Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

258. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Poindexter) to the White House Chief of Staff (Regan)¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

• National Security Initiatives and Scheduling—January–June 1986

Key Theme: Building a safer and better world.

The Setting

After an exceptionally busy fall, the President faces an equally challenging winter and spring. The Tokyo Summit in May² and the Washington Summit in June will dominate his national-security time from at least mid-April on. The President’s initiatives in other areas—whether in Central America or the Middle East, on counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence—must be maintained and, where possible, advanced. On some issues, he will also need to consider new initiatives that continue to define the agenda in his own terms and keep critics on the defensive. In many of these instances, the personal diplomacy of the President will be crucial to success.

Given these demands, and the likelihood that some activities will expand to fill even greater time, we have tried to sketch out a schedule that meets his top-priority objectives while retaining flexibility. In particular, we recommend a head-of-government meeting-slate that emphasizes individual and group meetings with leaders from regions vital to US economic and security interests. In addition to Gorbachev and the participants in Tokyo, these include the leaders of ASEAN states, of the Caribbean basin, and of our North American neighbors.

In general, we are helped in the foreign policy area by a front-loaded domestic agenda in the first three months. This can serve to deflect attention from Soviet public pressure on us in advance of the June summit. At the same time, we must be sensitive to domestic and budget defeats that create the impression of weakness during this same period.

Objectives

— Prepare and hold productive meeting with Gorbachev in Washington and expose him to the US by travelling together to other key locations around the country.

• Expectations are higher than for Geneva, and the Soviets will try to exploit. We have to prevent too strict a definition of success, and avoid one-sided concessions. If major breakthrough is possible—on arms control, regional conflicts, human rights, exchanges—may see signs in preparations over next several months. Shultz-Shevardnadze meetings in Washington will require some direct role by President. Itinerary around US should reinforce our basic themes.
• As before Geneva, maintaining strong Allied consensus on East-West issues will strengthen President’s hand. Tokyo Summit allows such consultation before June meeting.
• Sustained support for democratic resistance movements globally (and for President’s UNGA initiative)³ needed to convey steadiness, keep pressure on exposed Soviet positions. Probe for Soviet give, perhaps on Afghanistan.
• Major downside: impression that US-Soviet summits will be all talk, no action unless US yields on SDI.

— Pursue successful Tokyo Economic Summit.

• Could be a high risk event: press corps is bored by economic summits and will look for negatives in US-Japan relations, try to tear down “Ron-Yasu” relationship when Nakasone visits in April.⁴ We need progress in key areas of US-Japan relations, i.e. higher Japanese defense spending, demonstrable action on trade, greater sharing of security assistance burden, etc. Challenge will be to create a public diplomacy program and policy benchmarks that show progress over last 5 years. We should preserve good news on trade, defense spending, etc., for President, not Cabinet officers.
• Major downside: lack of progress in opening Japanese markets before May kindles protectionist sentiment, producing divisive meeting.

— Sustain support for defense, security assistance, covert action.

• Maintain sustainable growth in the national security budget in the context of a program of defense reform; continue to build support for SDI and strategic modernization program (against backdrop of arms talks); preserve security/economic assistance programs from budget cutbacks.
• Gramm-Rudman constraints may draw President into tough programmatic decisions on resources and commitments.⁵ His hand will be strengthened if we can energize search for defense strategies that do better for less, by exploiting our competitive (especially technological) advantages.
• Major downside: budget crunch forces choices that undercut us with Soviets.

— Emphasize Western Hemisphere policy, with special emphasis on successful record (and need to stay the course) in Central America and the Caribbean.

• Meeting with Caribbean leaders in Grenada⁶ will dramatize; newly elected Guatemalan President will visit in May, a big turn-around from Carter era. Focus on democratization in all of Latin America.
• Legislative effort on covert action (especially Nicaragua) will be time-consuming, but essential to meeting Gorbachev on a strong footing.
• Visit to Mexico⁷ and Mulroney State visit⁸ round out theme.
• Major downside: serious reverses for contras.

— Emphasize Pacific Basin policy by meeting with leaders of ASEAN nations before or after Tokyo Summit.

• A visit to a common site (tentatively, Bali) would allow the President to keep his commitment to visit ASEAN without doing a three-country tour. The President has underscored place of Pacific Basin in future US security and economic interests; work in this area has, however, lost much momentum. Downsides include textile exports and situation in Philippines.

— Show continued interest in issues of importance that require little Presidential time now.

• Increase counter-terrorism measures (in light of VP report,⁹ combine stronger international cooperative efforts with improved pre-emption and response capabilities).
• Seize possible opportunities that may appear in Middle East peace process.
• Continue to associate ourselves with the successful evolution in Indo-Pak relations following Armacost-Fortier mission.¹⁰
• Protect strategic interest and promote reform in the Philippines (downside: elections may seem sham).
• Sustain counter-intelligence efforts.

1. Source: Reagan Library, Donald Fortier Files, Subject File, Planning. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Attached but not printed is an undated paper, “Schedule of National Security Events (January–December 1986).” Pearson sent the memorandum to Poindexter under a December 11 covering memorandum, indicating that it responded to Regan’s request, made at a November 29 planning meeting. There is no indication that Poindexter approved Pearson’s recommendation that Poindexter sign the memorandum. (Ibid.)
2. Scheduled to take place May 2–7, 1986.
3. See Document 253.
4. The President often referred to Nakasone Yasuhiro as “Yasu,” a shortened version of his name.
5. Reference is to the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99–177; 99 Stat. 1037), which the President signed into law on December 12.
6. Scheduled to take place February 20, 1986.
7. The President was scheduled to take part in an informal meeting with de la Madrid in Mexicali on January 3.
8. Scheduled to take place March 17–20.
9. Reference is to the final report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combating Terrorism. The report, dated December 20, is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. XLVII, Part 2, Terrorism, June 1985–January 1989.
10. See footnote 13, Document 248.