Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy

254. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• Soviet Strategy for the Geneva Meeting

SUMMARY: Assuming that the Geneva Meeting is unlikely to yield a breakthrough on arms control, the Soviets really have a choice between two strategies. They could treat the Geneva meeting as a halting step forward in a still potentially improving relationship; or they could use the “failure” of Geneva for intensive political warfare to undermine our Congressional and allied support over the next year. END SUMMARY.

One of the cliches of recent months has been that we are on the defensive because of Soviet arms control proposals and Gorbachev’s public relations barrage. I have never believed this. In fact, with SDI getting its funding doubled by the Congress, and with our allies in the process of being bought off via participation in SDI, we are objectively in a quite solid bargaining position.² If this continues, the Soviets will be forced to make increasingly attractive offers of offensive reductions in order to try to lure us into a trade of SDI limits; or else, ideally, they will reconcile themselves to SDI and talk to us seriously about a joint transition to SDI coupled with offensive reductions.

A Worst-Case Scenario

The risk we face, in my view, is not that we are under pressure now. With or without the last new US offers, we really are not. The risk is that a summit that yields no breakthrough on arms control could be used by the Soviets as an excuse for an intensive campaign of political warfare to undermine the Congressional and allied support which we now enjoy. They could use the dramatic event of the Summit as a moment, in the spotlight of world publicity, to portray us before our people and our allies as the obstacle to arms control and world peace.

The liberals in Congress are quite capable of turning on SDI next year—if not to kill research, then to try to confine the research to areas (like terminal defense) which arms controllers consider more respectable. They would try to “help out” the prospects for arms control by forcing us into limits on SDI to meet the Soviet concerns.

I need not elaborate on what mischief the Soviets could make in the Alliance by renewed all-out political warfare against SDI.

In his TIME interview³ and on two other recent occasions, Gorbachev has raised the possibility of a Soviet walk-out from the Geneva arms talks if we do not abandon SDI. I doubt they would carry out this threat, because their boycott of the INF and START talks in 1983–84 was a failure; it undercut their propaganda campaign against us in Western Europe.⁴

I still see, however, the possibility that they could keep the talks going pro forma while waging another intensive campaign. They could reject a final communique at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, hold some nasty press conferences, reject a follow-on Summit, and reject all the secondary kinds of agreements that we would have been able to point to as limited progress in the relationship. The fact that all meetings are cordial now could be only part of building a record that they have tried hard for a successful outcome—as, indeed, we too are doing.

An Alternative Hypothesis

Obviously, what we would like to see, if the meeting yields no breakthrough, is that both sides treat it nevertheless as a worthwhile chance to meet and as an occasion to give impetus to all the ongoing negotiations. In other words, there would be a few modest accomplishments and an atmosphere that gives hope of future improvements in the relationship.

Having said all the above, I would have to say that the Soviets have some reasons to go along with this and not to go with the worst-case scenario.

An excellent recent INR analysis pointed out that the Soviets will always retain the option of political warfare against SDI—next year, as well as now.⁵ They wouldn’t be giving up this card now by permitting a mildly positive Summit.

Gorbachev also faces some important domestic decisions in advance of his Party Congress in February. He may well not want to declare failure at the Summit, because he would then be obliged to follow through by expanding military programs.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario sketched above is a high-risk course. They could overplay their hand in Europe, as they have so often done, and end up themselves seen as stubborn and overbearing. We too have been building a record of positive proposals, which the Soviets might pay a price for rejecting out of hand. The ability of the Great Communicator to get our view across should never be underestimated.

Implications

Nevertheless, much of recent Soviet propaganda suggests that they are at least preparing for the possibility of failure and preparing for themselves the option of playing hardball.

Our best counterstrategy now is to continue to build the record of our forthcomingness. Should the Soviets do the worst in Geneva, we will be able to react effectively by:

— continuing to take the “high road,” expressing our willingness to meet with the Soviets and stressing that our latest arms control proposal remains on the table;

— undertaking a program of extensive briefings in which we outline the shortcomings of the Soviet counterproposal;

— doing all we can to associate Soviet behavior after November with the Soviets’ post-INF sulk of 1983–84, stressing that Soviet moods are temporary and calculated to influence Western opinion; and

— reacting very strongly to Soviet efforts to communicate with Congress and non-governmental groups in the U.S., stressing that the Soviets failed to get what they wanted from an elected U.S. government, and hence would try to exert pressure on the government through other channels. Such an approach could scare off Congressional critics tempted to legislate restrictions on the SDI program in order to appease Soviet concerns.

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/P Files, Memoranda and Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff to the Secretary and Other Seventh Floor Principals: Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons 11/1–30/85. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Rodman and VanOudenaren. The memorandum is also in Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, vol. V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986, Document 132.
2. The President had requested $3.7 billion for SDI research for FY 1986. The Senate Armed Services Committee reported a FY 1986 defense authorization bill (S. 1160) that reduced the SDI request to $2.96 billion; the full Senate passed S. 1160 on June 5. The House Armed Services Committee version (H.R. 1872) reduced the SDI request to $2.5 billion; the full House passed H.R. 1872 on June 27. Earlier, on June 20, House members had rejected an amendment that would have reduced funding to $2.1 billion. On October 24, the House Appropriations Committee agreed to provide the $2.5 billion after also voting against an amendment that would have reduced the funding to $2.1 billion. The House approved the conference report on October 29, and the President signed the Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 99–145; 99 Stat. 583) into law on November 8. (Congress and the Nation, vol. VII, 1985–1988, pp. 277–280; Margaret Shapiro, “Panel Rejects Funding For Chemical Weapons: House Committee Bars Further Cut for SDI,” Washington Post, October 25, 1985, p. A14)
3. The interview, “An interview with Gorbachev,” was printed in the September 9 issue of TIME Magazine.
4. See footnote 4, Document 182.
5. Not found and not further identified.