Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985–October 1986

132. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz¹

Washington, November 1, 1985

SUBJECT

• Soviet Strategy for the Geneva Meeting

SUMMARY: Assuming that the Geneva Meeting is unlikely to yield a breakthrough on arms control, the Soviets really have a choice between two strategies. They could treat the Geneva meeting as a halting step forward in a still potentially improving relationship; or they could use the “failure” of Geneva for intensive political warfare to undermine our Congressional and allied support over the next year. END SUMMARY.

One of the cliches of recent months has been that we are on the defensive because of Soviet arms control proposals and Gorbachev’s public relations barrage. I have never believed this. In fact, with SDI getting its funding doubled by the Congress,² and with our allies in the process of being bought off via participation in SDI,³ we are objectively in a quite solid bargaining position. If this continues, the Soviets will be forced to make increasingly attractive offers of offensive reductions in order to try to lure us into a trade of SDI limits; or else, ideally, they will reconcile themselves to SDI and talk to us seriously about a joint transition to SDI coupled with offensive reductions.

A Worst-Case Scenario

The risk we face, in my view, is not that we are under pressure now. With or without the last new US offers, we really are not. The risk is that a summit that yields no breakthrough on arms control could be used by the Soviets as an excuse for an intensive campaign of political warfare to undermine the Congressional and allied support which we now enjoy. They could use the dramatic event of the Summit as a moment, in the spotlight of world publicity, to portray us before our people and our allies as the obstacle to arms control and world peace.

The liberals in Congress are quite capable of turning on SDI next year—if not to kill research, then to try to confine the research to areas (like terminal defense) which arms controllers consider more respectable. They would try to “help out” the prospects for arms control by forcing us into limits on SDI to meet the Soviet concerns.

I need not elaborate on what mischief the Soviets could make in the Alliance by renewed all-out political warfare against SDI.

In his TIME interview and on two other recent occasions, Gorbachev has raised the possibility of a Soviet walk-out from the Geneva arms talks if we do not abandon SDI. I doubt they would carry out this threat, because their boycott of the INF and START talks in 1983–84 was a failure; it undercut their propaganda campaign against us in Western Europe.

I still see, however, the possibility that they could keep the talks going pro forma while waging another intensive campaign. They could reject a final communique at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, hold some nasty press conferences, reject a follow-on Summit, and reject all the secondary kinds of agreements that we would have been able to point to as limited progress in the relationship. The fact that all meetings are cordial now could be only part of building a record that they have tried hard for a successful outcome—as, indeed, we too are doing.

An Alternative Hypothesis

Obviously, what we would like to see, if the meeting yields no breakthrough, is that both sides treat it nevertheless as a worthwhile chance to meet and as an occasion to give impetus to all the ongoing negotiations. In other words, there would be a few modest accomplishments and an atmosphere that gives hope of future improvements in the relationship.

Having said all the above, I would have to say that the Soviets have some reasons to go along with this and not to go with the worst-case scenario.

An excellent recent INR analysis pointed out that the Soviets will always retain the option of political warfare against SDI—next year, as well as now.⁴ They wouldn’t be giving up this card now by permitting a mildly positive Summit.

Gorbachev also faces some important domestic decisions in advance of his Party Congress in February. He may well not want to declare failure at the Summit, because he would then be obliged to follow through by expanding military programs.

Moreover, the worst-case scenario sketched above is a high-risk course. They could overplay their hand in Europe, as they have so often done, and end up themselves seen as stubborn and overbearing. We too have been building a record of positive proposals, which the Soviets might pay a price for rejecting out of hand. The ability of the Great Communicator to get our view across should never be underestimated.

Implications

Nevertheless, much of recent Soviet propaganda suggests that they are at least preparing for the possibility of failure and preparing for themselves the option of playing hardball.

Our best counterstrategy now is to continue to build the record of our forthcomingness. Should the Soviets do the worst in Geneva, we will be able to react effectively by:

—continuing to take the “high road,” expressing our willingness to meet with the Soviets and stressing that our latest arms control proposal remains on the table;

—undertaking a program of extensive briefings in which we outline the shortcomings of the Soviet counterproposal;

—doing all we can to associate Soviet behavior after November with the Soviets’ post-INF sulk of 1983–84, stressing that Soviet moods are temporary and calculated to influence Western opinion; and

—reacting very strongly to Soviet efforts to communicate with Congress and non-governmental groups in the U.S., stressing that the Soviets failed to get what they wanted from an elected U.S. government, and hence would try to exert pressure on the government through other channels. Such an approach could scare off Congressional critics tempted to legislate restrictions on the SDI program in order to appease Soviet concerns.

1. Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/ Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/1–30/85; NLR–775–14–63–9–8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Rodman and VanOudenaren.
2. In a Washington Post article, “Panel Rejects Funding For Chemical Weapons: House Committee Bars Further Cuts for SDI,” October 25, Margaret Shapiro wrote: “On the SDI missile-defense proposal, known as ‘Star Wars,’ the committee agreed to provide $2.5 billion after voting, 31 to 23, against an amendment that would have cut funding for the controversial research program to $2.1 billion. The amount voted by the committee was less than the $3.7 billion originally requested by Reagan last February but identical to what the House approved in the defense authorization in June. Concerned about efforts to reduce SDI funding further, Reagan called Appropriations Committee members to the White House Tuesday and told them that cuts below $ 2.5 billion would hurt his position at the Geneva summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev next month.” (Washington Post, October 25, 1985, p. A14)
3. In telegram 347875 to all NATO capitals, November 13, the Department wrote: “The progress of our discussions with several allied governments on SDI research involvement, and the development of varied policies on the subject, have highlighted the need for specific guidance on the implications of those policies for their firms’ potential participation in the SDI research effort.” (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850812–0206)
4. Not found.