able to sustain. I would draw the opposite conclusion, however. Without support for the Contras and for Savimbi, it’s our diplomatic objectives that become unsustainable. Here I would urge a stepped-up Administration effort for the Contras and Savimbi in order to improve their position rapidly, to get them over a crucial hump before the rot sets in on our side.
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- As you have noted, it also puts a premium on issues where we can have an impact by policy moves or shifts that don’t cost resources. E.g., Eastern Europe. There may not be many of these.
All this may be overly gloomy. Other trends may become apparent. If Gramm-Rudman really does put our economy on a sounder footing, the prospect is for solid sustained growth in the whole Western world, easing many of our other problems. Gorbachev may not be able to launch the kind of radical reforms the Chinese have undertaken, so he may not be in so great a position to exploit our weaknesses. Our SDI research program, if it retains substantial Congressional support next year, will continue to give us major leverage on arms control even if overall defense spending takes a beating. And the Republicans might squeak by in the Senate.
Nevertheless, the worst-case scenario is worth thinking about. These are only some preliminary thoughts about a problem that clearly deserves further examination.
- Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 12/1–31/85. Secret. Drafted by Rodman. There is no indication that Shultz saw the memorandum.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 258.↩